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1 
General Introduction 
 
 
 
“Every national court in the European Community is now a Community law court. 
National judges have a duty, in common with the European Court of Justice, to see 
that Community law is respected in the application and interpretation of the 
Community Treaties. In fact national courts probably interpret and apply 
Community law more often than the two Community courts do. The national court 
is the natural forum for Community law. One can be more precise; every national 
court, whatever its powers, is a Community court of general jurisdiction, with 
power to apply all rules of Community law.” 
 
                    -John Temple Lang1 
 
 
Normative perspective  
Trivial as it may sound, it is yet necessary to acknowledge that the European Union (EU)
2
 and 
national laws are closely interwoven and that the process of Europeanisation of national law 
and national legal systems has been progressing with an unswerving pace.
3
 EU law has been 
increasingly affecting a great number of national legal areas by means of a very intense law-
                                                 
1
 Lang (1996), p.1.  
2
 The original title of the project referred to the decentralized European Community judges. However, in the 
course of the research process the European Community ceased to exists. The introduction of the new Treaty 
regime through the Lisbon reform Treaty has had profound consequences for the operation of the European 
Union but also for the nomenclature and articles numbering applied in the present research project. Whereas the 
conducted survey employed the EC nomenclature, the evidence gained therefrom has to be presented in terms of 
EU law. The reference to EC law or the European Community could not yet be fully avoided. At some points the 
reader will therefore come across the Treaty articles as numbered under the former regime, especially the 
frequently cited jurisprudence of the ECJ and national courts refers to the EC Treaty and EC law. Also, under the 
new regime the European Court of Justice has officially become the Court of Justice of the European Union. For 
the sake of consistency and clarity it was decided to refer to the Court as to the ECJ, European Court of Justice or 
simply the Court. The present study is based on the state of affairs up until the 1
st
 of December 2011.  
3
 It should be observed that the term ‘Europeanisation’ is a very broad one and is used in various branches of 
social and political sciences. In all of them it has its own meaning and context. Regardless of the context, the 
term always refers to a process of domestic adaptation in a specific area (political, economical, institutional or 
cultural) as a result of the membership in the EU. For the purpose of this book the term is used in its legal 
context, that is to say it refers thus to the process of transformation in the legal area, i.e. it covers EU activities 
that affect national legal sources and the process of adaptation of legal actors to the new legal reality imposed by 
the law of the Union. For more on the processes of Europeanisation and the respective definition see for instance: 
Wouters et al (2008), pp.5-6; Börzel&Risse (2000); Knill&Lehmkuhl (1999); Jans et al (2007), pp.3-5.  
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2 
making process and through the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. By 
2008 the body of generally binding secondary EU legislation encompassed nearly 12000 
legislative acts, out of which 10 000 were regulations and 1700 were directives.
4
 Although EU 
law pertains predominantly to the sphere of public and administrative law, in the course of 
time European Union rules have affected to a greater or lesser extent virtually all areas in 
national law categories, including those that were for a long time guarded against such 
influence. In that regard, EU rules Europeanised not only national public, constitutional
5
 and 
administrative
6
 laws but also the field of private law. They forced changes in, inter alia, 
employment, social security, environmental, business, asylum or consumer protection national 
laws. Likewise, in the sphere of criminal law harmonization has become an important 
phenomenon in recent years.
7
 This dramatically expanding process of Europeanisation has led 
to the increase of the number of sources of law and a rapid transformation of national laws in 
various fields. What is more, not only has European Union law brought about changes in 
national substantive law but it also has affected national procedural rules. At present, it is fair 
to say that the majority of national legislation has its roots in Brussels and Strasburg.
8
 In fact, 
it may be argued that there is nearly no area of national law that has not been affected by the 
process of legal integration in the European Union.
9
 By and large, national laws have become 
Europeanised to an immense extent.  
The foregoing gains a very particular importance if seen in the light of the fact that the 
law of the European Union
 
can directly affect interests of individuals in the EU, that is to say 
                                                 
4
 From 25
th
 Annual Report from the Commission on monitoring the application of Community law (2007), COM 
(2008) 777 final, p.2. It should not be forgotten that the legislative body encompasses also binding decisions and 
an enormous amount of soft law measures.  
5
 On the process of Europeanisation of national public and constitutional laws see Jans et al (2007).  
6
 For more see for instance Ladeur (2002) and Eliantonio (2009).  
7
 For more on the European influence on national criminal laws see Corstens&Pradel (2002).   
8
 See Prechal et al (2005), p.4.  
9
 In relation to the Europeanisation of national laws process terms such as ‘harmonization’, ‘homogenization’, 
‘unification’, ‘approximation’ or ‘convergence’ are used interchangeably, see Twigg-Flesner (2008), p.9; Stein 
(1964), p.5. In fact, the terms harmonization and approximation are synonymous but it should be noted that 
harmonization is mostly used with regard to EU directives. Unification and homogenization are much more 
extensive for they assume a thorough replacement of national provisions by a new set of law. Under the former 
Treaty regime, it was mostly referred to the approximation of national laws whereas the term harmonization was 
used only in Art.93 EC concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation. In all other 
issues the term approximation was used. For more see Van Gerven (2004), pp.505-532 and Van Gerven (2008) 
pp.400-414. Under the TFEU, in turn, the term harmonization occurs more frequently, that is to say 34 times.  
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3 
it is capable of creating rights and obligations not only in relation to the contracting Member 
States but also its citizens. This principle, being one of the most revolutionary characteristics 
of the legal system of the EU
10
, was established by the ECJ as early as 1963 in the landmark 
Van Gend&Loos ruling.
11
 Importantly, the system of the Treaties creates a system of judicial 
protection at the level of the European Union but it does not establish separate EU courts in 
each Member State which could protect the rights individuals derive from Union’s law. It 
occurs that individuals can gain a direct access to the European Court of Justice in order to 
protect their rights flowing from EU law only in very limited situations which are enshrined in 
Articles 263 (ex Art. 230 EC)
12
 and 340 (ex Art. 288 EC) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). Put crudely, individuals can resort to the Court only to protect 
themselves against illegal actions of the Union.
13
 As a consequence of the above described 
judicial architecture, the disputes between EU institutions and between the institutions and 
Member States or individuals fall under the jurisdiction of the Court in Luxembourg. What 
emerges clearly is that disputes with regard to EU law that arise in vertical situations, i.e. 
between individuals and public authorities of the Member States or in horizontal situations, 
i.e. between individuals are heard in national courts and tribunals. It is the underpinning 
premise of the present research project that the national courts are obliged to protect those 
rights and, at the same time, are expected to ensure effet utile of EU law, regardless of what 
                                                 
10
 See Albors-Llorens (1996), p.7. 
11
 Case 26-62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland 
Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1: “(…) this view is confirmed by the preamble of the Treaty, which refers 
not only to Governments but also to peoples (…) The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member states but also their 
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage.” 
12
 And consequently in Art. 265 and 277 TFEU. The relevance of both is however rather limited.  
13
 What is more, in the context of the legality review, the access to the Court for individuals has been quite 
problematic for decades. Under the former Treaty system the conditions under which individuals could directly 
gain standing in the annulment procedure were namely very restrictive. The issue of locus standi of individuals in 
direct actions has been a subject of much controversy and criticism and therefore it has generated an extensive 
academic analysis. Under the Lisbon Treaty regime the standing requirement for non-privileged applicants is 
modified but in practice it improves only slightly what has been confirmed very recently by the Court in order T-
18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2011] 
ECR n.y.r. For more on the issue of locus standi of individuals under the present Treaty regime see Eliantonio 
(2010), pp.127-128.  
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4 
their national legislation provides.
14
 In that sense, all national courts have potentially become 
decentralized EU courts and, consequently, all national judges have become EU law judges. It 
is observed that “national judges play a fundamental role in the multilevel system.”15 
 This involvement of the national judges in the process of legal integration in the 
Union is one of the most outstanding features of the legal order of the EU. In order for 
national judges to fulfill this constitutive task, the law of the European Union provides them 
with various mechanisms which are to facilitate this process. Those follow from, inter alia, 
the fundamental principles of EU law such as supremacy, direct effect, indirect effect, 
effectiveness and from the procedure of preliminary ruling before the ECJ. Hence, one can 
speak of the Europeanisation of the national courts which is of a two-fold dimension. On the 
one hand, a bulk of the legal provisions applied in the daily practice by national judges is of 
EU origin. On the other hand, the function of a national judge has been Europeanised as she
16
 
has become responsible for ensuring the uniform application and effectiveness of European 
Union law.  
From the normative
17
 point of view, the European Union expects much from the 
national judge. It endows her with new tasks and responsibilities and imposes new obligations 
on her. Seen from another perspective, the new obligations and tasks are at the same time new 
competences which, at least from the theoretical point of view, empower the judge by giving 
her judicial tools which were traditionally not foreseen under national constitutional and 
institutional frameworks.
18
 Being an EU law judge is about fulfilling those obligations, but in 
order for a judge to do so a considerable dose of willingness, trust and engagement on her part 
seems necessary. The developments in jurisprudence across different Member States evidently 
show that the relationship between national judges and EU law has mostly been somewhat 
                                                 
14
 From Koopmans (1993), p.9.  
15
 From Martinico (2011), p.84.  
16
 Throughout this work a judge will be referred to as a female judge. Such a choice is underpinned by two major 
reasons. The first one relates to the fact that the majority of Polish judges of ordinary courts are females. The 
second is of a purely personal character and relates to the author’s affinity with gender equality studies. 
17
 In the present study the word ‘normative’ refers to what the law ought to be and what it prescribes.  
18
 As observed by Bobek: “In classical narratives of the story called the European integration, national judges are 
said to have “mandate” under EC law; they are “empowered” by EC law, or, in the less thrilling versions of the 
story, they just become “Community judges.” With powers come duties and responsibility (…)”, see Bobek, The 
new European judges and the limits of the possible [in] Łazowski (2010), p.127.  
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5 
complicated and marked with tensions and distrust.
19
 It is also suggested that despite the fact 
that the national judge has never before been such a powerful player in the process of rights 
enforcement, a proper and uniform use of the new tools which were assigned to her by EU law 
may be faced with various problems. Different authors suggest that national judges might, 
inter alia, lack adequate knowledge of EU law, be unfamiliar with the methods of legal 
interpretation as practiced by the Court of Justice, lack foreign languages skills or simply have 
no access to EU law sources. Others point to the features of the autonomous legal and 
judiciary systems of Member States, characteristics of the national legal culture which might 
create obstacles to the fulfillment of the EU law expectations, boundaries of judicial discretion 
or the national procedural obstructions.
20
 Consequently, it is suggested that the uniform 
fulfillment of the expectations stemming from EU law by national judges cannot be taken for 
granted. The foregoing motion, which constitutes the point of departure of the present study, is 
adequately reflected in the following illustration from practice.  
 
Practical Perspective  
In June 2004, shortly after Poland joined the European Union, Mr Brzeziński purchased an old 
Volkswagen Golf in Germany which he then imported to Poland. In accordance with the 
Polish law, excise duty applied to the second-hand vehicles originating from other Member 
States. Mr Brzezinski dutifully submitted a simplified AKC-U declaration pertaining to the 
acquisition of a vehicle and paid PLN 855 by way of excise duty. Several days later Mr 
Brzeziński requested reimbursement of the excise duty he had paid which, in his opinion, had 
been wrongly charged, stating that the charging of such a duty is contrary to Articles 28, 30 
and 110 TFEU (then Articles 23 EC, 25 EC and 90 EC). By his decision, the Head of the 
Customs Office in Warsaw rejected that request. In September 2004, Mr Brzeziński lodged a 
                                                 
19
 Evidence coming from different Member States shows that national judges do not necessarily want to fulfil the 
role which is put on them by EU law. France is the best example illustrating the problem. As claimed by Plötner, 
“France is one of the Member States in which Community law has had the greatest difficulties to be fully 
integrated and recognised as supreme to national law.” See Plötner, Report on France [in] Slaughter et al (1998), 
p.41, see also Mehdi (2011).  
20
 For the discussion on the potential obstacles to the fulfilment of EU law expectations by national judges see for 
instance: Bobek (2008a); Kühn (2005); Prechal et al (2005); various authors in Jansen et al (1997); Łętowska 
(2005), pp.3-10; Wentkowska (2003b); Wentkowska (2003a), pp.71-100; Biernat (2005), pp.159-177; Łazowski 
(2001).  
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6 
complaint against that decision before the Head of the Customs Office in Warsaw. By 
decision of January 2005, the latter upheld the decision of the director of the Warsaw Customs 
Office and rejected the claim before him. Eventually, Mr Brzezinski brought his case to the 
Voivodship Administrative Court (VAC) in Warsaw against the decision dismissing his 
complaint. He asked for the decision to be set aside and for the customs administration to be 
ordered to reimburse him the amount of the excise duty he had paid on the ground that it is 
incompatible with the aforementioned European provisions.  In his response to this plea, the 
Head of the Customs Office in Warsaw argued that the plea alleging infringement the Treaty 
was unfounded and asked for the action to be dismissed.  
Mr Brzeziński was not the only one confronted with such a problem. Similarly, Mr 
Piórkowski purchased a second-hand car in Germany and had to pay excise duty after 
importing it to Poland. Mr Piórkowski also requested a refund of excise duty at the Head of 
the Customs Office in Olsztyn. The Head of the Customs Office in Olsztyn rejected that 
motion. Mr Piórkowski appealed to the Head of the Customs Chamber who upheld the 
decision of the Head of the Customs Office. Mr Piórkowski lodged a complaint at the VAC in 
Olsztyn and claimed the non-conformity of national law with the EU rules on free movement 
of goods and with the provisions of the Polish Constitution. Also the Voivodship 
Administrative Courts in Lublin and Łódź dealt with a similar complaint. As a matter of fact, 
dozens of look-alike cases were being settled before administrative courts across the country. 
There was one striking difference between them though: the final judicial decision taken by a 
respective judge. The Court in Olsztyn, not knowing how to proceed, formulated a question of 
law and referred it to the Polish Constitutional Court. In its reference the court expressed its 
doubts as to the constitutionality of the provisions included in excise duty act if read in 
conjunction with Art. 110 TFEU and stressed that national courts are not competent to review 
the legality of national statutes, the competence which belongs to the Constitutional 
Tribunal.
21
 The Court in Lublin in its judgment of 25 May 2005
22
 was of the opinion that the 
respective national provisions were at variance with EU law since they infringed the principle 
of equal treatment of similar domestic and imported goods. The court decided to set aside the 
                                                 
21
 See procedural decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 19 December 2006, P 37/05.  
22
 Judgment of VAC in Lublin of 25 May 2005 I SA/Lu 77/05.  
General Introduction 
 
 
 
7 
national provisions and consequently the decisions of the respective customs office. 
Interestingly, the same court but adjudicating in a different bench dismissed a similar case 
since it found that the excise duty concerned constitutes one of the elements of the Polish tax 
system and the fact of charging excise duty was in conformity with the Treaty.
23
 Likewise, the 
VAC in Łódź dismissed the complaint against the local Customs Office by stating that it can 
merely assess the conformity of the respective decision to the binding legal provisions.
24
 In 
case of Mr Brzezinski, the VAC decided to stay the proceedings and refer a preliminary 
question to the ECJ on the conformity of the respective national provisions with articles 28, 30 
and 110 TFEU. In January 2007 the ECJ held that the Polish excise duty on second-hand 
vehicles was incompatible with Article 110 TFEU.
25
 
 
Explanatory Perspective  
The above discussed cluster of cases illustrates how intricate it has become to function as a 
national judge at a crossroads of national and European Union law. How was it possible that 
virtually the same factual backgrounds, virtually the same claims and the same legal 
provisions led the concerned judges to totally different judicial decisions? Why did some of 
the judges ensure the effet utile of EU law and protected the rights of individuals stemming 
from it while others disregarded the claims? What prompted the judge in Warsaw to refer her 
questions to the ECJ and why did the judge in Olsztyn decided to resort to the Constitutional 
Tribunal instead? Those and other absorbing questions might come to the mind of the reader. 
All those questions are yet empirical in nature and cannot be answered by means of a bare 
examination of normative models of judicial behaviour and/or analysis of the concerned 
judicial pronouncements. In other words, they would require a comprehensive, 
interdisciplinary research in order to be addressed and ultimately answered.  
Nearly from the beginning of the existence of the European Communities, later the 
European Union, political and legal scholars have been aiming at providing multifarious and 
frequently competing theories regarding the problem of the determinants of behaviour of 
                                                 
23
 Judgment of VAC in Lublin of 11 February 2005, SA/Lu 690/004.  
24
 Judgment of VAC in Łódź of 23 June 2005, I SA/Łd 1059/04.  
25
 See case C-313/05 Maciej Brzeziński v. Dyrektor Izby Celnej w Warszawie [2007] ECR  I-513.  
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national judges in the process of European Union integration. This interdisciplinary stream of 
thought, which clearly goes beyond the narrow theoretical and doctrinal legal considerations, 
pays attention to, inter alia, the issues of judicial co-operation and dialogue between the 
European Court of Justice and national judiciaries and especially the role national judges play 
in this process. Individual writers focus on, for instance, the role of the ECJ in the integration 
processes, the cooperation between the ECJ and national constitutional courts, the reasons of 
the judicial dialogue between the European and the national judges (or the lack thereof) or the 
role national litigants play in the preliminary reference procedure. In the opinion of the 
scholars and in accordance with the evidence presented by them, different factors bear on the 
way judges behave when confronted with EU law. This stream of judicial politics is 
represented by Slaughter, Mattli, Stone Sweet, Weiler, Micklitz, Wind and Alter, to name just 
a few.
26
 Without tracking the intricacies of various alternative explanations of the national 
courts’ acceptance of the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect and their support for the 
preliminary ruling procedure any further, suffice it to say that the literature offers four general 
forms of explanations of national courts participation in the processes of legal integration in 
Europe. Those are: legalism which rests on the authority of the law argument
27
, neo-realism 
which assumes that the behaviour of national judiciaries and their approach to EU law is 
mostly motivated by national political and economic interests
28
 and neo-functionalism which 
                                                 
26
 The volume The European Court and national courts – doctrine and jurisprudence. Legal change in its social 
context edited by Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler published in 1998 is one of the most outstanding, 
interdisciplinary and complex works on the relationship between the ECJ and the courts of Member States. In 
this book various academics undertake an attempt to illustrate the process of reception of EU law by national 
courts and the reasons thereof. The contributions come from both legal and political science. For more about 
different accounts of legal integration in the framework of the European Union, judicial politics and theories 
attached to this see for instance: Volcansek (1986); Weiler (1993); Selck et al (2007); Alter (1998); Alter (2009); 
Kilpatrick (1998); Mattli&Slaughter (1998); Burley&Mattli (1993); Mattli&Slaughter (1996); Golub (1996); 
Micklitz (2005); Wind (2010).  
27
 Legalists, also called formalists, assume that the jurisprudence of the ECJ is binding on national courts and for 
that reason national courts fulfill the requirements which EU law puts on them. Expressed differently, the 
acceptance of the ECJ’s jurisprudence by national courts rests on its authority and the ‘power of the law’. The 
situations when judges refuse to apply EU law may have their roots in misunderstandings or lack of knowledge 
on part of judiciary. Hence, national judges fulfill the responsibilities put on them by the ECJ due to legal logic 
and reasoning. Weiler claims that although most formal and for that reason most naïve theory does have a 
significant force, see Weiler (1993), p.423. 
28
 Neo-realists suggest that national governments and political concerns influence the behaviour of national 
judiciaries and their approach to EU law. In accordance with the neo-realist theory, a pure calculation of the 
national political and economic interests bear on the way judges proceed with EU law and accepts the principle 
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basically amounts to judicial empowerment theory and puts forward that particular personal 
motives and objectives and self-interest encourage judges and other legal actors to participate 
in the process of legal integration within the EU.
29
 Finally, the inter-court competition theory, 
which is a nuanced stream of the judicial empowerment doctrine, is based on the thesis that 
national courts use EU law and participate in the dialogue with the ECJ in order to maximize 
their judicial interests in the process of “bureaucratic struggles” between different levels of 
judiciary.
30
 While all those theories are accused of not being free from drawbacks and 
weaknesses
31
, they do, however, provide many relevant and interesting insights and clues on 
how and foremost why judges do (not) participate in the process of legal integration within the 
European Union. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
of supremacy of EU law and the political actors may influence the courts through various channels. Whereas 
there is some evidence that may indeed judges response to political preferences and political actors may try to 
influence the judicial behaviour, such evidence is not sufficient to acknowledge the neo-realist theory valid, for 
more see Alter, National courts acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: a critical evaluation of theories of 
legal integration [in] Slaughter et al (1998), pp.234-238 
29
 Neo-functionalism focuses on individual judges and other actors and their interests in the process of EU 
integration. In accordance with this theory, the ECJ provided legal actors with various personal incentives which 
aim to encourage them to participate in the processes of legal integration. In that sense, the national courts might 
make use of the preliminary ruling procedure for different motives which in general fall under the concept of the 
judicial empowerment. The manner the judges are empowered may take various forms, for instance it allows 
them to conduct judicial review – a task which would normally be reserved for constitutional courts - or consider 
more sophisticated judicial problems and legal inquiries. This thesis is based on the assumption that judges work 
to enhance their own authority in order to control legal and political outcomes and to reduce the control of other 
governmental institutions. For more see for instance Stein (1981) and Weiler (1994). For a general overview see 
Stone Sweet (2000), pp.164-165 and Stone Sweet&Brunell (1998a). Another stream of judicial empowerment 
doctrine emphasizes the crucial role national litigants and private actors have played in establishing and 
enhancing the processes of legal integration within the Union. EU law allowed national actors to protect their 
rights and interests flowing therefrom before national courts. In consequence, private actors provided national 
courts with new issues and questions whereby they activated the preliminary reference procedure and kept the 
machine running. This thesis is closely associated with the theory of legal integration as the result of 
transnational processes which claims that the level of preliminary references from the Member States depends on 
the intensity of transnational commercial activity and the density of EU law. For more see: Burley&Mattli 
(1993); Mattli&Slaughter (1998); Stone Sweet&.Brunell (1998b); Mattli&Slaughter (1996).   
30
 Alter’s theory of inter-court competition is rests on the assumption that the references to the European Court of 
Justice should be seen in the context of competition between various judicial actors, see Alter, Explaining 
national courts acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: a critical evaluation of theories of legal 
integration [in] Slaughter et al (1998), pp.227-252.  
31
 In that regard, the legalist theory is seen as too naïve, the realist theory does not seem to be sufficiently 
substantiated by evidence, neo-functionalism is not capable of explaining, inter alia, the different trends between 
different Member States and within the States themselves, see Alter, Explaining national court acceptance of 
European court jurisprudence: a critical evaluation of theories of legal integration [in] Slaughter et al (1998), 
pp.229-246. The inter-court competition theory is, in turn, criticised for seeing the judiciary through the 
perspective of competition and power seeking, see Micklitz (2005), pp.432-436.  
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The present research project runs parallel to the aforementioned studies in trying to 
understand the way national judges behave in the context of EU law and explaining whether 
and how the judges adapt to the new legal circumstances, i.e. the way judges approach EU law 
and fulfill the expectations following therefrom. However, it takes a different, more 
pragmatic, point of departure and is premised on a distinct theoretical framework whereby it 
adds another perspective to the problem. In order to achieve this, the present study takes a step 
back and looks at the process of the impact of EU law on the daily functioning of national 
judges and the way national judges perceive the role of EU law in their daily practice by 
focusing on three set of problems which relate to: the knowledge of EU law among national 
judges, their experiences with resorting to it and the application thereof and their attitudes 
towards the new role imposed on them by EU law. In that sense, the study investigates the 
process of Europeanisation of the functioning of national judges from a more aggregate level, 
that is to say it addresses the problem of general reception of the legal order of the Union and 
the legal expectations imposed by it by national judges. For that purpose the project turns to 
the stream of socio-legal theory.
32
 The foregoing implicates that next to applying the black-
letter method this study also employs social science research methods which go beyond the 
normative and theoretical models of the functioning of national judiciaries. By employing a 
distinct methodological and theoretical approach, this study provides new insights into the 
functioning of national judges in the context of EU law. 
 
Socio-Legal Perspective  
By approaching an extensive group of Polish civil judges this study provides empirical, i.e. 
quantitative and qualitative evidence which illustrates the impact of EU law on the daily 
functioning of national judges and the way the judges approach the law of the European Union 
and the tasks following therefrom. In that sense, the picture of the functioning of national 
judiciary in the EU capacity is drawn from a judge’s individual and therefore also subjective 
perspective.  
                                                 
32
 Fix-Fierro (2003), p.139 provides a brief and concise account of the sociological model of the law and claims 
that “(…) the sociological model of the law, law is not about logic, but about social structures, variables, factors, 
attitudes and the like, or, more simply, about ‘how people actually behave’ (…)”  
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The choice of Poland is motivated by several reasons. First, Poland is a New Member 
State
33
 of the European Union which, in contrast to the Old Member States, is not yet given 
much attention in the academic writing.
34
 The process of implementation of the enormous 
body of EU law into the Polish legal system, which was the main formal requirement upon the 
accession to the Union, was rather hasty and pressured.
35
 As opposed to the judges in the Old 
Member States, who were gradually and step by step getting familiar with the legal changes 
imposed by the law of the European Communities, later the Union, the Polish judges did not 
have much time to adjust to the new legal circumstances, it was rather a “shock therapy.”36 
Second, soon after the country joined the EU the Polish Constitutional Tribunal indicated that 
it is not willing to unconditionally accept the supreme position of the law of the Union which, 
arguably, might induce various problems attached to the exercise of the new EU law powers 
by national courts of lower instance.
37
 Third, shortly before the commencement of the present 
study, a parallel project concerning the functioning of national judges as EU judges in the 
Netherlands and Germany – two Old Member States of the Union38 - was initiated (hereinafter 
HiiL Report).
39
 In that sense, gaining an empirical data for Poland would allow to highlight 
the differences between the functioning of the judges in the New and Old Member States of 
the European Union. One could namely assume that there should be considerable disparities in 
the manner judges from the Old and New Member States approach and accommodate EU law 
                                                 
33
 The term New Member States refers to those states which joined the EU in the process of so-called Eastern 
Enlargement in year 2004 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). 
34
 See Reimann (2002), p.692. It should yet be acknowledged that the body of writings concerning the judiciaries 
in the New Member States is increasingly growing, the most recent example concerning all New Member States 
is the comprehensive volume edited by Łazowski (2010).  
35
 From Łętowska&Wiewiórowska-Domagalska (2007), pp.280-281.   
36
 From ibid, p.280. The authors claim that “Polish lawyers had to accept all these regulations at once and be 
prepared for the far-reaching consequences of such changes”, see p.281.  
37
 See judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on the European Arrest Warrant of 27 April 2005, P 1/05 and 
judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on the Accession Treaty of 11 May 2005, K 18/04.  
38
 The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the Netherlands are two original founding states of the 
European Communities. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) became part of the European 
Community as part of a newly united Germany which was formally concluded on the 3
rd
 of October 1990 after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990. 
39
 Project by Nowak, Amtenbrink, Hertogh and Wissink which commenced in 2007 and was financed by the 
Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL). The project resulted in a publication: National Judges 
as European Union Judges. Knowledge, Experiences and Attitudes of Lower Court Judges in Germany and the 
Netherlands, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague 2011. In the present study the term ‘HiiL Report’ 
refers to this final publication. 
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in their daily practice. More precisely, it could be anticipated that the judges from a New 
Member State might lag behind their counterparts from the Old Member States in the manner 
they adapt to the legal circumstances imposed by the law of the Union for the reason of, for 
instance, a lack of adequate EU law knowledge or limited experiences with the application 
thereof. Fourth, the affinity of the author with the Polish legal system, the national legal 
culture and the local language naturally implied the respective choice.  
The present study is a descriptive attempt at evaluating and explaining how and why 
Polish civil judges of lower ordinary courts participate in the process of legal integration 
within the European Union. Put differently, this study attempts at looking how national judges 
approach EU law and perceive its role in their daily judicial decision-making. For the 
foregoing purpose, the study focuses on three a priori established set of problems which relate 
to the knowledge of EU law and of the mechanisms of its application among national judges, 
the daily experiences of judges with the application of EU law and their personal attitudes 
towards the law of the European Union and the new role it imposes on them and the Union 
itself. The three clusters of variables are scrutinized in a broader institutional and operational 
legal framework of the daily judicial functioning. In that sense, the study first establishes the 
formal, legal context in which the judges function and respectively it focuses on the way 
judges personally construct the EU legality, the way they perceive and understand their 
function as EU law judges and the way they experience the law of the European Union in their 
daily practice.  
By and large, the present project is guided by the theoretical framework provided by 
Legal Consciousness studies whereby it maps the way European Union law is received and 
operated in the everyday practice of the courts and illustrates the potential motives that might 
drive national judges to participate (or not) in the process of legal integration within the Union 
and the (practical) problems they might come across while exercising the new EU law 
competences. It follows from the foregoing that a part of the problems which are touched 
upon in the present study is of extra-legal character and therefore has largely been neglected in 
the academic legal writing. This study does not aim at providing clear-cut and rigid answers to 
all the questions which have been raised so far. Instead, it aims at drawing an aggregate and 
more nuanced picture of the judicial behavior in the context of EU law, indicating the 
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problems attached to the judicial functioning vis-à-vis EU law and signaling the potential 
factors which may have influence thereupon.
40
 The foregoing is achieved by applying a socio-
legal methodology whereby it enriches the increasingly growing body of empirical research in 
law.
41
 One of the ultimate goals of this study has a pragmatic and educational dimension, that 
is to say it aims at delivering a set of means that could possibly facilitate the functioning of the 
national judges as EU judges. With everything considered, this study focuses on the Polish 
civil judges and the way they think and act while dealing with the law which is imposed from 
the outside of the state, that is to say when they deal with European Union law.  
Rather than focusing on the field of administrative law and jurisdiction, which have 
traditionally been very closely intertwined with the law of the European Union, the present 
study takes as its focal point the field of civil law and jurisdiction which has been subject to an 
intense Europeanisation process only in the course of the last two decades and is therefore 
paid a rather scant attention on part of legal scholars. What is more, it concerns the 
functioning of lower court judges, that is first and second instance courts, the operation of 
which is mostly unexplored in the academic writing.
42
 Eventually, it also juxtaposes selected 
elements of the gained empirical evidence with similar evidence following from the parallel 
project for Germany and the Netherlands (HiiL Report).  
Five themes are central to this book. First, the theoretical and methodological premises 
of the present research project are discussed. Second, the legal framework of the study is 
illustrated. In that regard, the process of Europeanisation of the national legal systems and the 
implications thereof for the national judiciaries are touched upon and, subsequently, the 
factual obligations which are put on national judges by means of EU law are discussed. Put 
differently, Chapter 2 addresses the issue of the theoretical model of a national judge as an EU 
law judge which follows from the EU law expectations. In Chapter 3 the legal environment 
comprising the elements of the judicial architecture in Poland is elaborated upon. Such an 
                                                 
40
 See Oldfather (2007) for a general overview of interdisciplinary research into the problem of judicial 
behaviour and the variety of methodological tools employed for that purpose.  
41
 See Ulen (2002), p.875 who discuses the role of empirical and experimental approaches to the study of law and 
claims that “increased empiricism in the law is vital to the future of the law as a science.” 
42
 Traditionally, the most academic attention is paid to the functioning of the national constitutional and supreme 
courts.  
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exercise is necessary to understand the institutional and operational context in which the 
concerned judges operate and to grasp the potential institutional obstacles to the fulfillment of 
the expectations stemming from EU law. Chapter 4 and 5 illustrate the quantitative and 
qualitative findings gained in the course of the empirical study. Next, the comparative chapter 
which pulls together selected results for the Netherlands and Germany follows. Importantly, 
the conclusions included in each chapter are of a tentative and generalized character. It is the 
purpose of the last part of this study to compile all the findings following therefrom in an 
attempt to tell the story of the functioning of Polish civil judges as EU law judges to the fullest 
extent possible. Next to that the last part of the work proposes a set of recommendations and 
solutions which could possibly facilitate the functioning of national judges in their EU 
capacity. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical and Methodological 
Premises 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It has become clear from the preceding General Introduction that in order to see how judges 
function in the context of EU law the present study not only explores the field of strict law but 
it also seeks to answer the question whether and what (extra-)legal phenomena may bear on 
the operation thereof. Hence, the study widens the perspective in which the law operates by 
other determinants, be it social, economic or cultural. What has been argued so far is that a 
pure normative and formal legal theory is incapable of providing a good explanation of 
judicial behavior and should be discarded as unsatisfying. As it is claimed “(…) normative 
legal theory rules out most systematic behavioral inquiries about law; it treats legal theory as 
largely distinct from social scientific inquiry.”43 Hence, it is necessary to turn towards the 
empirical legal theory and adapt a distinct methodological approach which makes it possible 
to provide “a more nuanced understanding of law and legal institutions.”44 This chapter takes 
as its point of departure the underpinning theoretical premises of the project. Subsequently, 
the research questions are developed, followed by the methodological design applied in the 
present study. Eventually, the theoretical and methodological limitations of this study are 
discussed.  
 
                                                 
43
 From Cotterrell (1989), p.217.  
44
 From Franck (2008), p.804. The author elaborately discusses, inter alia, the problem of the empirical 
dimension of scholarship in the area of law, methodological aspects thereof and the benefits of integrating the 
empirical prism into the legal scholarship.  
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2. The overarching theory 
 
2.1. Theory of legal adjudication: Legal Realism and the New Legal Realism 
 
It can be observed that the underlying theoretical framework of this research is to some extent 
underpinned by Legal Realism (LR) – a family of legal theories of adjudication that was 
developed in the United States and Scandinavia in the first half of the 20
th
 century.
45
 Realists 
have found a disjunction between the ‘law in the books’ and ‘the law in action’46 or put 
differently, between what the law ought to be and what the law is in practice. The most basic 
assumption of this theory was that judges base their decision on non-legal considerations 
rather than on the law itself.
47
 It pointed at the personal and accidental factors in judicial 
behavior.
48
 The realists concluded that law is often rationally indeterminate. The theory is an 
empirical, naturalized and descriptive theory of adjudication that seeks the causes of judicial 
decisions.
49
 For that reason, many of the realists believed in the necessity to apply an 
interdisciplinary approach to law.
50
  
The respective theory is too broad to be considered here in more detail and many of its 
elements are not applicable to the context of the present study.
51
 Therefore it should be 
sufficient just to keep in mind that the LR has considerably borne on the development of 
other, distinct streams of legal thought such as law and economics, critical legal studies or 
law-and-society, without assuming too much about other underlying philosophical elements of 
                                                 
45
 It is claimed that legal realism was rather a movement in thought and work about law, not a school of legal 
thought, see Llewellyn (1931), pp.1233-1234.  
46
 See Leiter (2002), p.24. Legal realism was exposed to hard criticism for being weak, inconsistent, based upon 
false premises and being at odds with the whole idea of normative legal theory. See also Green (2005), pp.1915-
2000; Fisher et al (1993); Cotterrell (1989), pp.182-215; Green (2009) on the discussion on differences between 
realists and positivists.  
47
 Realists claimed that in deciding cases “(…) judges react primarily to the underlying facts of the case, rather 
than to applicable legal rules and reasons (…)”, see Leiter (2001), p.278.  
48
 Some of the realists that belonged to the so-called ‘idiosyncrasy wing’ asserted that the personality of the judge 
is a core factor in the process of adjudication, see Leiter (2010), pp.258-259.  
49
 See Leiter (2002), p.16.  
50
 Realists looked to behaviorist psychology and sociology in order to explain how the law works. For those 
reasons, some accused the legal realism of simply falling under the category of behavioristic psychology.  
51
 Most importantly, the legal realism theory seems to entirely downplay the legal factors which are at stake. 
Moreover, it the theory developed in the common law system and for that reason many of its elements are 
difficult to be utilized for the sake of this study.  
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it. More recently a school of New Legal Realism (NLR) which reaches for the theoretical 
grounds of Legal Realism has emerged.
52
 It aims at studying the law from the bottom-up 
approach
53
 and focuses on the role of law in lifes of ordinary people but also on understanding 
the underlying reasons of judicial decisions by establishing hypotheses and looking into large 
sets of data.
54
 By combining diverse social science methods and perspectives (so-called 
integrative interdisciplinary approach) the NLR allows to construct a very nuanced and rich 
picture of the operation of the law. In contrast to LR, the NLR does not disregard the role of 
law as it stands in the books since it assumes that it constitutes a part of the overall binding 
legal system. It also pays attention to transnational and international issues and domains and 
the aspect of legal pluralism and human rights.
55
 The goal of NLR is to “create translations of 
social science that will be useful even to legal academics and lawyers who do not wish to 
perform empirical research themselves, while also encouraging translations of legal issues that 
will help social scientists gain a more sophisticated understanding of how law is understood 
“from the inside” by those with legal training.”56 Finally, the NLR promotes new teaching 
methods in legal education in which traditional legal material would be necessary but not 
sufficient means to the proper understanding of the law.
57
 With everything considered, it can 
be concluded that the present study fits into the NLR stream.  
 
2.2. Law-and-society and Legal Consciousness theory 
 
Having established that the general theoretical framework underpinning the study could be 
seen in the light of the NLR stream it is essential to consider law-and-society theory which is 
classified as one of the successors of the realism movement and is, basically speaking, 
                                                 
52
 In June 2004 a first New Legal Realist Conference took place in Madison, Wisconsin, US which was a 
response to increasingly emerging voices from scholars with regard to the necessity of more theoretically and 
methodologically rich empirical research into legal setting. For more see for instance Erlanger et al (2005).  
53
 The motto of the NLR reads: “Studying law from the ground-level up to the top”, see the leading website of 
the NLR: http://www.newlegalrealism.org (last accessed 20 March 2012).  
54
 See Miles&Sunstein (2007), p.2. 
55
 For more see Merry (2006).  
56
 From Erlanger et al (2005), p.336.  
57
 Ibid, p.359.  
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concerned with the effects of law on behavior of individuals.
58
 As it will be shown, different 
areas of contemporary law-and-society theory provide the present study with many interesting 
theoretical, methodological and empirical clues that can be employed therein.  
The present study addresses the issue of how the law which is enacted and imposed 
from the outside of the state, and therefore could be seen as ‘foreign’ (nonstate) law, is 
approached by a closed group of actors who deal with law on their daily and professional 
basis.
59
 It will thus explore the way officials behave when they are faced with questions of 
European Union law which exists in parallel to the national legal order.
60
 However, not only 
are the systems parallel but they are also intertwining. It is generally assumed that in modern 
legal systems state officials accept the authority of the state law and consequently apply it.
61
 
Yet, in the present research the ‘foreign’ law is considered and for that reason the 
aforementioned assumption is put into question. Law-and-society theory recognizes the social 
consequences of legal pluralism and parallel and intersecting legal orders and emphasizes the 
necessity of further exploration thereof. That is to say, it points out the desirability of research 
on how different and intersecting legal dimensions affect behaviour of groups or individuals 
and inter alia officials of the state.
62
 Be that as it may, there has been very little research with 
regard to that matter so far.
63
 Seen in this light, this study partly occupies that niche.  
Another stream of scholarship which constitutes the overarching theoretical and 
methodological framework of the present research originates from the already mentioned legal 
                                                 
58
 See Cotterrel (1989), pp.207-208. Law-and-society movement developed in the US and other countries from 
the 1960s onwards. It originates in sociology of law and is mostly concerned with the impact and/or effectiveness 
of law, i.e. it examines the impact of law on behavior.  
59
 Using the term ‘foreign law’ for the law of the European Union is necessarily a simplification used for the 
sake of explaining theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the study. This ‘foreignness’ of the law of 
the European Union should be understood in the light of the fact that EU law is enacted outside of the state 
(nonstate law) and not by the national legislator. As a matter of fact though, EU law should be seen as an integral 
part of the national legal order, not as a foreign, or alien, element to it. The ECJ was clear on that point in case 
6/62 Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L [1964] ECR 00585, paras.3 and 7 of the summary where it stated that the Treaty 
created its own legal system which became an integral part of the legal orders of the Member States.  
60
 The term ‘parallel legal orders’ is used to describe a situation when a society has more than one legal order, i.e. 
apart from the state law also other systems (international, religious) exist within the same society or territory.  
61
 See Galligan (2006), p.295.  
62
 Ibid, pp.169-172.  
63
 One of the existing studies is a study on the dilemmas that are faced by Indonesian judges when they have to 
decide cases on the basis of competing  - customary, state and religious - legal orders; see Bowen (2000), pp.97-
127.  
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consciousness (hereinafter LC) studies. The notion of legal consciousness is rather a broad 
one and encompasses different dimensions but it always refers to the process of law 
perception and understanding and the process of compliance with law. Galligan has presented 
six ways legal consciousness can be understood. The first one reflects the idea that the very 
expression of social relations is an expression of law. The second sense of legal consciousness 
refers to the manner officials and citizens perceive legal orders as valid and binding. The third 
meaning of legal consciousness concerns the sense of commitment to the legal order and 
specific laws.
64
 It is rather apparent that both dimensions are closely intertwined. The 
underlying idea of the fourth sense is based on the assumption that laws influence the way 
people perceive wider issues and entails creation of new expectations that go beyond the law 
as such.
65
 The fifth dimension deals with the way people assimilate ideas about law directly or 
indirectly. Eventually, the sixth sense of legal consciousness relates to the law as an 
instrument used to advance the interests of individuals and groups. This sense is mostly 
associated with disadvantaged or marginal groups in society. For the purposes of the present 
study the second and third form of legal consciousness are most relevant.  
Another constitutive theory in this field has been established by Ewick and Silbey who 
constructed three varieties of legal consciousness. The authors of The Common Place of Law: 
Stories from Everyday Life deal with ordinary people’s understandings of the law and the 
varieties of legal consciousness that they reveal. In a nutshell, they explore how different 
people perceive, imagine, use, respond to, invoke and experience the law and legality.
66
 In that 
respect, legal consciousness focus on the way the law is used by individuals. However, in 
order to know the uses of law it is necessary to know why, when and how the law is used, but 
also why and when it is not employed.
67
 Legal consciousness is about the way people behave 
but also about the attitudes they have to actions which may be undertaken.
68
 According to the 
authors, the phrase legal consciousness is used to “name participation in the process of 
                                                 
64
 Galligan (2006), pp.336-337.  
65
 Ibid, p.338.  
66
 See Ewick&Silbey (1998) and Ewick&Silbey (1992). The authors collected accounts of the law from more 
than four hundred people originating from different social and ethnic classes and with different educational 
backgrounds. On the basis of those accounts they distinguished different forms of legal consciousness. 
67
 See Ewick&Silbey (1992), p.737.  
68
 See Hoffmann (2003), p.694.  
  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Premises 
 
20 
constructing legality.”69 The concept of legality is distinct from the concept of the law. 
Whereas the law is reflected in a set of formal and normative institutions, the legality will 
refer to the way those legal institutions are shaped and translated in everyday action.
70
 The 
notion of legal consciousness is therefore employed in order to identify the manner particular 
individuals understand what the law is and what it means for their social relations. At this 
point the notion of a ‘particular individual’ should be emphasized. By focusing on ‘individual’ 
or ‘micro’ experiences of law, the legal consciousness studies distinguish themselves from the 
legal culture studies which concern a ‘macro’ or group phenomenon.71 At the same time legal 
culture and legal consciousness intersect and intertwine with each other whereby they 
visualize how particular actions amass into institutional forms.
72
  
Against the above-described background, the authors of The common place of law 
identified three forms of legal consciousness, these are: before the law (distinctive 
consciousness of legality), with the law (instrumental consciousness of legality) and against 
the law (resistant consciousness of legality). The particular varieties of legal consciousness 
carry the following features:  
 
- Persons being before the law perceive the law as a distinct and remote, 
autonomous, majestic, separate, impartial but authoritative and mostly 
predictable sphere of law that can be engaged but only in particular 
situations. They may sometimes feel frustrated about their own 
                                                 
69
 From Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.45.  
70
 See Blackstone et al (2009), p.633.  
71
 International encyclopedia of social and behavioral sciences (2001), p.8624: “Legal culture refers to an 
aggregate level (macro or group) phenomenon: legal consciousness usually refers to micro level social action, 
specifically the ways in which individuals interpret and mobilize legal meanings and signs.” There is no rigorous 
concept or definition of legal culture, the notion requires therefore much caution. The broadest definition of legal 
culture belongs to Friedman who refers to it as to the “ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and 
legal institutions, which some public or some part of the public holds”, see Friedman (1997), p.34, on the 
discussion with regard to the concept of legal cultures. Friedman distinguishes between lay legal culture which is 
hold by the general public and internal legal culture hold by legal professionals such as lawyers and judges, see 
Friedman (1977), p.76. Cotterell (2011), p.11 claims that “(…) legal culture should be seen as a multi-faceted 
view of legal experience presented especially through the perceptions, words and actions of those participating in 
it.”  
72
 From International encyclopedia of social and behavioral sciences (2001), p.8628.  
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powerlessness.
73
 Persons before the law see the law as “somewhere else, a 
place very different from everyday life (…) as a realm removed from 
ordinary affairs.”74 Persons before the law distinct themselves from it.75 
Subjects before the law are convinced of legitimacy of the law which 
however remains a distinct domain of life. 
 
- Persons acting with the law see the law as an axiomatic part of their daily 
practice which they eagerly engage with.
76
 It is a game that can be played 
and an available and effective instrument that can be used, as a tool which 
allows achieving different objectives. In this account “legality is understood 
to be a game of skill, resource, and negotiation, where persons can seek their 
own interests legitimately against others.”77 Persons with the law engage 
with the law and utilize it instrumentally.  
 
- Persons against the law can be characterized as resistant to it, as trying to 
avoid or omit it. They feel powerless and have cynical attitude to it. Law is 
observed as an arbitrary product of power against which they struggle.
78
 
Subject against the law feel “virtually incapacitated”79 and resist and distrust 
the law.
80
 
 
It is yet important to bear in mind that the above-explored forms of legal consciousness may 
not necessarily accurately correspond to any particular individual since “(…) an individual 
might, in the context of various interactions or events, express all three forms of 
consciousness (…) a person may express a multifaceted and possibly contradictory 
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 Ewick&Silbey (1998), pp.47, 74-108.  
74
 Ibid, p.47.  
75
 Ibid.  
76
 Ibid, pp.48, 108-164.  
77
 International encyclopedia of social and behavioral sciences (2001), pp.8627-8628.  
78
 Ewick&Silbey (1998), pp.28, 47, 165-220.  
79
 International encyclopedia of social and behavioral sciences (2001), p.8628.  
80
 See Nielsen (2000), p.1060.  
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consciousness.”81 In that sense, the scholars also concluded that legal consciousness of a 
specific individual may comprise contradictory understandings and usages of the same legal 
phenomenon.
82
 By establishing how individual embodiments of consciousness of law operate 
simultaneously, Ewick and Silbey show that legality is one, enduring construction.
83
 
It is one of the primary objectives of the present study to see whether the theory 
established by the above-mentioned authors may in any way translate in distinct research 
framework and circumstances, that is to say whether it can be applied to legal professionals 
who in their institutional authority permanently deal with law and legal rules. Put differently, 
it is aimed to see whether distinct formations of legal consciousness (with, before, against) 
with regard to EU law are present among national judges. Alternatively, depending on the 
outcomes of the empirical study, it might be necessary to reconceptualise the theory of legal 
consciousness in order for it to be better suited for the purposes of the judiciary.  
The foregoing observations evidently trigger various theoretical and methodological 
inquires with regard to the present study. The most important and obvious reason thereof is 
the fact that law is an axiomatic part of the practice of courts, it is permanently present in their 
everyday work and it has a professional dimension. Judges - professional legal actors - are 
supposed to be the mouth of law and any professional activity they perform is supposed to be 
premised thereon.
84
 In contrast, most of the characters featuring in The common place of law 
rarely experienced the so-called common existence and operation of the law since it was 
mostly an intrusive and remote aspect of their everyday life.
85
 In other words, the presence of 
law in everyday life of a judge has a totally different nature than that of an ordinary citizen. In 
that sense, one can speak of legal consciousness which is internal to the system of law. Legal 
consciousness which is ‘internal’ to the system of law stands in contrast to its ‘external’ form 
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 Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.5.  
82
 See also Kostiner (2003), p.329.  
83
 See Nielsen (2000), p.1060 who observes that “Ewick and Silbey’s typology is instructive but it is not meant to 
be a discrete set of options to describe the legal consciousness of particular individuals at particular times. 
Instead, in mapping the terrain of legal consciousness, Ewick and Silbey explain these prototypes as culturally 
available schema to be referenced and employed in different ways and at different times.”  
84
 In accordance with Montesquieu (1832), p.99 judges are merely the mouth of law (la bouche qui prononce les 
paroles de la loi).  
85
 See Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.15.  
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which is presented by ordinary citizens.
86
 For the foregoing reasons in the context of the 
present study, a law first perspective needed to be applied.
87
 What is more, since the primary 
objective of the research project was to infer what role EU law plays in the daily judicial 
practice, it was necessary to focus on this aspect of adjudication. In that sense, the theoretical 
premises have been considerably narrowed down. Secondly, from the normative point of 
view, judges are to observe the law as it is enshrined in legal structures and sets of written and 
unwritten rules. Theoretically speaking, they cannot resist the law since by agreeing on 
becoming judges they become subordinate to the rule of law and are expected to conform to it. 
Those are undoubtedly legitimate observations and at the same time arguments which would 
speak against the reasonableness of establishing different forms of legal consciousness among 
judges. Nonetheless, the place EU law occupies in the daily practice of a national judge is 
distinct from that of national law. Regardless of what the doctrine says, EU law constitutes an 
element of adjudication which might be seen as imposed from the outside. The developments 
in national jurisprudence in different Member States evidently show that the doctrines 
stemming from EU have not been automatically accepted and integrated by national judges.
88
 
Furthermore, the EU legal order is autonomous and separate from the national legal order, 
although theoretically speaking it constitutes an integral part of it. Also, for a Polish judge, EU 
law is still a rather novel part of a daily practice, too some extent indeterminate and indefinite. 
Furthermore, the national institutional and constitutional frameworks including the 
jurisprudence of the national supreme courts might create situations when unequivocal legal 
answers are scarce and where judges can execute some discretionary powers. Finally, as 
observed by Ewick and Silbey, the form of legal consciousness may vary across time and it 
reflects knowledge and experiences with law. In that sense, it is worth examining to what 
extent the knowledge of EU law and a rather short experience with resorting to it might 
determine a judge’s legal consciousness. For all the aforegoing reasons, the assumption that a 
                                                 
86
 Hence, one can also speak of the external legal culture which is the legal culture of ordinary people and the 
internal legal culture which is shared by those who perform law related tasks in the society, see Friedman (1989), 
p.1580.  
87
 Silbey (2005), pp.348 and 355. In case of popular legal consciousness the authors claim to avoid the so-called 
law-first perspective but rather focus on normal daily life of people and see how legal institutions and concept 
emerge in the daily practices.  
88
 See note 19.  
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judge conforms to (EU) law might be put into question. Finally, the purpose of the legal 
consciousness studies is not only to see how persons construct legality by (not)invoking the 
law but also to see how they make sense of law and what their attitudes towards and 
conceptions about the law are. As observed by Ewick and Silbey, legal consciousness is not 
only what people do but also “what they say”.89 By inferring what the understandings of the 
law individuals have, Ewick and Silbey were enabled to establish what the role the law might 
possibly play in disputes they take part in. Likewise, by finding out how individual judges 
comprehend the role EU law plays in their practice, it would be possible to indicate how it 
will be operationalized. With everything considered, the study of legal consciousness in the 
context of present research aims at exploring how judges conceive of EU law in relation to 
their daily practice whereby it allows to see whether judges comply with it and when they 
think it is necessary to comply with it.  
One of the most tangled aspects of legal consciousness studies is the extent to which 
the phenomenon may be discovered, defined, recorded and measured, if at all.
90
 The initial 
theoretical and at the same time methodological assumption of the present study was to 
explore and assess the forms of legal consciousness through the use of six vignettes which 
were included in the questionnaire.
91
 In the context of the present study, a vignette is a brief 
description of a hypothetical legal problem which the judge could potentially deal with. Each 
problem was clearly linked to an EU law aspect. The three different forms of legal 
consciousness were reflected in the vignettes; two vignettes for each form. In line with Silbey 
and Ewick’s theory it was assumed the form ‘with the law’ would be mirrored in an 
instrumental use of EU law. In that sense, judges with the law would use EU law only when 
for instance the parties to the proceedings wished to rely on EU law or when EU law would 
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 See Ewick&Slibey (1998), p.46.  
90
 See Hertogh (2004), pp.461-463 on the empirical methods which used to be employed by researchers in the 
earlier phase of the legal consciousness discourse and the methods which are used in more recent studies. The 
author notices a shift from purely statistical methods which were commonly used in the 1970s to the methods 
which fall under the category of descriptive ethnography.  
91
 The method is based on the technique of anchoring vignettes which was developed in 2004 by King et al and 
used in social sciences in order to avoid different interpretations of identical questions by respondents and to 
provide them with a common reference point. See King et al (2004), pp.191-207 and King&Wand (2007), pp.46-
66. The anchoring vignettes website: http://gking.harvard.edu/vign/ provides information on the issue and a 
library of examples.  
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offer a better solution of the dispute. Furthermore, it was established that judges ‘against’ the 
law would simply disregard EU law and the principle of its supremacy. Finally, judges 
‘before’ the law would unconditionally observe the principle of supremacy of EU law and 
consequently unconditionally apply EU law. In their preferred answers to the vignettes, judges 
had to decide whether they would proceed in the same or in a different way than the 
hypothetical judge pictured in the respective vignette. Alternatively, judges could indicate that 
they would not know how to proceed. The answer the judge would opt for would allow to 
categorize her as falling into one of the legal consciousness schemes. Each vignette provided 
room for explanation of the respective choice.  
 
3. Research questions 
 
As it has become apparent, the overarching objective of the present study is to find out how 
national judges experience EU law in their daily practice and what the reception of the legal 
order of the EU and the judicial obligations following from it is among the Polish civil judges 
of lower courts. The foregoing inquiry cannot be answered in vacuum though. Therefore, it is 
necessary to respond to two following general research questions:  
 
- What are the knowledge of, experiences with and attitudes towards European Union 
law among national judges of lower courts adjudicating in the area of private law in 
Poland?  
- Are Polish civil law judges ‘before’, ‘against’ and ‘with the law’ of the EU and if so, 
when are national judges ‘before’, ‘against’ and ‘with the law’ of the EU?  
 
In differentiating and analyzing the way the judges experience and perceive the law of the 
European Union, three general clusters of problems had been determined. Those three clusters 
revolve around the issues attached to the knowledge of, experiences with and attitudes 
towards EU law.  
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Knowledge of EU law  
The European Union has been built and based on law. A good knowledge of it for those who 
are obliged to apply seems a basic and core condition for the proper functioning of national 
judges as EU law judges.
92
 National judges are thus expected to possess an adequate level of 
knowledge and understanding of European Union legal system. Be that as it may, the 
knowledge of EU law cannot be taken for granted. Hypothetically, huge volumes of legal 
measures produced in Brussels/Strasburg in combination with the Luxemburg case-law may 
possibly pose a considerable obstacle to any ordinary national judge.
93
 Also, the knowledge of 
judges with regard to European Union law depends on their training and education in the field 
and their access to the EU provisions and case-law of the ECJ which presumably are 
hampered. In that regard, it could hypothesized that national judges are more familiar with 
national law sources than they are with EU law sources. The empirical part of the survey 
which relates to this problem explores what the level of EU law knowledge among national 
judges is, how judges can obtain it and whether they can easily access the sources of EU law. 
This part does not aim at exploring what exactly the judges know about EU law but what the 
general level of that knowledge is and how judges remedy contingent lack of such knowledge. 
Exemplary questions regarding this part of the study read: how would you asses your 
knowledge of EU law? Which sources to you use to improve your knowledge of EU law? Is 
the EU law training offer satisfactory?  
 
Attitudes towards EU law 
In this part the personal attitudes and conceptions concerning EU law, EU integration and the 
new role which is put on national judges by means of EU law are investigated. The following 
questions are posed: do national judges perceive themselves as European Union judges? What 
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 The importance of continuous education in the field of EU law is stressed by many scholars, see for instance 
Prechal&Van Ooik (2006), pp.12-14; Frąckowiak (2003), pp.313-319; Garlicki (2000), pp.194-195.  
93
 See The personal experience of a Hungarian national judge after the accession of her country to the European 
Union, public hearing at the Committee of Legal Affairs, European Parliament, 11 June 2007, available online at: 
www.europarl.europa.eu/comparl/juri/hearings/20070611/marosi_en.pdf (last accessed 13 September 2011).  
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are the attitudes towards the principle of supremacy of EU law and what are the views on the 
EU shared by the judges? What is the level of trust into the institutions of the Union? 
94
 
Some of the questions posed in this cluster clearly link to the issue of perceived 
legitimacy since, in accordance with a socio-legal concept of the notion, legitimacy is 
“basically a matter of procedures, faith in law, in processes and institutions, not in results (…) 
Legitimacy means an attitude (and behavior) about institutions and processes.”95 Put 
differently, in the context of the present study the concept of legitimacy relates to the 
acceptance of and trust into the exercise of public power by the institutions of the Union as 
reflected by the national judges.
96
 The issue of attitudes toward law naturally raises “the 
nagging question about the way attitudes translate into behavior.”97 And yet, as observed by 
Friedman, it is rational to assume that such a relationship exists since, as it is suggested by the 
theory, attitudes people take towards law bears on the way the make use of that law.
98
 The 
author also observes that the knowledge of the law is undoubtedly relevant for the attitudes 
towards law.  
 
Experiences with EU law  
In order to properly function in her EU capacity a judge must correctly understand the way a 
multi-dimensional legal system operates
99
, that is to say she ought to understand the system of 
intertwining national and EU legal orders. The issue of experience is obviously very closely 
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 Several questions in this cluster were patterned on the standard inquiries employed in the regular 
Eurobarometer surveys concerning the public opinion across the EU which are conducted by the European 
Commission, for more see  http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (last accessed 13 December 2011).  
95
 See Friedman (1977), p.141. In this context a descriptive or sociological concept of legitimacy is employed 
which is understood as a subjective judgement of the functioning of the institutions of the Union and the powers 
they exercise. The sociological legitimacy is, thus, different from the normative form thereof. It should however 
be observed that there are various definitions, aspects and sources of legitimacy. As claimed by Sadurski “while 
very important, the notion of ‘legitimacy’ is notoriously ambiguous, and many confusions would be avoided if 
the discussants clarified what notion of legitimacy they have in mind (…)”, Sadurski (2011), p.2. The author 
addresses the issue of inter alia, sociological versus normative legitimacy.   
96
 See also Amtenbrink (2009), pp.12-17 and Momirov (2011), pp.32-36.  
97
 Friedman (1977), p.77.  
98
 Ibid.   
99
 In the academic literature various concept are used; the notions of multi-level, multi-layered, multi-centered or 
multi-dimensional legal order are used interchangeably even though they are not entirely overlapping. The term 
“multidimensional legal order” is borrowed from Amtenbrink (2009) who describes as intertwining “the legal 
orders of states with a new, supranational legal order”, see pp.23 and 44-53. See also Pernice (2009), pp.372-374.  
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linked to that of knowledge. Nevertheless, even a satisfactory knowledge of EU law does not 
necessarily result in a proper application of that law.
100
 Moreover, such application may be 
hampered by national rules. Arguably, national judges, in order to understand the way multi-
dimensional order operates and subsequently to operationalized it, are actually forced to 
change the way they perceive law and their own judicial roles. The two central questions in 
this respect relate to the actual experiences with the application of EU law in the daily practice 
and the feasibility of the rules of EU law application. Exemplary questions read as follows: 
what is the impact of EU law on the daily practice? What are the practical problems while 
applying European law? Are the obligations of harmonious interpretation and ex officio 
application of European law clear enough? Is the preliminary ruling mechanism 
comprehensible and practicable?  
The specific inquires that were included in the questionnaire which was distributed 
among the judges pertain to those three groups of issues. Subsequently, the semi-structured 
interviews revolved around those three aspects.  
 
4. Methodological approach  
 
4.1. Interdisciplinary study 
 
The present study goes beyond narrowly defined legal research which is usually focused on a 
bare exposition of the current legal position. It integrates both legal and empirical, that is to 
say quantitative and qualitative methods based on fact finding. Thus, this research comes in 
the shape of an interdisciplinary study combining legal and social science methodology.
101
  
The research methods are, on the one hand, a theoretical analysis of European and 
national judicial architecture and, on the other hand, an empirical assessment of daily 
functioning of the Polish civil judges in the context of the law of the European Union. 
Generally, the research can be described as a confrontation study between the law in the books 
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 See Garlicki (2000), pp.217-218; Wyrozumska (2000), pp.219- 228.  
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 On the possibilities of interdisciplinary research into law, especially the pragmatic and positivist approach to 
the problem in question, see Van Klink &Taekema (2008).  
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and day-to-day reality, i.e. law in action. As aforementioned, the empirical data collection 
circle adopts the scheme which has been developed in the context of the projects conducted 
for the Netherlands and Germany (HiiL project). The confrontation between theoretical 
standards, that is to say the expectations imposed on national courts by European law, and 
background realities, i.e. the way the judges function in practice while dealing with European 
law issues, was carried out through the distribution of a questionnaire among the judges and, 
subsequently, by conducting in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 25 of them.
102
 Finally, 
a comparative study was carried out, taking the results of empirical research for three 
countries, that is to say Poland, Germany and the Netherlands, into account.  
All in all, explaining the functioning of national judges as EU judges is carried out 
from two points of departure. The first part of the study focuses on the way judges ought to 
behave and what is expected from them by means of EU law. In the second part a 
functional/factual approach is employed which tries to seek an answer to the positive question 
on how judges approach European Union law and why they behave the way they do.  
 
4.2. Legal research 
 
The main objective of this part of the study is to identify and describe features of the legal 
regime that are relevant to the actions of judges. It comprises, on the one hand, an analysis of 
the processes of Europeanisation of national laws and the legal expectations which are put on 
national judges by means of EU law and, on the other hand, the national legal architecture 
which includes the structures, mechanisms, legal instruments and techniques, procedures and 
remedies present in Poland and to a more limited extent in Germany and the Netherlands. It 
also signals the areas of friction between national and European Union law that may be 
essential to the understanding the way the judges function and apply EU law which in turn 
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 See the following subsections on the exact execution of the empirical part of the study. Additionally, the 
relevant institutions responsible for training of the judges were consulted and four different 2, 3 or 4 days long 
trainings covering different aspects of EU law and teaching methods of EU law which were organized by the 
Polish National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution across the country were attended. The participation in 
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allows to see whether the national legal framework creates any obstacles to the adequate 
functioning on national judges as EU law judges.  
Simply put, the elaboration on the legal environment is approached in two ways. First, 
the obligations imposed on national judges by EU law are explored (top-down approach). 
Subsequently, the national legal and judiciary systems and the way they correspond with 
European law are examined (bottom-up approach). In analysing the judicial architecture in the 
European Union, the expectations imposed on national judges and national legal and judiciary 
systems and the place of the EU law therein the research employs classical methods applied in 
legal sciences such as a literature survey and an analysis of EU and national statutory law and 
case-law.
103
 This part of research results in a theoretical and purely normative discourse on the 
legal position of the subjects in question from the lawyer’s point of view. 
 
4.3. Empirical research 
 
In analyzing the functioning of national judges as EU judges and their knowledge, experiences 
and attitudes with regard to EU law the study turns away from the traditional doctrinal legal 
black letter analysis to instead embrace social science methods that seek to look behind the 
scene of formal law in order to discern the manner in which judges function. It has emerged 
from the foregoing discussion that the study aims at mapping the legal consciousness of 
national civil judges. Such an endeavor induces one constitutive question though, namely: 
whether and to what extent can the behavior and legal consciousness of judges be explored 
and measured in an objective manner? In other words, to what extent can a judge be reduced 
to a “statistical aggregate” only?104 The answer to this question has important practical 
consequences and implications for the methodological inquiry choices. 
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 At this point it should be emphasized that the access to the jurisprudence of ordinary courts in Poland is 
heavily obstructed. In practice only the case-law of the Supreme Court is accessible while the pronouncements of 
ordinary courts are virtually inaccessible for the general public. This stands in contrast to the case-law 
originating from the administrative courts which offer an open on-line access to their jurisprudence.  
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 From Bogdan&Taylor (1975), p.4.  
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4.3.1. A mixed research design  
 
Standard indexes can be used in order to objectively measure for instance the way judges 
assess their knowledge of law. Yet, it is questionable to what extent the conceptions, views 
and feelings with regard to EU law can be measured and understood by means of purely 
objective, quantitative data. For those reasons a mixed research design is applied to the 
empirical part of the study.  
The first part of the empirical study was based on the distribution of questionnaires 
which delivered rich quantitative data that allowed to see what the general trends with regard 
to the knowledge of, experiences with and attitudes towards EU law among the judges are.
105
 
The second part of empirical research was based on a qualitative and subjective method, i.e. 
semi-structured interviews. This method allowed knowing judges personally and see them as 
they are construct their own legal reality and understanding of EU law. Moreover, it made it 
possible to explore the concepts the nature of which was lost in the quantitative approach, e.g. 
frustration or indifference. Put differently, the interviews assisted with interpreting and 
understanding the individual lived experience and practice with EU law. The method of 
qualitative interviewing brings the study to a research paradigm called interpretevism. 
Interpretevists assume that the social sciences ought to be concerned, not simply with 
quantifying what actually happens in social phenomena, but in providing an interpretation of 
events and phenomena in terms of how the people involved perceive and understand their own 
experience. The interpretivist framework of inquiry sees the reality that is local, culturally 
bound, relative and specifically constructed and rejects the notion of value-free research. 
Interpretevists look for understanding of a particular context, for the motives and intentions 
that direct human behaviour.
106
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 Groves et al (2004) provide a very detailed overview of survey methodology, i.e.: sampling frames and errors, 
methods of data collection, guidelines for writing good questions, evaluation of survey and so forth.  
106
 Interpretevism is interchangeably called constructivism or cultural theory, see Hantrais (2009), p.58. In 
accordance with Willis three research paradigms can be distinguished, i.e.: postpositivism, critical approach and 
interpretevism, see Willis (2007). However, different authors apply different classifications. Sometimes, 
interpretevism is viewed as a part of the critical theory. On the contrary, Bogdan and Taylor (1975) concern 
positivism and phenomenologist approach as the two basic ones while Chalmers (1982) lists five general 
alternatives, i.e. empiricism, postempiricism, critical theory, sociological and anarchistic. Collingridge&Gantt 
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Traditionally, quantitative and qualitative methods and the research paradigms which 
underpin them were in stark contrast or even hostile to each other. This phenomenon is 
sometimes referred to as the paradigm wars. The contrasting epistemological, ontological and 
philosophical positions of the paradigms constituted the center of the problem.
107
 However, 
the modern trend, based on the pragmatism position, is that of theoretical and methodological 
pluralism, that is to say the use of mixed methods and the integration of quantitative and 
qualitative data in one research (sometimes called triangulation or MMRD - Multiple Method 
Research Design).
108
 Multiple-method researchers base their approach to data on a moderate 
relativistic epistemology that justifies the value of knowledge from many sources in place of 
elevating one source. The mixed-strategy approach is a point of departure for the present study 
as well. Such a methodological choice made it possible to examine the various facets of the 
posed research questions and to explore the different angles of problem at stake.
109
 Put 
differently, the application of the mixed-strategy approach in the present study is underlain by 
the complementarity argument in accordance with which mixed approaches are employed in 
order to seek elaboration, enhancement, illustration, clarification of the results of one method 
with the results from another.
110
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
(2008) list three approaches to qualitative studies, those are ethnography, existential phenomenology and 
grounded theory. All in all, there seems to exist kind of ambiguity in the field and the boundaries between the 
paradigms are somewhat blurred. Moreover, once we turn to the issue of research designs and techniques we 
encounter notable obscurity. Virtually almost every handbook on qualitative research presents a different view 
on the issue. This could be, however, explained by the fact the qualitative research has gained considerable 
popularity during the last decades and has witnessed increasing methodological pluralism.  
107
 It should be underscored that some writers have been immensely reluctant to accept that quantitative and 
qualitative data can be combined. According to Kuhn the paradigms within the field are incompatible since their 
fundamental beliefs cannot be reconciled, see Kuhn (1970), pp.148-150. See also Hantrais (2009), p.98 for a 
table compiling the dominant features of quantitative and qualitative research methods and consequently the 
research paradigms.  
108
 Triangulation, also called cross-examination, refers to the research tool based on more than one 
methodological tool. The purpose of triangulation is to validate the obtained data. In accordance with Cohen et al 
(2007), p.141 triangulation is “an attempt to map out, or explain more fully, the richness and complexity of 
human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint and, in so doing, by making use of both 
quantitative and qualitative data.” 
109
 See Spicer, Combining qualitative and quantitative methods [in] Seale (2004b), p.294; Bryman (2008), pp.13-
25 and Bryman (2006), pp.97-113. Also Fielding&Fielding (2008), p.571; Hantrais (2009), pp.105-108.  
110
 See Bryman (2006), p.105 and Greene et al (1989), p.259. It is however important to acknowledge that: “(…) 
theoretical triangulation does not necessarily reduce bias, nor does methodological triangulation necessarily 
increase validity. Combining results from different analytic perspectives or methods may offer a fuller picture but 
not necessarily more ‘objective’ or ‘valid’ one. When we combine theories and methods we do so to add breadth 
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4.3.2. Access to the group and sampling   
 
The project concerns judges adjudicating in ordinary courts of first and second instance, that is 
to say district and regional courts
111
, and more precisely their civil departments. In order to 
adequately reflect the knowledge of, experiences with and attitudes towards EU law present in 
the judiciary a randomly selected group of judges would have to participate in the survey. It is 
yet by no means novel to state that the judiciary is a protected and closed group greatly 
sheltered from any exterior intrusion. For the foregoing reason the manner in which judges 
should and could be approached and the process of gaining access to the representatives of the 
group remained one of the largest technical and methodological impediments in the present 
study and involved numerous steps.
112
 It namely occurred that a direct access to the judges 
and the method of probability sampling were impossible in practice. Ultimately, in the course 
of September 2009, the Polish National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution
113
 sent a 
letter to the presidents of 5 judicial districts informing them about the survey on-line, its 
purpose and the access details.
114
 The presidents were inquired to forward the letter to the 
chosen by them subordinate courts in such a way that a hundred judges working at the civil 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
or depth to our analysis, not because we subscribe to a single and ‘objective’ truth (…)”, from Fielding&Fielding 
(2008), p.560. 
111
 For more on the structure of the judiciary in Poland see Chapter 3. Appellate courts were excluded from the 
research project for two major reasons. First of all they cannot be considered to be the courts which are 
proximate to individuals as, in fact, they are at the apex of the judiciary structure. Also, the access to judges at 
the appellate level was impeded.   
112
 The Supreme Court, representatives of the academic world, the Ministry of Justice and the Polish National 
School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution were taken into consideration and approached in order to gain access 
to the judiciary. 
113
 Krajowa Szkoła Sądownictwa i Prokuratury (National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution), see 
www.kssip.gov.pl.  
114
 There are 11 judicial districts in Poland, those are: Białystok, Gdańsk, Katowice, Cracow, Lublin, Łódź, 
Poznań, Rzeszów, Szczecin, Warsaw and Wrocław. For the list of the appellate courts see the website of the 
Ministry of Justice, at http://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/rejestry-i-ewidencje/lista-sadow-powszechnych/ (last accessed 10 
October 2011). The districts chosen for the purpose of the survey were: Gdańsk, Warsaw, Poznań, Rzeszów and 
Białystok which represent both central and peripheral areas. At the moment of the survey there were 4535,08 
judges working in first and second instance courts adjudicating in the divisions which were included in the 
project and 10 409 judges working in all instances and all chambers of common courts, including the Supreme 
Court (data for the whole country). With regard to the judicial units which were included in the survey it should 
be observed that there were in total 2689,91 judges adjudicating in the chambers and instances included in the 
study. Data imparted by the National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution originating from the internal 
letter exchange of 10 September 2009 between the Ministry of Justice and the National School.  
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chambers of the ordinary courts in the respective judicial district would be informed. The 
chosen judges were supposed to cover all age groups, represent both genders and all areas of 
expertise and work in both big cities and small towns. The process of completion of the 
questionnaire took place between October and December 2009. After 5 weeks the presidents 
of the selected courts were reminded about the survey by the School of Judiciary and Public 
Prosecution. In addition to that, in order to maximize the response rate and increase the size of 
the sample, both the questionnaire and information about the internet survey were circulated 
during the trainings in EU law for national judges the author participated in. The judges 
approached during the trainings were also requested to inform their colleagues with regard to 
the survey on-line. In the subsequent stage 25 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with judges who in the questionnaire expressed their consent to be interviewed. 
The interviews took part in the period between February and June 2010.  
With everything considered it should be emphasized that the reality of empirical 
research and particular circumstances of the judicial environment did not allow for the random 
and independent probability sampling method and had to rely on the method of non-
probability convenience sampling and network sampling.
115
 This, in turn, has significant 
consequences for the external validity of the gained data and the method in which it was 
analysed and presented. 
 
                                                 
115
 Probability and non-probability sampling are two general sampling methods. In principle, a representative and 
unbiased sample can only be achieved in the course of probability sampling which in turn allows to employ the 
method of inferential (also called analytical or inductive) statistics and to make generalizations about the whole 
population. By and large, probability sampling is a preferred method of sampling but there are many instances 
where probability sampling is not feasible or practical which was also the case in the present study. In order to 
conduct probability sampling a list of the population (sampling frame) is necessary. Although a sampling frame 
for the Polish civil judiciary was as such available, the judges conditioned their participation in the survey on the 
approval from their supervisors. This in turn necessarily enforced the change in the manner the judges should be 
approached. From the informal exchange of information between the author and the National School of Judiciary 
and Public Prosecution it also followed that the presidents of particular courts refused to forward the letter 
informing about the survey to the judges working in the respective courts. For more on the sampling methods see 
Bloch, Doing social surveys [in] Seale (2004b), pp.173-177. See also Polit&Beck (2010), p.1453 on the 
persisting “myth of random sampling in quantitative research (…) in which virtually all researchers conspire 
when they apply standard statistical tests to analyse their data, in violation of the assumption of random 
sampling” and Gentry&Hofyzer (1977), p.106 who claim that “all too often the researcher, not wanting to 
identify his sample as a non-probability one, stretches the concept of probability and uses evaluative techniques 
not consistent with his sampling methodology.” 
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4.3.3. Questionnaire’s structure and the picture of the sample  
 
The questionnaire was designed in a manner which made it possible to assess in a systematic 
and objective way the variables relating to knowledge, experiences and attitudes of national 
judges.
116
 In principle, it was patterned on the version of the questionnaire which was 
designed for the parallel project for Germany and the Netherlands. However, many contextual, 
linguistic and technical adjustments were brought therein. Also, on request of the National 
School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution additional questions were asked which pertained 
to, for instance, the availability and quality of EU law trainings for the judiciary.
117
 The 
questions included in the survey concerned, inter alia, the frequency of EU law the national 
judges encounter, the level of EU law knowledge, the clarity of the mechanisms of the 
application of EU law, forms of education in EU law and generally speaking judges’ attitudes 
towards the Union, its law, EU law institutions and the new role which is put on them by EU 
law. Moreover, questions concerning the gender and age of the respondents, the respective 
judicial unit and the chamber the judge adjudicates in were included.
118
 The questionnaire was 
anonymous but it included a question whether a judge agrees to be interviewed at some future 
date which implied the necessity of providing some personal data. The survey was based on 
pre-coded/fixed-choice questions in which a limited number of answers were given. 
Additionally, an open-ended question at the end of the questionnaire was included. The 
questionnaire also encompassed six vignettes with some room for explanation of the choice 
the judge made. The questionnaire was prepared in both on-line and paper version.  
The response rate to the survey should, in overall, be seen as very satisfactory. After 2 
months of survey 373
119
 questionnaires were filled in, out of which 300 in their entirety. Quite 
a number of questionnaires were eliminated due to either carelessness (contradictory answers, 
                                                 
116
 For clues on how to collect questionnaires data, design a questionnaire and analyze quantitative data see Seale 
(2004a).  
117
 The School for the Judiciary and Public Prosecution facilitated the access to the civil judiciary under the 
condition of including several questions concerning the concerned matters.  
118
 Both Polish and English version of the questionnaire can be found in Annex II and III attached at the end of 
this book.  
119
 Out of this number 336 were filled out on-line and 37 were filled out by judges approached during the 
trainings in EU law.  
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only neutral answers) or the fact of not belonging to the target group (criminal judges). 
Eventually, 313 questionnaires were taken into consideration in the analysis, of which 281 are 
entirely filled out.
120
 Once the process of the questionnaires distribution and collection was 
completed, the data was processed, quantified and analyzed.
121
  
The aim pursued with the data collection was to draw a general picture of the impact of 
EU law on the functioning of national civil judges, see general trends with regard to the three 
clusters of variables and indicate the possible problems and phenomena that are existent with 
regard to the judicial functioning in the context of EU law. The method of non-probability 
sampling, which, as already mentioned, was the only possibility to execute the empirical part 
of the study, implies that it is difficult to assume true unbiasedness in the sample which in turn 
precludes using the technique of inferential statistics. Therefore in this study foremost the 
method of simple descriptive statistics technique was employed.
122
 This method allowed to 
describe the facts happening in the immediate surveyed group. The distribution of answers 
provided by the judges is displayed through percentages (ratio/frequency distribution). In 
some instance the method of bivariate statistics using the cross-tabulation method is employed 
in order to see relationship between two variables in the population at hand.
123
 In order to 
                                                 
120
 A number of judges discontinued filling out the questionnaire in the last stage including the vignettes.  
121
 The data was processed and quantified by means of an Excel Spreadsheet. In case of Germany and the 
Netherlands, the process of preparation of the questionnaires, their quantification and statistical analysis was 
assisted by a professional institution specializing in survey methods. In case of Poland the whole process of 
setting the questionnaire on-line, coding and quantifying data was carried out by the author of this study.  
122
 Descriptive statistics summarize the data in quantitative terms, i.e. they present the facts about the immediate 
surveyed group. In that sense they are different form inferential statistics which allows to make general 
propositions about the whole population (so-called external validity). In principle, statistical inference may take 
place in sets of data that origin from systems based on random variation. In other words, only random samples 
justify employing the method of statistical inference, see for instance Gentry&Hoftyzer (1977), p. 107 who claim 
that “(…) unless the sample is truly randon, the use of the various techniques of statistical inference are 
unwarranted and the application of such techniques can lead to incorrect conclusions because of possible “built-
in” biases of the sampling procedure. When a non-probability sample is employed it would be prudent to 
acknowledge it as such, and to avoid the tools of statistical inference that are valid only within the context of 
random sample.” It is yet worth emphasizing that there is no full agreement with regard to the foregoing as some 
authors suggest that random sampling is not required if the smaple is not biased. Inferential statistics start with 
establishing a hypothesis concering relationship between two measured variables and aim at finding out whether 
the data supports the hypothetis.  
123
 Univariate statistics present the data concerning a single tested variable. Bivariate statistics look for 
relationships between two variables such as for instance age and attitude. For more see Bloch, Statistical 
reasoning: from one to two variables [in] Seale (2004b), pp.324-339.  
  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Premises 
 
37 
make generalizations
124
 and enhance the validity of conclusions the present study employs the 
concept of proximal similarity model as developed by Campbell which allows to extrapolate 
the gained results to a broader group of people.
125
 The method relies on rich and descriptive 
information of the study context and the observed population in order to see how the sample 
corresponds with the entire population (so-called gradient of similarity).
126
  
With regard to the foregoing it should be observed that female judges constituted 58 
percent of the respondents and male judges accounted to 42 percent of the respondents which 
quite accurately reflects the uneven gender distribution which is present in the Polish 
judiciary.
127
 75 percent of the surveyed judges adjudicated in the first instance courts and the 
remaining 25 percent in both first and second or only in a second instance courts which quite 
adequately reflects the general distribution in the number of judges between first and second 
instance courts in Poland.
128
 The response rate per judicial unit was yet somewhat unbalanced 
                                                 
124
 For the definition of generalization see Polit&Beck (2010), p.1451 who observe that “generalization is an act 
of reasoning that involves drawing broad conclusions from particular instances – that is, making an inference 
about the unobserved based on the observed.”  
125
 See Campbell (1986), pp.73-76. As observed by Witte&Howard (2002), p.282 “(…) the proximal similarity 
model depends on a theoretically informed assessment of non-random nature of a sample to avoid the pitfalls of 
a pure convenience sample.” Trochim&Donnelly (2006), p.34 observe that the proximal similarity model is “a 
model for generalizing from your study to another context based upon the degree to which the other context is 
similar to your study context.” See also Collingridge&Gantt (2008), pp.391-392. In that sense, it is necessary to 
consider the features of the actual gained sample and the features of the population to which the results would be 
generalized.   
126
 In line with Trochim&Donnelly (2006), p.35 a gradient of similarity is “the dimension along which your 
study context can be related to other potential contexts to which you might wish to generalize. Contexts that are 
closer to your along the gradient of similarity of place, time, people, and so on can be generalized to with more 
confidence that ones that are further away.”  
127
 In accordance with the data collected by the Central Statistical Office in 1995 female judges constituted 57 
percent of the total number of judicial appointments, 64 percent in 2000 and 2004 and 61 percent in 2005, see 
Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland 2006, p.160, to be found at: 
http://bip.ms.gov.pl/statystyki/tablgus2006.pdf (last accessed 10 May 2010). From the exchange of letters with 
the Ministry of Justice it follows that in 2009, 2010 and 2011 female judges constituted respectively 63,76; 63,91 
and 63,97 percent of the total number of ordinary courts judges in Poland; document DSO-061-63/12 in 
possession of the author. In 2008 and 2009 the percentage rate of new female judges nominations reached 63 
percent, that is 372 out of 586 in 2008 and 732 out of 1157 in 2009. The reader might also notice that total 
number of new nominations in 2009 is much higher if juxtaposed with the preceding years. Information provided 
by the Ministry of Justice, reference number DK-I-126-78/10, document in possession of the author.   
128
 In accordance with the data provided by the National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution originating 
from the internal letter exchange of 10 September 2009 between the Ministry of Justice and the National School 
it follows that out of the total number 72 percent of judges worked in district courts and 28 percent in regional 
courts. The possibility for a judge to adjudicate in both first and second instance capacity is statutory possible. 
First of all, the regional courts operate in both first and second instance depending on the subject matter of the 
dispute. Next to that, it is common that a first instance judge fulfils both positions, that is to say she works in a 
 
  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Premises 
 
38 
and shows overrepresentation of judges from the Białystok judicial unit which can be 
classified as periferial (28 percent of the total number of responses) and underrepresentation 
of judges from the Warsaw unit classified as central (12 percent) followed by Poznań unit (19 
percent), Rzeszów (17 percent), Gdańsk (14 percent) and other units (8 percent).129 60 percent 
of the judges who filled out the questionnaire adjudicated in civil chambers, 22 percent in 
labour and/or social security chambers and 18 percent in company chambers.
130
 The age 
distribution across the sample is shown in the graph below. It is yet difficult to infer to what 
extent the sample reflects the situation in the entire population as official statistical data 
concerning the age distribution across the judiciary is unavailable.
131
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
court of first instance and she is ‘delegated’ to a second instance court for an indefinite period of time by a 
decision of the Minister of Justice or for a period of one month a year by a decision of the president of a district 
court. Such possibility is regulated statutory in Law on Common Courts Organisation, art. 77.  
129
 n=282.  
130
 Whereas at the time of the survey 69 percent of the concerned judges in district courts worked in civil 
chambers, 14,5 percent in employment and social security chambers and 16,5 percent in commercial chambers. 
With regard to the regional courts 60 percent worked in civil chambers, 12 percent in commercial chambers and 
25 percent in employment and social security chambers. Data imparted by the National School of Judiciary and 
Public Prosecution originating from the internal letter exchange of 10 September 2009 between the Ministry of 
Justice and the National School.  
131
 The maximal retiring age in judiciary is 65 years which may be extended to 70 years on a special wish of a 
judge and after an approval from the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland. However a judge has a 
statutory right to retire at the age of 55 for female judges and 60 for male judges, see for more Law on Common 
Courts Organisation of 27 July 2001, O.J. 98 item.1070, art.69. Any information concerning the virtual age 
distribution in the judiciary was unavailable since “it requires additional facts establishment and involves further 
data processing. In addition, in line with the Law on the access to public information, art.3 p.1 (OJ No 112, 
p.1198 with amendments) processed data may be made available to the applicant only if proven that making the 
info accessible is of particular importance for the matters of public policy” as argued by the Ministry of Justice in 
their response DK-I-126-78/10 to the author’s inquiry.   
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n=284
132
 
 
The selective non-response bias which implied that only those judges who are experienced 
and interested in EU law would participate in the empirical, both quantitative and qualitative, 
part of the study posed a significant concern prior to the commencement of the survey 
stage.
133
 The results highlighted that as a matter of fact the gross majority of the judges who 
participated in the empirical (both quantitative and qualitative) part of the study did not have 
any or had very limited practical experience with EU law and the knowledge thereof which 
might suggest that the fear of the selective non-response bias was to a large extent unfound. 
With everything considered it can be observed that the size of the sample, the distribution of 
the basic characteristics and the fact that the group of judges is homogenous in terms of their 
education, career path and the general operational setting would seem to indicate a rather 
adequate representativeness of the sample. It should, however, be emphasized that with the 
                                                 
132
 The question concerning the age of the judge was included in the final part of the survey which explains why 
it does not overlap with the total number of analysed questionnaires.  
133
 Non-response bias takes place in statistical surveys and occurs when participants who respond to the survey 
differ in the outcome variable from those who do not respond at all whereby it results in a loss of accuracy in 
population estimates. For more on non-response bias see Lahaut et al (2002).  
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proximal similarity model the generalizations necessarily remain theoretical
134
 and may only 
indicate trends which are present in the population.  
 
4.3.4. Semi-structured interviews 
 
It is claimed that a face-to-face interview is the most flexible form of data collection, has the 
greatest potential and allows to help and motivate the respondents.
135
 Moreover, it permits 
optimal communication and both verbal and non-verbal cognition.
136
 25 judges participated in 
the qualitative part of the study.
137
 They covered all the appellate districts which took part in 
the survey and originated from provincial, middle size cities as well as courts in the biggest 
cities. The age distribution fluctuated between 31-years-old and 60-years-old. 5 judges 
adjudicated in the second instance courts and the remaining 21 in the first instance.
138
 Most of 
the interviews were recorded
139
 and in the later stage transcribed in a Word document. 
Subsequently they were analyzed and coded
140
 with the aim of locating statements and 
opinions reflecting social schemes and looking for common patters and phenomena that would 
allow generating a theory. In that sense, the method of analytic generalization was employed 
which relies on distinguishing “between information that is relevant to all (or many) study 
participants, in contrast to aspects of the experience that are unique to particular 
participants.”141  
                                                 
134
 Trochim&Donnelly (2006), p.35 who claim that with the proximal similarity model for external validity does 
not allow for generalizing with certainty as the generalizations will always remain “a question of more or less 
similar.” 
135
 Creswell (1998) and Maxwell (2005) provide useful clues on how to conduct and organize interviews, 
negotiate research relationship with participants in the survey, use protocols, store and order qualitative data. See 
also Seidman (1997).  
136
 See De Leeuw (2008), p.317. For extensive guidelines on qualitative interviewing consult Seale (2004a), 
pp.253-269.  
137
 An interview was conducted with each judge who gave her consent to be interviewed in the questionnaire. 
One of the interviewed judges was approached through another channel.  
138
 In addition to that a dozen on-going interviews were conducted during the trainings in EU law for national 
courts which were followed by the author. Those have not directly been included in the analysis but allowed to 
gain additional insight into the range of the existent problems. 
139
 Several interviewed judges did not give their consent to be recorded.  
140
 The analysis of the transcribed interviews has become one of the longest and most tangled parts of the 
research process.  
141
 See Polit&Beck (2010), p.1453.  
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The qualitative part of the study proved to be a great technique allowing to get to know 
the judges personally and to observe them as they construct their own legal reality and 
understanding of EU law. Consequently, it allowed to develop explanations of the quantitative 
results and to identify further problems attached to the functioning in the context of EU law. It 
illustrated the way judges behave and provided a contextualized understanding of judicial 
experience with EU law and delivered invaluable insights into the cause-effect relationships of 
the way judges function which subsequently facilitated to draw fuller pictures of the instances 
of legal consciousness and the existent social schemes attached to them.
142
 Put differently, the 
interviews greatly assisted with interpreting and understanding an individual lived experience 
with EU law and allowed to (re)conceptualize the theory of legal consciousness so it would fit 
the specific research context.  
One of the largest concerns of the empirical study was the pitfall attached to the fact 
that people tend to give a good impression of themselves and also the institutions which they 
identify and/or feel they represent.
143
 Presumably, this rule also applied to the present research 
interview setting. It was therefore somewhat surprising that most the judges who agreed to be 
interviewed did not hesitate to, for instance, admit their incompetence in the area of EU law 
and its application or share the frustration about the new role which EU law assigned to them. 
Since face-to-face interviews are the “Rolls Royce” of data collection144 they required much 
care, time and expenses.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142
 It should yet be observed that there is more than one recipe for doing qualitative research. As Maxwell (2005), 
p.79 formulates it: “The appropriate answer to almost any question about the use of qualitative methods is: it 
depends (…)” Another important implication is that in qualitative research there is no single valid description of 
a situation but that the description always corresponds with the purpose(s) of a study, see Hammersley (1991), 
pp.195-203. Further confusion stems from the fact that there are no clear distinctions between qualitative 
research methods and the nomenclature used in the field. What in one case is called ethnography, can be given a 
name of a fieldwork, a participant observation or an interpretive case study in another research. For the purpose 
of this study, it should be sufficient just to bear the latter aspect of qualitative methods in mind; regardless of its 
‘ethnometodological survey’, an ‘interpretative case-study’ or a ‘symbolic interactionism’ name.  
143
 See Alvesson (2003), p.21.  
144
 Seale (2004a), p.318.  
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4.4. Comparative research  
 
The last part of the study involves elements of comparative research as the results for Poland 
are juxtaposed with the available data concerning the functioning of civil judiciaries in EU 
law context in other Member States. Such a comparison facilitates the process of sharpening 
of the focal point of analysis of the subject under study and suggests new perspectives. In a 
similar vein, a comparative study allows to propose common measures of a more general 
nature, also at the EU level, which might possibly facilitate the functioning of national 
judiciaries in the EU capacity. A cross-national comparison gives a means of confronting 
findings in an attempt to identify and illuminate similarities and differences in the way 
national judiciaries function as decentralized EU courts.
145
  
In the framework of the present research it is necessary to observe that any 
comparative exercise had to rest on an adequate empirical data, that is to say it requires a 
process of juxtaposing the responses of national judges to the law of the European Union and 
the way judges look upon EU law. Such an exercise is only possible if an appropriate 
empirical data is available for other Member States. As a matter of fact, the empirical 
evidence pertaining to the way national judges function in their European Union capacity is 
very scarce and comes down to the corresponding research project for Germany and the 
Netherlands, several empirical studies which focus on selected aspects of EU law in particular 
countries
146
 and the survey commissioned by the European Parliament on the role of the 
                                                 
145
 As it is claimed “a comparative approach is better suited to generate findings of a broader validity. It also 
brings the research design closer to the dynamic reality of European integration where Community legal rules 
and principles are forged against a background of divergent national legal and institutional approaches and then 
transmitted back for implementation and enforcement in the same national environment. Only a comparative 
analysis of legal change under European influence allows us to test contradictory claims of convergence and 
divergence of legal systems, of harmonization or of disintegrative influences of European law on national law.“, 
see Bakardjieva Engelbrekt (2009), p.239. 
146
 See for instance Wind (2010), pp.1039-1063 in which the author scrutinizes the reasons of (not) referring 
preliminary questions to the ECJ by Danish and Swedish judges and suggest that judges in both countries are 
very reluctant to refer questions and will very likely use the acte clair doctrine to avoid preliminary references. 
Similarly Wind et al (2009), pp.63-88. See also the Report of the Swedish Kommerskollegium (Trade Council) 
of 30 March 2005 referred to by Wind (2010), p.1053 which was based on interviews with Swedish judges which 
pointed out that the majority of Swedish judges were not sufficiently familiar with EU law and the preliminary 
ruling procedure but also with the dynamic forms of legal interpretation. The Report indicated that Swedish 
judges tend to interpret EU law on their own instead of referring their problems to the ECJ.  
  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Premises 
 
43 
national judge in the European judicial system.
147
 The latter one, being an interesting and 
insightful report on the functioning of the national judges does not, however, offer an 
appropriate source of data which might be used for the purposes of the present study to a 
wider extent. The research method used by the executors of the project does not correspond 
with the research method applied in the present study and comprises several methodological 
shortcomings.
148
 Therefore, the results of the mentioned study can only be utilized as an 
indicative of the situation and the problems attached to the functioning of national judiciaries. 
The other studies mentioned above are, in turn, very restrained with regard to the surveyed 
aspects. With everything considered, only the parallel HiiL project offers an appropriate 
source of data which can be used for the process of comparison. Yet, it should not be forgotten 
that the practical problems attached to gaining access to the respective national judiciaries, the 
peculiarities of each legal system and the national judicial architecture and the issues attached 
to the specificity of each language implied that the execution of the empirical part of the 
projects in the concerned Member States took a somewhat different form in each country. The 
research project in Germany was limited to the Land of North-Rhine Westphalia which might 
put into question the representatives of the group for the whole country, especially for the 
Länder which constituted part of the former German Democratic Republic. Moreover, the 
response rate in Germany was somewhat low and accounted to 10 percent. The project for 
Poland, in turn, embraces various judicial units which promptly reflected geographical 
distribution but does not include the judges adjudicating in the higher appeal courts. The 
Polish project also included social security judges who were neither included in projects for 
Germany where they constitute part of the specialized courts, nor in the Netherlands where the 
disputes relating social security are settled by administrative divisions of local courts. With 
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 See Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft report on the role of the national judge in the European judicial 
system, 2007/2027 (INI), to be found at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=en&procnum=INI/2007/2027 (last accessed 8 
March 2011).  
148
 The survey covered a variety of courts including both administrative and private law courts which renders any 
comparison in the framework of the present study impossible. Moreover, whereas the project was aimed at all 
EU jurisdictions, nearly half of the answers (44 percent) originated from Germany, followed by Poland (19 
percent) and several countries were not represented at all. Finally, a considerable part of the data is presented 
collectively for all the countries and all sources of law which makes it impossible to isolate data for a specific 
Member State, see p.13 and following of the Draft Report.  
  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Premises 
 
44 
everything considered, the respective data cannot be used in its entirety and without any 
reservations. 
The well-known structural problem of comparative studies is “how to compare apples 
with apples and not oranges.”149 Yet, with regard to the aforegoing it should be observed that 
despite some differences in the organization of the respective judiciaries, all of them are based 
on the same model of justice. Namely, they all belong to the civil law tradition group based on 
a clear separation of powers where judges constitute a separate body of legal profession, are 
law graduates admitted to the profession through a public examination and are obliged to 
follow a long judiciary training and the majority of them have a life-long low profile judicial 
career in a highly bureaucratic and hierarchical judiciary organisation.
150
 Finally, all of them 
are subject to the law and are impartial and independent in their office. Also, it should not be 
forgotten that the primary objective of the comparative section is not to compare the legal 
systems of the three countries as such but to compare the problems attached to the functioning 
of national judges as EU judges which have become and the responses and solutions to those 
problems which followed from the surveys. In that sense, the functional comparative method 
comes to avail since it “is factual, it focuses not on rules but on their effects, not on doctrinal 
structures and arguments, but on events.”151 Put differently, the concerned method pays 
attention to “the organic responses of legal systems. It is the response that is identified and 
compared.”152 Since the comparison focuses on selected aspects of legal systems (judiciary 
and legal profession) and it comprises countries belonging to the same societal context it can 
be classified as a micro- and intra-cultural comparison.
153
 The exercise is carried out at an 
aggregate, meta- level and is preceded by a brief presentation of several features of the legal 
orders of Germany and the Netherlands which comprise the most relevant characteristics of 
the their national constitutional frameworks, the organization of the judiciary and the civil 
procedure. 
 
                                                 
149
 From Makinwa (2009), p.343.  
150
 See Fix-Fieero (2003), p.155 for the common traits of the civil model of justice.  
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 Michaels (2006), p.342.  
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 From Makinwa (2009), p.344.  
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 See De Cruz (1999), pp.227-230.  
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5. Methodological and theoretical limitations of the study  
 
Due to the lack of congruent projects the present study has come across several serious 
methodological and technical challenges and obstacles, foremost in the empirical phase of it. 
Many of the problems emerged only in the course of the empirical part of the study or even 
afterwards, that is to say during the phase of assessment of both quantitative and qualitative 
data. Identifying these issues at this point is however necessary to understand the discussion in 
the subsequent chapters. It also makes it possible to learn from the mistakes and to improve 
and enhance the methodological tools in order to avoid similar problems in potential future 
research. 
First of all, this research has blended different, i.e. legal, sociological and partly 
political perspectives in one study. It has worked with not yet fully-fledged socio-legal theory 
applied in a novel environment. Likewise, different research methods and techniques have 
been employed. Such an exercise easily triggers doubts and confusion among (legal) scholars. 
At the same time it has to be recognized that no single perspective or approach can reflect an 
entire and satisfactory picture of the object under scrutiny, especially if the main aim of the 
study is to find out what is actually happening on the ground and how national judges receive 
and perceive the legal order of the Union.
154
 Indeed, “(…) potential bias and distortion is the 
price we must pay to gain understanding of complex social settings.”155 In order to partly 
reduce the validity threats in this study, the methods of an intensive and long-term 
involvement with the object of the study
156
, rich data set, triangulation and comparison have 
been applied.
157
 The study has also been enriched by many insights from various legal and 
political scholars who offer arguments that seem to plausibly explain some of the results.  
The major technical and methodological concern, as in any empirical research based 
on a survey, related to the direct access to the objects of the study and even to any public 
information about the objects of the study. The judiciary constitutes an extraordinary group in 
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 See Stone Sweet (2000), p.5.  
155
 From Bogdan&Taylor (1975), p.13.  
156
 Which comprises not only survey and interviews but also participation in EU law trainings, visiting different 
courts across the country, consulting authorities involved with the functioning of the judiciary and academics.  
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 For the mentioned methods see Maxwell (2005), pp.109-114. See also Bogdan&Taylor (1975), pp.9-13.  
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that regard as it is very closed, hermetic and protected from any external influence. Hence, 
gaining access to the judges accounted to a thorny and long-lasting process. The success of the 
survey has thus utterly been dependent upon the consent of the presidents of the courts to take 
part in the survey and consequently, willingness of the judges to participate and share their 
perspectives on EU law in the quantitative and qualitative part of the study. Another difficulty 
was attached to the fact that the survey took an on-line form which might, arguably, have 
discouraged older generation judges to participate in it and made it impossible to participate 
for those judges who experience obstacles with regard to access to the internet. By and large, 
the fact that it was impossible to employ the method of probability sampling renders it 
difficult to gauge the representativeness and unbiasedness of the surveyed group with a full 
certainty. This in turn closes the door to further inferential analysis of the quantitative data and 
constitutes one of the biggest drawbacks of the present study.  
Further obstacles concern the construction of the survey and the formulation of the 
questions enshrined therein. Linguistic particularities of languages and local legal 
circumstances induced that it was not possible to directly employ the questionnaire of the twin 
project which was designed for Germany and the Netherlands in the Polish context. Moreover, 
the questionnaire failed to address several aspects which became apparent and significant only 
a posteriori. Likewise, it occurred that some questions were prone to various interpretations 
by the judges.
158
  
Additional problems related to the construction of the anchoring vignettes which were 
initially designed to reflect the embodiments of legal consciousness. As Chapter 5 will 
illustrate, the vignettes occurred to be underpinned by several presumptions that, in some 
instances, proved to be insufficient to understand and explain the forms of legal 
consciousness. The most fallacious one was the assumption that all judges possess a minimum 
level of knowledge of EU law and are knowledgeable of the basic mechanisms of its 
application. The startlingly high proportion of judges, which in nearly each case amounted to 
one-third of the group, who would not know how to proceed with, summa summarum, quite 
straightforward EU law problems and the remarks judges provided to the vignettes which 
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 For similar problems with regard to design of a survey which was tested among Dutch and Scottish lawyers 
see Őrücü (2007), p.446.  
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delivered many fresh, distinct clues coerced the author to reconsider the initial premises. Put 
differently, the vignettes seem to have disregarded some of the factors which, a posteriori, 
proved to have influence on the way judges make decisions. In that regard, the author agrees 
that qualitative (interviewing) methodology is better suited and necessary for conducting the 
legal consciousness analysis.
159
 Yet, the foregoing is not intended to discard the relevance and 
significance of quantitative research for purposes of legal consciousness discourse. It should, 
however, be emphasized that only qualitative research makes it possible to understand the 
dynamics of the process and investigate in detail the social schemes, informal context and 
other agents which quantitative methods were not able to capture.
160
  
Finally, the questionnaire provided for a ‘neutral’ answer possibility to many of its 
motions. The fact that a considerable number of the Polish civil judges chose for this option 
with regard to many survey questions have initially resulted in a significant dose of confusion 
as to a correct interpretation of the results. However, as both the quantitative and qualitative 
data seem to suggest, the ‘neutral’ stance towards many of the motions proposed in the survey 
might be explained by the fact of a scant and short experience with the application of EU law 
in the daily practice of civil courts and limited knowledge of judges in that regard.  
The present study supports the observation that every social science method produces 
results which embrace a certain level of doubt.
161
 Despite those concerns, the study made it 
possible to enrich the already existing picture of the functioning of national judges as EU law 
judges and provide new insights into the existing theories. Indeed, looking into the minds of 
judges is not a simple assignment. In particular, it requires abandoning certain 
conventionalism and traditional (legal) methods and approaches. With this point, it is, 
perhaps, worth recalling Everson and Eisner who assert that “(…) confusion and challenge, 
however, are also masters of opportunity (…) for the select methodological cognoscenti, 
confusion and trial transmute into core disciplinary opportunities as the challenges of 
integration are deemed to be no longer treatable within the confines of, say, the law, political 
                                                 
159
 See Hoffmann (2003), p.700; Nielsen (2000), pp.1062-1063.  
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 See Poteete et al (2010), p.10.  
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 Ibid, p.4.  
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science, or economic theory, but are instead necessitating of the wholesale re-orientation and 
re-dedication of academic discourse (…)”.162 
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 Everson&Eisner (2007), pp.42-43.  
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Chapter 2 
The EU’s Expectations of its Judges 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Having established the main theoretical and methodological foundations of the present study it 
is necessary to sketch the legal framework thereof. This framework is of a twofold nature. On 
the one hand, it relates to the fact of an increasing impact of EU law on the national legal 
orders, and in particular on the sphere of private law and jurisdiction.
163
 This process of 
Europeanisation of national legal sources has namely a profound bearing on the functioning of 
national courts, at least from the theoretical point of view, and constitutes therefore crucial 
background information. On the other hand, the present chapter regards the factual duties and 
expectations which are put on national courts by means of acquis communautaire. Thus, the 
present section addresses how national judges ought to function as decentralized EU judges, 
i.e. how they are expected to response to EU law and decide EU law cases. In that sense, the 
second aim of the present chapter is to draw a theoretical model of the functioning of national 
judge as an EU law judge. It must, however, be emphasized that the set of normative 
obligations which are put on the national judge does not reflect the entire picture. In fact, the 
judicial tasks attached to EU law are underpinned by several expectations of (extra-legal) 
nature without which those tasks may not be adequately fulfilled. The latter will also be 
addressed in the course of this chapter. 
The scope of obligations of national judges with relation to EU law which will be 
examined are limited to those general principles which have their roots in the systemic 
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 For the purpose of this study the term private law, in contrast to public law, refers to laws that regulate 
relationships between individuals operating in their private capacity. In that respect, also labour, consumer or 
company law will constitute part of private law. And yet it should not be forgotten that the notion of private law 
is a confusing one and may be understood in various ways. It should also be recognized that the private – public 
law divide is increasingly blurred, there are fields of law which share components of both areas which are also 
called functional fields of law. For more see Alpa (2000), pp.324-325 and Hesselink (2002), pp.228-230. 
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doctrines of EU law that govern the judicial enforcement of that law and the relationship 
between national and Union legal orders, i.e. general principles of EU law which are deduced 
from the nature of the EU. It is necessary to notice that the entire issue pertaining to the 
obligations imposed on national judges by EU law has been subject to an extensive academic 
attention and is, therefore, thoroughly explored in the academic writing.
164
  
 
2. Setting the scene: progressive Europeanisation of national private law 
 
As indicated before, it is the underlying premise of the present study that national laws are 
progressively Europeanised. The national legal systems and sources have mostly been affected 
in the process of harmonization through the adoption of EU regulations and directives 
pertaining to particular realms of substantive law.
165
 This process is also called positive 
harmonization since it introduces new provisions into national laws from the top.
166
 
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the ECJ has played an important role in the process of 
Europeanisation of national law since the Court can interpret EU law provisions by means of 
preliminary rulings. For this process the term of negative harmonization is sometimes used 
since ECJ’s case-law induces convergence across national legal systems by striking down 
national legislation that is at variance with EU law, abolishing the differences with regard to 
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 For an elaborate overview of the role of national courts with regard to EU law see Claes (2005); Koopmans 
(1993); Arnull (2006); Lenaerts et al (2006); Kornobis-Romanowska (2007); various authors in Wróbel (2005); 
O’Keeffe (2000); Prechal (2006), Koncewicz (2004), pp.78-80; Golub (2004); Sinaniotis (2006); Lang (1997b); 
Schermer&Waelbroeck (2001); Obradovic&Lavranos (2007); Jans et al (2007); Van Harten (2011), pp.23-59.  
165
 In accordance with Article 288 TFEU (ex. Art. 249 EC), a regulation is a measure of general application 
which is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States whereas a directive binds those 
Member States to which it is addressed and only as to the results to be achieved. Directives always require 
implementing measures. As Prechal formulates it: “the very purpose of directives is their implementation in 
national law.” See Prechal (2006), p.131. 
166
 Two forms of this type of harmonization can be distinguished, that is minimum and maximum harmonization. 
With the former one, Member States can keep or adopt more stringent legislation which will go beyond the 
framework of law imposed by the Union. Minimum harmonization measures set only minimum standards with 
which the Member States must comply. They can however provide for optional provisions (higher standards) 
which Member States can but do not have to implement. Maximum harmonization, interchangeably called total 
or full harmonization, does not leave any margin of discretion to the Member States which are obliged to 
implement the measure in the exact meaning provided by it. Total harmonization has originally been achieved by 
means of regulations but at present also directives are used for that purpose. 
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interpretation of the Treaties and secondary EU measures, establishing minimum standards 
and removing barriers to the process of EU integration.
167
 
With this also the sphere of national private laws has undergone rapid transformation 
over the last two decades and has become one of the areas subjected to intense harmonization. 
It should be stressed that the EU’s encroachment on the realm of private law has been greatly 
sensitive an issue since private law remains, as such, within the national competences 
domain.
168
 This is reflective of the constitutional limitations of the legislative competences the 
EU enjoys in this field.
169
 It does not therefore come as a surprise that the issue of possibility 
of harmonization of national law in the private sphere has been controversially debated. And 
yet, national private laws which were hardly affected by EU legislation at the beginning of the 
European integration process, have eventually become a subject of profound convergence 
processes. The Union increasingly encroached on national civil laws by employing the 
arguments of the necessity of completion of the internal market, elimination of distortion of 
competition and obstacles to free cross-border trade and transaction in the EU or strengthening 
of consumer protection.
170
 From this brief discussion it becomes apparent why most of the 
measures enacted in the area of private law, especially contract law, are adopted under Article 
114 TFEU (ex 95 EC).
171
 At the same time it also explains why family law is arguably the 
only sphere of private law which has so far eluded harmonization processes in its entirety.
172
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 See Barnard&Deakin (2002); Hepple (2005), pp.193-224; Weatherill (2005), pp.2-3; Scharpf (1996), pp.15-
39.  
168
 Under the former Treaty regime, Art.3 EC Treaty did not include any action in the sphere of private laws as an 
objective of the Community. Also at present the Union does not have either exclusive or shared or supporting 
competences in the area of private law as such. It does however list the sphere of internal market, social policy or 
consumer protection under the field of shared competences, see Article 4 TFEU. For more on the situation before 
the Lisbon Treaty see Weatherill (2006), pp.89-103.  
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 See Weatherill (2001), pp.339-398 and Reich (2005), pp.383-407.  
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 Which were the primary objectives of the EC under the former Treaty regime and are now either exclusive or 
shared competences of the Union. The process of the so-called competence creep occupies much place in the 
academic writing, for an overview see Vogenauer&Weatherill (2005), pp.821-837. Some authors argues that the 
process of harmonization of private laws may indeed be perceived as one of the elements necessary to complete 
the achievement of a fully-fledged, internal market in the EU see Twigg-Flesner (2008), p.11 and Weatherill 
(2001), pp.346-350. It must be however acknowledged that the argument of the necessity of convergence of 
private laws for purposes of the internal market is debatable an issue and has been questioned ever since, see for 
instance Joerges (2004), pp.159-189. 
171
 Article 114 TFEU (ex Art.95 EC) introduced by the Single European Act in 1987, allows the Union to adopt 
measures for the approximation of the provisions which aim at the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market. The measures are to be adopted by qualified majority voting and in accordance with the co-decision 
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The ongoing process of convergence of national private laws has become in a short 
time one of the main points of political, legal and academic discourse in Europe. The 
Commission adopted several communications on European contract law.
173
 The most recent 
Green Paper of the Commission of 2010 puts forward seven instruments of European contract 
Law.
174
 Similarly, the European Parliament has adopted several resolutions on the possibility 
of harmonization of national private laws in which it was ascertained that harmonization of 
some parts of that law would be necessary to attain the objectives of the internal market
175
 or 
would even be essential for its existence.
176
 The demand for more unified private law rules for 
the whole EU entailed the emergence of the idea of uniform European private law in the form 
of non-binding instruments such as the European Civil Code, European Contract Law or the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
procedure which allows the European Parliament to exert considerable influence on measures being adopted. 
Before 1987 Art.94 EC was mostly used in order to adopt measures in private law area.  
172
 The lack of any EU harmonizing measures in the area of family law does not imply that there are no attempts 
at such actions at all. More recently an intense academic discussion with regard to the possibility of 
Europeanisation of family law has been taking place, for more see instance Boele-Woelki&Martiny (2007), 
pp.125-143 
173
 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract 
Law, COM (2001) 398 final, OJ C 225/1; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council. A more coherent European contract law. An Action plan, COM (2003) 68 final, OJ C 63/1; 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. European contract law and 
the revision of the acquis: the way forward, COM (2004) 651 final.  The first document was aimed at facilitating 
a fundamental discussion and consultation about possible development paths in the sphere of contract law across 
the EU. The second one is considered as a further step in the ongoing process of discussion on the developments 
in European Contract Law and the Common Frame of Reference. In the last document the Commission points 
out that further action is needed in order to improve the quality and coherence of acquis in the contract law 
sphere.  
174
 See Green Paper from the Commission on policy options towards a European Contract Law for consumers 
and businesses of 1 July 2010 COM (2010) 348 final. The options comprise of binding and non-binding 
instruments such as: publication of the results of the Expert Group on a Common Frame of Reference in the area 
of European Contract Law, creating an official “toolbox” for the legislator which  could be used as a reference 
tool by the Commission, Commission recommendation on European contract Law which would be addressed to 
the Member States, a Regulation setting up an optional instrument of European Contract Law, a directive on 
European Contract Law, a regulation establishing a European Contract Law, a regulation establishing a European 
Civil Code. The options were supposed to serve as a basis for public consultation of relevant stakeholders which 
run until 31 January 2011.  
175
 See for instance resolution A2-157/89 of the European Parliament on action to bring into line the private law 
of the Member States, OJ C 158/400 and resolution A3-0329/94 on the harmonization of certain sectors of the 
private law of the Member States, OJ C 205/518.  
176
 Resolution B5-0228, 0229-0230/2000, OJ C 377/326 at point 28. In one of his articles Smits attempts to apply 
elements of evolutionary theory to law and puts forward a thesis that the more unified/homogeneous the 
economy (environment) in the EU becomes, the more uniform private law will be. See Smits (2008), p.487.  
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Draft Common Frame of Reference.
177
 Not surprisingly, the feasibility and constitutionality of 
such tools is being put into question by some authors.
178
 
Leaving aside the question whether the EU has the competence to adopt generally 
binding legal measures aiming at complete harmonization and whether such measures are 
truly desirable at the European level, it must be emphasized that the Union has already unified 
or harmonized particular areas of national private laws mainly by means of several Treaty 
articles, numerous directives and regulations and through the case-law of the ECJ. European 
Union measures have affected the core elements of national private laws to such extent that it 
is generally accepted to speak of European Private Law.
179
 At present, EU directives pertain to 
a broad range of national legislation in the field of private law, such as for instance products 
liability, environmental damage, late payment in commercial transactions, general product 
safety or equal treatment in the workplace.
180
 Contract and tort law and consumer protection 
occupy the central position within the area of harmonized private law. In this domain partial 
harmonization has taken place with regard to, inter alia, contracts negotiated away from 
business premises, package travel contracts, unfair terms in consumer contacts, consumer 
credit contract, contracts with regard to immovable properties on a time-share basis, distance 
sale contracts, sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees contracts, self-employed 
commercial agents or liability for damages for defective products.
181
 Furthermore, the bulk of 
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 The issue is a very broad one and anything more than a passing reference to it goes beyond the scope of this 
work. There exist academic networks dealing with the problem, for instance Joint Network on European Private 
Law (CoPECL) associating such groups as the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group 
on the Existing EC Private Law, Acquis Group and Accademia dei Giusprivatisti Europei in Pavia. Also family 
law has gradually gained much attention, especially through the Commission on European Family Law (CEFL) 
which addresses the principles of that law in Europe. The literature on the subject is in abundance, for more see 
for example Vaquer (2008); Twigg-Flesner (2008); Hartkamp et al (2004); Hondius (2000), pp.385-416; Schulze 
(2005), pp.3-19; Keirse (2011), pp.34-51; Smits (2007), pp.219-240; Hesselink (2011), pp.441-469.  
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 See for instance Legrand (1996), pp.52-81; Legrand (1997), pp.44-63; Smits (2007), pp.226-227, Smits 
(2010), pp.26-40, see also discussion by various authors in Hartkamp et al (2004).  
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 See Smits (2004), pp.229-245, Schulze (2005), p.15.  
180
 More about the process of private law harmonization by means of directives in Müller-Graff (2004), pp.77-
100 and Keirse (2011), pp.42-45.  
181
 See for instance the following EU directives: Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products as amended by Directive 1999/34/EC; Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect 
the consumer in respect of contacts negotiated away from business premises; Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 
18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relating to self-employed commercial 
agents; Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
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EU directives pertain to labour law area and social security rules. In this domain, the issues of 
equal treatment of men and women, discrimination in workplace, protection of employees in 
case of the sale of an undertaking, posting of workers or collective redundancies occupy the 
central position.
182
 Commercial and company law, (intellectual) property law are also 
subjected to partial approximation. In the sphere of commercial and company law, Union rules 
concern for instance commercial agents, mergers and takeovers of assets or annual accounts of 
undertakings whereas in the field of intellectual property several directives concern 
semiconductors and software protection and trade mark law.
183
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
administrative provisions of the Member states concerning consumer credit as modified by Directive 90/88/EEC, 
98/7/EEC and 2008/48/EC; Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays 
and package tours; Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. For 
other relevant directives see Annex I.  
182
 See for instance the following EU directives: Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
September 2002; Council Directive 91/383/EC of 25 June 1991 supplementing the measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a 
temporary employment relationship; Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young 
people at work;  Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of 
discrimination based on sex; Council Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary 
pension rights of employed and self-employed persons moving within the Community; Directive 2000/43/EC of 
29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin; Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation; Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws 
of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, consolidating Directives 77/187/EC and 98/50/EC. For other 
relevant EU directives see Annex I.  
183
 See for instance the following EU directives: First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to 
approximate the laws of the Member states relating to trade marks; Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 
1991 on the legal protection of computer programs; Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on 
rental right and lending right and on certain related to copyrights in the field of intellectual property;  Directive 
96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases; 
Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of 
designs; Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty 
concerning mergers of public limited liability companies; Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 
1982 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, concerning the division of public limited liability companies; 
Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids; 
Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies. For other relevant EU directives see Annex I.  
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In addition to the above, EU regulations, which aim at the unification of laws, affect, 
inter alia, national civil procedure or social security laws to a certain extent.
184
 The rules 
applicable in civil procedures in cross-border litigations relating to for instance the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters or the service of (extra)judicial 
documents play a particularly important role in that regard.
185
 It might thus be inferred that 
European measures aim at harmonizing particular national civil procedural rules.
186
 A very 
special place is also occupied by European Union competition law which is covered under 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and several EU regulations and under Article 107 TFEU which 
concerns the issue of state aid.
187
 In order to grasp the dimension of the harmonization of 
national private laws a list of the most important EU acquis in the area is provided in Annex 
I.
188
 The annex, which is not intended to be exhaustive
189
, encompasses approximately 150 
                                                 
184
 See for instance the following EU regulations: Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 
on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community; Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000 on insolvency proceedings; Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation 
between the courts of the Member States in the taking evidence in civil or commercial matters; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE);  Council 
Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims; 
Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of 11 July 2007 of the Council and European Parliament establishing a European 
Small Claims Procedure; Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations . For other relevant EU regulations see Annex I.  
185
 The field of the judicial cooperation in civil matters in the EU is a relatively new legal phenomenon in 
European law which pertains to, by and large, questions of jurisdiction, conflict of laws, enforcement of 
judgments, service of judicial and extrajudicial documents, taking evidence. In the academic writing the concepts 
of European private international law or European civil procedure are used. See for instance: Dickinson (2005); 
Storskrubb (2008).  
186
 Several Community regulations in the field of civil procedure are based on Article 81 TFEU (ex 65 EC) which 
says that legal measures may be taken in the area of cooperation in civil and commercial matters with cross-
border effects as far as is required for the proper functioning of the internal market. For a through overview of 
procedural harmonization in the EU see Storskrubb (2008).  
187
 EU competition law has an extraordinary nature as the enforcement thereof is primary entrusted to the 
European Commission under Article 105 TFEU. However, since May 2004 also national authorities for 
competition and national courts are involved in the process of enforcement of EU competition law, see Council 
Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  
188
 For a list of most EU directives in the area of private law see for instance Müller-Graff (2004), pp.90-100 and 
Annex I to the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European 
Contract Law, COM(2001) 398 final, pp.19-44.  
189
 The areas which are listed in the Annex I are reflective of spheres of law the judges participating in the survey 
are adjudicating in.  
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EU directives and regulations covering different fields of private law and civil procedure and 
is a clear evidence of the immense influence of EU measures on national private laws.  
The foregoing brief analysis supports the observation that EU directives and 
regulations play a crucial role in the process of Europeanisation of private laws. And yet, it is 
well known that directives are written in general language, may contain gaps and many of 
them are ambiguous in their substance, definitions and concepts.
190
 This implies that the 
practical application of them is dependent upon the way they are interpreted. In that respect 
the ECJ has played a significant role in the process of further clarification of Union measures 
and shaping of European private law.
191
 At present, there is a large body of case law by the 
ECJ in the areas mentioned.
192
 In its jurisprudence the Court has attempted to clarify the scope 
of specific directives or regulations and explaining the notions of, for instance, consumer
193
, 
unfairness of contract terms
194
, refund of payments in the event of insolvency
195
, liability for 
defective products and rules on damages
196
, package holidays, travel and tours
197
 or product 
liability risk defence term.
198
 A great bulk of cases relates to the issue of equal treatment and 
gender discrimination in employment relationships and social security schemes
199
, 
                                                 
190
 See Twigg-Flesner (2008), p.107.  
191
 Ibid, pp.49-50. 
192
 For more check for instance Mak (2008) and Rott (2005), pp.6-17.  
193
 Case 361/89 Criminal proceedings against Patrice Di Pinto [1991] ECR I-1198.  
194
 Joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98C, Océano Grupo Editorial SA and others v. Salvat Editores SA and others 
[2000] ECR I-4941 and C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v. Ludger 
Hofstetter,Ulrike Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403.  
195
 Case C-178/94 Dillenkofer and others v. Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-4845.  
196
 C-168/00 Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG [2002] ECR I-2631 and C-203/99 Henning 
Veedfald v. Århus Amtskommune [2001] ECR I-3569.  
197
 Joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Erich Dillenkofer, Christian Erdmann, 
Hans-Jürgen Schulte, Anke Heuer, Werner, Ursula and Trosten Knor v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] 
ECR I-4845.  
198
 Case C-300/95 Commission v. UK [1997] ECR I-2649. 
199
 See for instance cases: 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena 
[1976] ECR 455, C-149/77 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1978] 
ECR 1365, C-177/88 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen 
(VJV-Centrum) Plus [1990] ECR I-3941, C-342/93 Joan Gillespie and others v. Northern Health and Social 
Services Boards, Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and 
Southern Health and Social Services Board [1996] ECR I-475.  Several important cases concern the issue of age 
discrimination in employment relationships, see for instance cases: C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm 
[2005] ECR I-9981, C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG [2010] ECR n.y.r., C-341/08 
Domnica Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe [2010] ECR  n.y.r.  
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organisation of working time
200
, protection of employees and transfer of undertakings.
201
 
Frequently, the ECJ is asked to interpret the EU regulations in the field of transborder 
cooperation and jurisdiction of courts for instance the Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.
202
  
Next to interpreting secondary EU law legislation, the Court has given direct 
horizontal effect to several provisions of EU primary law, such as for instance the freedom of 
services and persons, which in turn will directly bear on agreements concluded by private 
parties.
203
 Also, the Court frequently rules on general principles of Union law, such as for 
instance non-discrimination, equality, proportionality or the right to effective judicial 
protection, which may indirectly bear on the proceedings in civil cases and their outcomes.
204
 
All the above-discussed methods of Europeanisation of national legal systems are interacting 
with each other and have created a partially harmonized, multi-level private law system in the 
European Union.
205
 A system in which rules of national origin are intertwining with norms 
derived from EU law. As a matter of fact, the harmonization processes at the Union’s level 
brought about a partition of private laws at the national level.
206
 It is argued that the system 
which has been established resembles a patchwork and is not necessarily deemed coherent and 
consistent.
207
 The so-called piecemeal or fragmentary approach to the process of 
                                                 
200
 See case C-84/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of the European Union 
[1996] ECR I-5755, C-303/98 Sindicato de Médicos de Asistencia Pública (Simap) v. Conselleria de Sanidad y 
Consumo de la Generalidad Valenciana [2000] ECR I-7963. 
201
 See for instance cases C-499/04 Hans Werhof v. Freeway Traffic Systems GmbH & Co. KG [2006] ECR I-
2397 and C-466/07 Dietmar Klarenberg  v. Ferrotron Technologies GmbH [2009] ECR I-0000. For a general 
overview of cases in the realm of labour law check Sciarra (2001).  
202
 The number of preliminary references from national courts on the interpretation and scope of application of 
the said Regulation is abundant, see for instance case C-111/08 SCT Industri AB i likvidation v. Alpenblume AB 
[2009] ECR I-0000.  
203
 See Keirse (2011), p.46 
204
 Ibid.  
205
 For a broad overview of the manner in which European law influence individual national private laws see for 
instance Hartkamp et al (2007).  
206
 See Joerges (2004), p.168 and Hesselink (2002), pp.37-44.   
207
 Smits puts forward that the system of European Private Law is fragmentary, arbitrary, inconsistent and 
ineffective and does not achieve the creation of a satisfactory level playing field for private enterprises in the EU. 
See Smits (2007), p.225. It should also be emphasized that directives may be incoherent between themselves for 
they are often prepared by different General Directorates of the European Commission, see Hesselink (2002), 
p.43. 
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harmonization
208
 that pertains to particular and discrete aspects of private law in combination 
with specific features of that law and peculiarity of every national legal system may arguably 
lead to situations when a correct implementation, application or enforcement of EU law may 
be impeded.  
 
3. Europeanisation of national law: potential consequences for national 
judiciaries  
 
In view of the foregoing it becomes evident that EU law has crept in the sphere of private 
relations and conferred, directly or indirectly, various rights on, inter alia, consumers, 
employees or undertakings. Those rights go hand in hand with numerous duties which are 
imposed on the respective parties. In situations when those rights are breached or the 
obligations are not met a dispute will very likely be heard and decided by a national judge 
adjudicating in the private law area.  
As it has already been illustrated the greater part of measures in the field of private law 
is adopted in the form of directives which in many instances touch upon various core concepts 
of national law in the field of for instance contract or labour law. Pursuant to Article 288 
TFEU (ex 249 EC) Member States are expected to transpose directives into their own legal 
systems in accordance with their own constitutional rules. Hence, the application and 
enforcement of EU legislation in the area of private law depends upon national transposition 
and implementation of directives into domestic legal systems. In fact, the progressive 
Europeanisation of national private laws implies that national judges adjudicating in this area 
deal with national norms introduced in order to implement EU law, or more precisely EU 
directives, on a daily basis. Arguably, in most cases a national judge will apply those 
originally EU law norms, i.e. national norm introduced in order to implement EU provision, 
automatically.
209
 It may therefore be inferred that national judges in various Member States 
                                                 
208
 See Van Gerven (2004), p.525 and Smits (2007), p.225.  
209
 A directive is most often implemented into different parts of national civil code. Sometimes it may be partly 
implemented into a code and partly in separate statutes. See for instance Hesselink (2006), pp.59-69 and next 
chapter on the discussion on the implementation of EU directives into the Polish private law system.  
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apply various and often divergent legal provisions which in fact have their roots in one and the 
same EU measure.
210
 Alternatively, the national judge might be asked to enforce directly 
applicable provisions of EU regulations. 
In view of the preceding discussion, it should yet be observed that the process of the 
national transposition of EU directives is a difficult and technically complex one and requires 
much care and workload on the part of a national legislator. Also, political factors may 
influence the processes of implementation of EU directives.
211
 It is thus by no means 
surprising that directives are well-known from being implemented incorrectly or belatedly.
212
 
The central concern arises therefore in situations when it is put forward that a directive is not 
correctly implemented or not implemented at all. Further difficulties may be provoked by the 
fact that the correct application of an EU directive or regulation depends upon the way its 
provisions are interpreted since, for instance, the terminology and concepts enshrined therein 
may be broad, not sufficiently defined or ambiguous. In that sense, EU law sources may also 
play a soft role in the process of adjudication, as an interpretative aid or a supplementary or 
                                                 
210
 See for more Tin Tai&Teuben (2008), p.835. 
211
 There is a very broad range of academic, mostly political science, writing in that respect. Various authors 
point to distinct variables which may influence the process of EU directives transposition, see for instance 
Lampinen&Uusikylä (2007), pp.237-240 who point to the factors such as stable political culture, high public 
support for the EU, interests groups and efficient political institutions; Falkner at al (2007) who illustrate that 
administrative shortcomings, issue linkage or problems with interpretation may influence the transposition 
processes; Knill (1998) who points to the problem of low political attention and pressure with regard to the 
processes of transposition; see also Haas (1998); Versluis (2004) and Mastenbroek (2003). By and large, the 
authors argue that the implementation process differ greatly between the Member States but also across policy 
domains.  
212
 See for instance Prechal (1994), p.7. In its Annual Reports on the Monitoring the Application of 
Community/EU law, the Commission constantly claims that the proper and timely transposition of EU directives 
remains a problematic issue for the Member States. The statistics included in the annual reports are very telling 
in that respect. In 2007 there were 1196 events of non-communication of national measures transposing EU 
directives to the Commission, see 25
th
 Annual Report from the Commission on monitoring the application of 
Community law (2007) Statistical Annex I to III, COM(2008) 777, SEC(2008) 2855, p. 3, in 2010 the number 
decreased to 855, see Letters of formal notice for non-communication sent by country 2010 to be found at: 
ec.europa.eu/eu_law/docs/docs_directives/lfn_ms_2010.pdf (last accessed 20 August 2011)  It should be borne in 
mind that this numbers concern non–communication situations whereas in practice it is impossible to detect all 
instances of an incorrect application. See also information on the measures taken by the national authorities in 
each Member State to incorporate EU directives into their national law to be found at: 
ec.europa.eu/community_law/directives/directives_communication_en.htm (last accessed 13 May 2009) and 
Progress in notification of national measures implementing all adopted directives at: 
ec.europa.eu/eu_law/docs/docs_directives/mne_country_20091124_en.pdf (last accessed 20 August 2011). The 
last document shows that Poland has one of the lowest rates of notifications from among all the Member States 
with only Luxembourg, Italy and Greece doing worse.  
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subsidiary legal argument supporting the line of reasoning or allowing to re-construct the 
meaning of national provisions.
213
 In addition to the above, it may also be claimed that a 
national provision is not compatible with a Treaty provision, i.e. it contravenes one of the 
freedoms of the internal market or a fundamental principle of EU law such as non-
discrimination or proportionality.  
These are but a few eventualities which implicate that the seemingly straightforward 
task performed by national judges in their daily practice becomes much more intricate when a 
question of EU law arises in a dispute. However, what really makes this task complex is the 
fact that in situations when an EU law element appears in a case, distinct judicial mechanisms 
ought to be applied. For instance, a national judge is expected to enforce a directly effective 
EU provision and give precedence to an EU law provision or, more likely in the context of 
private law, interpret national law in the light of Union law. This may also possibly involve 
the necessity of referring a preliminary question to the ECJ. The subsequent part of this work 
takes as its point of departure this dimension of the Europeanisation process, that is to say the 
factual legal expectations which are put on national judges by means of EU law.  
 
4. Responsibilities of national judges following from EU primary law  
 
In view of the seemingly significant role which is put on the national judiciaries by EU law it 
is rather surprising that only one provision of EU Treaties, that is to say Article 267 TFEU (ex 
Art. 234 EC) directly refers to national courts. This provision, which will be a subject of 
separate considerations
214
, does not reflect the virtual position of national courts in the judicial 
architecture of the Union though.
215
 Next to Article 267 TFEU, there are two other provisions 
that refer to national courts in an indirect way. Those are the second sentence of Article 19 (1) 
TEU, which was introduced only recently by the Treaty of Lisbon, according to which the 
Member States are responsible for providing effective judicial protection and Article 4 (3) 
TEU (ex Art. 10 EC) which enshrines the general principle of loyalty. Both of them embrace 
                                                 
213
 See Bobek (2006), p.266.  
214
 See section 8 of the present chapter.  
215
 See Maher (1994), p.231.  
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obligations which are of a very general but constitutive nature for the functioning of national 
courts and shall, therefore, be investigated in more detail.  
The second sentence of Article 19 (1) TEU stipulates that “Member States shall 
provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union 
law”.216 The introduction of this article into the system of the Treaties finally codified and 
enhanced, though only partially
217
, a broad line of jurisprudence of the ECJ which related to 
the obligation of the Member States, and consequently their courts, to ensure effective judicial 
protection of the rights individuals derive from EU law and finally filled in the legislative 
lacuna which existed in this field for many decades.
218
 It should also be observed that the 
principle of effective judicial protection is very closely interwoven with the principle of 
national procedural autonomy and effectiveness which will be discussed in the later sections 
of this chapter.
219
 Since the principle as such was not enshrined in the Treaties at the moment 
of the empirical part of the present study it seems necessary to briefly look into the origins of 
it. 
The principle of effective judicial protection implies that the Member States must 
assure access to national courts. Those, in turn, are expected to effectively protect the rights 
individuals derive from EU law. In the case Johnston the Court clearly pointed out that all 
persons have the right to an effective judicial remedy if their rights stemming from EU law are 
infringed. In view of the ECJ, the task of ensuring effective judicial review relied upon the 
Member States and was a reflection of a general principle of law which underpins the 
                                                 
216
 See Barents (2010), p.715 for a brief overview of legislative history of the article.  
217
 See Arnull (2011), p.68. The author claims that the article should be included at the end of Art. 4(3) TEU 
since it seems misplaced as part of Art. 19 TEU which, as a matter of fact, regards the institutional architecture of 
the EU and the role of the ECJ within it, see note 19 of the article, p.53.  
218
 See Barents (2010).  
219
 In accordance with Jans et al  the principle of effective judicial protection should be seen as an extension of 
the principle of effectiveness of EU law, see Jans et al (2007), p.51. See also the discussion in Prechal (2006), 
p.143 and Prechal (1997), p.4 where the author claims that the principle of effectiveness and effective judicial 
protection are not fully equivalent. Others claim that the principle as an emanation of the principle of 
effectiveness, see Miąsik, Zasada proporcjonalności w prawie wspólnotowym i jej zastosowanie przez sądy 
krajowe [in] Wróbel (2005), p.324. In view of those opinions, the fact that the Court held that the principle of 
effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States is somewhat confusing, see case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, para.18. In its recent judgment the Court stated, in turn, that the 
principle of effectiveness constitutes part of the principle of effective judicial protection, see joined cases C-
317/08 to C-320/08 Rosalba Alassini and others v. Telecom Italia SpA and others [2010] ECR n.y.r., para.49.  
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constitutional traditions of the Member States and is enshrined in articles 6 and 13 of the 
ECHR.
220
 The judgment carried several important implications. It established access to the 
courts as a fundamental principle common to all Member States. Anybody whose rights 
stemming from EU law are infringed has the right to seek and obtain an effective remedy in a 
competent court which must be independent and impartial.
221
 The principle does not only 
concern situations when an individual directly relies on EU provisions but also situations 
when national implementing provisions are concerned. Thus, if a properly implemented 
directive does intend to regulate the issue of effective protection, the Member States are still 
obliged to ensure that the rights an individual can derive from the directive can be protected in 
a judicial process.
222
 The right to effective judicial protection as pointed out by the Court is 
thus of a very general nature and applies to situations when legal decisions of national 
authorities which aim at applying EU law are in question.
223
 The requirement to establish 
effective review procedures has become a frequent issue in the jurisprudence of the ECJ, be it 
in relation to discriminatory treatment of employees or assessment of the facts and 
evidence.
224
 From the preceding brief summary it follows that that the content of the right to 
effective judicial review as established by the ECJ is not well-defined and explicit.
225
 
Furthermore, it is by no means easy to predict when the Court will utilize the principle of 
                                                 
220
 Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston, paras.18-19. See also cases: C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli v. Commission 
[1992] ECR I-6313, para.14; C-424/99 Commission v. Austria [2001] ECR I-9285, para.45; C-50/00 P Unión de 
Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the European Union [2002] ECR I-6677, para.39; C-467/01 Ministero delle 
Finanze v. Eribrand SpA [2003] ECR I-6471, para.61.  
221
 Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v. Persons Unknown [1987] ECR 2545, para.7; case C-17/00 François De Coster 
v. Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445, para.17 and case C-506/04 
Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg [2006] ECR I-8613, paras.48-54 where the 
Court extensively elaborates on the notions of independence and impartiality.  
222
 From Prechal (2006), p.143.  
223
 See case C-327/02 Lili Georgieva Panayotova and others v. Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 
[2004] ECR I-11055, para.27.  
224
 Case C-120/97 Upjohn Ltd v. The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 and Others 
[1999] ECR I-223, paras. 33-36; case C-92/00 Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik Planungs- GmbH (HI) v. 
Stadt Wien [2002] ECR I-5553, para.52 and case C-187/95 Belinda Jane Coote v. Granada Hospitality Ltd 
[1998] ECR I-5199, paras.22-24. In case Verholen the Court employed the principle of effectiveness and 
effective judicial protection in order to interfere with Dutch rules on locus standi. The plaintiff's wife had no 
standing to participate in the proceedings under Dutch law. Nevertheless, the Court extended the scope of the 
directive in issue to other persons who “may have a direct interest in ensuring that the principle of non-
discrimination is respected as regards persons who are protected”, see joined cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-
89/90 A. Verholen and others v. Sociale Verzekeringsbank Amsterdam [1991] ECR I-3757, paras.23 and 25. 
225
 See Ward (2007), p.175. Arnull refers to the principle of effective judicial protection as to “an unruly horse”, 
see Arnull (2011), p.51.  
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effective judicial protection in an individual case. It is yet evident that for the national courts 
the principle of effective judicial protection is of very general and fundamental nature and 
implies that they are expected to effectively protect the rights individuals derive from EU law 
and to ensure adequate remedies if those rights are breached.  
Likewise, the principle of loyalty/loyal cooperation, which determines the relations 
between the EU and its Members, is recognized as one of the fundamental, constitutional 
principles underpinning the existence of the Union.
226
 The indirect nature of the loyalty 
provision has not withheld the ECJ from greatly relying on it in order to expand the range of 
the obligations and duties of the Member States in relation to EU law.
227
 The ECJ started to 
employ this provision from the 1980s and ever since it has extensively employed this principle 
in order to expand the range of the obligations and tasks of the Member States in relation to 
EU law.
228
 The principle imposes obligations on the national public authorities to undertake 
any action necessary to secure the fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty or resulting 
from an action of the Union. Furthermore, Member States are obliged to refrain from any 
action that could impair the accomplishment of the aims and objectives of the Treaty. The 
principle of loyal cooperation and good faith is addressed to the Members States in general 
and has been interpreted as covering all the organs of the State, i.e. it applies to legislative, 
executive, administrative and judicial authorities across all layers.
229
 The provision is broad 
and may bear various implications for national authorities in the process of the application and 
interpretation of EU law.
230
 This, in turn, has profound consequences for the functioning of 
national courts in their European capacity as the principle of loyal cooperation is claimed to 
                                                 
226
 See Jans et al (2007), pp.37-41; Lang (2008), pp.75-76. 
227
 See Maher (1994), p.231.  
228
 See ibid and Hinton (1999), pp.344-347. Often it is claimed that the ECJ uses the article too often, too zealous 
if not too impudent and for political choices. Gormley claims that the article has become the most dynamic 
provision of the Treaty employed by the ECJ, see Gormley, Some further reflections on the development of 
general principles of law within article 10 EC [in] Bernitz et al (2008), p.303. 
229
 See for instance case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] 
ECR 1891, para.26 or case C-2/88 Imm J. J. Zwartveld and others [1990] ECR I-3365, paras.17-18. And yet, the 
provision is not one-sided. It applies to the Union institutions as well and obliges them to cooperate with the 
Member States and between each other. Likewise, it requires from the Member States to loyally cooperate with 
each other. 
230
 Hinton (1999), p.320.  
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constitute the ground for most of the judicial enforcement of EU law.
231
 In that sense, the 
principle of loyalty does not create a specific duty in itself but it overarches all other 
obligations of national courts in relation to EU law. Many of the consequences of the 
provision are not substantive but of a procedural character and they primary concern national 
courts.
232
  
From the foregoing account it follows that the Treaty is not intended to regulate the 
tasks of national courts with relation to EU law in more detail. Leaving aside the mechanism 
of the preliminary ruling, the Treaty does not provide for any explicit rules and mechanisms 
based on which EU law can be invoked by individuals and should be applied by national 
judges. The tasks and competences of national courts have only been defined and established 
as a consequence of the case law of the Court of Justice, that is to say they are all judge made 
law. It was only the European Courts of Justice which, step by step, established that national 
judges are responsible for the application of EU law and explicated to national judges how 
they are supposed to apply EU law and which tools they are expected to utilize. In the 
academic writing, the duties of national courts are sometimes classified as belonging to either 
the first or second generation obligations groups.
233
 The first generation principles created the 
obligation for national courts to apply EU law, either directly or indirectly. Thus, the 
principles such as supremacy, direct effect or the obligation to interpret national law in the 
                                                 
231
 Lang (2008), pp.77 and 89-92; Lang (2006), pp.476-477; Lang (1997a), p.70. The author proclaims article 
4(3) TFEU to constitute the basis for many other constitutional principles of EU law. Following the author’s 
argumentation, most of the general duties imposed on national courts, for instance the duty to provide effective 
protection for rights derived from EU law, the duty to set aside national laws incompatible with EU law, the duty 
to interpret national law in the light of EU law, the duty to award compensation in cases of infringement of EU 
law by national public authorities and the duty to raise point of EU law of the court’s own motion, to name just a 
few, are underpinned by the principle of loyalty. 
232
 Lang (2008), p.110.  
233
 As a matter of fact, the term “second generation” was employed for the first time by De Wilmars (1981), 
p.379. For more check Claes (2004), p.103. Some authors use the word constitutional for the first generation 
issue since they are derived from the most crucial legal principles that are underpinning the entire legal system of 
the Union. See also Postulski, Sądy państw członkowskich jako sądy wspólnotowe [in] Wróbel (2005), pp.410-
473 and Prechal (1994), p.150.  In turn, Bermann applies the terms of first, second and third generation fidelity 
challenges, see Bermann (2008), pp.525-530. In accordance with this typology the first generation fidelity 
challenge encompasses primacy, direct effect and the use of the preliminary reference procedure. The second 
generation fidelity problems relate to effectiveness of EU law and operation of that law in practice. In that 
respect they concern rules on national procedural autonomy but also state liability. Third generation fidelity 
problems pertain to the application of the interpretations provided by the ECJ in the preliminary reference 
procedure or the compliance with the obligations of harmonious interpretation.  
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light of EU law must be mentioned. The second generation problems refer to the rule of 
effectiveness of EU law under national systems of judicial protection and availability of 
proper remedies in national legal systems. To be more specific, they pertain to the issue of 
practical possibility of the enforcement of the right that individuals derive from EU law. 
Somewhere in between those groups the obligations attached to the principle of state liability 
in damages for infringements of EU law and the consequences thereof for the functioning of 
national courts should be placed.
234
 Finally, the story of the role of national courts is 
completed by the preliminary reference procedure and the roles national judges play within it.  
 
5. The obligation to ensure supremacy and direct effect of EU law  
 
Two central principles which explain the position of national courts vis-à-vis EU law and their 
function with regard to it are the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. Not only are both 
principles the most constitutive for the nature of EU law and its relationship with national law 
but they are also two cardinal principles for the functioning of national courts in their EU 
capacity. On the one hand, they are powerful tools in the hands of individuals and, on the 
other hand, they empower national courts by conferring on them competences which they 
would normally not have under national law. In a nutshell, the principle of supremacy read in 
conjunction with the principle of direct effect implicate that national courts are under the 
obligation to recognize and enforce directly effective EU law provisions when national 
provisions are in conflict with them. Those national provisions which are incompatible with 
EU law provisions must be set aside. The preceding synopsis does not reflect the whole 
meaning of both principles though. It is therefore necessary to look in more detail into the 
rationale standing behind both doctrines.  
                                                 
234
 It is rather difficult to clearly classify the rule of state liability for, on the one hand, it has been called a general 
principle of EU law and, on the other hand, it is very closely related to the issue of effectiveness of EU law. In 
the present study the principle of state liability is addressed from the perspective of possible consequences of 
incompliance of national courts with the normative expectations imposed on them by EU law.  
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The principle of supremacy and direct effect of EU law were established by the ECJ in 
several landmark cases.
235
 From the chronological point of view, direct effect was established 
earlier in the aforementioned Van Gend&Loos case.
236
 It is yet the principle of supremacy of 
EU law which is perceived to be a fundamental one for the maintenance and survival of the 
legal order of the Union
237
 and which is seen as a necessary precondition of direct effect.
238
  
The principle of supremacy of EU law was established by the ECJ in its Costa v. 
E.N.E.L ruling in which the Court stated that the Treaty, being an independent source of law, 
cannot be overridden by national laws.
239
 The general assumption underlying the 
argumentation of the ECJ is the premise that EU creates its own legal system which becomes 
an integral part of national legal systems and the efficacy of it would be undermined if 
national law could take precedence over the law of the EU. The principle became a frequent 
subject matter of the jurisprudence of the ECJ and in the course of time was more precisely 
defined and deepened. In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case the Court established 
that any national provision, also one of constitutional nature, cannot take precedence over EU 
law in the case of incompatibility.
240
 The principle was given an added dimension in the 
Simmenthal judgment in which the Court established that national court must accordingly set 
aside any provisions of national law which may conflict with EU law whether prior or 
subsequent to the establishment of the respective European rule.
241
 From the foregoing 
                                                 
235
 Declaration No 17 attached to the Lisbon Treaty recalls that primary and secondary EU law take primacy over 
the laws of the Member States. It is yet debatable what the binding nature of the declaration is. The author does 
not agree with Beck (2011), pp.471-472 who claims that by means of the aforementioned declaration the 
principle of supremacy of EU law has been codified in the Lisbon Treaty.  
236
 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend&Loos v. Netherlands Inland 
Revenu Administration [1963] ECR 1. 
237
 See Timmermans, Application of Community law by national courts: (limits) to direct effect and supremacy 
[in] Jansen et al (1997), p.35.  
238
 The ECJ first established the principle of direct effect and only 2 years later it ruled on primacy. As Prechal 
observed: “Although direct effect and supremacy often go hand in hand, they are two separate concepts”, see 
Prechal (1994), p.121.  
239
 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L [1964] ECR 585, part on the submission that the Court was obliged to 
apply the national law.  
240
 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125, para.3.  
241
 See case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 585, paras.14, 16, 
16, 21 and 24. That case-law has been reaffirmed on several occasions, see for instance: C-159/91 Criminal 
proceedings against Jean-Claude Levy [1993] ECR I-4287, para.9; C-347/96 Solred SA v. Administración 
General del Estado [1998] ECR I-937, para.30. 
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discussion, it is clear that the ECJ provided no room for leeway for national bodies and courts. 
National courts are under the obligation to apply directly effective EU provisions when they 
are in conflict with national laws. Those national provisions which are incompatible with EU 
law provisions must be set aside.  
This system of obligations soon proved to be rather troublesome for it required from 
national courts to execute tasks and jurisdiction which they would normally not exercise under 
national law or which would as a matter of fact go much beyond their constitutional 
competences and were not necessarily in accordance with the standing legal traditions.
242
 This 
situation has become most evident in the Factortame case which arose out of a situation when, 
in accordance with national rules, there was no competence for English courts to grant interim 
relief to the applicants. In accordance with the claim of the applicant such situation was in 
breach of EU law. The ECJ was adamant in its attitude towards the issue of supremacy of EU 
law and decided the case in favour of the applicants. In accordance with the words of the 
Court, any national rule which may impede the full effect of Union law must be set aside by 
the national court.
243
 Importantly, the fact that such a rule should be set aside neither implies 
its nullification nor does it prevent its application in disputes that fall outside the scope of EU 
law. In the IN.CO.GE ’90 case the ECJ rejected the argument that the provisions found 
incompatible with EU law should be treated as non-existent. Put differently, domestic courts 
are obliged to disapply an incompatible national rule which is however not equivalent to 
rendering that rule null and void.
244
 From all the above it can thus be concluded that 
supremacy of EU law is based on the notion of supremacy in application.
245
 Finally, the 
functioning of the principle of supremacy is closely connected to the direct effect of the 
provision an individual wishes to rely on. This, as will be illustrated in the subsequent section, 
very much depends on the nature of that provision which might be different depending on the 
legal sources it is enshrined in.  
                                                 
242
 See Lasser (2009), p.248.  
243
 Case C-213/89 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] 
ECR I-2433, paras.20-22  
244
 Joined cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v. IN.CO.GE.'90 et al [1998] ECR I-6307, paras.18-
21.  
245
 See Kwiecień (2005), p.1485.  
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The principle of direct effect as enshrined in the Van Gend&Loos case implies that EU 
law is an autonomous legal order which automatically constitutes an integral part of the legal 
orders of the Member States.
246
 In consequence, EU law can independently confer rights on 
individuals and allows them to directly rely on Union’s norms in the disputes before national 
courts, provided that specified conditions are met.
247
 National courts are, in turn, obliged to 
give effect to those rights. The principle of direct effect was very widely elaborated upon in 
the Simmenthal case, in which the Court stated in a straightforward manner that in the context 
of judicial application of Community law direct effect signifies that EU law must be fully and 
uniformly applied by every national court whose obligation is to protect in its entirety the 
rights conferred on individuals by EU law.
248
 This approach presented by the ECJ carries 
substantive practical implications for national courts. It requires national judges to enable 
individuals to rely on EU law, that is to say the EU provisions are applied and consequently 
the rights of individuals flowing from EU law are protected.
249
  
The foregoing synopsis does not reflect the full essence of the principle of direct effect 
though.
250
 What is more, the basic premise that provisions of EU law be directly effective 
does not implicate that all EU provisions are capable of producing such effect. In order for a 
primary or secondary law provision to be directly effective it must satisfy certain conditions, 
i.e. it must be clear, precise and unconditional.
251
 Those conditions do however have different 
and intricate implications for different sources of EU law and they have undergone a 
                                                 
246
 Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend&Loos v. Netherlands Inland 
Revenu Administration [1963] ECR 1, part II, point B.  
247
 See Jans et al (2007), p.63.  
248
 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 585, paras.14, 16 and 
21.  
249
 In case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839, paras.31-32 the Court broaden 
the meaning of the direct effect and included also national administrative bodies in the group of bodies that must 
apply directly effective EU provisions, so called administrative direct effect. See also cases: C-431/92 
Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [1995] ECR I-2189, C-224/97 Erich 
Ciola v. Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517, paras.29-33. For more check Prechal (2000), pp.1049-1051.  
250
 See Craig&De Búrca (2003), pp.178-179, “(…) the concept of direct effect is not straightforward. Academic 
and even judicial uncertainty remains about the exact meaning and scope of the term.” To make the issue even 
more obscure broad and narrow definitions of the principle can be distinguished. Furthermore, there exists a 
distinction between the notions of direct application and direct effect. In Van Gend en Loos the ECJ provided for 
a broad interpretation of the principle, simply stating that EU law can be invoked before national courts. The 
narrow, also called subjective, interpretation of the principle puts the impact on the ability of EU provisions to 
provide individuals with rights that can be protected before national courts. 
251
 Case 26/62 van Gend&Loos, part II, point B.  
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substantial evolution over the years. Hence, in order to grasp the essence of the obligations 
imposed on national courts by the principle of direct effect it is indispensable to consider 
particular sources of EU law separately.  
 
5.1. Ensuring direct effect of Treaty provisions  
 
Whereas there is no provision in the Treaty which would stipulate that its provisions can be 
relied upon by individuals before national courts, in the Van Gend&Loos judgment the ECJ 
ruled on the Article 30 TFEU (ex Article 12 EC) could be invoked and relied upon before 
national courts by individuals under specific conditions. What emerged is that a provision of 
the Treaty is capable of producing direct effect if it is clear and unconditional
252
, it enshrines a 
negative obligation (obligation to refrain from certain actions), it does not depend on national 
implementation and contains no reservations in relation to the Member States.
253
 In case 
Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging the Court ascertained that a Treaty provision is 
sufficiently precise to be applied by the court where the obligation which it imposes is set out 
in unambiguous terms.
254
 Put crudely, in a situation when a party relies on a Treaty provision 
which is clear, sufficiently precise and intends to create rights and duties, a national judge is 
obliged to apply that provision and safeguard the rights flowing from it. 
This brief analysis answers one question but raises another one. The Treaty is formally 
addressed to the Member States and consequently the foregoing considerations concern 
situations when a person relies on a Treaty provision in a dispute against public authorities, in 
so-called vertical situations. It remains however debatable whether a national court is expected 
to ensure direct effect of a Treaty article in a dispute between two individuals, that is to say in 
horizontal situations. In case Defrenne II the Court ruled that a Treaty provision may provide 
                                                 
252
 In case 28/67 Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1968] ECR 143, p.152. the Court 
concluded that a provision is unconditional where it is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the taking 
of any measure either by the institutions of the Union or by the Member States. In a nutshell, the provision must 
not leave any leeway to the Member States and no additional legal acts are necessary. 
253
 In the course of time, the ECJ gradually loosened the above-mentioned criteria by ruling that some of the 
Treaty provisions which require additional executive instrument (positive obligations) are also capable of 
producing direct effect, see cases: 57/65 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Sarrelouis [1965] ECR 210 and 
2/74 Jean Reyners v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 631, para.32.  
254
 Case 71/85 Netherlands v. Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging [1986] ECR 3855, para.20.  
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direct rights and duties also with regard to disputes between two individuals.
255
 Similar 
decisions were taken in cases Bosman, Angonese and Courage, to name just a few.
256
 The 
Treaty is yet drafted in a general language and regulates a wide range of issues. Consequently, 
from the practical point of view, every time an individual wishes to rely on a Treaty provision 
a national judge will have to undertake a test examining whether the article in question meets 
the conditions of direct effect as provided by the ECJ.
257
 In such situations, the case-law of the 
ECJ comes to the aid for a great deal of Treaty articles has already been scrutinized by the 
Court as to their ability to produce direct effect.
258
  
 
5.2. Limited obligation to secure direct effect of international agreements 
 
International agreements concluded by the EU constitute an integral part of Union’s law259 
and occupy place between primary and secondary EU law.
260
 Traditionally, international 
                                                 
255
 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] ECR 455, 
para.39.  
256
 Case C-415/95 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and others v. Bosman and others 
[1995] ECR 4291 where the Court ruled that Article 45 TFEU (ex 39 EC) has a horizontal direct effect, case C-
281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] ECR 4139, paras.34-35 where the Court 
held that Article 54 TFEU (ex 48 EC) applies to private parties as well; case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v. Bernard 
Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd and Others [2001] ECR 6297, paras.23-25 where the Court has held 
that Articles 102 TFEU (ex 82 EC) produce direct effects in relations between individuals and create rights for 
the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard. See also case 36/74 B.N.O. Walrave and 
L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cycliste internationale, Koninklijke Nederlandsche Wielren Unie and 
Federación Española Ciclismo [1974] ECR 1405, paras.17-19 concerning article 45 TFEU.   
257
 Such test may go much beyond a simple assessment of examining whether the provision is clear and 
unconditional and may also involve the evaluation of various factors, for instance economic factors, see case 
27/77 Firma Fink-Frucht GmbH v. Hauptzollamt München-Landsbergerstrasse [1978] ECR 223, p.232.  
258
 See for instance cases: C-390/98 H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd v. The Coal Authority [2001] ECR I-6117, paras.53 
and 67 where the Court ruled that Art.93(3) of the EC Treaty (now Art.108 (3) TFEU) has no direct effect; case 
126/86 Fernando Roberto Giménez Zaera v. Institut Nacional de la Seguridad Social and Tesorería General de 
la Seguridad Social [1987] ECR 3697, paras.10-11 where the Court ruled out direct effect of Art.2 of the TEU 
(now Art.3 of the TEU); case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v. Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-143, para.61 where the Court ruled that Art.43 EC (now 
Art.49 TFEU) is capable of conferring rights on a private undertaking; case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I -11767, para.97, where Art.49 EC (now Art.56 TFEU) was 
held to have direct effect. Check also Schermers&Waelbroeck (2001), pp.183-185, who list Treaty articles 
having and not having direct effect at that point in time.   
259
 See case 181/73 R. & V. Haegeman v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 00499.  
260
 See case C-61/94 Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany [1996] ECR I-
03989, para.52. It should yet not be forgotten that the system of Treaties does not, in fact, address the issue of 
place of international law within EU law and the issue is a very complex one. See also Lavranos (2010), p.122.  
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agreements and treaties bind only the states and organizations that are party to them. The ECJ 
has however held that under certain circumstances international agreements can also produce 
direct effect in relation to individuals. Similarly to other sources of EU law, provisions of 
international agreements must be sufficiently precise, clear and unconditional to be directly 
effective.
261
 In the International Fruit case, the Court established that in order for provisions 
of international agreement to be directly effective, the spirit, the general scheme and the terms 
of the agreement must be considered by the national court.
262
 Consequently, the Court found 
that the relevant provision of the GATT agreement which was in question was not directly 
effective.
263
 In the Kupferberg case the Court ruled that the issue of direct effect of an 
agreement should be decided on the grounds of the text, the framework and the purpose of the 
agreement.
264
 In its subsequent jurisprudence the Court repeatedly denied direct effect of the 
provisions of GATT, WTO and TRIPs agreements
265
 but recognized direct effect of the 
provisions of the EEA agreement
266
 and the Association Agreements.
267
 Interestingly, the 
Court held that not only the provisions of association agreements but also provisions of the 
acts of bodies created for purposes of that associations can be directly effective.
268
 It can be 
concluded from the foregoing that the Court applied the conditions for direct effect to 
international agreements more rigorously than in case of other sources of law whereby only 
                                                 
261
 See case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] ECR 3719, para.14. 
262
 Case 21-24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] 
ECR 1219, para.20.  
263
 The Court concluded that the agreement is characterized by great flexibility of its provisions, the possibility of 
derogation, suspension and withdrawal from the agreement and for that reason it is not capable of being directly 
effective. See paragraphs 20-27 of the judgment.  
264
 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A [1982] ECR 3641, paras.20-26. In this 
judgment the Court found the provisions of the agreement directly effective. 
265
 See for instance cases: 9/73 Carl Schlüter v. Hauptzollamt Lörrach [1973] ECR 1135, C-469/93 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Chiquita Italia SpA [1995] ECR I-4553; C-149/96 Portuguese 
Republic v. Council of the European Union [1999] ECR I-8395; T-30/99 Bocchi Food Trade International 
GmbH v. Commission of the European Communities [2001] ECR II-943; joined cases C-300/98 and 392/98 
Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Tuk Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH v. Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. 
KG [2000] ECR I-11307. See also Eeckhout, A panorama of two decades of EU external relations law [in] 
Arnull et al (2008), pp.323-337 and Jackson, Direct effect of Treaties in the US and the EU, the case of the WTO: 
some perceptions and proposal [in] Arnull et al (2008), pp.361- 382 who argues that the refusal to grant direct 
effect to GATT and WTO Treaties is the “major conundrum for this jurisprudence”, p.377.  
266
 See case 115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v. Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II-39.  
267
 See for instance case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany et al v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-
8615, para.28 or C-18/90 Office national de l'emploi v. Bahia Kziber [1991] ECR I-199, para.23.  
268
 Case 262/96 Sema Sürül v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1999] ECR I-2685, para.74.  
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under very specific circumstances national courts may be expected to ensure direct effect of 
international agreements concluded by the Union.
269
 
 
5.3. Ensuring direct effect of EU regulations and decisions 
 
In accordance with Article 288 TFEU an EU regulation is binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. Similarly, a decision is binding in its entirety upon those to 
whom it is addressed. The way this issue is addressed in Article 288 TFEU does not leave 
much room for doubt. Neither regulations nor decisions require transposition into national 
law, they immediately become part of national legal regime and are directly applicable. It 
follows that those provisions of regulations which create rights and obligations for individuals 
and are clear, unconditional and relevant to the situation of a litigant, may be directly relied 
upon individuals in their national courts which will be under the obligation to interpret the 
provisions enshrined in those measures and to enforce them in both vertical and horizontal 
situations.
270
 Likewise, EU decisions, which are measures of individual character binding only 
upon those to whom they are addressed, are directly effective. The ECJ in the Grad case 
observed that, even though the effects of decisions are not equivalent to those of regulations, 
they both may produce the same (direct) effect.
 271
 
In principle, regulations are directly effective in both vertical and horizontal situations. 
However, in order for a regulation to be directly effective in a dispute between two individuals 
it must precisely define what the rights and obligations of the individuals are.
272
 Furthermore, 
some regulations require an adaption of special measures necessary for their application.
273
  
                                                 
269
 See Douglas-Scott (2002), p.287.  
270
 In the Politi case the Court explicitly confirmed that EU regulations have direct effect, see case 43/71 Politi 
s.a.s. v. Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic [1972] ECR 1039, para.9. 
271
 Case 9/70 Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] ECR 825, para.5.  
272
 Case C-108/01 Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma, Salumificio S. Rita SpA v. Asda Stores Ltd, Hygrade 
Foods Ltd [2003] ECR I-5121, paras.87-99.  
273
 In case Monte Arcosu the ECJ held that even though the provisions of regulations generally have immediate 
effect in the national legal systems, they may not be relied upon before a national court if the legislator of a 
Member State has not adopted the provisions necessary for their implementation in the national legal system, see 
case C-403/98 Azienda Agricola Monte Arcosu Srl v. Regione Autonoma della Sardegna et al. [2001] ECR I-
103, paras.25-29. The regulation provided that Member States should, for the purposes of the regulation, define 
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5.4. Securing direct effect of EU directives 
 
The position of EU directives and their enforceability by national courts is somewhat different 
and more complex if compared to that of the Treaty provisions and EU regulations or 
decisions. An EU directive is addressed to the Member States which are obliged to attain the 
required result of it whereas the manner of achieving those results remain at the country’s 
discretions. From the foregoing observations it can be concluded that directives are intended 
to produce different effects than Treaty provisions, regulations or decisions, especially in 
horizontal situations. Provided that a directive is correctly implemented, its legal effects with 
regard to individuals are derived from national implementation measures and not from the 
directive itself.
274
 It must however be reiterated that directives are well-known from being 
implemented incorrectly or belatedly, what can have profound implications for the legal 
position of individuals. The issue of the nature of directives and the implications thereof has 
occupied the central position in the debate on the direct effect of directives in vertical and 
horizontal situations. It is therefore necessary to examine the broad case-law on the subject 
matter.  
In its landmark and far-reading case Van Duyn the ECJ explicitly held that directives 
are capable of having direct effect and individuals may not be prevented from relying on the 
provisions of a directive before national courts.
275
 However, the ECJ went on to acknowledge 
that in every such case the national court ought to examine whether the nature, general scheme 
and wording of the provision of the directive in question is capable of producing direct effect 
and referred to the obligation that a provision must be sufficiently clear, precise and exact to 
be applied directly by a national judge. In the Ratti case, which concerned questions with 
regard to two directives one of which was not implemented on time, the Court once again held 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
what is meant by the expression ”farmer practicing farming as his main occupation”. Italian legislator did not 
fulfill that obligation and in consequence individuals could not rely on the regulation.  
274
 Cases: 102/79 Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium [1980] ECR 147, para.12 
and 8/81 Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, para.19.  
275
 Put crudely, the ECJ observed that directives are binding whereby they are able to be relied upon. Case 41/74 
Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, para.12.  
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that directives are capable of producing direct effect.
276
 The Court invoked the issue of a 
failure of a Member State to implement directives on time as the ground for an individual to 
invoke provisions of directives in actions before national courts. Importantly, the Court ruled 
that, provided that the date for implementation has not passed, there is no failure by a Member 
State and individuals are not able to directly rely on the provisions of a directive.
277
 However, 
in Inter-Environnement and Adeneler cases the Court took a somewhat different stand by 
observing that already during the transposition period the Member States must refrain from 
any measures that could seriously compromise the results prescribed by the directive.
278
 This 
obligation to refrain from taking such measures applies also to national courts.
279
 
Additionally, in case Marks&Spencer, the Court observed that the adoption of national 
measures correctly implementing a directive does not exhaust the effects of the directive.
280
 
For that reason, individuals are entitled to rely on the unconditional and sufficiently precise 
provisions of a directive in every case when the full application of the directive is not secured 
in practice, i.e. not only where the directive has not been implemented in due time or has been 
implemented incorrectly, but also in situations when national authorities do not apply the 
implementing provisions in such a way as to achieve the result sought by the directive at 
stake.
281
 Leaving aside the afore-mentioned and exceptional situations, it can be summarized 
that national judges are expected to enforce direct effective provisions of a directive in 
situations when a Member State implements it incorrectly or it does not implement it by the 
                                                 
276
 Case 148/78 Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, paras.19-23. Furthermore, it was 
held that a Member State which has not implemented the directive in the prescribed period may not rely on its 
own failure to perform the obligations imposed by the directives. The Member States are thus estopped from 
relying on their own failure to transpose the directive the provisions of which confer some right on individuals. 
By means of this judgment the Court established the so-called ‘estoppel’ doctrine.  
277
 Case 148/78 Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti [1979] ECR 1629, paras.43-44.  
278
 Case 129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v. Région wallonne [1997] ECR I-7411, para.45  and case 
Konstantinos Adeneler et al v. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) [2006] ECR I-6057, para.122.  
279
 The Court based this obligation on the principle of loyal cooperation read in conjunction with Art.288 TFEU.  
280
 Case 62/00 Marks & Spencer plc v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise [2002] ECR I-6325, para.27.  
281
 With respect to the Marks&Spencer ruling, it should be observed that in practice it is nearly impossible that 
implementing (administrative) decisions issued for the purpose of enforcement of the directive in question would 
be incompatible with national legislation correctly implementing directive. It does not however change the fact 
that the Court accepted to some extent the possibility for an individual to rely on the provisions of a directive 
even if it has been properly implemented. See Jans et al (2007), p.89.  
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prescribed period and the provisions of a directive are clear, sufficiently precise and 
unconditional.
282
  
The approach taken by the ECJ is rather straightforward but it is readily apparent that 
there are many other aspects attached to the issue of enforcement of EU directives which may 
give rise to some doubts on part of national judges. First of all, this concerns the issue of 
vertical and horizontal situations. In the case Becker, the Court ruled that the provisions of a 
directive may be relied on by individuals against state authorities. It did not thus mention 
situations when a directive is relied upon in litigations against private individuals.
283
 It was 
only after several years that the Court clarified that direct effect of directives takes place only 
against public authorities, that is to say exclusively in vertical disputes.
284
 The issue has 
become one of the most controversial, debated and criticized aspects of EU law.
285
 Recently 
the Court was again invited to revise its case on law on the issue of horizontal direct effect in 
case Pfeiffer.
286
 Despite the call from the AG Colomer to reconsider (the exclusion) of 
horizontal direct effect, the Court again proved adamant and did not change its standing with 
regard to the subject matter.
287
 It may thus be concluded that the issue of horizontal direct 
                                                 
282
 This reasoning was constantly repeated by the Court in various rulings. See for instance cases: 8/81 Ursula 
Becker v. Finanzamt Muenster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53 or 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v. Commune di Milano 
[1989] ECR 1839. In case Comitatto Difesa the Court held that the conditions of sufficient precision and 
unconditionally with regard to directives must meet the same requirements as in case of the Treaty provisions, 
see case C-236/92 Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and others v. Regione Lombardia and 
others [1994] ECR I-483, paras.9-10. Additionally, in case Karella the Court stressed that derogations from the 
provisions in question which are included in directives do not rule out unconditional character of those 
provisions, see joined cases C-19/90 and C-20/90 Marina Karella and Nicolas Karellas v. Minister for Industry, 
Energy and Technology and Organismos Anasygkrotiseos Epicheiriseon AE [1991] ECR I-02691, paras.20-22 
283
 See Case 8/81 Ursula Becker, para.25.  
284
 Case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 
723, para.48.  
285
 The judgment in case 152/84 Marshall met with much criticism, also among the members of the Court 
themselves. It has been argued that apparent incoherence occurs when the issue of horizontal direct effect of 
directives is compared to that of the Treaty provisions which are also addressed to the Member States only. It 
should be recalled that the Court confirmed the possibility of the Treaty provisions to be directly effective in 
Defrenne II case. The issue of horizontal direct of directives effect returned to the Court again and again ever 
since, without much success though. See for instance joined cases 372-374/85 Ministère Public v. Oscar Traen 
and others [1987] ECR 2141, para.24-26; case 80/86 Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV 
[1987] ECR 3969, para.9; case 91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl. [1994] ECR I-3325, paras.19-22. 
286
 Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut 
eV [2004] ECR I-8835, paras.103-109.  
287
 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 27 April 2004 in case C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v. 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV.  
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effect is a closed one and the possibility that the Court will relax his attitude to the subject 
matter is nonexistent.
288
 Yet, the fact the Court explicitly ruled out the possibility of horizontal 
direct effect of directives does not mean that individuals are entirely deprived of enforcing 
their rights flowing from directives against other individuals. The Court attempted to remedy 
that situation through circumventing its own jurisprudence to some extent by identifying the 
boundaries of the state in a rather broad manner, ruling on the obligation of national courts to 
interpret national law in the light of directives, giving direct effect to general principles of EU 
law and establishing the principle of state liability in damages.  
In the aforementioned Marshall case, the Court ruled out the possibility of horizontal 
direct effect but at the same time it concluded that the plaintiff was capable of relying on the 
provisions of the invoked by her directive against the respondent – the Health Authority – for 
the respondent was in fact a public body.
289
 It follows that that even the public bodies that do 
not participate in the process of transposition are responsible for the application of the 
provisions of directives.
290
 Even though the foregoing does not induce much controversy, it 
becomes somewhat more complicated if seen in the light of the notion of a public authority 
and its boundaries which the Court established in the Foster case.
291
 Subsequently, the ECJ 
concluded that individuals may rely on the provisions of directives against all organs of the 
                                                 
288
 However, a line of case-law in so-called ‘incidental horizontal effect’ implies that in some horizontal 
situations provisions of unimplemented directives may exceptionally be relied upon before national courts if they 
do not impose legal obligations on persons. This concept enshrined in for instance case C-194/94 CIA Security 
International SA v. Signalson SA and Secutitel SPRL [1996] ECR I-2201 or case C-441/93 Panagis Pafitis and 
others v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados A.E. and others [1996] ECR I-1347 is however too complex, inconsistent 
and ambiguous to be expounded here in more detail, for more on incidental effect of directives check Betlem 
(2002), pp.409-413.  
289
 See case 152/84 Marshall, para.50.  
290
 See Craig&De Burca (2005), pp.208-209.  
291
 Case 188/89 A.Foster et al v. British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313. The subject matter in that case concerned 
horizontal direct effect against a nationalized enterprise: British Gas Corporation. In its judgment the Court 
defined a public body by listing three cumulative conditions which must be fulfilled in order for a body to be an 
emanation of the state. First of all, the legal form of the body does not affect its position. Secondly, it must be a 
body that provides a public service which is controlled by the State. Eventually, its powers go beyond usual 
powers resulting from relations between individuals. It is readily apparent that the definition provided in the 
Foster case does leave many questions open. It remains unknown what kind of a control the State should have 
over the body and what “special powers” mean. It may be argued that this definition provide for a very broad 
interpretation of a public body which covers a wide range of organizations and bodies. In case Kampelmann the 
conditions for a body to be regarded as an organ of the State previously listed as cumulative, have become non-
cumulative in character, see joined cases C-253/96 to C-258/96 Helmut Kampelmann and Others v. 
Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe, Stadtwerke Witten GmbH v. Andreas Schade and Klaus Haseley v. 
Stadtwerke Altena GmbH [1997] ECR I-06907.  
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public administration, including decentralized authorities such as municipalities
292
 and public 
corporations which are responsible for restructuring national undertakings.
293
 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the issue of direct effect of EU directives 
bears many practical and intricate implications for national judges. Firstly, it must be 
concluded that national judges are obliged to protect the rights of individuals stemming from 
directives. They are expected to enforce provisions of directives if they are either incorrectly 
implemented or not implemented by the prescribed period and are clear, sufficiently precise 
and unconditional. A judge ought to consider whether the dispute has a vertical character 
which may involve the necessity of conducting the Foster test. Provided that provisions of a 
directive in question are incapable of producing direct effect, a judge will have to resort to 
other mechanisms available for the decentralized enforcement of EU law which will be 
subject of further considerations in the later part of this chapter. Seen in the light of the 
foregoing synopsis, one may argue that multitude aspects of direct effect of EU directives 
which in addition comprises many inconsistencies provides for a situation when crystal clear 
answers are scarce and situations when a judge has to deal with EU directives may involve 
additional burden, ambiguity and the necessity to consult the case-law of the Court.
294
 
 
5.5. The obligation to ensure direct effect of general principles of EU law?  
 
In two more recent, far-reaching and controversial and therefore hotly debated rulings 
Mangold and Kücükdeveci the ECJ added a new twist to the principle of direct effect and 
supremacy whereby it broadened the set of obligations which are put on national judges.
295
 In 
the former case it ruled that it is the task of the national court to set aside national provisions 
                                                 
292
 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v. Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839, para. 31. Corroborated in joined 
cases C-253/96 to C-258/96 Helmut Kampelmann and Others v. Landschaftsverband Westfalen-Lippe, 
Stadtwerke Witten GmbH v. Andreas Schade and Klaus Haseley v. Stadtwerke Altena GmbH [1997] ECR I-
06907, para.46. 
293
 Joined case C-19/90 and 20/90 Marina Karella and Nicolas Karellas v. Minister for Industry, Energy and 
Technology and Organismos Anasygkrotiseos Epicheiriseon AE [1991] ECR I-2691.  
294
 Prechal puts forward that as matter of fact, the entire system of decentralized enforcement of directives has in 
fact become unfeasible for national judges, see Prechal (1994), p.11.  
295
 Both judgments evoked firm discussion across the EU, for a general overview see De Mol (2010), pp.293-
308. See also Wiesbrock (2010), pp.539-550 and Muir (2010).   
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which conflict with EU law in a horizontal dispute, even if the period prescribed for 
transposition of the directive in questions has not expired yet, in order to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age.
296
 In the latter 
one it held that the full effectiveness of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
means that the national court, faced with a national provision falling within the scope of 
European Union law which it considers to be incompatible with that principle, and which 
cannot be interpreted in conformity with that principle, must decline to apply that provision.
297
 
In a nutshell, a national court is obliged to disapply a national rule which is contrary to the 
general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age also in horizontal situations when 
the national provisions may not be interpreted in line with the directive.
298
 It is yet necessary 
to observe that general principles of EU law gain direct horizontal effect only in situations 
when they evidently collide with national law which falls within the scope of EU law.
299
 
However, at this point another significant observation follows, i.e. the Court refers to the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as to the general principle of Community 
law whereas it is debatable whether the concerned principle indeed occupies such a place in 
the EU legal order.
300
 As claimed by De Mol, the Court gives effect to “an unwritten, court-
                                                 
296
 See case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. In the Mangold case Arbeitsgericht 
München referred a question concerning interpretation of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term contracts and 
art. 6 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. The respective national labour court wished to know whether a 
German statutory provision concerning exempting employees older than 52 years from limitations to conclude 
fixed-term contracts was compatible with EU law. Importantly, the period for the implementation of Directive 
2000/78/EC had not expired both at the moment of the dispute and the moment of handing down the judgment by 
the ECJ. For a comprehensive overview see Schmidt (2005), pp.505-524.  
297
 In case Kücükdeveci the German labour court asked the ECJ whether a provision of the German Civil Code 
concerning the periods of notice on dismissal which are to be met by employers which were increased gradually 
with the length of service but did not take into account the period of service before reaching the age of 25 were in 
compliance with EU law and more precisely with Directive 2000/78 or the general principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age. The national court also asked whether a general principle of EU law may be 
applied directly in a horizontal dispute implying setting aside the incompatible national provision.  
298
 See case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG [2010] ECR I-365.  
299
 See Lenaerts&Gutiérrez-Fons (2010), p.1642. See also Hesselink (2011), p.449 who argues that yet it is not 
clear what exactly is meant by a case which falls within the scope of EU law. What is more, the author argues 
that recently the ECJ refers more frequently to general principles of civil law, it is yet not clear whether those 
would also be assigned direct (horizontal) effect.  
300
 In the Mangold judgment, para.74 the Court refers to the constitutional traditions which are common to the 
Member States and various international instruments which constitute, in the opinion of the Court, basis to 
regard the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as a general principle of Community law. It might 
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made fundamental right.”301 This in turn triggers various inquiries as to the implications of 
such a finding for the national courts since, first, there is a number of sources of general 
principles of EU law (and EU fundamental rights), and, second, it might imply that any 
principle allegedly derived from the “constitutional traditions common to the Member States” 
which is given expression in an EU measure could be granted a status of a general principle of 
EU law which national courts would have to protect, also in horizontal disputes. Thus, the 
national judges would be expected to identify (unwritten) general principles of EU law and 
give effect to them.
302
 As a matter of fact, the Court does not discuss the issue of direct effect 
in neither of the judgments and instead it focuses on the principle of effectiveness and primacy 
of EU law
303
 and yet from the reading of both judgments it follows that provisions of an EU 
directive which express general principles of European Union law are to be given full direct 
effect, even in horizontal situations. Once the concerned rule applies, the effects of it could be 
far reaching but it should be emphasized that the effects of Kücükdeveci could only take place 
under extraordinary circumstances, that’s is to say the alleged principle is enshrined in the 
secondary legislation in question the sole purpose of which is to give effect to that principle 
(to give it expression).
304
 Undoubtedly, Kücükdeveci case has blurred the boundaries of the 
notion of direct effect, left many questions unanswered and endangers the principle of legal 
certainty.
305
 It remains to be seen whether the new doctrine will be enhanced and possibly 
broadened in the future but it should be underscored that potentially it might carry significant 
implications for the functioning of national civil courts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
be argued that the presented by the Court evidence which elevates the principle to the status of general principle 
of EU law is not sufficient and as matter of fact is not correct, see for instance Schmidt (2005), p.519.  
301
 From De Mol (2011), p.301.  
302
 From Muir (2010), p.19 
303
 Ibid, p.15.  
304
 Ibid, p.19.  
305
 From Wiesbrock (2010), pp.544 and 549.  
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6. The obligation to interpret national law in harmony with EU law 
 
The principle of harmonious interpretation, also called indirect effect or consistent, sincere or 
conforming interpretation
306
, imposes on national courts the obligation to interpret national 
law in conformity with EU law. In a nutshell, the principle expects from national judges to 
construe national legislation as much as possible in harmony with EU law. Originally this 
obligation concerned interpretation of national law in harmony with EU directives. In the 
course of time the Court has however extended the scope of conforming interpretation to other 
sources of EU law, i.e. Treaty provisions
307
 and EU recommendations.
308
 In the present 
context only the aspect of EU directives is discussed since it is of the most practical relevance 
for national judges. As the principle is one of the most essential tools which are at disposal of 
national judges it is necessary to consider the rationale standing behind it and the practical 
implications of the doctrine for national courts. 
As it was illustrated in the foregoing considerations an individual may come across a 
situation when she would not be able to enforce her rights stemming from an EU directive for 
the provisions of that directive are not capable of producing direct effect. In order to partly 
remedy such an eventuality, the ECJ established the doctrine of the interpretation of national 
law in conformity with EU directives. Thus, the principle of harmonious interpretation can be 
seen as an extension of the direct effect principle in relation to EU directives which have 
either not been implemented correctly or have not been implemented at all and are not directly 
                                                 
306
 Other terms used for the consistent interpretation doctrine are inter alia: concurring/concurrent interpretation, 
interpretation in the light of a Community/EU provision, benevolent interpretation, purposive interpretation or 
interpretative obligation. See: Prechal (2006), p.181 and Wissink (2001), p.11.  
307
 See cases 157/86 Mary Murphy and others v. An Bord Telecom Eireann [1988] ECR 673, para.11; joined 
cases C-270/97 and C-271/97 Deutsche Post AG v. Elisabeth Sievers and Brunhilde Schrage [2000] ECR I-929, 
paras.62-64. In both cases the Court rules that national courts are obliged to interpret national law in the light of 
article Art.143 TFEU (ex 119 EC). The doctrine of harmonious interpretation was extended to the interpretation 
of framework decisions adopted in the III pillar. In case C-105/03 Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285, paras 43-47  
the Court held that that the principle of conforming interpretation is binding in relation to framework decisions 
adopted in the context of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. When applying national law, the national 
courts had to interpret national law as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework 
decision. For more check for instance Ward (2007), pp.21-25.  
308
 See case C-322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles [1989] ECR I-4407, paras.18-
19 where the Court held that, even though recommendations are not binding, national courts are must take them 
into consideration in disputes submitted to them, in particular where they are capable of casting light on the 
interpretation of other provisions of national or EU law.  
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effective. In that sense, it remains a second available to an individual solution in situations 
when she cannot directly rely on a directive.
309
  
The principle has its roots in the Von Colson case in which the EU directive which the 
plaintiffs wished to rely on against a state employer was not implemented correctly but for its 
lack of sufficient precision it was not capable of producing direct effect. In its judgment the 
ECJ ruled that national courts are under the obligation to interpret and apply national law 
implementing a directive in conformity with that directive.
310
 In the case Marleasing the 
Court, first, reaffirmed the position it had
 
taken in Von Colson that domestic courts must as far 
as possible
 
interpret national law in the light of the directive in order to achieve the result 
prescribed by the
 
directive and went on to conclude that this obligation is binding on courts 
also in the disputes such as those in the main proceeding, that is to say in disputes taking place 
between individuals.
311
 Additionally, the Court made clear that the obligation of harmonious 
interpretation takes place also with regard to national provisions the introduction of which was 
not related to the process of the implementation of the directive.
312
 In the Pfeiffer case the 
Court went even further and pointed out that the obligation for national law to be interpreted 
in conformity with EU law is inherent in the system of the Treaty.
313
 Furthermore, the Court 
established that domestic courts are required to consider national law “as a whole” in order to 
assess to what extent it may be applied so as not to produce a result contrary to that sought by 
the directive.
314
 In its more recent case-law, the ECJ has broadened the obligations stemming 
from the principle of consistent interpretation even further by ruling that during the 
                                                 
309
 See Reich et al (2003), p.50.  
310
 Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891, para. 
26 The Court based this obligation of national courts on the principle of loyal cooperation and on the binding 
nature of article 288 TFEU. 
311
 Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-495, paras.8-
9 and 13. The Court addressed the issue of consistent interpretation in horizontal situations when the directive 
was not implemented at all.  
312
 Case C-106/89 Marleasing, para.9.  
313
 Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer et al v. Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, kreisverband Waldshut 
eV [2004] ECR I-8835, para.114.  
314
 Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 35 Pfeiffer, para.115.  
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transposition period national courts are obliged to refrain from interpreting domestic 
provisions in a way that could compromise the results prescribed by the directive.
315
  
National courts are obliged to interpret national provisions in conformity with 
directives “in so far as it is given discretion to do so under national law”.316 Although it may 
be argued that the leeway left to national courts was limited by the Court it still remains 
debatable how it should be defined and what implications this notion carries for national 
judges.
317
 From Pfeiffer it could be inferred that the notion implies that national judges are 
bound to apply all possible interpretative methods allowed under national law.
318
 In the 
Adelener case, in turn, the Court concluded that the obligation cannot serve as the basis for an 
interpretation of national law contra legem.
319
 At this point one may however argue that the 
prohibition of contra legem interpretation has in fact a very similar meaning to the obligation 
of so far as possible interpretation.
320
 With regard to the foregoing considerations, one very 
intricate point arises. It namely always depends on a judge how he interprets the contra legem 
principle. In strict cases it might even mean that any interpretation which strays away from the 
literal ambit of the provision becomes a contra legem interpretation.
321
 All in all, this 
obligation clearly leaves a considerable margin of appreciation to the judge.  
Furthermore, when interpreting the national rules in conformity with EU law, the 
national courts must make sure that they do not interpret the rules in the way that would be in 
conflict with fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order or with general principles of 
EU law, such as the principle of proportionality
322
 and that the obligation on a national court 
to interpret national law in the light of EU law is limited by general principles of law such as 
                                                 
315
 Case C-212/04 Konstantions Adeneler and others v. Ellinikos Organisamos Galaktos (ELOG) [2006], 
paras.120-124. For more on this case see Betlem (2007), pp.112-116.  
316
 Case 14/83 Von Colson, para.28. In the joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer the ECJ uses the term “to 
as far as possible extent”, see para.113.   
317
 See Prechal (1994), p.229.  
318
 Joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer, para.116.  
319
 Case C-212/04 Adeneler, para.110. Also case C-105/03 Maria Pupino, para.47 from which it follows that the 
principle does require that, where necessary, the national court consider the whole of national law in order to 
assess how far it can be applied in such a way as not to produce a result contrary to that envisaged by the 
framework decision.  
320
 See Wissink (2001), pp.202-204.  
321
 See Chalmers (1997), p.190.  
322
 See for instance cases: C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971, para.24 and case C-305/05 Ordre des 
barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I-5305, para.28.  
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for instance legal certainty and non-retroactivity.
323
 It is also necessary to acknowledge that 
the ECJ emphatically restricted the boundaries of indirect effect in relation to penal liability. 
In the case Kolpinghuis the Court held that a directive cannot have the effect of determining or 
deteriorating the liability in penal law of individuals who have acted in contravention of the 
provisions of a directive.
324
  
Recapitulating the issue of harmonious interpretation several practical implications for 
national judges in relation to the principle can be specified. First of all, in a situation when a 
directive is incorrectly or belatedly implemented and its provisions are not directly effective or 
the dispute takes place between two private parties, national judges are obliged to interpret the 
provisions of national law in the light of the directive in question, that is to say they are 
obliged to give effect to it by means of interpretation. Provisions of national law must be 
given a meaning so as to conform to the directive and to achieve an outcome consistent with 
the objective pursued by the directive. With regard to the national law that is to be interpreted 
it does not matter whether they predate or postdate the directive. The judge may be required to 
consistently interpret other national laws that may be necessary to achieve results prescribed 
by the directive. In fact, the judge is obliged to look into the entire body of national law and 
interpret in a way so as to achieve the prescribed outcomes. Another aspect is related to the 
obligation to employ all possible interpretative methods allowed under national law. 
Eventually, it can be observed that the obligation to construe national law in conformity with a 
directive is limited by the notion of contra legem interpretation, general principles of law such 
as legal certainty and non-retroactivity and the prohibition of imposing criminal liability. Seen 
in the light of the foregoing, it may be argued that the limits of harmonious interpretation are 
very broadly, if not too abstractly, defined.  
 
                                                 
323
 Case C-212/04 Adeneler, para.110 and case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. 
Telefónica de España SAU [2008] ECR I-127, para.70 
324
 Case 80/86 Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV [1987] ECR 3969, paras.13-14. See also 
case C-168/95 Criminal proceedings against Luciano Arcaro [1996] ECR 4075, para.42. Nevertheless, it should 
also be emphasized that in the opinion of AG Jacobs, the thesis expressed by the Court in Arcaro and 
Kolpinghuis pertains only to cases with criminal liability context and the limitations on the obligation of 
harmonious interpretation cannot be expanded to cases where civil (non-criminal) liability is at stake. See the 
opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-456/98 Centrosteel Srl v. Adipol GmbH delivered on 16 March 2000. 
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7. The obligation to ensuring equivalence and effectiveness of EU law 
versus the national procedural autonomy  
 
7.1. The principle of national procedural autonomy  
 
The above-discussed mechanisms which the Court provided national judges with do not 
function in a vacuum but within the entire national systems of procedures and remedies.
325
 
Apart from several exceptional legal acts
326
, EU law does not provide for any set of 
procedures and remedies that could be utilized in order to enforce EU law provisions. In 
situations when EU law does not regulate how its law should be enforced, it is the task of the 
Member States to point out the courts that have jurisdiction in the field and the judicial 
procedures that should be utilized in the litigation process.
327
 This national competence is 
referred to as the principle of national procedural autonomy and implicates that national courts 
must enforce EU law in accordance with national procedures and available remedies.
328
 In the 
past the Court ruled that the EEC Treaty was not intended to create new remedies in the 
national courts to ensure the observance of EU law which would be different from those 
already laid down by national law.
329
 Put differently, the operation of EU provisions is 
determined by the national procedural setting to a far extent.
330
  
                                                 
325
 From Prechal (1994), p.148.  
326
 See for instance: Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of 
discrimination based on sex OJ L 014/6; Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests OJ L 166/51.  
327
 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] 
ECR 1989, para.5. It has been argued elsewhere that the rudimentary elements of the national procedural 
autonomy doctrine can be seen in the case 34/67 Firma Gebrüder Lück v. Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau [1968] 
ECR 359. Also other judgments: 45/76 Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 02043, para. 
13; 68/79 Hans Just I/S v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs [1980] ECR 00501, para.20; C-312/93 Peterbroeck, 
van Campenhout&Cie SCS v. Belgian States [1995] ECR I-04599, para.12; joined cases C-279/96, C-280/96 and 
C-281/96 Ansaldo Energia SpA v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v. Marine Insurance Consultants Srl and GMB Srl and Others v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello 
Stato [1998] ECR I-5025, para.27.  
328
 At this point it is important to bear in mind that the term ‘procedural autonomy’ does not appear as such in the 
texts of ECJ cases, see Kakouris (1997), p.1389. Van Gerven claims that the term procedural autonomy should 
be replaced by the term national procedural competence, see Van Gerven (2000), p.502.  
329
 See case 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] 
ECR 1805, para.6 of the summary.  
330
 See Prechal (1997), p.3.  
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Be that as it may, the Court has imposed on national courts two conditions with regard 
to the procedural autonomy. Those two limitations underpinning the autonomy of national 
administration of justice are mostly referred to as the principles of effectiveness (practical 
possibility) and equivalence. Both, effectiveness and equivalence are rooted in the principle of 
loyalty and although they are distinct from each other they should be read in a cumulative 
way.
331
 The latter principle imposes on national courts the obligation to ensure that national 
procedural rules are not less favourable than those governing the application of domestic 
law.
332
 The former one prohibits enforcement of national rules that can impair the efficacy of 
EU law. Both principles may bear distinct implications for national courts.  
 
7.2. Securing non-discriminatory treatment of claims based on EU law 
 
The principle of equivalence as such should not give rise to much controversy and problems 
for national courts since it prohibits, in rather straightforward words, discriminatory actions 
with regard to claims based on EU law. Thus, national courts have to treat claims based on EU 
law in the same manner as similar claims based on national law and every type of action 
provided by national law must also be available for purposes of claims arising on the basis of 
directly effective provisions of EU law under the same procedural conditions.
333
 Put 
differently, the fact that EU law is involved in a dispute may not be used as a distinguishing 
factor in the dispute at stake. From Pasquini it can be inferred that the principle of equivalence 
must be seen in the light of principle of non-discrimination/equal treatment which is one of 
fundamental principles of EU law.
334
 The ECJ has taken a rather unambiguous position 
                                                 
331
 Delicostopoulos (2003), p.601.  
332
 See for instance Becker (2007), p.1043. It is clearly stated in the case-law that it is for the national court to 
consider whether national procedural rules fulfill the requirement of equivalence, see for instance case C-261/95 
Rosalba Palmisani v. Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) [1997] ECR I-4025, para.33  
333
 Case 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH et Rewe-Markt Steffen v. Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 
1805, para 6 of the summary.  
334
 Case C-34/02 Sante Pasquini v. Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (INPS) [2003] ECR I-6515, 
paras.57 and 59. Despite its rather plain nature, somewhat more attention was given to the principle of 
equivalence with regard to cases concerning national rules on time-limits. In case Spac the ECJ pointed out that 
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infringements of EU law and to those with regard to infringements of national law. It follows that EU law does 
not prohibit the laying down of special detailed rules governing claims and legal proceedings to challenge the 
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towards the principle of equivalence and the task to assess whether a national procedural rule 
does meet the requirement of equivalence should not pose many problems to a national 
judge.
335
 The practice shows that principle of equivalence will be most likely relevant in cases 
regarding direct discrimination.
336
 
 
7.3. Ensuring effectiveness of EU law 
 
The issue of effectiveness of EU law occurs to be more complicated if juxtaposed to that of 
the equivalence. Also, it is frequently seen as an equivalent of the principle of effective 
judicial protection. In a nutshell, the principle of effectiveness prohibits national judges to 
enforce national rules that can impair the efficacy of EU law. The complex nature of the 
principle of effectiveness is reflected in a very broad case-law of the ECJ which pertains to 
domestic rules regarding, inter alia, time-limits, ex-officio application of EU law, reparations 
or interim relief.  
As it was ruled in Rewe the principle of effectiveness precludes national procedural 
rules that would render the application of EU law “impossible in practice”.337 In the Van 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
imposition of taxes provided that those rules apply equally to actions based on EU law as for those based on 
national law; see case C-260/96 Ministero delle Finanze v. Spac SpA [1998] ECR I-4997, paras.20-21. Also 
cases C-229/96 Aprile v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1998] ECR I-7141 or C-343/96 Dilexport v. 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1999] ECR I-579. In the case Levez the Court reaffirmed its 
reasoning from Spac and went on to state that if it has to be determined whether a procedural rule is less 
favourable than those governing similar domestic actions, the national court must take into account the role of 
that provision in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any special features of that procedure 
before the different national courts. Eventually, the Court concluded that EU law precludes national procedural 
rules which exist next to other alternative remedies available in similar situations if the latter are likely to be less 
favourable than those applicable to similar domestic claims, see case C-326/96 B.S. Levez v. T.H. Jennings 
(Harlow Pools) Ltd. [1998] ECR I-7835, paras.43, 44 and 53 and subsequently case C-78/98 Preston v. 
Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust [2000] ECR I-3201, para.63. For more see Tridimas, Enforcing 
Community rights in national courts: some recent development [in] O’Keeffe&Bavasso (2000), pp.471-473. 
335
 See Jans et al (2007), p.47.  
336
 See for instance case C-122/96 Stephen Austin Saldanha and MTS Securities Corporation v. Hiross Holding 
AG [1997] ECR I-5325, para.14 and C-180/95 Nils Draehmpaehl v. Urania Immobilienservice OHG [1997] ECR 
I-2195, para.37. See also joined cases C-392/04 and C-422/04 i-21 Germany GmbH, Arcor AG & Co. KG v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2006] ECR I-8559, para.68 where the Court held that the national court did not 
apply the concept of manifest unlawfulness in a dispute regarding EU law in the same manner as it did with 
regard to a dispute concerning national law and therefore the principle of equivalence was not complied with.  
337
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ECR 1989, para.5. In its subsequent case-law, the Court employed the formula of “virtually impossible” and 
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Schijndel case it was established that in each case where a national procedural provision 
renders application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult, the respective national court 
is obliged to analyze the problem by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its 
progress and its special features, viewed as a whole. Furthermore, the national court is ought 
to take into consideration the basic principles of the system of judicial protection, such as the 
rights of the defense, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure.
338
 
Consequently, a national judge dealing with an obstructive domestic procedural rule that 
possibly undermines the effectiveness of EU law must examine the provision in question in 
the context and circumstances of the pending case and of the whole domestic judicial 
protection system.  
Another dimension of the complex nature of the effectiveness principle, which should 
be seen in conjunction of the previously discussed principle of effective judicial protection, 
comes to light if its rather difficult relationship with the “no new remedies” principle is 
considered. Namely, in the early 1990’ the ECJ departed from the principle established in the 
Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft case for it was clear that lack of some remedies in national 
procedural rules would undermine the effectiveness of EU law. This phase, marked by such 
cases as Factortame or Emmot, can be perceived as a time of striking inroad of the ECJ into 
national procedures and remedies. Applying the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
has led to various national procedural rules being declared incompatible with EU law by the 
ECJ.
339
 One can even speak of a progressive harmonization in the area of domestic 
procedures
340
 and some authors put forward the argument of the gradual arrival of European 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
“excessively difficult” see case Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SpA San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, 
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procedural primacy.
341
 However, at present, the manner in which the Court approaches the 
procedural autonomy issue is characterized by a rather balanced approach towards the 
problem.
342
 The facts of the case, its special circumstances, the role of the remedy in the 
national procedural system and the principle of legal certainty will have to be taken into 
consideration by national court to assess whether the procedural rule poses a hindrance to the 
effectiveness of EU law.
343
  
From the case-law pertaining to the national procedural autonomy and the established 
limits thereof it can be concluded that the ECJ’s attitude towards the issue is a rather fuzzy 
one and it is difficult to draw clear-cut lines which could help to categorize national rules and 
procedures as compatible or incompatible with the principles of effectiveness. This is an 
axiomatic result of the fact that the Court in every case has to balance, on the one hand, the 
necessity of ensuring effet utile of EU law and the effective judicial protection of the rights 
individuals derive from EU law and, on the other hand, the principle of national procedural 
autonomy.
344
 On the part of national courts it may involve the necessity of carrying out a case-
by-case detailed proportionality test in which the obligation to provide effective judicial 
protection and protect the rights flowing form EU law, the factual circumstances of the case 
and the role and aims of the procedure in domestic legal system will have to be balanced 
against each other.
345
 It has been pointed out elsewhere that the rules on national remedies are 
subject to further development and that the existent case-law is very open-ended, prone to 
reinterpretation and incoherent.
346
 In consequence crystal clear answers become scarce
347
 and 
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343
 See Arnull (2006), p.333.  
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See Tridimas, Enforcing Community rights in national courts: some recent developments [in] 
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346
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the principle of legal certainty may be undermined.
348
 For it is beyond the scope of this work 
to examine the whole range of relevant cases touching upon the problem of the limits to the 
national procedural autonomy and effectiveness of EU law enforcement, only the issue of ex 
officio application of EU law, which is the most relevant in the framework of the empirical 
study, will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent section of this chapter.  
 
7.4. Obligation to apply EU law of court’s own motion  
 
In most legal systems and especially in civil disputes the ability of the parties to raise a point 
of law in a proceeding is limited, i.e. when a point of law is not raised at the correct stage a 
party will not be able to do so in later stages of the proceeding. Similarly, the national 
procedural rules can limit the ability of a court to raise a point of law of its own motion. This 
rule, called a judicial passivity rule, requires the court to rule on basis of argument raised by 
the parties. In the light of the foregoing the obligation to ex officio raise points of EU law in a 
dispute is rather a complex one. The crucial question attached to the problem is whether 
national courts can, should or are obliged to raise and apply EU law in situation when the 
parties themselves do not raise points of that law.
349
 It occurs that the operationalization of the 
obligation will very much depend on the national procedural rules and the local principles of 
civil procedure.  
In case Verholen the Court held that EU law does not prevent a national court from 
raising and applying points of EU law of its own motion.
350
 However, two other judgments of 
the ECJ are no longer that crystal clear. In the Van Schijndel case the plaintiffs invoked 
provisions of EU law only in the last stage of the litigation, that is before the Dutch Supreme 
Court. The Dutch procedure excludes invoking new arguments in the cassation stage of the 
litigation unless those new points are on pure points of law.
351
 In Van Schijndel the Court was 
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[1991] ECR I-3757, para.16.   
351
 Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Jeroen van Schijndel, paras. 13, 15, 21 and 22. For the confirmation of 
the Van Schijndel ruling see joined cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 J. van der Weerd and others v. Minister van 
Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit [2007] ECR I-4233, para.41.  
  
 
EU’s Expectations of its Judges 
 
90 
asked whether EU law obliges national courts to raise points of EU law ex officio. The Court 
ruled that a requirement to raise a point of EU law of the court’s own motion exists only to the 
extent that similar obligation exists under national law. In other words, the courts are not 
obliged to abandon their passive role and ex officio raise points of EU law if the same action is 
required in relation to national law. The Court went on to conclude that this kind of limitations 
are justified by the principle common for civil suits in which it is for the parties to take the 
initiative. In such cases, the court is capable of acting of its own motion only in exceptional 
circumstances, that is to say when public interest requires its intervention. In turn, in the 
Peterbroeck case the Court took a somewhat different approach. In that case the plaintiff was 
no longer allowed to raise a new plea based on EU law before the Cour d' Appel and the 
respective court did not have the competence to raise the issue of EU law of its own motion. 
In its judgment the Court precluded application of domestic procedural rules which prevent 
the national court from considering of its own motion whether a measure of domestic law is 
compatible with a provision of EU law when the latter provision has not been invoked by the 
litigant within a certain period.
352
 Both cases, despite having many vivid analogies, delivered 
seemingly contradictory judgments. This apparent inconsistency can however be explained if 
one considers the circumstances of the Peterbroeck case. Brussels Cour d' Appel was namely 
the first and last instance court which had the possibility to refer a preliminary question to the 
ECJ. If such a court was prevented from raising an issue of EU law of its own motion then it 
would also be stopped from referring a preliminary question to the ECJ whereby it would 
seriously impede the effectiveness of EU law. In such circumstances it was necessary for the 
ECJ to set aside such a national procedural rule.  
In Eco-Swiss China Time the Dutch Hoge Raad asked whether a national court was 
under the obligation to raise a point of EU competition law of its own motion. The Court ruled 
that articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex Articles 81 and 82 EC) on competition are fundamental 
provisions of EU law, essential for the existence of the internal market and a matter of 
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national public policy and therefore they must be automatically applied by domestic courts.
353
 
A noteworthy aspect of the case is the fact that under Dutch law a violation of domestic 
competition law is not deemed a public policy matter. It can thus be argued that the Court 
went much beyond the Van Schijndel ruling. Hence, the judgment carries a number of 
important practical implications. It could be namely concluded that all fundamental provisions 
of the Treaty which are essential for the existence of the Union legal order and the internal 
market are matters of public policy and in consequence should be raised of the courts’ own 
motion. It should be recognized that for instance the four basic freedoms of the internal 
market, the rules concerning competition or the principle of equal treatment of women and 
men are matters of EU public policy. However, the list of the principles which are 
fundamental for the existence of the Union is not clearly defined and the problem remains 
therefore an open one.  
In the Oceano Grupo case, the Court established that the obligation to raise EU law 
points of the court’s own motion would be a proper means of implementing the Directive on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts.
354
 In accordance with the judgment, national courts may 
ex officio determine if a term of a contract is unfair. Put differently, the courts do not have to 
wait until the parties to the dispute so desire.
355
 In case Mostaza Claro, the Court went further 
by stating that national courts are obliged to test whether a term of a contract is unfair.
356
 Such 
power to determine of its own motion whether a term is unfair is a necessary precondition of 
effective protection of customers. Eventually, in case Pannon the Court reaffirmed its stance 
and ruled that the national court it requited to scrutinize of its own motion the unfairness of a 
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contractual term and if the latter is indeed found unfair, the national judge should not apply it, 
unless the consumer opposes the non-application.
357
  
In concluding this brief analysis on the duty of national courts to raise issues of EU 
law it may be observed that the case-law on the subject matter is rather inconsistent and 
confusing. National courts must raise EU law points of their own motion if the public interest 
so demands and when a similar obligation exists with regard to national law. In addition to 
that, national courts are obliged to raise those points ex officio with regard to fundamental 
provisions of EU law, especially those which are essential for the existence of the internal 
market or are related to consumer protection.  
 
8. The duty to dialogue and cooperate: the preliminary ruling procedure 
 
8.1. The preliminary ruling procedure in a nutshell  
 
From the previous sections it follows that national courts are obliged to apply and enforce EU 
law in their practice. In order to do that they are expected to resort to the mechanisms such as 
supremacy, direct effect or indirect effect which were established and left to their disposal by 
the ECJ. Yet, the foregoing neither implies that national courts are fully free in their decisions 
concerning EU law, nor does it mean that national courts are the last instance courts that 
interpret and judicate EU law. As a matter of fact, the fundamental constitutional principles 
and doctrines which are crucial for the existence of the Union, its legal structure and the 
internal market have been established through the judgments of the Court given on the 
requests of national courts that decided to send to Luxembourg their questions concerning EU 
law that had arisen in relation with cases pending before them.
358
 This competence of national 
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courts to refer their inquiries pertaining to EU law to the ECJ follows from the procedure of 
preliminary ruling which is enshrined in the mentioned before Article 267 TFEU.
359
  
In accordance with Article 267 TFEU the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation and validity of the Treaties and the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.
360
 When a 
question concerning above mentioned areas arises before any national court or tribunal, a 
judge may request the ECJ to give a ruling thereon, if she considers it necessary to give a 
judgment. Furthermore, if such a question is raised before a final court or tribunal of last 
instance then that court or tribunal is obliged to bring the case to the ECJ. Importantly, in 
accordance with the ECJ, the term of the last instance court should be understood as including 
the highest courts, irrespective of their general or specialized competence, and all the courts 
against the decisions of which there exist no further remedy.
361
 By and large, the preliminary 
ruling procedure engages national courts in a dialogue with the European Court of Justice 
which possesses the final authority with regard to interpretation of EU law.  
                                                 
359
 At the moment of the empirical survey the preliminary ruling procedure was regulated separately for different 
pillars of the Union by Articles 234 EC (first pillar), 68 EC (visas, asylum and immigration policies) and 35 TEU 
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In the ruling Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf the Court held that the procedure is cardinal for 
the “preservation of the Community character of the law established by the Treaty. It aims at 
ensuring the coherence of Community law across all the Member States”.362 In the course of 
years, the preliminary ruling procedure has proved to be one of the most pivotal and 
fundamental mechanism for the building the Union’s legal order and the entire legal system of 
the Union.
363
 The mechanism has become the main communication channel between the ECJ 
and national judges. It is “an index both of judicial cooperation between the Court of Justice 
and the national courts of the Member States and of the integration of Community law into 
national law”.364 The procedure enshrined in Article 267 is formulated in a very broad and 
rather vague terms. In practice, the relationships between the national courts and the ECJ are 
far more complicated and are going much beyond what is enshrined in the article. When 
analyzing the factual role of the ECJ one may immediately notice a gap between the formal 
role of the Court and national judiciaries as enshrined in the Treaty and their position in 
practice.
365
  
 
8.2. Division of tasks in the preliminary ruling procedure  
 
The preliminary ruling procedure can be put in motion exclusively by national courts; their 
willingness to employ the procedure is therefore of crucial importance for its 
operationalization. Also, it is left for the national court to apply provided by the ECJ 
interpretation to the factual case pending before it.
366
 Put differently, the authority to refer 
questions to the ECJ and, subsequently, to apply the provided judgment is exclusively vested 
with national judges and they are the guardians of the procedure. In that respect the proper 
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application of EU law relies on the acceptance of the judgment provided by the Court by a 
national judge. Such acceptance has however a broader meaning for it relates not only to the 
specific national dispute in which the question appeared and a concrete judge who referred the 
question. In accordance with the doctrine of binding precedent it relates to general acceptance 
of the respective judgment by all judges adjudicating in all Member States.
367
 Cooperation 
and loyalty are thus two key concepts underpinning the dialogue between the ECJ and the 
national courts. It may therefore be claimed that the willingness of national judges to utilize 
the procedure in a sine qua non for the evolution of European legal system.
368
 In that sense, 
the procedure carries serious traps for the entire legal system of the Union since it relies, to a 
large degree, on the good will of national courts to refer their questions and subsequently on 
their acceptance of the judgments delivered by the Court.
369
 
Theoretically speaking, the division of tasks between the Court of Justice and national 
courts in the preliminary ruling procedure could be seen as based on distinction between 
interpretation of EU law (by the ECJ) and application thereof in national systems to the facts 
of the case (by domestic courts). Article 267 TFEU and 19 (3) b TEU are very clear on that 
point for they explicitly speak of interpretation as the task assigned to the ECJ.
370
 In that 
sense, the Court acts as an assistant, facilitator and a helping hand in situations when national 
judges deal with EU law and not as an appellate or last instance cassation court. The role of 
the ECJ in the procedure should therefore be rather seen as “a concerned godfather than as a 
sergeant-major”.371 Accordingly, if a national judge has doubts as to the correct meaning of an 
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some questions put forward by a national court for those concerned application of EU law in a particular case.  
371
 From Kapteyn et al (1998), p.525.  
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EU primary or secondary provision that is of importance to the pending dispute she should 
refer a preliminary question to the Court which will, in turn, concern the proper interpretation 
thereof. In its judgment the Court will provide for an (abstract) interpretation of the meaning 
and scope of the provision in question. Subsequently, the national judge is expected to take 
over the interpretation and to resolve the domestic dispute in accordance with it.
372
 It becomes 
apparent that the Court does not have any competence to interpret domestic law of the 
Member States.
373
 
Be that as it may, it is questionable whether it is possible to draw a clear line between 
those two tasks. First of all, neither the Treaty nor any secondary source of EU law provide a 
definition of a notion of interpretation and the scope thereof in the context of EU law.
374
 
Secondly, it is debatable whether it is possible to provide for an abstract interpretation of EU 
provisions without taking into consideration the factual circumstances and the context of a 
particular case.
375
 As Kapteyn puts it: “the process of thought leading to a judicial decision 
                                                 
372
 This division of labour between the ECJ and the national court was originally claimed by the ECJ in joined 
cases 28 to 32-62 Da Costa en Schaake.  
373
 In the light of the foregoing, the so-called Dzodzi line of cases introduces some controversy and confusion. In 
Dzodzi and subsequent case-law the ECJ established the principle that the Court is entitled to give preliminary 
rulings on issues with regard to EU provisions which have been rendered applicable either by domestic law or 
merely by virtue of terms in a contract, see joined cases C-297/88 and C-197/89 Massam Dzodzi v. Belgian State 
[1999] ECR I-3763, paras.32-43. See also cases C-231/89 Gmurzynska-Bscher v. Oberfinanzdirektion Köln 
[1990] ECR I-4003 and C-384/89 Tomatis and Fulchiron [1991] ECR I-127. Crudely speaking, the entire line of 
cases concerned a situation when the factual situation were outside the scope of the EU law (purely internal 
situation) but the interpretation of the provisions of that law were essential to resolve the dispute in the main 
proceeding. The Court pointed out that the necessity to ensure the uniformity of the effects of EU law in the 
Member States justifies the competence of the ECJ in such cases. In Leur-Bloem the Court established that it had 
jurisdiction to rule on points of EU law when the matter in question did not fall under EU law but was governed 
by national law. The national provisions were introduced into the domestic system in order to apply the same 
treatment to purely internal situations as to those regulated by the directive, see case C-28/95 Leur-Bloem v. 
Inspecteur der Belastingen/Ondernemingen Amsterdam 2 [1997] ECR I-4161. Similarly in C-130/95 Giloy v. 
Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Ost [1997] ECR I-615. The Dzodzi line of cases is undoubtedly very 
controversial and therefore it should not come as a surprise that it had met with a strong criticism. It is especially 
astonishing if juxtaposed with the developed by the ECJ requirement to clearly define national legislative and 
factual circumstances of the case and the prohibition to refer hypothetical questions. For the whole line of 
jurisprudence and further discussion check Kaleda (2000); Lenaerts (2006), pp.225-229 and Arnull (2006), 
pp.107-114.  
374
 Kornobis-Romanowska (2007), p.101. The only exception to that rule is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union in the Title VII of which general provisions governing the interpretation and application of 
the Charter are provided.  
375
 See also the opinion of the AG Colomer in case C-1/99 Kofisa Italia Srl v. Ministero delle Finanze and 
Servizio della Riscossione dei Tributi-San Paolo Riscossioni Genova Spa [2001] ECR I-207. This can be seen in 
Telemarsicabruzzo case where the Court explicitly demanded that national courts specify in a clear manner the 
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cannot be readily separated into two independent parts: the interpretation of general rules and 
the subsequent application of the rules thus interpreted to the facts.”376 Moreover, the Court 
has frequently gone beyond its competences by pointing out in a rather unambiguous way 
what the national courts are expected to do in a particular case and how they should apply EU 
law.
377
 In such situations, the only task left to the national judge is to execute the ECJ’s 
ruling.
378
 Finally, the so-called CILFIT doctrine introduces further complexity into the issue 
of the division of the tasks between the courts.  
 
8.3. CILFIT doctrine vis-à-vis judicial interpretation methods  
 
From Article 267 TFEU it follows that lower national courts are attributed discretionary 
powers with regard to the preliminary reference procedure whereas the courts of last instance 
have no room in that regard. However, in its famous CILFIT judgment the Court established 
that a national court against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
similarly to the court of first and second instance, is not always obliged to refer a preliminary 
question when interpretative doubts exist with regard to EU law and is able to establish its 
own interpretation of Union law.
379
 The Court listed three exceptions to the rule following 
from Article 267 TFEU. First of all, national courts are not obliged to refer a question with 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
factual and legal context in which the ruling is sought so as to enable the Court to provide the national court with 
a reply that is useful for the dispute before it but also because it is often difficult or even impossible to interpret a 
rule in abstracto; see joined cases 320-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v. Circostel [1993] ECR I-393, para.5. 
376
 See Kapteyn (2008), p.485.  
377
 See Alter (1998), pp.126-127. A good example of blurring the dividing line between the interpretation and 
application is case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm [2005] ECR I-9981. It is sufficient to juxtapose 
the questions referred by the national court and the answers provided by the ECJ to notice that in fact the ECJ 
judged on national law and its incompatibility with EU law. See also case C-338/95 Wiener S.I. GmbH v. 
Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1997] ECR I-6495 which illustrates how detailed interpretations of EU law provisions 
provided by the ECJ can be and case C-435/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and others v. 
Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, paras.85-90 to see how the Court provides detailed 
guidance in order to enable help the court to give judgment in particular case. Likewise, judgments concerning 
consumer protection tend to be very detailed and technical in nature which implies that the only tasks left to the 
national courts is to apply the ruling to the dispute at stake, see for instance cases C-229/04 Crailsheimer 
Volksbank eG v. Klaus Conrads and others [2005] ECR I-9293 and C-264/02 Cofinoga Mérignac SA v. Sylvain 
Sachithanathan [2004] ECR I-2176.  
378
 See also Perju (2009), pp.352-353.  
379
 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415.  
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regard to the interpretation of EU law if the answer to the question cannot affect the outcome 
of the case, that is to say the answers to the question is irrelevant.
380
 Secondly, a national court 
is not obliged to refer a question if the Court has already dealt with a comparable or similar 
question in the past, irrespective of the nature of the proceeding that gave rise to the reference 
(so-called acte éclairé doctrine).
381
 Put differently, if a clear precedent exists on an 
interpretation of a particular EU provisions, then the court may pass over the preliminary 
reference procedure.
382
 Thirdly, if the correct application of EU law is sufficiently obvious 
and clear that it leaves no room for doubt how the question should be resolved then the 
national court can refrain from referring a question and establish its own interpretation of the 
provision in question (so-called acte clair doctrine).
383
 Importantly, when a question referred 
by a national court fulfills the conditions of acte clair or acte eclairé doctrine then the ECJ 
may, at any time of the proceedings, issue a reasoned order in which it will refer to its 
previous judgment and case-law.
384
  
However, the ECJ warned the national courts against relying on the acte clair doctrine 
too easily and listed certain conditions which should be fulfilled in order for a national court 
to be allowed to pass over the preliminary ruling. First, the Court pointed out that the matter 
must be obvious for the national court concerned, national courts of other Member States and 
the ECJ. Interpretation of the EU law provision should also involve a comparison of different 
language versions thereof.
385
 Provided that two or more versions are different, a judge should 
                                                 
380
 Case 283/81 CILFIT, para.10.  
381
 Case 283/81 CILFIT, paras.14-15. This rule was however established as early as in 1963 in case 28 to 30-62 
Da Costa en Schaake. 
382
 The issue of authority of rulings on validity of EU acts and their binding force on all national courts is not 
debatable for the ECJ explicitly rules on that issue, see case 66/80 SpA International Chemical Corporation v. 
Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato [1981] ECR 1191, paras. 9-18. However, the problem of authority of 
rulings on interpretation has been subject of controversy for decades. Through the decisions in the Schaake and 
CILFIT cases a system of precedent seemed to be well established but the ECJ has as a matter of fact never 
explicitly ruled on this issue. At present, the issue is regulated by article 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Court of Justice which explicitly states that in cases of acte clair and acte éclairé the Court may issue a reasoned 
order in which the national judge is referred to a previous judgment. For more see: Anderson (1995), pp.307-315 
and Craig&De Burca (2005), pp.439-452.  
383
 Case 283/81 CILFIT, para.16.  
384
 Article 104 (3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.  
385
 This point was reaffirmed by the Court in case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v. 
Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403, paras.25 and 28. In case C-99/00 Kenny Roland 
Lyckeskog v. Åklagarkammeren i Uddevalla [2002] ECR I-4839 the AG Tizzano stated that in his opinion that 
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interpret the provision in accordance with all except for those that are different from the 
rest.
386
 However, in case of excessive divergences between different language versions, the 
provision at stake should be interpreted by reference to the aim and general scheme of the 
measure of which it forms part.
387
 The judge should also bear in mind that legal concepts and 
terminology can have different meanings in different Member States and in Union law. 
Finally, particular EU law provisions should be seen in the light and context of the whole legal 
order of the EU.
388
 In the light of the foregoing one may conclude that from the theoretical 
point of view the CILFIT criteria are very complex, strict and not possible to be met.
389
 For 
that reason they have been quite strongly criticized by academics and AGs.
390
 But yet, there 
are abundant examples from national judiciary which illustrate how the national courts 
adopted a somewhat liberal attitude to the acte clair doctrine and (ab)used it in order to avoid 
sending preliminary questions to the ECJ.
391
  
With everything considered, the most important message for the national judge 
flowing from CILFIT is the fact that she can interpret Union law on her own if it is clear how 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
“(…)comparison of the various language versions should be regarded as a perfectly normal method of 
interpretation in the case of any legislation drafted in several languages, be it national (in multilingual States), 
Community or international legislation.” At this point it should be borne in mind that in accordance with 
statutory and case-law all official languages in the Union are equally authentic. In the process of interpretation of 
EU law all language versions should therefore be juxtaposed to each other. At present there are 23 official 
languages in the EU. The official languages of the European Union are stipulated in the amended EEC Council 
Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community OJ 17 1958, 
pp.385–386. The Official Journal of the EU is also published in 23 languages. See also: Van Calster (1997), 
pp.363-395; Doczekalska (2006), pp.14-21; Fryżlewicz (2008), pp.9-57; Arnull (2006), pp.608-611 and Itzcovich 
(2009), pp.550-552. 
386
 See joined cases C-283/94, C-291/94 and C-292/94 Denkavit International BV, VITIC Amsterdam BV and 
Voormeer BV v. Bundesamt für Finanzen [1996] ECR I-5063, para.25.  
387
 Case 30-77 Régina v. Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, para.14. See also cases : 9/79 Marianne 
Wörsdorfer, née Koschniske, v. Raad van Arbeid [1979] ECR 2717, para.6; case 100/84 Commission v. United 
Kingdom [1985] ECR 1169, para.17; case C-152/01 Kyocera Electronics Europe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Krefeld 
[2003] ECR I-13821, para.33 and case T-80/97 Starway v. Council [2000] ECR II-3099, para.81 
388
 Case 283/81 CILFIT, paras.18-20.  
389
 Check for more Arnull (2006), p.123.  
390
 See: Broberg (2008), pp.1383-1397 and Bobek (2008a), p.13. For an opposite opinion check Van Harten, The 
Application of Community Precedent and Acte Clair by the Hoge Raad [in] Obradovic&Lavranos (2007), 
pp.237-262. See also: the opinion of the AG in case C-339/95 Wiener [1997] ECR I-6495, the opinion of AG 
Tizzano in case C-99/00 Lyckeskog [2002] ECR I-4839 and the opinion of the AG Colomer in case C-461/03 
Gaston Schul [2005] ECR I-10513. The last argues that the CILFIT doctrine should be adapted to the demand of 
the times.  
391
 Especially the French courts were quite active in that respect, see Jarvis (1998), pp.422-425. See also Arnull 
(1989), pp.622-639 and Itzcovic (2009), p.548.  
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the provisions at issue should be interpreted. Yet, she ought to keep in mind that EU law and 
the methods of its interpretation have their peculiar features which may differ from the 
interpretation methods practiced by national judges with regard to national law.
392
 These 
differences in methodology applied by the ECJ and national judges can, arguably, lead to 
problems in judicial application of EU law on the national level.
393
 Traditionally, close textual 
reading of legal provisions (textual or literal interpretation) is the main methodological tool 
employed by civil law judges. In contrast, in ECJ’s methodology the comparative, systemic 
but foremost teleological, also called purposive, interpretation occupy an important place.
394
 
The foregoing is not intended to imply that the traditional textual interpretation is not 
employed by the ECJ.
395
 On the contrary, if a provision is written down in a clear and 
straightforward manner which does not provide any room for doubt the Court will most likely 
follow the literal meaning of that provision.
396
 The Court does not however limit itself to this 
way of legal reasoning and it departs from this method on a quite frequent basis.
397
 By doing 
so, the Court will apply systematic or teleological method and will interpret respective 
                                                 
392
 On different methods of interpretation see Hesselink (2011), pp.452-459.  
393
 See Golub (2004), p.16 in which the author argues that the differences in judicial interpretative methods 
applied by national judges and the ECJ may have impact on the relationship between the courts. See also Slynn 
(1993), pp.240-241. On the contrary, it may be argued that the methods applied by the Court are in fact the same 
as those applied by the national judges for the ECJ judges were educated in the national systems so the methods 
they apply cannot differ from those applied in their Member States.    
394
 According to the case-law, in the process of interpretation of a particular law, the Court takes into account 
“not only the wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which it is part”, see 
case 292/82 Firma E. Merck v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR 3781, para.12 or case C-223/98 
Adidas AG [1998] ECR I-7081, para.23. The issue of the legal reasoning of the ECJ is undoubtedly a fascinating 
one and occupies a prominent place in academic writing, for more check for instance: Bengoetxea (1993) in 
which the author provides for a broad overview of the Court’s interpretative criteria, ways of legal reasoning and 
European jurisprudence in general; see also Itzcovich (2009); Lasser (2003); Maduro (2007); Pollicino (2004), 
Dehousse (1998), p.125. 
395
 Other names for textual interpretation are: semiotic, linguistic or literal. See also Bengoetxea (1993), pp.233-
240 and Schermers&Waelbroeck (2001), p.11.  
396
 One of the biggest merits of textual approach is the fact that it is a transparent method of interpretation for it is 
in its entirety based on publicly available legal text, see Primus (2009), p.164. In case 14/81 Alpha Steel Ltd v. 
Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 749, paras.32-33, the Court held that going against 
explicit words of the Treaty would amount to its revision and could not be accepted. And yet there are examples 
of the Court explicitly ruling against the words of the Treaty to be found, see for instance cases 22-70 
Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263; 
294/83 Parti écologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament [2986] ECR 1339; 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 
4199; C-62/88 Hellenic Republic v. Council of the European Communities (Chernobyl I) [1990] ECR I-1527.  
397
 See for instance case C-369/89 Piageme and others v. BVBA Peeters [1991] ECR I-2971, paras.14-15 in 
which the Court claims that close textual reading of the provision is not satisfactory for it does not take the aim 
of the measure into consideration.  
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provisions very broadly or fill in the existing lacunas. By applying the systematic 
interpretation, the Court will examine the position of the disputed measure in the entire legal 
system.
398
 In turn, in case of the teleological method, the purpose, aim, objectives or efficacy 
of a particular measure will be taken into account. Put differently, when interpreting an EU 
provision the Court will look at the telos of the Union.
399
 The meta-purpose of such an 
exercise will be to ultimately arrive at the solution which will assure the full effectiveness of 
EU law.
400
 The engagement in a teleological interpretation technique allowed the ECJ to, on 
the one hand, fill the gaps existent in the Treaty and, on the other hand, to broaden the scope, 
circumvent or even re-write those Treaty provisions which were unclear and open to various 
manners of interpretation.
401
 In the process of teleological interpretation of EU acts and its 
provisions the Court will refer to, for instance, the general purpose and aim of the specific 
provisions or the measure as such
402
 or broader aims of the Union
403
, i.e. one of the basic 
freedoms underpinning the internal market or even the process of integration as such.
404
 It 
should therefore be recognized that the purposive method is a very dynamic and flexible one 
and serves a purpose of advancing the evolution of the Union. Most importantly for the 
present considerations is the fact that national judges in the process of interpreting and 
applying EU laws in the disputes pending before them should, similarly to the ECJ, bear in 
mind the place of the interpreted provision in the system of the Treaties and the objectives and 
purpose thereof.  
 
 
                                                 
398
 See 281/81 CILFIT, para.20 in which the Court stated that “Every provision of Community law must be 
placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of EC law as a whole regard being had to the 
objectives thereof and to its state of evolution.” 
399
 See Pollicino (2004), p.289.  
400
 This method of interpretation led the Court to establish the principles underpinning the existence of the EU 
such as for instance supremacy and direct effect. On the importance of teleological interpretation for EU legal 
order and the differences in the legal reasoning of the AGs and the Court see Maduro (2007). 
401
 See Pollicino (2004), pp.292-295.  
402
 This can be referred to as a “micro-teleological approach” which aims at ensuring the purpose of a specific 
article, see Lasser (2004), p.289.  
403
 This can be referred to as a “macro-teleological approach”, ibid.  
404
 See for instance case 22-70 Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European 
Communities (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, paras.72-74 or C-168/00 Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & 
Co. KG [2002] ECR I-2631, paras.19-24.  
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8.4. The prohibition to rule on the validity of EU measures  
 
If a national judge deals with a question of validity of European provisions she is under the 
obligation to refer a question to the ECJ, regardless of the position of the court in the national 
judicial order. This rule is not as such enshrined in Article 267 TFEU but it was established in 
the Foto-Frost case stating that national courts are not eligible to declare an EU legal act null 
and void for this competence is strictly reserved to the ECJ.
405
 This implicates that in any 
situation when a national judge is having doubts as to the validity of a Union’s act, she will be 
obliged to refer a preliminary question to the Court. In subsequent cases the ECJ established 
that the rule holds even if a national judge is dealing with a question of validity of Union’s 
measure and the ECJ in its earlier ruling declared a similar measure invalid.
406
 However, the 
Court established that in some exceptional situations, for instance when a national court has 
serious doubts as to the validity of an EU act on which a national provision is based, it may 
suspend application of that national measure or grant an interim relief with regard to it. 
Subsequently, the national judge is obliged to refer the question of validity of the EU act in 
question to the Court of Justice.
407
 Should the Court find that the contested measure must be 
deemed invalid, it declares it void.
408
 The national court which referred the question must set 
aside the measure in the dispute in which the question occurred and all other cases in which 
the measure constitutes a basis for the judgment.
409
  
                                                 
405
 See case 314/85 Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Os [1987] ECR 4199, para.15. The Court claimed that 
the possibility of a national court to rule on the invalidity of an EU act would be incompatible with the necessity 
if uniformity and coherence of the system of judicial protection instituted by the Treaty, see Foto-Frost v. 
Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Os [1987] ECR 4199, paras.15-16. 
406
 See case C-461/03 Gaston Schul Douane-expediteur BV v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en 
Voedselkwaliteit [2005] ECR I-10513, paras.20-25.  
407
 Joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and 
Zuckerfabrik Soest GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415, paras.20-33.  
408
 This however does not amount to declaring the measure invalid for it is for the institutions of the Community 
to amend or annul the measure. See case 16-65, Firma G. Schwarze v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide 
und Futtermittel [1965] ECR 877, p.886.  
409
 From the above going discussion it may be concluded that the procedure of preliminary ruling on validity of 
secondary EU measures constitutes an indirect way of gaining access to the European Court for individuals and 
should be seen in the light of the annulment procedure as enshrined in article 263, para. 4 TFEU or as, as a matter 
of fact, an alternative to it. In joined cases 133 to 136/85 Walter Rau Lebensmittelwerke and others v. 
Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1987] ECR 2289, para.12 the Court held that action under 
article 263 against a decision adopted by a Community institution does not preclude an action before a national 
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Leaving aside the issue of possible problems attached to pleading invalidity of EU 
measure before the national court
410
, it can be observed that a national judge plays a 
significant role in ensuring indirect access for individuals to the validity review by the ECJ. 
Article 267 TFEU, as interpreted in accordance with the Foto-Frost and in view of the 
restrictions of article 263(4) TFEU, constitutes as a matter of fact the only way for individuals 
to contest the validity of an EU act of general application. Nevertheless, the most tangled 
aspect of that role boils again down to the discretionary powers or, to be more specific, the 
willingness of a judge to engage with the procedure. A national court is namely always free to 
dismiss a claim of invalidity put forward by a party as unfounded.  
 
8.5. Formal requirements of the preliminary ruling procedure   
 
In order for a preliminary question(s) to be admitted by the Court various technical and 
procedural requirements must be met by the referring national court. In accordance with 
Article 267 TFEU any national court or tribunal of a Member State may refer a question to the 
ECJ. It is yet the ECJ that decides whether the referring body may be classified as a court or 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
court against a national measure adopted in order to implement that decision on the ground that the decision was 
unlawful. A private party can namely challenge the validity of a measure implementing EU law into national law 
before a national court which, in turn, would be under the obligation to refer the issue to the Luxembourg Court 
and would indirectly facilitate the access. Also in situation when national implementing measures are lacking, as 
it is in case of regulations, a validity action before a national court may be launched. See for instance joined cases 
C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions ex parte 
Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd and others v. Irish Aviation Authority [2002] ECR I-2569. This approach to 
the validity review was in fact favoured by the ECJ under the former Treaty regime. The Court held that if a 
person does not meet the conditions for admissibility under then Art.230(4) EC, he shall turn to the national court 
and plead the illegality of a Union act before a national judge who in accordance with the Foto-Frost rule has no 
competence to declare EU measures invalid, see case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeňos Agricultores [2002] ECR I-
6677, paras.40-41.  
410
 For those check for instance the opinion of AG Jacobs delivered in case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeňos 
Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677. The AG put forwards that the national procedural rules, the discretion enjoyed 
by national court and even its willingness to employ the procedure may effectively hamper the possibility to 
indirectly challenge the validity of EU acts. Moreover, national proceedings may bear various disadvantages for 
individual applicants such as extra costs or delays. See also Ward (2007), pp. 349-365 
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tribunal.
411
 A national court may refer a preliminary question regardless of its specialization, 
be it a commercial, labour, criminal administrative or civil law court.
412
  
The national court is expected to refer a question to the Court of Justice about the 
interpretation or validity of a provision of EU law in accordance with national procedural 
rules. It is only the national court which must assume the responsibility for the subsequent 
judgment and to assess, in the light of the circumstances of each case, both the necessity for a 
preliminary ruling and the relevance of the questions they refer to the Court.
413
 Neither the 
parties to the proceeding nor the public bodies can coerce the national court into referring a 
question
414
 since it is solely for the national court and not for the parties to a dispute to decide 
about referring the question to the Court.
415
  In accordance with the aforementioned 
Rheinmühlen case national courts are entitled to utilize the procedure of their own motion and 
national procedural laws cannot deprive or hinder the right of national court to use it.
416
 The 
                                                 
411
 In order to determine whether a body is a court or a tribunal the so-called Vaassen criteria are applicable. In 
accordance with those criteria a body can be recognized as a court or tribunal if it applies rules of law and is 
established by law, is permanent and independent, its jurisdiction is be compulsory and its procedure inter partes. 
See case 61-65 G. Vaassen-Göbbels (a widow) v. Management of the Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf [1996] 
ECR 261, para.273. See also cases: C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. 
Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH [1997] ECR I-4961, para.23; C-24/92 Pierre Corbiau v. Administration des 
Contributions [1993] ECR I-1277, para.15, C-134/97 Victoria Film A/S [1998] ECR I-7023, para.14; C-195/98 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft öffentlicher Dienst v. Republik Österreich [2000] ECR I-
10497, para.25; C-516/99 Walter Schmid [2002] ECR I-4573, para.34. Several cases indicate that the ECJ is not 
willing to depart from the above-mentioned criteria. In case Syfait the ECJ found that the reference was 
inadmissible for the Greek Competition Commission (Epitropi Antagonismou) did not meet the condition of 
judicial independence. See case C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others 
v. GlaxoSmithKline plc and others [2005] ECR I-4609, paras.30-38 
412
 However, administrative bodies are not entitled to request preliminary rulings; see cases: 65/77 Jean 
Razanatsimba [1977] ECR 2229, para.5 and 138/80 Jules Bor [1980] ECR 1975, para.4. The same rule pertains 
to arbitration tribunals regardless the fact that very often they fulfill most of the requirements, see case 102/81 
Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG and 
Reederei Friedrich Busse Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co. KG [1982] ECR 1095, paras.10-16. 
413
 See for instance case C-369/89 Piageme [1991] ECR I-2971, para.10 and joined cases C-422/93, C-423/93 
and C-424/93 Teresa Zabala Erasun, Elvira Encabo Terrazos and Francisco Casquero Carrillo v. Instituto 
Nacional de Empleo [1995] ECR I-1567, para.14. According to the case-law, the ECJ does not have the 
competence to criticize the reasons for the reference, see case 126/80 Salonia v. Poidomani and Giglio [1981] 
ECR 1563, para.6.  
414
 See case 283/81 CILFIT, para.9.  
415
 See case 44-65 Hessische Knappschaft v. Maison Singer and sons [1965] ECR 965, page 970 and joined cases 
C-322, 333, 335/95 Eurico Italia Srl, Viazzo Srl and F & P SpA v. Ente Nazionale Risi [1994] ECR I-711, 
para.17.  
416
 Case 166-73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] ECR 
33, para.5 See also case 93/78 Lothar Mattheus v. Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkühlkost eG [1979] ECR 2203, 
para.6. 
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national judge decides on the content of the questions and determines at which stage of the 
main proceedings the questions shall be sent.
417
 All references must, in principle, follow the 
same procedure which consists of written and oral part.
418
  
While referring a question the judge must keep in mind that a dispute in which the 
question arise must still be pending before a national court. The ruling that the Court provides 
is supposed to enable the national court to give a judgment. It is therefore axiomatic that post 
ante references cannot be considered and the ECJ is not eligible to consider a reference if the 
dispute before the national court had been terminated before sending the question.
419
 For the 
same reason hypothetical questions are not allowed.
420
 Similarly, the ECJ will very likely 
reject a reference in a case in which a genuine dispute (true litigation) is absent.
421
 National 
courts may not send questions which are irrelevant or unconnected to the main dispute
422
, lack 
precisions
423
, are too general
424
, fall exclusively under national law
425
 or are not of a judicial 
nature
426
. The absence of factual and legal context may be a reason for rejection of a 
reference.
427
 However, in this context it is noteworthy that in accordance with article 104(5) of 
                                                 
417
 See case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v. Persons unknown [1987] ECR 2545, paras.11-12.  
418
 Article 20 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice. The Court may decide that the oral part is not 
necessary for the proceedings. The only exception to that rule concerns situations in which the judge intends to 
make use of the accelerated or urgent preliminary possibility. 
419
 See case 338/85 Fratelli Pardini SpA v. Ministero del Commercio con l'Estero and Banca Toscana (Lucca 
branch) [1988] ECR 2041, para.12.  
420
 Case C-83/91 Wienand Meilicke v. ADV/ORGA F. A. Meyer AG [1992] ECR I-4871, para.25 or case C-
315/02 Anneliese Lenz and Finanzlandesdirektion für Tirol [2004] ECR I-7063, para.52  
421
 Case 104/79 Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello [1980] ECR 745, para.11. The line of jurisprudence with 
regard to genuine disputes is rather uneven and ambiguous and for that reason has been strongly criticized. In 
fact Foglia was the only case in which the ECJ decided that it had no jurisdiction for the fact that the dispute was 
of a fictitious nature. See cases: 46/80 SpA Vinal v. SpA Orbat [1981] ECR 77; 261/81 Walter Rau 
Lebensmittelwerke v. De Smedt PvbA [1982] ECR 3961; C-105/94 Celestinin v. Saar-Sektkellerei Faber [1997] 
ECR I-6257. For more discussion on the matter check O’Keeffe (1998), pp.509-536; Schermers&Waelbroeck 
(2001), pp.247-249 and Bebr (1982), pp.421-441.  
422
 Case 54/72 Fonderie Officine Riunite FOR v. Vereinigte Kammgarn-Spinnereien VKS [1973] ECR 193. 
423
 Case 52/76 Luigi Benedetti v. Munari F.lli s.a.s. [1977] ECR 163, paras.20-22.  
424
 Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v. Persons unknown [1987] ECR 2545, para.16. However, in many cases, the 
Court will try to infer the necessary elements of the case which will allow to establish the precise meaning of the 
question sent by a national court. See for instance case 10/71 Ministère public luxembourgeois v. Madeleine 
Muller, Veuve J.P. Hein and others [1971] ECR 729, paras.4-11.    
425
 See order of the Court in case 105/79 Preliminary ruling by the acting Judge at the Tribunal d’Instance 
Hayange [1979] ECR 2257.  
426
 Case 93/78 Lothar Mattheus v. Doego Fruchtimport und Tiefkühlkost eG [1978] ECR 2210, para.8.  
427
 See joined cases 320-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v. Circostel [1993] ECR I-393. The ruling has been 
confirmed on several occasions. See for instance C-386/92 Monin Automobiles – Maison du Deux-Roues [1993] 
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the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the Court may ask the national court to clarify 
some points encompassed in the reference in the later stage of the proceeding.
428
   
The national judge is expected to send her decision making the reference which 
contains the questions to the Registrar of the Court by a written application which must 
include the applicant’s name and permanent address, the description of the signatory, the 
name of the party/parties against whom the application is made, the subject matter of the 
dispute, the form of order sought and a brief statement of the pleas in law on which the 
application is based.
429
 Additionally, article 104 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of 
states that the reference for a preliminary ruling shall contain the subject matter of the main 
proceedings, the essential arguments of the parties in the main proceedings, a succinct 
presentation of the reasoning in the reference and the case-law and the provisions of the EU 
and domestic law relied on.
430
 As it has emerged from the previous passages, the national 
court is expected to provide the statement of reasons and a clear factual and legal background 
of the case, that is to say the facts, points of law which are applicable, statement of the reasons 
which led the national court to refer a question and the summary of the arguments of the 
parties. If those conditions are not met the reference may be deemed inadmissible. During the 
period of reference, the national court is expected to stay the relevant national proceeding.
431
 
The decision to stay the proceedings must be taken in accordance with national procedure. 
Once taken, the Court will send its judgment to the national court which referred the question. 
For the case-law with regard to the conditions which a reference must fulfill in order to be 
admissible is rather abundant, the Court has provided the national courts with an Information 
Note on references from national courts for a preliminary ruling.
432
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
ECR I-2049, para.6; C-378/93 La Pyramide Sarl [1994] ECR I-3999, para.14. In case C-316/93 Vaneetveld v. le 
Foyer [1994] ECR I-763, para.13 the Court revealed a more flexible approach towards the issue.  
428
 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 19 June 1991 with amendments, art.104(5).  
429
 Article 21 of the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice.  
430
 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 19 June 1991 with amendments, art.104(1).  
431
 See Information note on references by national courts for preliminary rulings, para.25.  
432
 The note is not a binding instrument and was designed for information purposes only. By and large, the 
document is a concise and simplified guideline on the preliminary ruling procedure, the role of the Court within 
it, the form of the reference, the stage at which it should be sent and the effects of the reference on the national 
proceedings.  
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It seems axiomatic that the preliminary ruling is binding on the national court that 
requested it.
433
 Once the judgment is handed down, the national court which requested it must 
apply the provided interpretation of EU law to the case pending before it. It is generally 
recognized that the judgment hold by the ECJ have retroactive effect, that is to say the 
national court is expected to apply it ex tunc. Only in very exceptional cases the Court will 
limit the temporal effects of its judgment.
434
 The ruling ought to be given retroactive effect in 
accordance with national procedural and material law.
435
  
One of the most troublesome aspects of the preliminary reference procedure is its 
average duration and the backlog the ECJ faces. The growth in the number of references sent 
to the ECJ year by year is striking.
436
 In the early years of the Court’s existence the procedure 
would last a few months only.
437
 The average duration of the proceedings, to date was 17.1 
months as against 16.8 months in 2008, 19.3 months in 2007, 19.8 months in 2006 and 20.4 
months in 2005.
438
 Admittedly, the shortening of the procedure duration should be seen as a 
very favourable development. Also, the Rules of Procedure of the Court foresee a possibility 
of an expedited procedure in cases with exceptional urgency which is, however, employed 
very exceptionally.
439
 One can yet still argue that the time the Court needs to give a 
                                                 
433
 Case 29-68  Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrücken [1969] ECR 165, para.3 and 
52-76 Luigi Benedetti v. Munari F.lli s.a.s [1977] ECR 163, para.26.  
434
 See case 43-75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] ECR 455, 
para.75.  
435
 This implies that national courts are not under obligation to set aside judgments of other national courts which 
have already entered into force; see joined cases 66, 127 and 128/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze v. Srl 
Meridionale Industria Salumi, Fratelli Vasanelli and Fratelli Ultrocchi [1980] ECR 1237, paras.9-10 and case 
61/79 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit italiana Srl [1980] ECR 1205, paras.16-18.  
436
 For the average yearly growth in the number of references check ECJ (2008), pp.97-100.  
437
 Most of the preliminary references would take maximum one month in the early years of the ECJ’s existence. 
See Schermers&Waelbroeck (2001), p.303.  
438
 ECJ (2010), p.94. Check also a data base on preliminary references by Stone Sweet&Brunell (1998a) and 
Stone Sweet&Brunell (2000), pp.117-127 and Tridimas&Tridimas (2004), pp.127-131. All the articles illustrate, 
inter alia, the number of references from particular Member States and the nature of those references. 
439
 See art. 104a of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. Also references in the areas covered by Title V 
of Part Three TFEU may be considered in accordance with the accelerated procedure, see art.104b. The last 
paragraph of Art. 267 TFEU provides also for a special urgent proceeding with regard to a person in custody. 
The application for the expedited procedure should be made by the national court seeking the preliminary ruling, 
the proceeding takes approximately 2 months on average. It should be emphasized that this special procedure is 
employed by the Court sporadically in cases concerning, inter alia, parental responsibility, see for instance case 
C-296/10 Bianca Purrucker v. Guillermo Vallés Pérez [2010] ECR n.y.r. In 2011 there were 11 applications for 
the accelerated procedure but only 4 of them were granted, see ECJ (2011), p. 99.  
  
 
EU’s Expectations of its Judges 
 
108 
preliminary ruling cannot be considered satisfactory and may, arguably, discourage national 
judges from utilizing it.
440
  
Lastly, the ECJ has often been criticized for the obsolete and rigid style of its 
judgments
441
 which may pose problems to national judges or dishearten them from utilizing 
the procedure.
442
  
 
9. Potential consequences of incompliance: the infringement action and 
state liability in damages for breaches of EU law 
 
The final section of the present chapter examines the issue of potential consequences of non-
compliance of national judges with the expectations which are put on them by means of EU 
law. The issue is embedded in, on the one hand, the infringement action under Articles 258-
260 TFEU for failure to fulfill the obligations following from EU law by a Member State and, 
on the other hand, the principle of state liability in damages for breaches of EU law by the 
Member States. Although both issues very much differ in nature, they are yet very much 
intertwined and they underscore aforegoing obligations and expectations which are put on the 
national judiciary by means of EU law. In that respect, the principle of state liability is, on the 
one hand, an obligation put on national judges by EU law to grant damages to individuals 
whose rights stemming from EU law are infringed and, on the other hand, a potential 
consequence of breach of EU law expectations on part of national judges.   
The infringement action following from Article 258 TFEU is one of the most essential 
mechanisms at the disposal of the European Commission that ensures compliance behaviour 
on part of the Member States, and therefore also its judiciary
443
, when they fail to fulfill their 
                                                 
440
 See Prechal et al (2005), pp.25-26; Alter (2009), p.151 and Twigg-Flesner (2008), p.131. To see how 
problematic the lengthy procedure can be for a particular case see for instance case C-298/87 Proceedings for 
compulsory reconstruction against Smanor SA [1988] ECR 4489, by the time the ECJ passed its judgment, the 
applicant in the main proceeding before the national court had already been bankrupt.  
441
 Lasser provides for an exquisite and terse analysis of the style of the decisions of the Court of Justice and 
observes that they are brief, ultra magisterial, deeply logical and deductive and self-assuring whereby they leave 
no much room for any doubt, see Lasser (2004), pp.104 -112. 
442
 See for instance Weiler (2001), p.219.  
443
 The notion of a Member State covers all constitutionally independent bodies and agencies of the state which 
are seen as public authorities, see case 77/69 Commission v. Belgium [1970] ECR 237, para.15.  
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obligations under the Treaty.
444
 In that sense, a failure of a (supreme) national court to comply 
with EU law potentially forms the basis for an enforcement action.
445
 It follows from the case-
law that a non-application of the judgment of the Court is seen as a non-fulfillment of the 
obligations under the Treaty and the breach thereof. Consequently, it may result in the 
infringement action against the State or incur state liability in damages.
446
 Yet, possibility of 
an infringement action against a Member State for a judicial error which would be in breach 
of EU law remains rather theoretical. A recent case Commission v. Spain is the first and so far 
the only infringement case against a national judicial decision of the highest national court 
(Tribunal Supremo) in which it was concluded that the national judicial decision indeed 
violated EU law.
447
 This enforcement mechanism remains a very exceptional one and in the 
case of courts which do not adjudicate as courts of last instance is in fact not applicable since 
it might be argued that a national remedy in form of an appeal to a higher national court would 
still be available to the concerned individual.
448
  
The foregoing issue is very much linked to the aspect of Member States’ liability for 
breaches of EU law. In fact, the system of the Treaties does not provide for a remedy that 
could be utilized by an individual in situations when her rights which she derives from EU law 
are infringed by Member States and she is suffering damage as a direct consequence of that 
infringement. It was only in the landmark case Francovich that the ECJ explicitly established 
                                                 
444
 On the purpose and the functioning of the procedure see Craig&De Búrca (2008), pp.429-459.  
445
 The Court has been clear on that point in case C-129/00 Commission v. Italy [2003] ECR I-14637. However, 
it follows that a simple judicial mistake of the court of last instance, in this case the Italian Supreme Court, 
would not suffice to hold the Member State liable, see para.33 of the judgement.  
446
 See case 199/82 San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595 and 104/89 Commission of the European Communities v. 
Italian Republic [1988] ECR I-579 in which the ECJ held that particular rules of Italian tax law are incompatible 
with Community law. The Italian courts consequently neglected the ruling of the ECJ. As a result the ECJ held 
that the Italian state breached the Treaty, case C-129/00 Commission of the European Communities v. Italian 
Republic [2003] ECR I-4637, para.41. See also Usher (1996), pp.106-110. Be that as it may, there are several 
examples of national courts’ disobedience where the referring courts refused to accept the judgment of the ECJ, 
see for instance judgment in case 145/79 SA Roquette Frères v. French State - Customs Administration [1980] 
ECR 2917, for more check Anderson (1995), pp.303-307.  
447
 See case C-154/08 Commission v. Spain [2009] ECR n.y.r. In accordance with the background of the case the 
Spanish Supreme Court should have referred a preliminary question to the ECJ but had not done so before 
handing down its ruling concerning VAT tax collected by Spanish Registrars (egistradores de la propiedad). For 
more details and possible implications of the respective judgment see López Escudero (2011), pp.227-242 
448
 See López Escudero (2011), pp.240-241 for the conditions for an infringement procedure for judicial 
decisions in breach of EU law and the reasons of the unwillingness on part of the Commission to bring the 
infringement actions in respect to mistakes of the national judiciaries, pp.235-236.  
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the principle of state liability for breaches of EU law as a fundamental principle of EU law.
449
 
The ECJ reconfirmed that effet utile of EU law would be undermined and the protection of the 
individuals’ rights would be weakened if individuals were incapable of obtaining redress in 
situations when their rights are infringed by a breach of EU law for which a Member State can 
be held responsible. This consideration brought the Court to the conclusion that the principle 
that Member States can be held responsible for loss and damage caused to individuals as a 
result of a breach of EU law is inherent in the system of the Treaty.
450
 Eventually, the Court 
held that the loss suffered by the individuals should be decided by a national court in 
accordance with domestic rules on liability provided that those rules are not less favorable 
than those relating to similar domestic claims.
451
 With everything considered, the principle of 
state liability imposes on national judges the obligation to award compensation to individuals 
who suffer damage as a result of an infringement of their rights stemming from EU law. The 
principle should be perceived as a corollary of and supplementary to the principles of 
supremacy and direct since the obligation to observe the principle of supremacy implies the 
necessity to repair the damage which resulted from the application of the national legislation 
which was in breach of EU law.
452
  
The Francovich case was only the first step in a string of case-law on state liability and 
it raised as many questions as it answered.
453
 In joined cases Brasserie du Pêcheur and 
                                                 
449
 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v. Italian Republic 
[1991] ECR I-5357. In Francovich a group of Italian workers whose employers became insolvent and unable to 
meet its redundancy payments sued the Italian government for non-compliance with a directive which required 
from the Member States to set up guarantee funds to remedy this type of situations. The ECJ found that the 
respective provisions of the directive were not sufficient to enable individuals to rely on those provisions against 
the Italian government before the national court, see para.26.  
450
 Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich, para.35. Additionally, the Court put forward the principle of 
loyal cooperation as a further basis for the state liability principle. Having established the state liability principle, 
the ECJ conditioned the right to reparation. It stated that the directive upon which an individual wishes to rely 
must entail the grant of rights to individuals, it should be possible to identify the content of those rights and a 
casual link between the breach and the loss and damage suffered must exist, see paras.38 and 40.  
451
 See section 7.2 of the present chapter.  
452
 See the opinion of AG Léger in case C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex 
parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] ECR I-2553, paras.69-70 and 104 and joined cases C-46/93 and C-
48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v. Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1996] ECR I-1029, para.22.  
453
 The questions which appeared concerned types of EU acts and kinds of breaches in relation to which a state 
may incur liability. Moreover, it was unclear which public authorities can incur state liability. The literature with 
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Factortame the Court was given a chance to significantly elaborate on some of the points of 
Francovich and to provide national courts with a number of practical hints with regard to the 
conditions under which state liability would be incurred.
454
 The ECJ held that the principle of 
state liability is not the last resort tool applied in situations when there is no other way for an 
individual to obtain redress, that is to say it is a complementary remedy.
455
 Also, there is no 
need to first establish that a Member state breached EU law. Subsequently, the Court went on 
to draw a parallel between Member State liability and non-contractual liability enshrined in 
Article 340 TFEU by holding that the conditions in both situations are the same.
456
 It follows 
from the ruling that the Court’s judgments in Brasserie and Francovich seemed to 
differentiate between a (simple) breach of EU law and a sufficiently serious breach. The 
situation changed after the Dillenkofer case where the ECJ held that, although the condition of 
a sufficiently serious breach was not as such mentioned in Francovich, it was yet evident from 
the facts and circumstances of the case that a serious breach had taken place.
457
 Hence, the 
condition of a serious breach would be applicable in every case where state liability is in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
relation to the Francovich ruling and its consequences is very broad Craig (1993), pp.595-621; Emiliou (1996), 
pp.399-411; Steiner (1993), pp.3-22.  
454
 As opposed to Francovich, which concerned state liability for non-transposition of a directive, in Brasserie it 
was dealt with infringement of a directly effective Treaty provision by the Member State's legislative act, see 
joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheu. 
455
 Initial case-law seemed to confirm that state liability in damages could be only used as a last resort remedy, 
following cases imply, however, that the ECJ changed its attitude towards the issue. See for instance joined cases 
C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Others v. Commissioners of Inland Revenu, H.M. Attorney 
General [2001] ECR I-1727. To learn more see Jans et al (2007), p.327 and Arnull (2006), pp.319-326.  
456
 Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, para.29. It should be noted that in 
this context Art.340 TFEU did not constitute the legal basis of the claim.  
457
 Joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Erich Dillenkofer, Christian Erdmann, 
Hans Jürgen Schulte, Anke Heuer, Werner, Ursula and Trosten Knor v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996], 
ECR I-4845, paras.23 and 26. Another noteworthy aspect of Dillenkofer is the fact that the Court distinguished 
two situations when sufficiently serious breach takes place. The Court argued that when a Member State has a 
wide discretion in the exercise of its powers a manifest and grave transgression of the limits of that discretion 
would constitute a serious breach. In turn, when the margin of discretion left to the Member state is very limited 
or does not exist at all then the mere infringement of EU law would suffice to create a sufficiently serious breach. 
Erich Dillenkofer, para.25. See also case C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex 
parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] ECR I-2553, para.28. In relation to that issue it seems necessary to 
mention the case Bergaderm in which the Court found that the general or individual nature of a measure taken by 
an institution is not a decisive criterion to establish the limits of the discretion left to the institution in question, 
see case 352/98 P Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA et al v. Commission [2000] ECR I-5291, 
para.46.  
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question.
458
 Eventually, a judge who finds that the state can render liability for an 
infringement of Union’s law is expected to award reparation to the individual in accordance 
with domestic rules. Such reparation must be directly proportional to the loss or damage 
sustained in order to ensure effective legal protection.
459
  
Most importantly in the context of the present study, a Member State may incur 
liability irrespective of the organ of the state whose act breached EU law and the obligation to 
make good damage cannot depend on national rules with regard to the division of powers 
between constitutional authorities.
460
 The case-law clearly indicates that that apart from the act 
of the legislature and the executive, the Member State may be held liable also for the acts of 
the national judiciary. Failure of a court of last instance to request a preliminary ruling 
concerning a problem of interpretation of EU law can lead to an infringement procedure 
commenced by the Commission or a state liability action for damages launched by an 
individual.
461
 It follows from the judgment that individuals relying on EU law must have the 
possibility of obtaining redress in the national courts for the damage resulting from the 
infringement of those rights owing to a decision of a court adjudicating in last instance.
462
 In 
that sense, the ECJ established a system of verification of the way national judges adjudicating 
in the last instance cooperate by means of the preliminary ruling procedure and a compliance 
mechanism which would potentially secure the involvement of national courts in the 
mechanism.
463
  
                                                 
458
 In the British Telecom case the Court ruled that a breach of Union law in a form of incorrect implementation 
of a directive may also constitute a basis to claim damages, see Case 392-93 The Queen v. H. M. Treasury, ex 
parte British Telecommunications plc [1996] ECR I-1631, para.40. 
459
 Damages which do not include loss of profit by individuals is precluded by EU law, see case Brasserie, 
paras.82 and 90.
 
For the overview of the consequences of state liability principle for the national judiciary see 
Fierstra, The significance of the Francovich jurisprudence for the national courts [in] Jansen et al (1997), p.117.  
460
 Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, paras.32 and 33.  
461
 See case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10329. In case of questions 
concering the validity of EU law courts of all instances are obliged to resort of the preliminary ruling mechanism. 
Consequently, the infringement procedure could also be started against a decision of a lower instance court, see 
section 8.4 of the present chapter.   
462
 Case C-224/01 Köbler, paras.36-40. See also C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy [2006] ECR I- 
5177. The ECJ repeated the conditions established in the foregoing cases which must be met in order to render 
the state liable for a judicial decision and held that the specific nature of the judicial function must be taken into 
account in order to asses whether  the State can be held liable for its judicial action.  
463
 See Fontanelli&Martinico (2010), p.362.  
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Importantly though, it is for the national legal order to designate courts which will 
have the competence to rule on state liability for an infringement of EU law by a decision of a 
national court adjudicating at last instance.
464
 The foregoing naturally induces various 
questions as to the practical shape and operationalization of such a system as it might imply 
that the highest/last instance courts themselves would have to decide upon granting damages 
with regard to their own decisions which are alleged to be incompatible with EU law. 
Arguably, depending on the procedural particularities of national legal system, one may also 
imagine a situation when lower courts would have to decide on state liability in damages for 
judicial pronouncements of their highest appeal/supreme courts.
465
 Also, the conditions 
governing state liability for judicial errors are very strict.
466
 Therefore, one might claim that 
the enforcement system through the state liability in damages principle is also rather a weak 
one. By and large, the infringement procedure and state liability in damages mechanisms 
which are not only very restrained in scope (to the courts of last instance) but also very 
exceptional in application.  
 
10.  Preliminary conclusions  
 
This chapter examined and explored the shape of the role national courts play in the 
application and enforcement of EU law from the normative point of view. The discussion 
presented the whole range of obligations which are put on national judges by means of EU 
law. Those new obligations are at the same time new competences as they give national 
judges powers which are traditionally not foreseen by national law. Both, the new 
competences and responsibilities should be seen as different sides of the same coin which 
                                                 
464
 Case C-224/01 Köbler, para.46.  
465
 See Zingales (2010), p.433.  
466
 In several judgments the Court held that the exclusion of state liability, or the limitation of state liability to 
cases of intentional fault or manifest negligence, is contrary to EU law. See for instance case C-173/03 Traghetti 
del Mediterraneo SpA v. Italy [2006] ECR I-5177 or a recent case C-379/10 Commission v. Italy [2011] ECR 
n.y.r. In the former one, the European Commission maintained that the Italian rules on damages caused by 
judiciary and the civil liability of judges is at variance with EU rules concerning the liability of Member States 
for breaches of EU law by one of their courts adjudicating at last instance. The Italian rules excluded the 
possibility of state liability with regard to the interpretation of law and the assessment of facts or evidence. For a 
critical view on the principle of state liability for judicial mistakes in breach of EU law, see Zingales (2010).  
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complement one common system of judicial protection in the European Union. The national 
judge is expected to utilize the discussed tools to eventually arrive at the meta-values (though 
vague and elusive) of the EU legal order, its effectiveness and uniformity thereof. By and 
large, national judges are expected to treat EU law as their own national law and they must 
constantly be aware that when they apply national law also EU law may be relevant for the 
dispute at stake.   
With respect to various obligations EU law imposes on national judges, there are three 
overriding points which emerge. First of all, EU law faces judges with a different kind of 
challenges. A national court has become a place of interaction between national and EU law 
and a national judge has become a main protector of the rights individuals derive from the 
latter which has to fit national and EU law together by means of new mechanisms and tools 
which have been set at his disposal by acquis communautaire. It is sensible to assume that this 
role expects from a national judge a good knowledge of EU law and the way that law operates 
in a multilevel legal order. Seen from this perspective, the knowledge of EU law and the 
means of its judicial enforcement seem axiomatic pre-conditions of any successful fulfillment 
of the new role which national judges are ought to play.
467
 Secondly, this new role expects 
from a judge to abandon its traditional, often passive, role and actively contribute to the 
development of EU legal order. It anticipates a kind of loyalty, trust, commitment and 
engagement with the law of the Union on the part of national judges. It expects that a judge 
consult and resort to EU law which should be seen as an integral part of the national legal 
order. As AG Maduro put it forward, national judges must “reason and justify their decisions 
in the context of a coherent and integrated European legal order.”468 The practical 
connotations of the foregoing for national judges may arguably involve various obstacles 
which are related to, inter alia, aspects of local judicial culture, the methodology and the 
interpretation methods employed by national judges in their daily practice and the 
organization of the judiciary. Third, the new role attached to EU law rests upon the goodwill 
of national judges to collaborate and contribute to the common European Union project. By 
                                                 
467
 Prechal et al refer to the necessity of good knowledge of EU law among national judges as the most 
fundamental problem of “generation zero”, see Prechal et al (2005), p.48.  
468
 Maduro (2007), p.13.  
  
 
EU’s Expectations of its Judges 
 
115 
and large, the fulfillment of the obligations stemming from EU law is premised on several 
expectations which evidently go beyond the legal sphere. 
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Chapter 3 
Legal and Judiciary System in Poland 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Having discussed the set of obligations that are put on national judges by means of EU law it is 
necessary to illustrate the shape and main features of the Polish legal and judiciary system. Such 
an exercise is essential to understand the entire legal context of judicial functioning and to infer 
to what extent the national constitutional, institutional, procedural and operational frameworks 
enable the national judge to meet the discussed obligations and expectations and thereby to 
fulfil the role which is put on them by EU law. This chapter also serves the purpose of a general 
reference point into the Polish legal system.
469
 The present chapter traces, in the first place, the 
main features of the national legal system and the organization of the judiciary system with a 
special focus on the civil jurisdiction. In addition, several aspects of the national legal culture 
and the characteristics of the Polish judicial community such as for instance the system of legal 
education, judicial training and nomination and the career track are analyzed.
470
 Next to that, the 
problem of accommodation of the tools of application of European Union law in the national 
sources of law, that is to say the adaptation of the national system to acquis communautaire 
expectations law is examined. For that purpose also the aspect of reception of the EU legal order 
by the Polish Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal is assessed. The following analysis 
is kept at a certain level of generalization and particular attention is given to those aspects of the 
legal system which, at least from a theoretical point of view, might bear on the functioning of 
                                                 
469
 Literature in English touching upon the organizational and functional aspects of the Polish legal system is very 
scarce. In that sense, the present chapter provides a concise and comprehensive guide into the issue.  
470
 The term “judicial community” is borrowed from Bell (2006), p.13. In accordance with the author “that 
community sets standards for judicial activity and inducts new judges into their role.” 
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civil judges as EU judges or might potentially jeopardize the proper functioning of national 
courts in their EU capacity.
471
  
 
2. Organization of the judiciary system 
 
2.1. General overview  
 
In accordance with the Polish Constitution the courts and tribunals constitute a separate power, 
are independent of other branches of power and pronounce their judgments in the name of the 
Republic.
472
 The Code of Civil Procedure states that the judiciary consists of the Supreme Court 
(Sąd Najwyższy), ordinary courts of common jurisdiction (sąd powszechny)473 and special 
courts. The Constitution specifies administrative courts and military courts as special courts and 
stipulates that extraordinary courts may be established only during a time of war.
474
 In 
accordance with Art.177 of the Constitution the common courts implement the administration of 
justice concerning all matters except for those statutorily reserved to other courts.  
The Polish judicial order is by no means homogeneous, i.e. it does function in one 
constitutional framework but it consists of distinct branches and each is quite distinct from the 
other. The ordinary courts comprising of, basically speaking, civil and criminal chambers are 
organized in three tiers and are headed by the Supreme Court which also perform control over 
the military courts. The organization of common courts is regulated in the Law on Common 
Courts Organisation (hereinafter CCO).
475
 The administrative jurisdiction includes sixteen 
provincial administrative courts (wojewódzki sąd administracyjny) which exercise control over 
the performance of public administration and are supervised by the Supreme Administrative 
Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny). The Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) 
                                                 
471
 The analysis is focused on the present state of affairs and the historical developments of the particular aspects of 
the system are only brought up when necessary to understand the functioning of the system at present. 
472
 See Articles 173 and 174 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.  
473
 They are interchangeably called common or ordinary courts or courts of common jurisdiction.  
474
 See Article 175 of the Constitution.  
475
 Law on Common Courts Organisation of 27 of July 2001, J L No.98, item 1070 with later amendments.   
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performs control of the conformity of law to the Constitution.
476
 The State Tribunal (Trybunał 
Stanu) rules on the constitutional liability of highest officers of state. Both the Constitutional 
Tribunal and the State Tribunal constitute a separate branch of judicial power by remaining 
outside the system of courts.
477
 The following flowchart outlines the architecture of the Polish 
judiciary system.  
 
         Common Courts                                                Special Courts 
 
Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1 
                                                 
476
 See Art.188 of the Constitution.  
477
 In that sense, the architecture of the Polish judiciary, based on the system of specialization and comprising of 
three supreme courts, quite much resembles that of the French Republic. For an exquisite analysis of, inter alia, the 
French judicial system see Lasser (2009), pp.29-56. 
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The Ministry of Justice is responsible for supervising courts’ administrative activities. The 
Minister of Justice also acts as a disposer of budget allocated to common courts.
478
 The tasks 
within the scope of authority over the administrative activity of common courts directly related 
to the administration of justice are performed by judges delegated to the Ministry of Justice.
479
 
Furthermore, the Minister of Justice issues, by regulation, internal common courts regulations 
that specify internal organisation and order of functioning of courts, the order of acts in courts, 
the order of performance of official duties and performance of tasks by judges holding 
managerial positions, the course of administrative acts in matters within the competence of 
courts, acceptable systems and hours of the performance of official duties and particular terms 
and conditions with respect to providing access to premises to participants of proceedings, 
witnesses and other persons who stay in courts.
480
 All the foregoing tasks are executed upon 
consultation with the National Council of the Judiciary and they may not in any way interfere 
with the independence of judges.
481
 
                                                 
478
 See art.177 para 1 of CCO.  
479
 See art.9 of CCO. The CCO specifies all the tasks of the Ministry with regard to it which include, inter alia, 
establishing and liquidating courts and determining seats and areas of jurisdiction thereof, delegating to one 
regional court the authority to hear cases within the scope of labour law and commercial law from the area of 
jurisdiction of another court circuit, delegating to one regional court the authority to hear cases related to the 
compliance of vetting statements with the actual state of affairs from the area of jurisdiction of another regional 
court within the same area of appellate jurisdiction, entrusting one of the district courts with keeping records for 
two or more of such courts, entrusting one of the district courts (commercial courts) with keeping the National 
Court Register for the area of jurisdiction of two or more such courts or for part of their area of jurisdiction. If the 
Minister of Justice founds irregularity in court proceedings efficiency, he/she may make a written comment on the 
irregularity and request the removal of results of such irregularity. See art.37 para 4 of the CCO. Duties exercised 
for the purpose of supervision over the administrative activity of courts comprise: the inspection of a court or some 
of its organisational units, verifying the course and efficiency of proceedings in particular cases, vetting in a court, 
inspection of the activity of the secretariat in a court, see art.38 para 1 of CCO. The first three tasks may be 
performed exclusively by judges, see Serafin&Szmulik (2007), p.19. 
480
 See art.41 para 1 of CCO. The issuance of mentioned regulations the principles of efficiency, principles of 
reason, principles of economical and fast acting, as well as the need to ensure reliable performance of tasks courts 
are entrusted with should be taken into consideration. Para 2 of the same article stipulates that “the Minister of 
Justice specifies, by regulation, detailed acts of courts with respect to matters within the scope of international civil 
and criminal proceedings in international relations, including: certifying documents to be used abroad, procedure of 
performance of acts related to persons using immunity and diplomacy and consular privileges as well as acts 
involving participation of such persons, acts related to appearance before courts, procedure for determining 
nationality, detailed procedure for applying for legal assistance and provision of such assistance to courts and other 
bodies of foreign countries and detailed procedure for applying for handing over of wanted or convicted persons as 
well as other forms of cooperation in criminal matters.” 
481
 See art.39 of CCO which reads: “Duties within the scope of supervision over the administrative activity of 
courts shall not violate the scope in which judges are independent.” See also Serafin&Szmulik (2007), p.18. Yet the 
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2.2. Common courts of ordinary jurisdiction  
 
In accordance with Art.177 of the Constitution the common courts shall implement the 
administration of justice concerning all matters except for those statutorily reserved to other 
courts. The organization of common courts is regulated be the CCO. The rules governing the 
jurisdiction of common courts are set out in articles 10 - 20 of the CCO and in articles 16 - 18 
and 27 - 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In accordance with art.1 para 1 of CCO, the system 
of common courts consist of district courts, regional courts and appellate courts.  
District courts (sąd rejonowy – SR) are exclusively first instance courts. Until the 1st of 
January 2010 also so-called municipal courts (sąd grodzki) existed which constituted special 
chambers of district courts.
482
 District courts are created for one or more municipalities but in 
larger cities more than one district court may exist.
483
 There are 321 district courts in Poland 
which are located in larger towns and cities.
484
 They handle all cases, except cases which are 
reserved for regional courts.
485
 A standard district court in a mid-range city has for instance two 
civil law divisions, three criminal divisions, two family law divisions, one labour and social 
security law division, four commercial law divisions and six municipal divisions for minor civil 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
far going administrative supervision exercised by the Ministry of Justice may trigger some concerns with respect to 
the independence of the judiciary as the Ministry of Justice may interfere with adjudication. 
482
 Municipal courts were created in 2001 and replaced the boards judging petty offences. A municipal court could 
be established or liquidated by means of a regulation of the Ministry of Justice as chambers in district courts or 
non-local chambers of district courts which were created out of the residence of a district court. Municipal courts 
used to hear cases concerning minor offences, cases related to fiscal petty offence and fiscal offence, except cases 
subject to hearing in the course of ordinary proceedings, offences prosecuted on private accusation, cases related to 
offence subject to hearing in expedited proceedings, other offences which are heard in accordance with the 
simplified procedure, civil cases subject to hearing in simplified proceedings, with the exclusion of cases heard in 
accordance with the European order for payment procedure and related to court deposits and forfeiture of objects, 
see art.13 para.2 of CCO. By the end of 2008 there were 325 municipal courts. The processes of liquidation thereof 
commenced in 2008. Forty of them were abolished by 1
st
 of January 2009 and 117 by 1
st
 of July 2009. 1227 judges 
were adjudicating in municipal courts. The cases heard by municipal courts were transferred to civil and criminal 
chambers of district courts and the employees were transferred to an appropriate court.  
483
 See art.10 para 1 of CCO.  
484
 Data as of February 2011 provided by the Ministry of Justice in response to an individual inquiry by the author, 
document BM-VI-061-123/11/1, in possession of the author. For the whole list of district courts see the website of 
the Ministry of Justice at: http://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/rejestry-i-ewidencje/lista-sadow-
powszechnych/search.html?Cat3=3 (last accessed 20 February 2011).  
485
 See art.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
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and criminal cases.
486
 Not all district courts have commercial divisions since those are created in 
larger towns/cities only.
487
 
Regional courts (sąd okręgowy - SO) operate as both first and second instance courts as 
they may hear appeals from district courts. Regional courts are created for minimum two district 
courts and there are 45 regional courts in Poland located in all major cities.
488
 Importantly, in 
certain cases regional courts are the courts of last instance against decisions of which there is no 
further remedy since there is no ultimate appeal allowed.
489
 They may also hear cases which are 
passed on by district courts due to interpretative doubts or legal issues that have arisen in a 
proceeding.
490
 Regional courts handle civil law cases, criminal law cases, commercial cases and 
labour and social security cases.
491
 A case is classified as either a district or regional case on the 
basis of the value of the subject matter in litigation, that is to say high value claims which 
exceeds PLN 75 thousand in civil cases and PLN 100 thousand in commercial cases
492
 are heard 
in regional courts which then act as courts of first instance.
493
  
                                                 
486
 Example from  the District Court in Lublin, see http://lublin.sr.gov.pl/56 (last accessed 14 October 2009)  
487
 A president of the district court and, if appointed, the financial manager of the district court constitute the 
administrative organs of the court., see art.21 para 1 p.1 and 4 of CCO. The president of the court manages and 
represents the court (with the exception of duties falling within the competence of the of the financial manager of 
the court), performs duties within the scope of court administration, performs other duties stipulated in the act and 
in separate provisions, is the professional superior of judges of a given court, appoints and dismisses judges, upon 
required consultations. See art.22 para 1, p.1-5 of CCO. The president and the vice president of a district court are 
appointed for a four-year term of office, for two subsequent terms of office at the most, see art.26 para 2. The 
distribution of duties in the district court is determined by the president of the regional court in the court circuit, see 
art.22 para 1a of CCO  
488
 For the list of regional courts see the website of the Ministry of Justice, http://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/rejestry-i-
ewidencje/lista-sadow-powszechnych/ (last accessed 11 January 2011).  
489
 See section 2.3 of the present chapter concerning the competences of the Supreme Court.  
490
 See art.18 para 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
491
 For instance the Regional Court in Warsaw has 25 divisions: 10 civil divisions functioning as first and second 
instance courts for civil law cases and family law cases, 5 divisions dealing with criminal law cases, 4 labour and 
social security divisions, 4 commercial law courts, 1 Community Trade Marks and Industrial Design protection 
division, 1 division for competition law and consumer protection.  
492
 See art.17(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. PLN 75 000 and 100 000 equal EUR 16 751 and 22 334 
respectively in accordance with the currency exchange rate of the National Bank of Poland of 2 December 2011.   
493
 The president of the regional court, the board of the regional court and the director of the regional court 
constitute the administrative organs of the court, see art.21 para 1 p.2 and 4 of CCO. The president and the vice 
president of a court of appeal and a regional court are appointed for a six-year term of office, and may not, directly 
upon the lapse of the term, be reappointed for the performance of the same function, see art.26 para 1. The tasks 
performed by the president of the regional court are similar to those of a president of the district court. In addition, 
he/she performs court administrative duties with respect to district courts within the area of jurisdiction of the 
regional court and exercises supervision over the activity of such courts, see art. 22 para 3 of CCO  
  
 
Legal and Judiciary System in Poland  
 
122 
Appellate courts (sąd apelacyjny - SA) are exclusively appeal courts hearing appeals 
from regional courts.
494
 There are 11 courts of appeal located in major cities. A court of appeal 
can uphold the appealed decision, amend the appealed decision or revoke the decision and 
resend the case for re-examination to the court of first instance. Courts of appeal handle civil 
law cases, criminal law cases, and labour and social security cases.
495
 Appeal courts are created 
for at least two regional courts. An appeal court together with all subjected district and regional 
courts constitute a judicial unit.
496
  
Cases in the area of private law may be classified as civil, family, commercial
497
, 
employment, social security or land registry cases which consequently will be heard by the 
following chambers (divisions) of common courts:  
- civil chambers (wydział cywilny) which deal with civil law litigations that do not fall 
under competences of labour, social security and commercial divisions. Civil chamber 
hear disputes concerning property rights and relating to rights in real estate, 
inheritance and succession law. Furthermore they decide in cases related to law of 
obligations such as contracts and most of consumer protection disputes, contractual 
liability and damages, also state liability in damages. Also non-patrimonial claims 
such as intellectual property and copy rights, press and media law may be heard by 
civil chambers. Civil divisions at regional courts may also hear family law cases and 
civil divisions at appellate courts hear also commercial law cases. It is important to 
bear in mind that even though consumer cases fall under the competence of ordinary 
                                                 
494
 The term ‘appellate court’ is therefore somewhat confusing since also regional courts function as appeal courts 
from the judgments of district courts.  
495
 See article 18 para 1 of CCO. For instance, the Court of Appeals in Warsaw has two civil divisions that handle 
civil, family and commercial (company) law cases, one criminal law division and one division for labour and social 
security cases.  
496
 See note 114 for the list of judicial units. The president of the court, the board of the court of appeal and the 
director of the court of appeal constitute the administrative organs of an appellate court, see art. 21 para 1 p.3 and 4 
of CCO. The tasks performed by the president of the appellate court are similar to those performed by district and 
regional courts presidents. In addition, the president of the court of appeal exercises supervision over the 
administrative activity of regional courts within the area of jurisdiction of the court of appeal. In justified 
circumstances or at the request of the president of the regional court, the president of the court of appeal may also 
undertake acts within the scope of supervision over the activity of district courts within the area of appellate 
jurisdiction, see art. 22 para 4 of CCO. 
497
 The classification of a dispute as a civil or commercial case is quite ambiguous. For that reason competence 
disputes between various divisions of courts may occasionally arise.  
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civil divisions, consumers may also opt for alternative dispute resolution provided by 
the network of consumer courts of arbitration.
498
 
- family and minors divisions (wydział rodzinny i nieletnich) handle family499 and 
custody law cases, cases with regard to juvenile delinquency and cases regarding 
persons addicted to alcohol and narcotic drugs undergoing special medical treatment.  
- commercial (company) divisions (wydział gospodarczy) which hear cases related to 
commercial law. A civil law case is recognized as a commercial law case if three 
cumulative conditions are fulfilled: (1) it must be a case concerning civil relationship 
(2) between entrepreneurs (3) relating to the business activity performed by them.
500
 
However, also other cases, such as for instance cases against entrepreneurs with 
regard to discontinuation of breaching of environmental law and restoration of 
environment to the original state are also classified as commercial disputes.
501
 Put 
bluntly, commercial cases disputes will relate to companies relations and commercial 
companies, government corporations relationships or insolvency law. Cases in 
commercial divisions are heard in accordance with a special procedure that is slightly 
                                                 
498
 Consumer courts of arbitration exist at Voivodship Inspectorates of the Trade Inspection. There are 16 consumer 
courts of arbitration with 15 branch offices. The decisions of the consumer courts, as well as settlements reached in 
them, are equally binding as the judgments of common courts of law, provided that a common court has confirmed 
their enforceability. However, the decision to use arbitration must be made by both of the parties to the dispute. 
Consumer courts of arbitration may only hear consumer-to-business disputes resulting from contracts of sales and 
provision of services, and only as regards property rights. The consumer courts of arbitration at the Voivodship 
Inspectorates of the Trade Inspection can decide cases where the value of the object in dispute does not exceed 
PLN 10 thousand. Only the Consumer Court in Warsaw can hear cases regardless of the value of the object in 
dispute. Consumers can also resort to mediation offered by the Voivodship Inspectorates of the Trade Inspection. 
In matters related to the provision of telecommunication services (for example consumer disputes with telephony 
operators) or postal services, the case may be filed to the consumer court of arbitration also by the President of the 
Office of Electronic Communication. Consumer disputes with banks (such as financial claims arising from non-
performance or undue performance of banking services) may, in turn, be solved with the support of the Banking 
Ombudsman, an institution operating at the Polish Bank Association. Disputes with insurance companies, pension 
fund managing companies, the Insurance Guarantee Fund and the Polish Motor Insurers' Bureau can be decided by 
the Court of Arbitration at the Insurance Ombudsman. In disputes with fuel gas and energy suppliers, consumers 
may seek the help of the specialized ombudsman institution set up by the Energy Regulatory Office. Arbitration 
courts are much quicker (average 2 months) and cheaper and operate in accordance with a simplified procedure. 
See http://www.uokik.gov.pl/help_and_advice.php (last accessed 2 January 2012).  
499
 Those include inter alia marriage relations, separations, alimony, kinship or fatherhood affiliation.  
500
 See Act on adjudication of courts in commercial matters of 24 May 1989, J.L. No 33, item 175 with later 
amendments, art.2 (1) and art.479 (1) para.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
501
 See Act on adjudication of courts in commercial matters, art.2(2).  
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different from the ordinary civil procedure.
502
 In addition to the foregoing it is 
necessary to observe that the Court for Protection of Competition and Consumers 
functioning as a first instance court for competition law cases, antitrust cases and 
collective consumer interests protection cases
503
 and the Community Trade Marks and 
Design Rights Court operate at Warsaw Regional Court.
504
 The latter court hears cases 
involving infringement of EU trade marks, threats to infringe designs or statements to 
the effect that designs and trade marks have not been infringed, annulment of an EU 
design right, revocation or annulment of a trade mark and the consequences of 
infringing trade marks.
505
 
- labour chambers and/or social security chambers (wydział pracy i ubezpieczeń 
społecznych) which may operate jointly or as separate chambers handle civil law cases 
with regards to employment relations, vindication of claims (damages) in relation to 
groundless dismissals. Social security divisions handle cases concerning social 
security, old-age and disability pensions, cases with regard to benefits under the 
responsibility of the national Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). Similarly to 
commercial chambers, they operate in accordance with a special procedure.
506
  
                                                 
502
 See art. 479 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For an extensive overview of the jurisdiction and functioning of 
commercial divisions see Bodnar&Ejchart (2009).  
503
 A breach of collective consumer interests takes place when the detrimental effects of an unlawful practice 
employed by an enterprise affect an unlimited number of people, i.e. potentially anybody can be harmed. In cases 
of abusive contract terms anybody who could possibly be harmed by such contract, the President of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection, NGOs concerned with consumer protections and local consumer 
ombudsman can bring an action against an entrepreneur. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts, O.J. L 095, p.0029. The procedure at this court is regulated in accordance with 
special regulation and has some administrative procedure features since antitrust, competition and in sometimes 
collective consumer interests protection cases are in first instance handled by the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection which is a central agency of state administration. See the website of the Office 
http://www.uokik.gov.pl/home.php (last accessed 20 January 2011). See art. 479 (28-33) para 1 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure for the jurisdiction of the Protection of Competition and Consumers Court. 
504
 Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów and Sąd Wspólnotowych Znaków Towarowych i Wzorów 
Przemysłowych respectively. See art.16 para 5 of CCO.  
505
 The Community Trade Marks and Design Rights Court was established on basis of EU regulations. See Council 
Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on community designs, O.J. No L3 of 5 January 2002, p.1 art.80-
81 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1891/2006 of 18 December 2006 amending Regulations (EC) No 6/2002 and 
(EC) No 40/94 to give effect to the accession of the European Community to the Geneva Act of the Hague 
Agreement concerning the international registration of industrial designs, O.J No L386 of 29 December 2006, p.14 
506
 See art.459-477 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
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- land registry divisions decide upon land register records and other civil proceedings 
involving the land register.  
From the theoretical point of view the functioning of the Polish judiciary is based on the 
principle of collegiality.
507
 However, in practice the impact of the principle is limited to second 
instance courts since civil law cases in first instance courts are heard by a single judge.
508
 Only 
labour law and family law cases
509
 are examined by a panel which comprises of a professional 
judge and two lay judges (ławnik)510 which are representatives of the community selected in 
secret voting by councils of municipalities within the jurisdiction of regional and district 
courts.
511
 Importantly, even if a first instance court seats in a panel, all orders given outside the 
hearing are issued by the professional judge.
512
 In that sense, the functioning of lay judges is 
limited to specific fields and only to the courts of first instance and they do not constitute part of 
the judiciary. Appeals are always heard by chambers composed of three professional judges.
513
  
 
2.3. Supreme Court 
 
Within the above outlined judicial architecture, the Polish Supreme Court (hereinafter PSC), 
which is located in the capital, is the court of last resort of appeal against judgments of the lower 
courts of common jurisdiction. In accordance with Art.183 of the Constitution the Supreme 
Court exercises supervision over common and military courts regarding their judgments. The 
Act on the Supreme Court is more precise for it establishes that the Court performs the tasks of 
                                                 
507
 See Jodłowski et al (2009), p.125.  
508
 See art. 47 para 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
509
 For a detailed list of cases which are heard by a panel composed of a professional judge and 2 lay judges see art. 
47 para 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
510
 See art.4 para 1 of CCO which states that “Citizens participate in administering justice by acting as lay judges in 
hearing of cases before courts of lower instances, unless acts provide otherwise and para 2 which reads: “When 
resolving a case lay judges are vested with the same rights as judges.”  
511
 See art. 160 para 1 of CCO. See the following articles for the procedure of selection.  
512
 Lay judges may not preside over the cases. They are supposed to offer advice to the professional judges which 
would rest on their life and work experience, see Jodłowski et al (2009), p.126. The practice shows that the 
participation of lay judges in proceedings is in many instances of a purely formal character since they do not 
posses the necessary legal knowledge. 
513
 See art.367 para 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This does also applie to the composition of cassation 
chambers at the Supreme Court, unless the Court adopts judicial resolutions but does not apply to small claims 
decisions which will be heard by a single judge also in appeal. Improper composition of a panel may give rise to 
finding the proceedings invalid, see art.379 para 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
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administration of justice by means of exercising supervision over the common and the military 
courts' judicial decisions, in order to assure their compliance with the law and to ensure their 
uniformity.
514
 In order to perform this task, the Supreme Court is issuing ultimate appeals 
(cassation)
515
 and other means of appeal, adopts resolutions and decides upon other matters 
provided for by statutory law. In addition to that the Supreme Court may express opinions about 
draft statutes and other normative acts of law, which are to constitute the bases for the decision-
making and the functioning of the courts.
516
 However, the PSC does not function as a supreme 
court for the entire judiciary system since it does not exercise any powers with regard to 
administrative courts which are headed by the Supreme Administrative Court.
517
  
The PSC exercises supervision over the common and martial courts, in respect of 
judgments arising from these courts. In that sense, the Court examines whether the judicial 
decisions of ordinary and military courts are compliant with the law. Its purpose is not to rule on 
                                                 
514
 See Act on the Supreme Court of 23 November 2002, J.L. No 240, item 2052, art.1 which states that the 
Supreme Court performs: 1.administration of justice by means of: exercising supervision over the common and the 
military courts' judicial decisions, in order to safeguard their compliance with law and to ensure their uniformity; to 
do this, the Supreme Court shall take cognisance of ultimate appeals (cassation) and of other means of appeal, 
adopting resolutions resolving legal issues, resolving other matters provided for by statutory law, 2. examination of 
protests concerning the elections and determination of the validity of the elections to the Sejm, the Senate, the 
election of the President of the Republic, and the validity of the national or the constitutional 
referendum; examination of protests concerning the elections to the European Parliament, 3. expression of opinions 
about draft statutes and other normative acts of law, which are to constitute the bases for the decision-making and 
the functioning of the courts, as well as about other acts of law which the Supreme Court shall think fit; 4. 
performance of other acts provided for by law. On the role of the Supreme Court see Wróbel W. (2008), pp.75-87.  
515
 A cassation case may be brought to the Supreme Court only in specific cases which are regulated in articles 
398.1 - 398.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Those cases are limited to the areas of: employment, social security, 
commercial and company, protection of fair competition, contracts abusive clauses, energy, telecommunication, 
post, railway transport markets regulation, non-litigious proceedings and international civil proceedings. However, 
even in those areas further conditions exist which limit the possibility of bringing a case to the Supreme Court, 
those relate mainly to the value of an object which is the subject of the proceeding. Cases which would not qualify 
for cassation are those which concern less that 50000 PLN for cases regarding property rights, less than 75 000 
PLN in commercial cases and less than 10 000 PLN in employment and social security cases with exception of 
those cases which concern the problem of suspension of old-age pension or disability pension and the social 
insurance obligation., see art.398 (2), para.1. Cassation is also not possible in cases concerning divorces, 
separation, alimony, residential and lease rent and infringement of possession, penalties for breach of order, work 
references and claims attached to them, allowances and their equivalents and finally cases which were heard in a 
simplified procedure, see art.398 (2), para 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By and large, the forgoing implies that 
in some instances the regional courts will be courts of last instance against decisions of which there is no possibility 
of a further review by another court.  
516
 See Act on the Supreme Court, art. 1.  
517
 The Supreme Court consists of first president, four vice-presidents of the Court and approximately 80 judges 
and is organized into four chambers: criminal, civil, labor and social insurance, and military one. For more see 
Serafin&Szmulik (2007), pp.60-81. 
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the merits of the cases, but to state whether the law has been correctly interpreted and applied 
on the basis of the facts already definitively assessed in the decisions referred to it (ruling on 
points of law). After a case is heard and the decision is given by the Supreme Court, the case 
will be sent back to the second instance court which will have to hear it again and judge it in the 
light of the decision of the Supreme Court.
518
 The Court also passes resolutions to clarify 
specific legal provisions and to resolve disputable questions in specific cases. Controversial 
legal issues may be referred to the Court by appellate courts on the basis of art. 390 para 1 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. As it has previously been mentioned, if the Court, while considering a 
cassation or other case, has doubts as to how the law should be interpreted it can decide to stay 
the proceeding and refer a question(s) to the seven judges chamber.
519
 Likewise, if there are 
discrepancies between the decisions of the common courts, military courts or the Supreme 
Court, the First President of the SC may request the Court in a bench of seven justices, or in 
another required composition to pass a resolution.
520
 If such a chamber is indeed of the opinion 
that the issue in question requires clarification it may further refer the issue to two or more other 
chambers or the full court which may decide to pronounce a resolution.
521
 Upon their adoption, 
the resolutions of the entire Supreme Court bench, of a joint bench of chambers or of a bench of 
entire chamber become legal principles, i.e. they gain binding precedential value for all 
courts.
522
 In such a capacity, the Supreme Court will function as an agent of normative 
change.
523
 The Court frequently explains to national lower courts the intricacies of some legal 
issues, provides them with the information how to proceed in particular situations. In that sense, 
the Supreme Court may perform some activities of didactical nature.
524
 Judgments of the 
Supreme Court (excluding resolutions) are not binding on all lower national courts though. A 
judgment binds only the court which the case origins from. Taking all the foregoing into 
                                                 
518
 The function the Polish Supreme Court fulfils resembles thus the Cour de Cassation of the French Republic. See 
Piasecki (2007), pp.181-189.  
519
 See art. 59 of the Act on the Supreme Court.  
520
 See art. 60 of the Act on the Supreme Court. Such a request may also be lodged by the Spokesman for Citizens’ 
Rights and the Public Prosecutor General or, within his/her competence, by the Chairperson of the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority and the Spokesman for the Insured, see para. 2 of the article.  
521
 See art. 61, para.1 of the Act on the Supreme Court.  
522
 See art.61, para. 6 of the Act on the Supreme Court. 
523
 From Guiraudon (2000), p.1107.  
524
 See Wróbel W. (2008), p.81.  
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consideration it may be concluded that all the functions performed by the Supreme Court aim at 
ensuring that corpus iuris is interpreted and applied by common and military courts in a uniform 
and proper manner throughout the entire state.
525
  
 
2.4. Constitutional Tribunal 
 
Common courts do not have the competence to review the compliance of national primary or 
secondary legislation with the Constitution since this form of control is reserved to the 
Constitutional Tribunal (CT).
526
 The primary function of the Constitutional Tribunal is the 
control of hierarchical conformity of legal norms, i.e. adjudicating on the conformity of the 
legal norms of lower rank to those considered superior (especially the Constitution) and 
eliminating the norms inconsistent with the system of law in force. The exclusive point of 
reference for such adjudication is the law (Constitution). More specifically, the Constitutional 
Tribunal adjudicates with regard to the following matters: the conformity of statutes and 
international agreements to the Constitution, the conformity of a statute to ratified international 
agreements whose ratification required prior consent granted by statute, the conformity of legal 
provisions issued by central State organs to the Constitution, ratified international agreements 
and statutes, disputes over the powers of central constitutional bodies and on the conformity to 
the Constitution of the purposes or activities of political parties, complaints of citizens 
concerning constitutional infringements (so called constitutional complaints).
527
 With 
everything considered, the role performed by the CT can be referred to as a negative legislator 
as it eliminates the provisions of unconstitutional statutes from the system of law. Judgments of 
the Constitutional Tribunal are made by a majority of votes, are of universally binding 
application and are final.
528
 Any national court, also first instance courts, may refer a legal 
                                                 
525
 See Piasecki (2005), p.124.  
526
 The Constitutional Tribunal was established in 1982 and became operational in 1986. Its role was enhanced 
after 1989.  
527
 Everyone whose constitutional freedoms or rights have been infringed has the right to appeal to the 
Constitutional Tribunal for a judgment on the conformity to the Constitution of a statute or another normative act 
upon which basis a court or organ of public administration has made a final decision on his freedoms or rights or on 
his obligations specified in the Constitution. Art.79 of the Constitution.  
528
 Art. 190 (1) and (5) of the Constitution.  
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question as to the compatibility of a normative act with the constitution, ratified international 
agreements and statutes. Such a question will take a form of decision on the basis of article 354 
of the Code of Civil Procedure which will be followed by another decision suspending the 
procedure.
529
  
 
2.5. Other courts and tribunals  
 
Administrative courts constitute a separate court system which deals with adjudication 
concerning the problems of legality of decisions taken by administrative bodies with law, i.e. 
they settle cases between legal persons or private citizens and administrative bodies. There are 
11 Voivodship Administrative Courts and one Supreme Administrative Court in Warsaw. 
Administrative courts decide upon complains against decisions and orders of administrative 
authorities, executive orders which complete administrative procedures, orders concerning 
execution proceedings and other acts and activities performed by public administration 
including written interpretations of tax law provided in individual cases. Next to that, they give 
judgments on the conformity with statutory law of the resolutions of organs of local authorities 
and normative acts of territorial organs of government administration.
530
 Due to the highly 
                                                 
529
 The referred question must fulfill material and procedural requirements in order to be found admissible. See 
art.32 of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of 1 August 1997, J.L. No 102 item 643 with later amendments 
which stipulates that the application must include: identification of the organ which enacted the normative act in 
question; a precise identification of the normative act, or a part thereof, called in question, formulation of the claim 
alleging the non-conformity of the normative act called in question to the Constitution, ratified international 
agreement or statutes, reasons for the claim containing indication of supporting evidence. The application 
submitted by the organ or organisation specified in Art.191, para.1, subparas.3-5 of the Constitution shall also 
include reference to the provision of law or by-laws, indicating that the statute or another normative act called in 
question concerns issues within their scope of activities. The question of law shall also indicate the scope within 
which an answer to the question may influence settlement of the case in relation to which the question has been 
asked and, additionally, it shall indicate the organ before which the proceedings are pending as well as the 
designation of the case. 
530
 Further scope of functions and activities of the administrative courts is regulated the Act on Proceedings before 
Administrative Courts of 30 August 2002, J.L. No 153, item 1270, with later amendments and Administrative 
Proceedings Code of 14 June 1960, J.L. No 30, item 168, consolidated text of 9 October 2000, J.L. No 98, item 
1071 with subsequent amendments. WSAs revoke, annul or uphold the appealed administrative act but they cannot 
issue any new administrative decision that would affect individual’s rights and obligations. 
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harmonized by EU law field of jurisdiction, administrative courts are confronted with EU law 
related issues on a daily basis.
531
  
Military courts constitute a distinct system which comprises of military garrison courts 
(wojskowy sąd garnizonowy) and regional military courts (wojskowy sąd okręgowy) that 
exercise administration of justice in criminal cases and all other cases which are stipulated in 
separate statutes in the Polish Armed Forces.
532
  Military courts handle cases involving crimes 
committed by soldiers and military employees.
533
 The Tribunal of State located in Warsaw has 
the competence to rule on the violations of the Constitution or of a statute by high national 
officials.
534
 Also deputies to Sejm and Senators are constitutionally accountable to the Tribunal 
of State to extent specified the Constitution.
535
 
 
3. Features of the judicial community 
 
The features of any judicial community comprise several distinct aspects which are of 
institutional and constitutional but foremost structural and operational nature. In that sense, it is 
necessary not only to touch upon the statutory role a judge is supposed to fulfil but also the 
character of legal education, judicial recruitment and career.
536
 The subsequent analysis will 
address the particular aspects of the Polish judicial community in order to visualize what it 
means to be a judge of a common court of ordinary jurisdiction in Poland. Apart from sketching 
an outline of the operational context, it will also be looked into the possible EU relevance 
thereof. 
                                                 
531
 See Miąsik (2008), p.373, see also Jaremba (2011).  
532
 The Military Chamber of the Supreme Court in Warsaw is the appellate and last instance court for military 
courts. 
533
 See Act on the military courts regime of 21 August 1997, J.L. No 117, item. 753. For more on military courts 
see Serafin&Szmulik (2007), pp.54-59. Crimes which fall under jurisdiction of military courts are regulated in 
Criminal Code and the procedure before military courts is regulated in criminal procedure. 
534
 Such as: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of the Council of Ministers, the 
President of the National Bank of Poland, the President of the Supreme Chamber of Control, members of the 
National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television, persons to whom the Prime Minister has granted powers 
of management over a ministry, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, see Art.199 p.1 of the 
Constitution. 
535
 See Art.199 (2) of the Constitution.  
536
 See Bell (2006), pp.13-43.  
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3.1. The constitutional rights and obligations of a judge  
 
Judges (sędzia), next to public attorneys (prokurator), advocates (adwokat), legal advisors 
(radca prawny)
537
, notaries (notariusz) and bailiffs (komornik), belong to the licensed legal 
professions which may be performed only by persons holding a Master of Laws degree. In 
accordance with Art.178 p.1 of the Constitution judges, within the exercise of their office, are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and statutes and pronounce their judgments in 
the name of the Republic of Poland.
538
 The independence of judges and courts is safeguarded by 
the National Council of the Judiciary which reacts to any attack on the constitutional principle 
of judicial independence by publicly criticizing any interference of the government posing 
threats to independence of judges.
539
 In that sense, the Council is pivotal for the functioning of 
the judiciary.
540
 
                                                 
537
 The Polish legal system distinguishes between the position of an advocate and a legal advisor but in fact the 
competences of both are quite similar. In accordance with art.6 of Act on legal advisors of 6 July 1982, J.L. No 
123, item 1059 with later amendments a legal advisor renders legal assistance and more precisely gives legal 
advice, draws up legal opinions, drafts legal acts and appears before courts and public offices. Art. 4 of Law on the 
Bar of 26 May 1982 J.L No 123 item 1058 with later amendments lists exactly the same tasks for advocates. A 
legal advisor, in contrast to an advocate may not represent a plaintiff in family, custody and some criminal cases. 
Moreover, an advocate, in contrast to a legal advisor, may not be employed by a company and may perform its 
tasks only as a member of a lawyer’s chamber.  
538
 Art.174 of the Constitution and art. 42 para 1 of CCO.  
539
 See Act on the National Council of the Judiciary of 20 December 1989, J.L. No 73, item 435 with later 
amendments, see the website of the Council: http://www.krs.pl/main2.php?node=history&grp=hist&lng=2 (last 
accessed on 12 January 2011). The Constitution stipulates in Art.186 that the Council is responsible for 
safeguarding the independence of both courts and judges. Current organisational structure, scope of activities and 
work procedure of the Council are regulated in the Act of 27 July 2001 on the National Council of the Judiciary, 
J.L No 11, item 67. The Council is composed of 25 members, for the composition see Art.187 of the Constitution 
and the website of the Council: Similarly to the majority of other European countries, the composition of the 
Council is mixed, whereas judges constitute the majority.  
540
 The most important powers of the Council are: adopting resolutions regarding applications to the Constitutional 
Tribunal to examine compliance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of normative acts within the scope 
concerning independence of courts and judges, considering and evaluating candidates for holding a judicial post 
and presenting to the President applications for appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court, common courts, voivodship administrative courts and military courts. Furthermore, the 
Council applies to the Disciplinary Commissioner with requests for initiating disciplinary proceedings with respect 
to judges and issues appeals against judgments of disciplinary courts of lower instance, considers  applications for 
retirement of judges, express consent to continue to hold the post by judges who have attained 65 years of age, 
considers applications of retired judges to return to judicial post, appoints the Disciplinary Commissioner of 
common courts, express opinion on appointment and dismissal of presidents and deputy presidents of common 
courts and military courts, carries out inspections of the court or vetting of the work of a judge, whose individual 
case is subject to consideration by the Council. See art.2 of the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary. 
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Judges are appointed for an indefinite period by the President of the Republic on the 
motion of the National Council of the Judiciary and are not removable.
541
 The foregoing implies 
that in practice judges are appointed until their retirement, unless they decide to relinquish the 
judicial position. A judge may not belong to a political party, a trade union or perform any 
public activities which would be incompatible with the principles of independence of the courts 
and judges.
542
. Recall of a judge from office, suspension from office, transfer to another bench 
or position against her will, may only occur by virtue of a court judgment and only in instances 
prescribed in statute.
543
 In accordance with Art.178(1) of the Constitution, judges are to be 
provided with appropriate work conditions and granted remuneration consistent with the dignity 
of their office and the scope of their duties.
544
 A judge is expected to act in compliance with the 
judicial oath and should, when on and off service, guard the authority of her post and avoid 
everything that could discredit the authority of a judge or weaken the confidence in her 
independence.
545
  
 
3.2. Legal education and the position of EU law therein 
 
The system of legal studies in Poland rests on a uniform 5 years long, that is to say a minimum 
of 10 semesters, university programme which eventually leads to obtaining a master of laws 
                                                 
541
 Art.179 and 180 of the Constitution and art. 55 para 1 of CCO. When appointing a judge for the post, the 
President of the Republic of Poland indicates the place of service (the seat) of a judge. 
542
 Art.178 (3) of the Constitution. A may not be held accountable and deprived of liberty for criminal offences 
unless a prior consent granted by a court specified by statute is given, see Art.181 of the Constitution.  
543
 See Art.180 (2) of the Constitution.  
544
 In accordance with the available statistical data, the Polish judge of the lowest level earns half of what her 
French counterpart earns and nearly three times less than her German counterpart. Only Slovakian, Romanian, 
Latvian and Bulgarian judges have lower salaries than Polish judges. The average yearly salary of the lowest level 
judge in Poland is EUR 12,6 thousand (EUR 1050 euro monthly) , whereas it is EUR 108,1 thousands in Ireland, 
EUR 77,3 thousands in Denmark , EUR 61,3 thousands in the Netherlands and EUR 35,5 thousand in Germany. 
See Siemaszko et al (2006), p.24. An average monthly gross salary in Poland was approximately EUR 774 and 816 
in 2008 and 2009 respectively, see CSO (2010), p.172. The base for calculation of the basic remuneration of a 
judge in a given calendar year rests on an average remuneration from the second quarter of the previous year 
announced by the Head of the Central Statistical Office in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland. The 
remuneration of judges of courts of the same competence may differ depending on the seniority and functions 
performed. The basic remuneration of a judge is determined in rates, the amount of which is established by 
applying the multipliers of the base for the basic remuneration. Next to the basic remuneration, a judge is entitled to 
receive a functional supplement due to performance of her function, for more details see art. 91 of CCO. 
545
 Art. 82 para 1and 2 of CCO.  
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degree.
546
 Legal studies curriculum comprises of elementary, and therefore also obligatory, 
courses such as, inter alia, general introduction to jurisprudence, constitutional law, criminal 
law, administrative law, civil law, civil and criminal procedure and legal logics. Next to that, so-
called dedicated courses are taught which include: legal theory and philosophy, doctrine of law 
and politics, labour and social security law, financial law, international public law, public 
economic law, history of Polish law, Roman law and commercial law. EU law constitutes part 
of the dedicated courses it plays rather a limited role during legal studies and the respective 
courses had become part of university legal curriculum only at the beginning of the new 
millennium. Nonetheless, at present a basic EU law course constitutes a necessary and 
obligatory part of legal curriculum.
547
 Yet, such an elementary course in EU law, which will 
predominantly pertain to the aspects of institutional law of the European Union, remains the 
only obligatory EU law course.
548
 It depends very much on the student and her preferences and 
availability of other EU law courses at the respective university whether he/she broadens her 
knowledge in the respective domain. Several universities offer a very comprehensive choice 
                                                 
546
 With a minimum of teaching hours accounting to 2400 and minimum of 300 ECTS points. Students can read 
law at either 16 public universities or various private universities which are spread across the country.  
547
 Warsaw University curriculum provides for a compulsory course on EU institutional and material law during the 
third year of legal studies and various facultative courses on institutional and material EU law including courses in 
English (usosweb.wpia.uw.edu.pl/kontroler.php?_action=actionx:katalog2/przedmioty/szukajPrzedmiotu), 
similarly Wrocław University (prawo.uni.wroc.pl/upload/File/1_SSP_2008_2009.pdf). EU material law is an 
obligatory course during the final year of legal studies at Gdansk University 
(http://prawo.univ.gda.pl/index.php?id=1&p=179 ). The Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń provides for a 
compulsory course in EU institutional law during the third year and EU material law in the fifth year of legal 
studies (www.law.uni.torun.pl/#33). Łódź University provides for a compulsory introductory course to the law of 
the EU during the second year of legal studies (www.wpia.uni.lodz.pl/students/programy/2010-2011/Prawo.xls ). 
The Silesian University provides for a compulsory course on European institutions during the second year of legal 
studies (www.wpia.us.edu.pl/sites/wia.us.edu.pl/files/pr-st.pdf ). The Jagiellonian University in Cracow provides 
for multifarious EU law courses but only EU institutional law constitutes part of basics and obligatory courses and 
may be followed as of the third year of the studies, other EU courses are optional, see 
http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/files/file/prawo/stacjonarne/harmonogramy/harmwykl.pdf . The European College of 
Law and Administration in Warsaw (private educational institution) provides for a compulsory course in 
institutional EU law in the third year and material EU law in the fourth year 
(http://www.ewspa.edu.pl/doc_pdf/Program_prawo_dz_200910.htm ).  
548
 In accordance with the guidelines established by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, EU law courses 
during legal studies are expected to provide the student with the knowledge of EU institutional law. In that regard, 
the problem of the place of EU law in other legal fields such as national and international public law should be 
touched upon. In addition, the students are supposed to understand the notions of EU and European Communities,  
the primary and secondary sources of EU law, the decision-making process in the European Union, the processes of 
enforcement of EU law and the problem of cooperation of Member States and the EU institutions in the process of 
making and enforcing EU law. See the guidelines: 
http://www.bip.nauka.gov.pl/_gAllery/24/02/2402/85_prawo.pdf  (last accessed 10 December 2010).  
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between miscellaneous EU courses, others will be much more limited in that respect.
 549
 In that 
sense, the accessibility and quality of EU law courses may differ considerably between different 
university centres. Importantly, in accordance with the ministerial guidelines the national and 
EU law are treated as separate branches of law. As it is argued by various authors, the uniform 
system of legal education is obsolete and outdated
550
 and rests on methodology which, put 
crudely, accounts to “positivism and abstraction”551 and rest on passive and ontological 
approach to the law.
552
 
 
3.3. Judicial recruitment, training and nomination  
 
Master graduates in law in Poland and persons who obtained a master degree in law abroad 
which is officially recognized in Poland and which have Polish citizenship are enabled to pursue 
their career in the judiciary. The system of admission to the judiciary and judge’s training 
period was considerably reformed in 2009. In the former system, the judicial training period 
took three years and was decentralized, that is to say each judicial district was responsible for 
organizing and supervising the training on the territory of the judicial circuit. The potential 
candidates were obliged to obtain a Master of Laws degree and to pass an entry examination to 
be admitted to the training. The 3 years long training included seminars focused on different 
fields of law (at least one day a week). EU law constituted one of the subjects of seminars but it 
was evidently attached a somewhat limited significance.
553
 In addition to the theoretical 
                                                 
549
 See for instance the Faculty of Law of the Warsaw University which provides for miscellaneous courses in EU 
material law, to be found on the website of the University http://www2.wpia.uw.edu.pl/151,Plan_zajec.html (last 
accessed 11 January 2011) and similarly the Jagiellonian University which provides for an broad offer of EU law 
courses, also in English at: http://www.law.uj.edu.pl/files/file/prawo/stacjonarne/harmonogramy/harmwykl.pdf 
(last accessed 15 June 2011).  
550
 It is not possible to first obtain a bachelor and only afterward a master degree. In that sense, the system is 
frequently criticized for being obsolete and outdated, see for instance Stępień (2010), pp.12-17. For the unified 
standards applicable to legal studies see the document of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, to be found 
at: http://www.bip.nauka.gov.pl/_gAllery/24/02/2402/85_prawo.pdf (last accessed 10 December 2010).  
551
 See Mańko (2005), p.529, the author claims names the system of teaching (private) law “simplistic and 
parochial”, p.530.  
552
 Stępień (2010), pp.12-17 and Wysocki (2010), p.39.  
553
 See art.18 of the Regulation of the Minister of Justice of 5 September 2002 O.J 154, p. 1283 with regard to the 
judicial and public prosecution training which in point 6 lists European law (it is not specified what is meant by the 
word European) next to constitutional and institutional law and the system of organization of justice, all together 
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training, a candidate was expected to gain practical experience within different chambers of 
courts at different levels. The training period was completed by a final judicial exam which 
comprised of a written and subsequently an oral part, provided that the candidate was successful 
in the written part.
554
 If successful in both parts and provided that there were open positions, the 
candidate could be nominated an assistant judge (asesor sądowy) or a court referendary 
(referendarz sądowy).555 An assistant judge could perform some judicial activities. Every 
assistant judge was looked after by a full judge adjudicating in a court of second instance (so-
called consultant judge). After 3 years of serving on a position as an assistant judge or 5 years as 
a court referendary or 6 years as an assistant to a judge and provided that a candidate is 
minimum 29-years-old, she can be nominated a judge in a district court.
556
 It is also possible 
that established academics are appointed to the judge positions.
557
 Furthermore, the judiciary is 
open to the representatives of the bar such as attorneys and counsels provided that they have 
worked in their profession for a particular period of time.
558
 The instances of transition from 
other legal professions to judiciary are however very rare.
559
 The President of the Republic of 
Poland, at the request of the National Council of the Judiciary, appoints for the position of a 
district court judge, within a month from the date of sending such request.
560
 When appointing a 
judge for the post, the President of the Republic of Poland indicates the place of service of a 
judge. The change of the place of service of a judge may be made without the change of the post 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
not less than 50 teaching hours in total. To compare, civil law and civil procedure would occupy a minimum of 260 
teaching hours and commercial law on its own a minimum of 100 teaching hours.  
554
 Unsuccessful candidates are allowed to re-take the exam only once.  
555
An assistant judge could be charged with judicial tasks for a definite period of maximum 4 years. Those 
assistants who were not charged with judicial tasks were authorized to perform the tasks of a judicial référendaire.  
556
 Furthermore, she must be a Polish citizen and enjoy full civil and full public rights, must be is a person of 
integrity, has the ability to perform duties of a judge as regards health condition, see art.61 para 1 of CCO.  
557
 Professors and senior doctor lectures (doktor habilitowany) in law at the Polish universities, in the Polish 
Academy of Science or other research institutes may be nominated judges in common courts for no more than half 
working time in accordance with art.62 of CCO.  
558
 Which is a minimum of 3 years for a position of a district judge, 6 years for a position of a regional court judge 
and 8 years for a position of an appellate court judge.  See articles 61, para 2, point 4, article 63, para 2, point 1 and 
art.64, para 2, point 1 of CCO. 
559
 There were 24, 40, 58, 58 transitions from judicial positions to other legal professions in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 
2009 respectively whereas there were 0 transitions from other judicial professions to judiciary in 2006, 2007 and 
2008 and 10 transitions in 2009, six thereof were advocates and 4 legal advisers. Data from gained from the 
Ministry of Justice in response to private application to provide public information, documents in possession of the 
author.  
560
 Art.55 para 1 of CCO.  
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in cases and under procedure provided for in Art.75 CCO.
561
 Since the number of open judiciary 
positions is limited, only the best candidates could be offered a job in the judiciary. What is 
more, a candidate could not choose her preferred specialization and had to agree on any open 
position.
562
  
The present system of training and preparing the candidates is centralized and 
supervised by the National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution which operates under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Justice.
563
 The candidates are obliged to pass an examination to be 
admitted to the general training period (aplikacja ogólna). EU law (in general) and the history 
of legal integration constitute an obligatory part of the examination. In the multiply choice entry 
tests of 2009 and 2010 only 2 questions out of 150 touched upon the problem of EU law and 
they boiled down to very general aspects of EU institutional law.
564
 The general post-graduate 
training lasts 12 months.
565
 A person who has successfully completed the general training may 
apply to continue training on the judge’s (aplikacja sędziowska) or prosecutor’s (aplikacja 
prokuratorska) scheme. The judicial training takes 54 months. During the first 30 months the 
applicants are expected to follow courses organized by the National School of Judiciary and 
Public Prosecution which take place in Cracow.
566
 In accordance with guidelines established by 
the School, EU law constitutes an integral though limited part of the courses and special focus is 
put on the cross-border judicial cooperation within the European Union, case-law of the Court 
of Justice in specific areas and the preliminary ruling mechanism.
567
 Subsequent to each courses 
                                                 
561
 Art.55 para 3 of CCO.  
562
 More on the former mechanism of admittance to the judiciary and judicial nominations see Piasecki (2005), 
pp.203-213.  
 
563
 On the 1st September 2006 the Polish National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution commenced its 
operation under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. It was established on the basis of the Act of 1
st
 July 
2005, amended by the Act of 23
rd
 January 2009 on the Polish National School of the Judiciary and Public 
Prosecution, O.J. 26, p.157. 
564
 The tests are available on-line, see http://www.kssip.gov.pl/info/nabor_2010  (last accessed 25 October 2010).  
565
 See art.25, para.1 of the Act on the Polish National School of the Judiciary and Public Prosecution.  
566
 The applicants follow courses at the premises of the National School of the Judiciary and Public Prosecution in 
Cracow for five days a week for not longer than 3 weeks in one time, but in principle no longer than one week. 
During the whole period of training there shall be 26 weekly sessions. See art.3 para.1 of the Regulation of the 
Ministry of Justice of 30 June 2009 with regard to the general, judicial and public prosecution application, O.J. 107, 
p.895 and the annex to the Resolution 37/2010 of the National School of the Judiciary and Public Prosecution.  
567
 See annex to the Resolution 37/2010 of the National School of the Judiciary and Public Prosecution. 
Interestingly, it stems from the guidelines that only the case-law of the ECJ with regard to specific areas is 
discussed whereas there is no room for the sources of EU law or the influence EU law exerts on national law.  
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period, the applicants are to gain practical experience within diverse chamber of different 
instances courts which should be located in the vicinity of the place of the residence of the 
candidate.
568
 At the end of this period the candidates are expected to enter a comprehensive 
exam which will be followed, provided that the applicant is successful, by 24 months long 
traineeship as an assistant judge or a judicial référendaire.
569
 Obviously, persons who at present 
occupy judicial positions were trained in the former, decentralized system.   
In the last four years there were 3075 new judges nominated.
570
 At the moment of the 
survey, there were 4535,08 judges working in district and regional courts adjudicating in the 
divisions which were included in the study and 10 409 judges working in all instances of 
common courts, including the appellate courts and the Supreme Court.
571
 Strikingly, Poland has 
one of the highest absolute numbers of judges in the EU with only Germany having more 
judges.
572
 The ratio of judges per 100 thousands of the population is also relatively high and 
amounts to 25,9 judge.
573
 The national yearly expenses on the judiciary are the highest in the 
European Union and amount to 1,78 percent of the national budget which may come a surprise 
if seen in the light of relatively low salaries in the judiciary.
574
 
 
3.4. Judicial vocational training  
 
A judge is expected to constantly improve her professional qualifications, participate in 
trainings and other forms of professional improvement.
575
 The already mentioned National 
                                                 
568
 See art.4 of the Regulation of the Ministry of Justice with regard to the general, judicial and public prosecution 
application.  
569
 See art.22 of the Act on the Polish National School of the Judiciary and Public Prosecution.  
570
 Source: data of the Office of the President of the Republic of Poland, 
http://www.prezydent.pl/wyszukiwarka/szukaj.html (last accessed on 15 December 2010).  
571
 See note 114.   
572
 Siemaszko et al (2006), p.21.  
573
 See Conseil de l’Europe CEPEJ Rapport 2010, p.11 to be found at the website of the Council of Europe at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2010/2010_pays_comparables.pdf (last accessed 10 January 
2011). See also Siemaszko et al (2006), p.22. Slovenia, Greece, Hungary, Czech Republic and Germany have 
higher proportions of judges which account to 39.4, 33.7, 27.2, 26.6 and 25.3 respectively.  
The countries with the lowest ration are: Ireland, England and Scotland, Wales, UK, Denmark, Malta and Spain 
with 3.0, 4.2, 4.5, 6.9, 9.2 and 9.8 respectively.  
574
 Siemaszko et al (2006), p.20. At the same time they amount to 17,3 EUR per citizen yearly which places Poland 
on the 16
th
 position in the European Union, see p.19 of the publication.  
575
 Art.82a of CCO.  
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School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution is not only responsible for the judge’s application 
and the preparation and organization of the programmes of training and exams for the judicial 
candidates but it also organizes various trainings and other cyclical forms of professional and 
vocational development for already practicing judges. It is one of the primary objectives of the 
School to conduct an on-going and post-graduate legal training which will provide legal trainees 
with a necessary general and specialist knowledge, skills and experience.
576
 In that sense, the 
School constitutes the main vocational training centre for judges. The School’s curriculum 
provides yearly for several trainings, seminars, conferences, symposia and workshops in EU 
law, including material, institutional and procedural Union’s law. Recently, the problem of 
European international private law occupies a quite a significant place in the training scheme 
offered by the School. Furthermore, the problem of the influence of EU law on specific realms 
of law becomes more and more prominent in the training offer.
577
 The School also provides for 
a limited possibility of international apprenticeships and courses and visits to the ECJ or the 
ECtHR in the framework of the European Judicial Training Network.
578
 The training activities 
are mostly organized in the form of lectures and to a more limited extent seminars and 
workshops of different length in various places across the country.
579
 The trainers are selected 
especially for specific training reasons and are in principle the representatives of the academy 
and experienced practitioners of law, including judges.
580
 Next to the School, many university 
centres offer various post-graduate trainings in distinct EU law related fields. Even though the 
judge is statutory obliged to deepen her knowledge of law, she is always free to choose the 
fields of trainings she is interested in. In that respect, there is no regular programme of training 
                                                 
576
 See Art. 2, paras.1-3 of the Act on the Polish National School of the Judiciary and Public Prosecution.  
577
 See specific trainings which are listed on the website of the School, for instance  
http://www.kssip.gov.pl/edu/590, http://www.kssip.gov.pl/edu/424, http://www.kssip.gov.pl/edu/592 (last accessed 
10 December 2010) .  
578
 See the website of the School http://www.kssip.gov.pl/info/harmonogram_2010/harmonogram_2010 (last 
accessed 10 December 2010).  
579
 Those may be one day long trainings but also two – three days long trainings. Some of post-graduate trainings 
are organized in collaboration with national universities such as the Warsaw University or the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, for more check the website of the KSSiP at: http://www.kssip.gov.pl/info/studia_podyplomowe (last 
accessed 20 November 2010). The author of the present project has personally followed four different 2, 3 and 4 
days long trainings in the course of 2009.  
580
 Only judges, prosecutors, academic teachers and other persons who have specialist knowledge from a particular 
field as well as judges and prosecutors emeritus may become lecturers in the Polish National School, see article 53 
of the Act on the Polish National School of the Judiciary and Public Prosecution.  
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and a judge’s knowledge of EU law will very much depend on her own interest and need in the 
area and the availability of respective courses.  
 
3.5. Judicial career track 
 
The judiciary model in Poland can be classified as the bureaucratic one in which judges are seen 
as civil servants with a rather low profile career of lifelong character and where the promotion 
and rules of organisation are very hierarchical.
581
 The Polish judiciary consists therefore of 
professional judges, i.e. those are in an overwhelming number career judges who start their 
profession from the lowest rung of the ladder and slowly climb up the hierarchical system. A 
judge may not undertake additional employment, except that of a lecturer or researcher, in the 
aggregate number of working hours not exceeding the number of working hours of a full time 
employee holding such a post, if such employment does not interfere with the performance of 
the duties of a judge.
582
  
A district court judge or a military garrison court judge who has held the post of district 
court judge or military garrison court judge or the post of public prosecutor for at least four 
years may be appointed a regional court judge.
583
 A common court and military court judge who 
has held the post of judge or the post of public prosecutor for at least six years, including at least 
three years as a regional court judge, military judge in a regional court or regional public 
prosecutor may be appointed a court of appeal judge.
584
  
Judges are appointed for an unlimited term. After reaching the retirement age (currently 
65 years), they become retired judges, retaining some of their rights and obligations.
585
 Female 
                                                 
581
 For more on judiciary models see Bell (2006), pp.14-15.  
582
 Art.86 para.1 of CCO para 2.  
583
 Art.63 para.1 of CCO.  
584
 Art 64 para.1 of CCO.  
585
 However, the Ministry of Justice may, at the judge’s request, allow her to continue performing her duties until 
the age of 70, see art.66 para.1 of CCO. A judge retires upon attaining 65 years of age, unless, not later than six 
months prior to attaining 65 years of age, he/she declares to the Minister of Justice the will to continue to hold the 
post and submits a certificate that he/she is able, as regards the condition of health, to perform the duties of a judge 
issued in accordance with the principles specified for a candidate for a judicial post. 
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judges may request to retire at age of 55 and male judges at age of 60.
586
 As mentioned 
beforehand, a judge cannot be removed. The transfer of a judge to another post may occur only 
upon her consent.
587
 She may be recalled, suspended or transferred to another court or to 
another position against her will only pursuant to a decision of a court (including a disciplinary 
court) and only in the cases specified in the Constitution. The Ministry of Justice may assign 
(delegate) a judge, upon her consent, to perform duties in another court, the Ministry of Justice 
or other organizational unit under the supervision of the Minister of Justice, in the Supreme 
Court at the request of the First President of the Supreme Court and in an administrative court - 
at the request of the President of the Chief Administrative Court for a specified period not 
exceeding two years or for an unspecified period.
588
 
It may be claimed that the system of promotions in the judiciary is untransparent and 
arbitrary since there is no separate promotion procedure, except those to the position of the 
president of the courts or a position in a higher court. In any case, it is up to the court president 
how judges are supervised and evaluated. In that sense, the system is of hierarchical nature and 
presidents have various means to both supervise but also influence the judges under his/her 
management.
589
 Two major factors play important role in the assessment of a judge’s 
performance and subsequently in their promotion, those are, first of all, the efficiency and, 
second of all, the number of overturned by an appellate court verdicts.
590
 The former criterion 
                                                 
586
 A judge retires at his/her request, retaining the right to retirement pay specified in Art. 100 § 2, upon attaining 
55 years of age in the case of a woman, provided she has worked at the post of judge or public prosecutor for at 
least 25 years, and upon attaining 60 years of age in the case of a man, provided he has worked at the post of judge 
or public prosecutor for at least 30 years.  
587
 Art.75 para.1 of CCO. Such a consent is, however, not required in the event of, inter alia, cancellation of the 
post caused by the change in courts organisation, cancellation of a given court or branch division or a transfer of 
the seat of a court, see para 2 point 1 and following.  
588
 Art.77 para.1of CCO, see also the following paras for other forms of delegation.  
589
 See Open Society Institute (2001), p.347. As claimed elsewhere “the existing procedure for monitoring judicial 
performance is insufficient to assist judges in their professional development; it is not systematic and is not based 
on clear criteria or transparent procedures”, see Open Society Institute (2002), p.158.  
590
 Yet, those are not statutory regulated. See Open Society Institute (2001), p.343. Importantly, on 2 September 
2011 the president of Poland has signed an amendment to the CCO which introduces, inter alia, a system of 
judges’ work assessment. See Ustawa z dnia 18 sierpnia 2011 o zmianie ustawy Prawo o ustroju sądów 
powszechnych oraz niektórych innych ustaw. Art. 106a, para.1 states that a judge is subject to periodical 
assessment of her work which will include an assessment of effectiveness in undertaken by her activities, 
professional competences in hearing cases; her specialization and other tasks entrusted to her. Para.2 states that 
effectiveness and efficiency in the tasks entrusted to her, “culture of the office” which includes personal culture and 
the manner of treating the parties to the proceedings and respecting their rights; skills to clearly and completely 
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has a clear link with the fact that efficiency of judicial proceeding remains the major problem 
the judiciary is confronted with which gains most attention of the public.
591
 The violation of the 
right to a trial within a reasonable time that is Art.6.1 of the ECHR in Poland is a common 
subject of cases dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
592
 In 
accordance with the Report of the World Bank, an average length of a contract enforcement 
proceeding in Poland amounts to 830 days whereas it is, for instance, 380 days in Denmark, 394 
days in Germany, 425 days in Estonia and 514 in the Netherlands.
593
 The fact that material and 
procedural law has been changing very intensively in the last decade makes the quality of 
adjudication even more problematic.  
In the recent years judges and courts have come under the fire from the media, 
politicians and public opinion and the public approval ratings with regard to judiciary has 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
formulate the reasoning given to judgments and process of improving judicial qualifications are taken into 
consideration while the assessment. In accordance with para 4, the assessment is carried out with taking into 
consideration the scope and difficulty of tasks entrusted on the judge, work experience, work burden and work 
conditions. The assessment is carried out by a visiting committee every four years. A committee consists of judges 
which adjudicate in a court of higher instance, see art. 37c, para.1 of the amendment. The president of the 
respective court in which the considered judges adjudicates takes the final assessment into consideration and 
develops an individual plan of professional development for a minimum of four years.  The new version of the 
CCO will enter into force after 6 months from its promulgation. The act is to be found at: 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/opinie6.nsf/nazwa/3361_u/$file/3361_u.pdf (last accessed 19 September 2011). 
591
 Next to the problem of the inefficiency and the prolixity of proceedings, the lack of, inter alia, financial 
resources and the lack of public confidence which is closely interrelated with the persisting concerns with regard to 
perceptions of corruption among the judiciary and the lack of transparency should be mentioned. Furthermore, the 
high level of formalization of the judicial procedures is indicated as one of the questions raised for necessary and 
thorough consideration or solution, see Bełdowski&Sześciło (2010), p.11 and Stępień (2010), pp.12-17. Moreover, 
some authors point to the problem of reducing Polish judges to the role of civil clerks, see Stępień (2010), pp.12-
17. Those perplexing points the Polish judiciary has been faced with, have become subject to different more or less 
intense but constant judicial reforms of various nature which have been executed in the course of the last 20 years. 
Those pertained to the aspects of, inter alia, the independence of judiciary, judicial capacity, the governance and 
organisation and administration of the judicial branch, judicial remunerations, judiciary and vocational training and 
the admittance to apprenticeship. Suffice it to look into the subsequent amendments to the Law on Common Courts 
Organisation to realize the intensity of the reform processes.  
592
 For more see report by Venice Commission (2007), pp.251-257. Until the 1
st
 of January 2010 there were 674 
judgments in which it was held that Poland breached the European Convention of Human Rights. It is assessed that 
out of this number approximately one third pertained to the infringement of Art.6 ECHR. 143 judgments until April 
4 2007 related to the length of proceedings before civil and labour courts, see information provided by the 
Committee of Ministers https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1115721&Site=CM (last accessed 31 August 2010). 
593
 Poland occupies therefore the third position after Slovenia and Italy where an average lengths amount to 1350 
and 1210 days respectively. See World Bank (2007), pp.100-102. See also Bełdowski et al (2010) where a global 
assessment of the effectiveness of the Polish judiciary is given.  
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become very low, if not alarming.
594
 Under the pressure of the multitude of judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights in which it was frequently found that Poland violated Art. 6 
of the Convention of Human Rights, in 2004 a domestic remedy for cases with excessive length 
of judicial proceedings was established.
595
  
 
4. Sources of law  
 
The Polish Constitution is the most important source of universally binding law in Poland and 
evidently the paramount normative act in the country.
596
 It is a lengthy document comprising of 
243 articles which are preceded by a preamble.
597
 The provisions of the Constitution apply 
directly, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
598
 It lists statutes, ratified international 
agreements and regulations as other universally binding sources of law in Poland.
599
 
Furthermore, enactments of local law issued by the operation of local authorities are sources of 
universally binding law in the territory of the organ issuing such enactments.
600
 From the 
                                                 
594
 In 2003, 53 percent of the population declared to distrust the common courts and only 36 percent declared to 
trust the courts. Interestingly, considerably more trust was declared with regard to for instance ECJ (65 percent) 
and the NATO (62 percent), see TNS OBOP (2003), p.3. In accordance with a recent research 37 percent assessed 
the working of common courts in a positive way, nearly 50 percent pointed to the problem of corruption within the 
judiciary and only 9 percent declared full trust into the judiciary see report by the Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości 
(2009). On the distrust into the judiciary and the reasons thereof see also Piana (2010), pp.114-117.  
595
 The remedy allows litigants to file a complaint against the court in question and eventually claim compensation 
for damages (up to 20 000 PLN which is equivalent to EUR 4474) caused by the excessive length which may be a 
result of action or inaction by court.  See Act on the domestic remedy for cases with excessive length of judicial 
proceedings of 17 June 2004, O.J No 179, p.1843 with subsequent amendments. In 2007 the courts handled 2618 
claims and 542 were found well-grounded, the claimants received compensation which amounted to 2 000 PLN on 
average. The damages, if adjudged, are paid from the own budget of the court against which the complaint was 
filed. See also the governmental proposal on amendments to the law on the domestic remedy for cases with 
excessive length of judicial proceedings (Rządowy projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy o skardze na naruszenie prawa 
strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez uzasadnionej zwłoki, Druk No 1281) pp.6-7, to be 
found at: http://static.e-prawnik.pl/ustawy/druk1281_1289386052.pdf (last accessed 6 June 2011).  
596
 For more on the role of the Constitution, its character and structure and its place in the national legal order see 
for instance Masterniak-Kubiak (2003), p.139 and following. It is claimed that the principle of supremacy of the 
constitution is axiomatic and it constitutes the fundaments of the hierarchical structure of sources of law, ibid, 
p.211.  
597
 See Garlicki, Constitutional law [in] Frankowski (2005), p.4.  
598
 See Art. 8 of the Constitution. 
599
 See Art. 81 (1) of the Constitution.  
600
 See Art. 87 (2) of the Constitution.  
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foregoing it follows that the system of sources of law is hierarchical and the legal acts enacted 
by the legislator occupy the top of the pyramid.  
Statutes (ustawa) are generally binding legal acts of the Parliament signed by the 
president. International agreements gain binding force after their ratification by the President.
601
 
In case of international agreements which pertain to issues of, inter alia, peace, alliances, 
political or military treaties, freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens as specified in the 
Constitution or the membership in an international organization, prior consent for ratification 
must be granted by statute.
602
 Regulations (rozporzadzenie) are issued on the basis of specific 
authorization contained in the statute and in the purpose to implement the statute.
603
 In addition 
to the above, the Constitution provides for the regulations having the force of statute issued by 
the President of the Republic, only in cases defined by the Constitution.
604
 Resolutions of the 
Council of Ministers and orders of the Prime Minister and ministers are of an internal character 
and bind only those organizational units which are subordinate to the organ which issues such 
act. Under Article 178(1) of the Constitution, judges in Poland are subordinate only to the 
Constitution and statutes and consequently to the ratified international agreements. Importantly, 
the only sources of universally binding law of the Republic of Poland are normative acts which 
are promulgated and published in official journals pursuant to the Act on promulgation of 
normative acts and certain other legal acts.
605
 
                                                 
601
 See Art.133 of the Constitution which stipulates that the President, as representative of the State in foreign 
affairs, ratifies and renounces international agreements.  
602
 See Art.88 (3) and Art. 133 (1) of the Constitution. Prior consent must be granted by statute if an agreement 
concerns issues of: peace, alliances, political or military treaties, freedoms, rights or obligations of citizens as 
specified in the Constitution, the membership in an international organization, considerable financial 
responsibilities imposed on the State, matters regulated by statute or those in respect of which the Constitution 
requires the form of a statute, see art.89 of the Constitution. In case of any international agreements whose 
ratification does not require consent granted by statute, the Prime Minister informs the Sejm of any intention to 
submit, for ratification by the President of the Republic such an agreement, see Art.89 (2) of the Constitution.  
603
 Persons competent to issue a regulation are the President of Republic of Poland, the Council of Ministers, the 
National Broadcasting Council, the Chairman of the Committee who is a member of the Council of Ministers, and 
the minister that manages the relevant area of public administration, see Art.92, 142, 146, 148, 149, 213, 228 of the 
Constitution.   
604
 For instance during martial law or whenever the Parliament is unable to assemble for a sitting. See Art.231 and 
234 of the Constitution.  
605
 See Act on promulgation of normative acts and certain other legal acts of 20 July 2000, consolidated act of 
2010, J.L. No 17, item 95 and Art.88 of the Constitution.  
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 From the formal point of view, case-law does not constitute a source of law in Poland 
but it can, in particular the case-law of the Supreme Court, play an important role in 
interpretations of statutes by the courts. Only the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal are 
generally binding and final.
606
 It is a common rule that the judgments of the Supreme Court are 
binding only by means of the authority of the Court.
607
 Furthermore, it should be acknowledged 
that incompliance of a lower court with the interpretations of law provided by the Supreme 
Court can be met with disapproval on the part of the latter.
608
 Finally, the resolutions of the 
Supreme Court become legal principles, i.e. they gain binding precedential value for other 
courts.
609
 It is against the background of these arguments that the binding role of case-law of the 
ECJ remains a perplexing aspect attached to the judicial application of EU law and the doctrine 
is not straightforward on this issue.
610
 
 
5. Civil law and civil litigation in Poland  
 
5.1. Sources of civil law and the impact of EU law thereon  
 
The fundamental division of the legal systems into the field of private law and public law was 
questioned and ignored for ideological reasons in the communist doctrine and the Polish Civil 
Code
611
 which was enacted on 23 April 1964 and was clearly based on the communist concept 
                                                 
606
 See Art.190 (1) and following of the Constitution.  
607
 See interview with Lech Gardocki, the president of the Supreme Court, in Rzeczpospolita of 6 November 2008, 
to be found at http://www.rp.pl/artykul/215311.html (last accessed on 3 January 2011).  
608
 Which the Supreme Court may explicitly express in its case-law. See Rola (2009).  
609
 See section 2.3 of the present chapter with regard to the Polish Supreme Court.  
610
 The problem of the precedential value of the judgments of the ECJ in Poland occupies much space in the Polish 
doctrine and persists to rise much controversy and doubts. As it is argued by many there are no sufficient normative 
grounds which would legitimize the general binding force of the jurisprudence of the Court, see for instance 
Wróbel A. (2004), p.105. See also Bartosiewicz (2009), pp.58-60, Mastalski (2004), p.4 who argues that the 
judgments of the ECJ should be placed in between judgments binding in a specific case and judgments having 
general precedential value.  
611
 From a formal point of view, the Civil Code does not occupy any special position among other pieces of 
legislation; the doctrine does give the CC a special role in the system though. One can even speak of supremacy of 
the CC for it encompasses general, leading principles and solutions which are also applicable to relationships 
regulated by provisions that are formally regulated outside the scope of the Code. The special position of the Code 
has also been corroborated by the Constitutional Tribunal, see judgment of the CT of 18 October 1994 K4, part II. 
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of law which rejected the idea of dividing the law into the public and private sphere.
612
 At the 
same time, the Civil Code of 1964 was based on earlier codifications and therefore comprised 
French, German and Austrian elements and was modeled on the Napoleonic Civil Code.
613
 
After the collapse of the communist regime the civil law doctrine has returned to the concept of 
private law and subsequently the Civil Code has undergone substantial changes.
614
 The 
transformation period naturally brought the necessity of changes in the Civil Code.
615
  
The Civil Code in its first article defines the scope of the relationships that it regulates, 
i.e. it encompasses “civil law relationships between natural and legal persons”.616 This reference 
does not clarify much for it does not explain what is understood by the notion of civil law 
relationships which remain thus undefined in the Civil Code. Furthermore, the Code embraces 
only general issues of civil relationships. There are many separate codes regulating civil law 
relationship of a special nature, for instance Commercial Companies Code, Labour Code, Law 
on Public Procurement, Family and Guardianship code, Law on Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights Law on Tourism Services.
617
 Extracodical laws regulating private law relationship 
                                                 
612
 See Radwański (2006), p.8.  
613
 See Mańko (2008), p.118 and Brzozowski (2005), p.38. The codification of civil law in Poland commenced in 
1918, after regaining of independence.  
614
 Nevertheless, from a formal point of view the Civil Code of 1964 is still in force and to some extent fifty years 
of communist doctrine still decide about the form of the legal system in Poland. 
615
 On 6 September 1986 the Commission for Reform of Civil Law (Komisja do Spraw Reformy Prawa 
Cywilnego) under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice commenced its works and in 1996 it was replaced by the 
Codification Commission of Civil Law (Komisja Kodyfikacyjna Prawa Cywilnego), also under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Justice, which exists ever since. See http://bip.ms.gov.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/komisje-
kodyfikacyjne/komisja-kodyfikacyjna-prawa-cywilnego/ (last accessed 10 January 2011). The Commissions have 
been responsible for the gradual modernization and modification of the civil law system, see Brzozowski (2005), 
pp.38-40 for the subsequent stages of civil law reform 
616
 The Civil Code is divided into several parts which are as follows: Book I - General part - regulates issues of 
general nature such as natural and legal persons, protection of personal interests, business entities, types of acts in 
law, limitation of claims and preclusive terms; Book II – Property and other property laws - regulates property 
rights including land and mortgage registers, ownership, perpetual usufruct, separate ownership of premises, 
cooperative ownership right to premises, rights to develop a plot of lawn, transmission equipment, timesharing, real 
security of liabilities; Book III – Obligations and liabilities – governs law of obligations which comprise trade, 
contracts including consumer contract to some extent and contractual and non-contractual liability including state 
liability, securities and remittance; Book IV - Inheritance law.  
617
 Next to separate codifications of different private law fields, there are several ordinary statutes which regulate 
specific civil law aspects such as, for instance the Land and Mortgage Books and Mortgages Act of 2001, J.L. 
No.124, item 1361 or the Ownership of Apartments Act of 1996, J.L. No 149, item 903 with subsequent 
amendments.  
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contain provisions describing their relations to the Civil Code by for instance stating that, “for 
matters unregulated in the Commercial Companies Code the Civil Code should apply.”618 
The process of accession to the EU brought many substantial changes in the field of 
private law and the Civil Code itself. Secondary EC/EU law was, however, not implemented in 
the Civil Code only. As a matter of fact only the Unfair Terms Directive, the Product Liability 
Directive and the Commercial Agency Directive were integrated into the Code itself. The 
remaining directives concerning, inter alia, consumer credit, distance contracts and consumer 
financial services were transposed in form of separate statutory measures.
619
 In that sense, 
consumer directives are partly either implemented into the Civil Code
620
 or are regulated by 
extracodical acts
621
 or are partly regulated in the Code and partly in separate legal acts.
622
 As it 
is claimed, the mixed approach to implementation, which was frequently based on transposition 
of a literal wording of the concerned EU directives
623
, resulted in a partial incoherence of the 
whole civil law system. Those provisions which were implemented in the extra-codical mode 
were often faithfully and literally reproduced
624
, which implies that the legal concepts and 
terminology used in the original EU legal instruments were often copied and pasted in the 
national legislation.
625The scholars observe that “the adopted method of implementation often 
                                                 
618
 See art.2 of the Commercial Companies Code or similarly art.139 p. of the Law on Public Procurement of 29 
January 2004, J.L No 19, item 177 stipulates that contracts for matters of public procurement, hereinafter known as 
contracts are governed by provisions of the Civil Code of 23 April 1964. 
619
 See Mańko (2008), p.123. See also Łętowska et al (2007), pp.873-889. Such an approach to implementation is 
also popular in other Member States, for instance in Germany.  
620
 For instance the definition of consumer, abusive contract clauses, liability for a hazardous product.  
621
 Such as for instance: Act on the protection of selected consumer rights and on liability for losses caused by 
hazardous products which implements directives 97/7/EC, 85/577/EEC, 93/13/EEC and 85/374/EEC; The law on 
timesharing implementing directive 94/47/EC; Act on the particular terms of consumer sales implementing 
directive 99/44/EC. See also Michałowska (2005), p.41.  
622
 See Łętowska et al (2007), pp.875-889. As the authors reckon “This complex system, which uses both the code 
and separate acts, makes it very difficult to establish norms in the application of the law. There are many models of 
sales agreements with varying objective and subjective criteria, and it is extremely difficult to point out regulations 
applicable to a given model (something that Polish courts still do not seem to realize) (…)”,  see p.878.  
623
 Ibid, p.882. There were however also instances of departure from the literal wording of directives, see p.883.  
624
 Ibid, p.878.  
625
 In case of the codical implementation though, the legislator endeavoured to “fit” the EU provisions into the 
style, method, structure and language of the Code, see ibid, pp.879-880. Importantly, according to the authors, in 
the pre-accession period the European Commission urged the national authorities to implement the directives 
literally. “Examples of comments from the European Commission showed that in fact the Commission wanted 
Polish legislators to transfer the literal wording of directives into the national law. The comment charts produced 
mechanical comparisons of phrases and expressions used mostly in English against the wording of the Polish law 
translated from Polish into English”, see p.882.  
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results in individual Polish implementation acts not correlating with one another, which lowers 
the quality of national legislation and hinders its interpretation and application.”626 Moreover, it 
can lead to a situation of contradictory regulations and can cause problems with regard to 
interpretation and application of the law by courts.
627
  
 
5.2. Nature of civil proceedings and the role of the judge therein   
 
The civil procedure in common courts and the Supreme Court is in principle governed by the 
Code of Civil Procedure of 1964.
628
 The Code distinguishes several modes of proceedings such 
as: examination proceedings including both trial and non-trial and subsidiary proceedings which 
relate to, for instance, enforcement of verdicts, conciliation proceedings and international civil 
proceedings which also comprise recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
629
 A 
typical civil law case will be heard at an examination trial or non-trial proceeding in which two 
opposing parties participate. Most commonly, in district and regional courts ordinary 
proceedings with standard procedure will be followed.
630
  
Art.176 of the Constitution guarantees at least two-instance proceedings. In principle all 
trials are open and public but the court may decide otherwise and sit in a closed session. To 
begin an action in a court of first instance a statement of claim must be filled with a court 
possessing territorial and subject matter jurisdiction. A statement of claims should comprise 
details such as: the trial court, the addresses of the parties and their representatives, the nature 
                                                 
626
  Ibid, p.878.  
627
 Ibid, p.881. Importantly, due to its nature the consumer disputes are not heard by the Polish Supreme Court 
which makes it difficult to achieve a uniform judicial application of the consumer law, see ibid, p.885.  
628
 Code of Civil Procedure of 17 November 1964, J.L. No.43, item 296 with subsequent amendments. The history 
of the Code of Civil Procedure is similar to that of the Civil Code and dates back to 1918. After the World War 
Two, the civil procedure the Soviet influences were integrated into the Code and were reflected in for instance so-
called ‘extraordinary revision’ allowing the state bodies to challenge the final judgments of courts provided that the 
public interest was at stake. After the collapse of communism, the Code was subject to thorough amendments 
which (re)introduced, inter alia, cassation system (in line with the French system) and the principles of equal rights 
of the parties in proceedings and adversarial proceedings. Furthermore, a multitude of minor alterations have been 
introduced into the code of procedure in the course of the last two decades. See Ereciński, Civil procedure [in] 
Frankowski (2005), pp.117-118.  
629
 On the modes of civil proceedings see ibid, pp.119-122.  
630
 In case of family law, labour and social security and commercial law special proceedings will apply. It is also 
possible for the court to decide a case only on a basis of written documents (for instance disputes involving debt 
claims on promissory notes), such cases involve a special mode of trial.  
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and precise details of the claim, the essential factual and possibly legal evidence that 
substantiate the claim.
631
 A judge is bound by a claim of the plaintiff (for instance he/she may 
not adjudicate damages if a plaintiff requests protection of his property) but is not bound by 
legal evidence which a plaintiff refers to support his case. This is underpinned by two leading 
principles, i.e. iura novit curia (the court knows the law) and the da mihi factum dabo tibi ius 
(court applies the law) and is reflected in art.187 of the Code of Civil Procedure which does not 
oblige the claimant to present the legal basis supporting his claim.
632
 In turn, pointing at legal 
arguments which the parties base their claims on is not a prerequisite of further proceedings. 
The parties are only obliged to present their claims and the factual circumstances of their 
dispute and present the evidence to substantiate it. In the end, it is the judge who will determine 
which law is applicable to the dispute in question, regardless of what the parties wish. In other 
words, it is presumed that the court knows the relevant law and knows how to apply it. The 
court may thus choose a material legal basis for its judgment and apply its own method of 
interpretation of those provisions. 
After admitting the statement of claim, a court examines its own competence and 
decides on the mode of trial since, as it has been previously mentioned, some disputes can be 
resolved in simplified procedures. The date of the first hearing is fixed and a copy of the 
statement of claims is delivered to the defendant who is, in principle, not required to reply but 
must explain the grounds if the claim is rejected.
633
 The hearing can be divided into following 
phases: announcement of a dispute and indication of the parties, presentation of the positions, 
claims and evidence (this may but does not need to include the legal evidence) of the parties, 
hearing of evidence, taking position by the parties with regard to the evidence presented by the 
opponent, closing the trial, announcement of the judgment.
634
 The court has competence to stay 
                                                 
631
 The CCP provides for a rejection of statement of claim in a few situations: a party lacks legal capacity, the same 
claim is subject of other litigation or has been already litigated, and the same claim has been submitted to 
arbitration court. 
632
 In accordance with art.187, para.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure a statement of claims must enclose the claims 
and factual circumstances. 
633
 This does not apply in commercial cases where the defendant is obliged to reply. 
634
 For a detailed overview of the stages of a civil proceeding see Jodłowski et al (2009), pp.318-470.  
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legal proceedings of its own motion.
635
 After deciding the case both parties have the right to 
appeal to the court of second instance.
636
 In that respect, the parties are allowed to invoke new 
evidence, facts and legal basis.
637
 The appeal court may confirm or overrule the original 
judgment. It may annul the original judgment and refer the case back to the court of first 
instance and the conditions of such annulment are set in the Code of Civil Procedure.
638
 The 
second appeal will be a cassation proceeding at the Supreme Court.
639
 However, as mentioned 
before cassation is not possible in all cases.
640
 A party may base the cassation claim on the 
ground of a breach of material law through its incorrect  interpretation or application (errors in 
indicant) or a breach of procedural law if such breach could influence the outcome of the case 
(errors in procedendo). It should be noted that the Supreme Court adjudicating in cassation 
cases may either decide on its own on the case or overrule the judgment of the second instance 
court and send it back for reopening.
641
 In the latter case, the court of second instance will be 
bund by the interpretation of the law as provided by the Supreme Court.
642
 The Code of Civil 
Procedure does regulate the issue of the application of foreign law and enforcement of the 
decisions of other EU members’ courts.643 It does not regulate in any way the place of European 
law and procedural aspects related to the processes of enforcement thereof. 
The nature of a civil proceeding is determined by several fundamental principles and 
prerequisites. Those are not explicitly named in the Code itself but can be derived from various 
procedural provisions enshrined in therein.
644
 The most pivotal principles which should be 
mentioned are: 
                                                 
635
 Even though the possibility of staying the proceeding is regulated by the Code of the Civil Procedure, some 
doubts are raised whether a court may stay the proceedings in order to refer a preliminary question to the European 
Court of Justice. The Code lists the situations when a proceeding can be stayed but a preliminary reference to the 
ECJ is not included in the list. 
636
 For the role and place of the appeal procedure and the formal prerequisites thereof see Piasecki (2007), pp.143-
166.  
637
 See art.368 para.1 p.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
638
 See art.386 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
639
 Cassation is an extraordinary and exceptional means of redress and therefore is limited to cases in which it is 
necessary to provide a definitive interpretation of legal provisions, to standardize jurisprudence of common courts 
and to decide in precedent cases, see Jodłowski et al (2009), p.491.  
640
  See section 2.3 on the Polish Supreme Court and note 515.   
641
 See art.398 (15) and 398 (16) of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
642
 Which is explicitly stated in art.398 (20) of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
643
 See art.1145-1153 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
644
 See Ereciński, Civil procedure [in] Frankowski (2005), p.122.  
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- principle of material/substantive truth and the principle of formal truth. The former 
implies that the factual and legal findings of the courts should be in harmony with the 
reality to the fullest extent possible. In the course of decades the principle of objective 
truth was marginalized and ultimately deleted from the Code of Civil Procedure.
645
 
The principle of formal truth implies that the evidence presented by the parties should 
correspond to the factual and legal findings done by the court.
646
 
- principle of equality of the parties  which means each party is equal and have equal 
rights to undertake an action in the proceeding  
- principle of the autonomy of the parties (dyspozycyjność) which is shown in capacity 
to freely decide about their material and procedural rights, i.e. the decision to avail 
oneself of a right is at the holder’s discretion.647 The party has the right to file a suit 
but also to modify, limit, renounce or withdraw his claim.
648
  
- principle of adversarial proceedings (kontradyktaryjność) which implies that the 
parties are obliged to collect and present evidence to the court to support their claims. 
In some instances, the court is competent to ex officio undertake an action to 
supplement the evidence (inquisitorial proceedings) delivered by the parties which 
will mostly happen in family cases or when the court suspects collusion between the 
parties.
649
  
- principle of directness which means that the whole case should be reviewed in its 
entirety before a national court and a closely correlated principle of orally conducted 
                                                 
645
 Ibid.  
646
 See Jodłowski et al (2009), pp.130-134.   
647
 This freedom to use the material rights must however be exercised in accordance with the rule of law and 
legality, ibid, pp.136-137.  
648
 The principle is based on the assumption that a civil proceeding may be filed only by a person (and not by a 
court itself). It is yet possible that bodies such as public prosecutor or non-governmental organizations initiate 
proceedings on behalf of a person. Also, non-trial proceedings may be initiated by the court, for instance in 
guardianship cases. Issues which are not subject of individual’s claim may not be adjudicated, see ibid, pp.136-
142.  
649
 Inquisitorial proceedings are yet exceptional.  
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proceedings (ustność) which ensures simplification and deformalization of the civil 
proceeding and transparency.
650
  
- principle of accumulation of factual and evidentiary material which is embedded in 
limitation of bringing facts and evidence to the court and the principle of free 
evaluation of evidence, i.e. discretionary powers of the courts in assessing the 
evidence and allowing new evidence. The former one implies that the party is obliged 
to bring all known facts and evidence at once unless it shows that it was not possible 
to resort to them at the beginning of the trial.
651
 
 
6. Accommodation of general principles of EU law in the national legal order 
 
In the foregoing chapter the entire set of obligations which the acquis communautaire puts on 
national judiciaries was elaborated upon. It is one of the aims of the present chapter to illustrate 
how those obligations are accommodated in national law and whether national law creates any 
constitutional or procedural obstacles which could hinder the application of EU law by national 
courts. Basically speaking, this amounts to the issue of the place of EU law in the national legal 
order and the relationship between both sources of law from the national perspective. The 
subsequent discussion, which will be divided in subsections concerning specific tenets of EU 
law, will not only address the way the issue is regulated in the national Constitution and relevant 
legal acts but will also examine the jurisprudence of the national Constitutional Tribunal and the 
Supreme Court touching the problem of the integration of systemic principles of EU law in the 
national legal order.  
 
 
 
                                                 
650
 The principle does not imply that the whole process must be conducted orally for the parties are allowed to hand 
in their statements and motions in writing. For obvious reasons the principle of oral proceedings plays a minor role 
in non-litigious proceedings. 
651
 See Jodłowski et al (2009), pp.149-150.  
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6.1. The place of EU law in the Polish constitutional framework: supremacy and 
direct effect  
 
At the outset it shall be observed that the Polish Constitution does not distinguish between 
international and EU law and no reference to the European Union or EU law can be found in the 
Constitution.
652
 Consequently, the national constitutional system does not provide for any 
specific rules which would explicitly regulate the relationship between the national legal order 
and the law of the European Union. From the constitutional regulation it does not 
straightforwardly follow how national authorities including courts are to apply EU law either. 
Nor is it stated in which situations and under what conditions individuals are allowed to invoke 
and rely on EU law.
653
 The principles of supremacy of EU law and the direct applicability and 
direct effect thereof are thus not enshrined in the Constitution or any national procedural rules. 
Nonetheless, in accordance with Article 9 of the Constitution, Poland respects international law 
which is binding on it. It is argued that this provision is of a declaratory nature and implies that 
the legislator is to observe the whole body of binding international law regardless of the form it 
takes and shows its good will and openness towards international law.
654
 In line with article 90 
of the Constitution, Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an 
international organization or institution the competence of organs of state authority in relation to 
certain matters.
655
 Most importantly, Article 91 of the Constitution defines the place of 
international and consequently, as it is argued, EU law in the domestic legal order. According to 
article 91, para.1 and 2 an international agreement after its ratification and promulgation forms 
                                                 
652
 See Biernat (2006), p.420. As claimed by Albi “The Polish Constitution represents the “international 
organization” approach towards the EU. Besides providing a “catch-all” solution to legitimize membership in all 
international organizations, it may also reflect the sensitivity surrounding the question of sovereignty.”, see Albi 
(2005), p.408. This “international organization approach” is subsequently visible in the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Tribunal which frequently refers to the Communities/EU as to the international organization. See 
also Biernat (2001), pp.41-42.  
653
 See Wójtowicz (2004), p.44.  
654
 See Masterniak-Kubiak (2003), pp.182-183. In accordance with the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 
10 August 2001, Ts 56/01, Article 9 of the Constitution is first of all addressed to the national legislator and it 
determines the manner of making use of the competence to regulate particular fields of public life.  
655
 It is argued that the proviso does not enable the national authorities to confer all the national competences to an 
international organization or institution and it is not possible to confer the competences which would be pivotal for 
the constitutional system of the country. See for instance Grzybowski (2005), p.18 and Łazowski&Wentkowska, 
Poland: constitutional drama and business as usual [in] Łazowski (2010), pp.280-281.  
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part of the domestic legal order and is directly applicable unless its application depends on the 
enactment of a statute and takes precedence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be 
reconciled with the provisions of such statutes. Article 91, para.3 provides that “If an 
agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international organization so 
provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of 
a conflict of laws”. It is argued that this article was introduced in the Constitution for the 
purposes of the later membership in the European Union.
656
 It would namely concern Union’s 
secondary legislation and more precisely EU regulations which, as it is stipulated in the TFEU, 
are directly applicable.
657
 It is yet questioned whether this article concerns all EU legal sources. 
EU directives, namely, are not directly applicable.
658
 It is, nonetheless, put forward that the 
Constitution by allowing for direct applicability of ratified international agreements and the law 
enacted by international organizations, allows for direct applicability of both primary and 
secondary EU law. Biernat argues that the entire acquis communautaire is directly applicable in 
Poland by virtue of Article 2 of the Act concerning the conditions to accession to the European 
Union and suggests that the notion of direct applicability should be interpreted broadly and 
comprise the notion of direct effect.
659
 Elsewhere it is argued that the articles of the Constitution 
do not constitute a sufficiently precise and straightforward basis for the application of EU legal 
provisions by Polish judges.
660
 
Apart from the above, the most intricate problem pertaining to the position and place of 
EU law in the Polish legal order relates to the fact that, as it has already been pointed out, the 
                                                 
656
 See Masterniak-Kubiak (2003), p.221 and Albi, Constituional changes and challenges in the New Member 
States [in] Łazowski (2010), pp.78, 80-81. 
657
 See Article 288 TFEU (ex. 249 EC). In the system of the Treaties it is not stipulated that EU law takes a 
supreme position which makes the discourse with regard to Article 91, para 3 much more complex.   
658
 See Wróbel (2004), pp.104-105 on the problem of direct effect and direct applicability and their relationship 
with the Polish Constitution.  
659
 Article 2 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the 
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the 
Treaties on which the European Union is founded, O.J 2003 L 236/33 reads: “From the date of accession, the 
provisions of the original Treaties and the acts adopted by the institutions and the European Central Bank before 
the accession shall be binding on the New Member States and shall apply in those states under  the conditions laid 
down in those Treaties and in this Act.” However, contrary to what Biernat argues, the article does not stipulate 
direct applicability of Union’s legislation but only its binding force. See Biernat (2006), pp.420-421.  
660
 Wójtowicz (2004), pp.49 and 69.  
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Constitution takes absolute primacy above all other sources of law. This principle has been 
confirmed by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its well-known judgments concerning the 
European Arrest Warrant and the constitutionality of the Accession Treaty which gained 
considerable attention among both Polish and foreign scholars.
661
 In both judgments the 
Tribunal aimed at elaborating on the problem of the place of EU law in the national legal order 
and the relationship between both. As the Tribunal held in the latter case, the Accession Treaty 
as such does not infringe the Polish Constitution which however ”enjoys precedence of binding 
force and precedence of application within the territory of the Republic of Poland.”662 The 
Tribunal rejected the claim put forward by the applicants that the European Community and the 
European Union are supranational organizations and referred to both in a traditional way as to 
international organizations.
663
 Furthermore, it was held that resolving the problem of 
inconsistency between both sources of law ultimately belongs to the Polish legislator which may 
decide to: amend the Constitution, cause modification to Community provisions or, ultimately, 
decide to withdraw Poland from the European Union.
664
 In a similar vein, in the judgment 
concerning the European Arrest Warrant, the Tribunal held that provisions of EAW and 
surrender procedures which were implemented as article 607 para 1 in the Criminal Procedure 
Code are at variance with article 55(1) of the Constitution.
665
 The loss of binding force of 
                                                 
661
 See the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on the European Arrest Warrant of 27 April 2005 P 1/05 and the 
judgment on the Accession Treaty of 11 May 2005 K 18/04. For comments on the decisions of the Constitutional 
Tribunal see for instance: Sadurski (2008); Siegel (2008); Komarek (2005); Pollicino (2008); Miąsik (2008); 
Kowalik-Bańczyk (2005); Kwiecień (2005b); Łazowski (2007); Wyrozumska (2005); Nußberger (2008); Łazowski 
(2011).  
662
 See the judgment in case K 18/04, point 11 of the reasons for the ruling. The case concerned Poland’s 
membership in the European Union and more precisely the constitutionality of the Accession Treaty. The initiators 
of the proceeding before the CT claimed that the accession was at variance with the Constitution and more 
precisely it failed to conform to the principle of sovereignty of the Polish nation and the supremacy of the 
Constitution within the national legal system. 
663
 See the judgment in case K 18/04, point 6 of the reasons for the ruling. See also Sadurski (2008), p.19. The 
Tribunal based its reasoning on the fact the word “supranational” is nowhere referred to in the Treaty system, i.e. 
from the linguistic point of view the problem of “supranational organization” is non-existent. The foregoing finding 
of the CT becomes however somewhat perplexed when read in the light of point 12 of the reasoning in which the 
Tribunal held that: “The concept and model of European law created a new situation, wherein, in each Member 
State, autonomous legal orders co-exist and are simultaneously operative. Their interaction may not be completely 
described by the traditional concepts of monism and dualism regarding the relationship between domestic law and 
international law.” 
664
 See K 18/04 point 13 of the principal reasons of the ruling.  
665
 See the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on the European Arrest Warrant of 27 April 2005 P 1/05. The 
proceeding before the CT were initiated by a regional court in Gdańsk which was dealing with a public 
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art.607 para 1 was however suspended by 18 months which were supposed to give the legislator 
enough time to find a solution to this conflict by for instance amending the Constitution and 
temporarily obliged the national courts to continue to apply the contested provision. Even 
though the relevant judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal evidently speak in favour of the 
absolute primacy of the Polish Constitution, it is yet put forward that this does not imply that the 
Constitutional Tribunal has taken an utterly negative or unfriendly stance towards the law of the 
European Union.
666
 From the Accession Treaty case, it namely follows that the CT does support 
the principle of precedence of EU law over sub-constitutional legal acts. The Tribunal has 
confirmed this finding in its subsequent judgments.
667
 Both judgments, which are touching upon 
the problem of the relationship of EU law and the Polish constitutional law in a very 
fundamental and extensive manner, do not represent the Tribunal’s first opinions with regard to 
the problem of the relationship of national law with EU law. In cases K 33/03
668
, K 15/04
669
 and 
K 24/04
670
 the Tribunal expressed its opinion concerning the supreme position of the Polish 
Constitution but also voiced its stance towards the obligation of interpretation of national law in 
harmony with EU law and the “constitutional principle of sympathetic predisposition towards 
the process of European integration and the cooperation between the states” which will be 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
prosecutor’s application  on the basis of the EAW to surrender a Polish citizen to the Netherlands for the purpose of 
conducting a criminal prosecution against her. The content of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
European Arrest Warrant was transposed into Polish legislation (procedural criminal code) but the execution of the 
provision had raised many doubts among the national academics since Article 55(1) of the constitution prohibited 
‘extradition’ of Polish citizens and the Constitution did not provide for difference between the ‘surrendering’ and 
‘extradition’. The prohibition of extradition of a Polish citizen as enshrined in article 55(1) of the Constitution was 
found to be absolute in nature by the Constitutional Tribunal.  
666
 See point 14 and following of the principle reasons for the ruling on the European Arrest Warrant. Kowalik-
Bańczyk suggests that the fact that the Tribunal postponed the effects of its ruling by 18 months and suggested that 
the national legislator should amend the Constitution implies that in fact the Tribunal implicitly recognized the 
principle of supremacy of EU law, see Kowalik-Bańczyk (2005), pp.1360-1361. See also a more recent judgment 
of the Constitutional Tribunal concerning the Treaty of Lisbon in which the Tribunal reaffirmed its stance on the 
absolute primacy of the national constitution over EU law, see case K 32/09 on Conformity of the Treaty of Lisbon 
with the Polish Constitution of 24 November 2010.  
667
 See the judgment in case K 18/04, point 11 of the reasons for the ruling.  
668
 See the judgment in case K 33/03 of 21 April 2004 on bio-components in gasoline and diesel.  
669
 See the judgment in case K 15/04 of 31 May 2004 on participation of foreigners in European Parliamentary 
elections.  
670
 See the judgment in case K 24/04 of 12 January 2005 on inequality of competences of Sejm and Senate 
committees in respect of European Union legislative proposals.  
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elaborated upon in the subsequent section of this chapter.
671
 In that sense, the Tribunal revealed 
its friendly approach to the legal order of the EU.
672
 With everything considered, the stance the 
Tribunal takes towards the issue of supremacy of EU law resembles the one presented by the 
German and French constitutional court: the principle of supremacy of EU law is accepted as a 
rule originating from the Constitution itself and valid so long as it conforms to, inter alia, the 
minimum guarantee functions realized by the Constitution itself and the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals which are guarded by Polish constitutional law.
673
 
The problem of supremacy of EU law is linked to the previously referred issue of direct 
effect of EU legal provisions. From the doctrinal point of view, putting the principle of direct 
effect into practice may seem somewhat perplexing an issue for national courts since it has been 
a leading principle in the Polish legal order that courts do not have competence to decide on the 
validity of statutes for only the Constitutional Tribunal may avail itself of such competence.
674
 
In consequence, the courts cannot refuse to apply normative acts on the grounds that they are 
unconstitutional. Pursuant to Art.193 of the Constitution, they may address a legal question to 
the Constitutional Tribunal regarding the compatibility of a given normative act with the 
Constitution, ratified international agreements or other acts if the outcome of a case pending 
before the courts hangs on the answer to that legal question. Not surprisingly, this issue raised 
much controversy when Poland joined the European Union for, from the theoretical point of 
view, the courts would not be allowed to set aside a statute even if it was incompatible with EU 
law. At the same time it should be acknowledged though that judges are not bound by 
enactments which are subordinate to statutes, such as regulations and, when examining a given 
case, may determine, on an independent basis, whether such enactments are compatible with 
statutes and with the Constitution. Should an enactment be found incompatible, the court may 
refuse to apply it and disregard it when handing down a ruling. Despite of foregoing, the task of 
                                                 
671
 See point 10 of the principal reasons for the ruling in the judgment K 15/04. On the historical development of 
the stance taken towards EC/EU law by the CT see for instance Miąsik (2008), pp.361-364.  
672
 See Łazowski&Wentkowska, Poland: constitutional drama and business as usual [in] Łazowski (2010), p.284.  
673
 See Kowalik-Bańczyk (2005), p.1355 and Miąsik (2008), p.361. See also judgment K 18/04 point 14. 
Łazowski&Wentkowska observe that “the emerging picture is complex. On the one hand, some consider the 
Constitutional Tribunal to be following the steps of the Bundesverfassungsgericht; on the other hand, it has 
demonstrated its pro-EU face too”, see Łazowski&Wentkowska, Poland: constitutional drama and business as 
usual [in] Łazowski (2010), p.284.  
674
 See Górka&Mik (2005) p.23.  
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scrutinizing the compatibility of statutes and ratified international agreements with the 
Constitution is an exclusive competence of the Constitutional Tribunal.
675
 In addition to that, the 
task of setting aside national provisions which are incompatible with EU law seems to conflict 
with a common presumption of infallibility of the legislator which implies that a judge is merely 
a passive executor of law as enacted by the law-maker.
676
 Hence, questioning the legislative 
work performed by the law-maker does not seem to fit in the Polish legal culture.  
The issue of the competence to set aside national provisions which are at variance with 
EU law was finally ruled upon by the Constitutional Tribunal in an interesting, though 
somewhat intricate, case P37/05.
677
 In this judgment, the Tribunal decided to decline its own 
jurisdiction on the issue of compatibility of national law with Art.110 TFEU but delivered an 
extensive reasoning which relates to the problem of the division of tasks between the European 
Court of Justice and Polish courts in interpreting EU law. The Constitutional Tribunal explicitly 
stated that ratified international agreements take precedence over statutes in instances of 
incompatibility between both sources of law.678 Further, the Tribunal proceeded to observe that 
the issue boils down to the problem of distinguishing between the process of application and the 
process of invalidating of the legal provision in question.
679
 Ultimately, the Tribunal stated that 
                                                 
675
 Art.188 of the Constitution.  
676
 See for instance Łętowska (2005), pp.3-10.  
677
 See procedural decision P 37/05 of 19 December 2006 that concerned the issue of excise duty which, in 
accordance with Polish provisions, was to be paid by virtue of a purchase of a passenger car abroad.  The claimant 
raised an allegation with regard to the non-conformity of domestic law to article 90 of the EC Treaty and to 
provisions of the constitutions. The concerned administrative court observed that Polish courts do not have 
competence to undermine statutes since such a competence is vested with the Constitutional Tribunal only. Case 
P37/05 is a very interesting and relevant one and has become sort of a manual for common courts when they deal 
with European issues. The CT declined its own jurisdiction to answer a question on the conformity of the Polish 
law with EC law provided that EU-related matters in question do not have constitutional implications. Subsequent 
case law of the CT and the Supreme Court elaborated further on the issue of EU law and its application and the 
division of powers between national courts and the ECJ in the interpretation of EU law.  
678
 P 37/05, part III, para 3 of the judgment which reads: “By placing international agreements in the position of 
hierarchical superiority over statutes, the legislator created a field for review of legality of statutory provisions from 
the perspective of their conformity to the ratified international agreements, whose ratification required a prior 
consent granted by statute (article 188 point 2 of the Constitution). Making use of such competence may, however, 
be justified only in the absence of any other means of eliminating the conflict (e.g. if an international agreement 
norm does not possess the character of a directly applicable norm) or where an important element relating to the 
legal certainty weights in favour thereof (e.g. if the scope of binding force of an international norm fully overlaps 
with the scope of binding force of a statutory norm, resulting in the latter becoming “empty” from the normative 
perspective).” 
679
 The Constitutional Tribunal observed that: “In principle, preference should be given to the elimination of 
conflicts between domestic and international norms at the level of applying the law (…) According to the principle 
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a national court should refuse to apply the statutory national provision conflicting with EU law 
and directly apply the provision of the latter if possible.
680
 Although it is claimed that the 
judgment has been of “a lesser caliber”681 than the previously mentioned judgments of the 
Tribunal and is in general deemed somewhat vague and implicit
682
, the respective case concerns 
problems attached to the judicial application of Union’s legal norms whereby it provided some 
guidelines to national judges on how to proceed with EU law related issues. 
Next to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, the line of case-law which 
touched upon the problems of supremacy and direct effect delivered by the Polish Supreme 
Court requires attention. As it has been observed, judgments of the Supreme Court are officially 
binding only in a specific case, the interpretations of law as provided by the SC play, however, 
an important role in ensuring that corpus iuris is interpreted and applied by common and 
military courts in a uniform and proper manner across the entire state. Since the issues of 
primacy and direct effect are traditionally the most intricate for national courts, it is rather 
surprising that the approach the Supreme Court took towards both of them is rather 
straightforward and complies with the EU expectations. In a number of cases the Court directly 
accepted the principle of supremacy of EU law by applying the Simmenthal formula and 
decided that national rules incompatible with EC rules should be set aside. The Court has also 
elaborated on the meaning of direct effect with regard to different sources of EU law. In its 
judgment of 10 February 2006, the Court ruled on the application of a directly effective 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
of precedence, the application of an international norm neither repeals, breaches nor invalidates the domestic law 
norm, but only limits the scope of application thereof. Changes in the contents or loss of binding force of an 
international norm will alter the scope of application of a statutory norm, without a need to undertake any actions 
on the part of the national legislator.” 
680
 P 37/05, part III, para 3 of the judgment which reads: “Accordingly, contrary to the stance presented by the 
court referring the question of law, national courts shall not only be authorized, but also obliged to refuse to apply 
a domestic law norm, where such norm remains in conflict with Community law norms. National courts shall not, 
in such case, adjudicate upon the repeal of a domestic law norm, but shall only refuse to apply the norm to the 
extent that is required to give precedence to the Community law norm. ” 
681
 From Łazowski (2008), p.188.  
682
 For an elaborate comment on the case see Łazowski, op cit. The authors argues however that, despite of being 
an interesting and pragmatic development, the judgment leaves many questions unanswered, and several points are 
argued in a vague, imprecise, inconsistent and controversial manner.  
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provision of the EC Treaty in the case and referred to the principle of primacy of EU law.
683
 
Further, the Court held that, in accordance with the principles of direct effect and primacy of 
EU law, national provisions which are not compatible with the Treaty may not be applied by 
national courts in disputes pending before them.
684
 In the so-called Miś case, which gained 
enormous public attention countrywide, the plaintiff wished to directly rely on the Council 
Directive 93/104/EC
685
. After his claim being rejected in first and second instance courts, the 
plaintiff applied to the Supreme Court for a cassation. On 6 of June 2006 the Court delivered its 
judgment in which it once more took the chance to elaborate on the issues of direct effect and 
primacy of EU law.
686
 The Court held that EU law takes precedence over national law and that 
individuals may rely on provisions of directives which are directly effective against public 
authorities. Subsequently, the Court applied a broad interpretation of the notion of the state and 
ruled that the hospital employing the plaintiff should be seen as a public body what 
subsequently implied that the plaintiff had a right to rely on the provisions of the directive 
against it. Several months later the Court rejected the possibility of relying by an individual on 
Art.13 of the EC Treaty (now partly enshrined in Art.10 TFEU) and provisions of Directive 
2000/78/EC.
687
 In the opinion of the Court, Article 13 regulated legislative competences of the 
Community and therefore could not constitute a basis for individual claims and might not be 
relied upon before a national court.
688
 Likewise, the mentioned directive is binding upon the 
Member States only, puts specific obligations on them and may not be relied upon by 
individuals.
689
 All in all, it may be claimed that the Supreme Court has accepted both principles 
                                                 
683
 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 February 2006 in a cassation case, III CSK 112/05. The Court held that 
certain provisions of the national patents act have an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions forbidden by 
Article 28 of the EC Treaty which cannot be justified under article 30 EC. The Court based its reasoning on, inter 
alia, the Dassonville formula and on the decisions taken in cases C-235/89 Commission v. Italy [1992] ECT I-777 
and C-30/90 Commission v. United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-29. 
684
 The Court also pointed to article 91.3 of the Constitution and the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal in case 
K 18/04 of 11 May 2005 as the basis for its decision.  
685
 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organization of working 
time, OJ L 307/18.  
686
 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 6 June 2006 in a cassation case, I PK 263/05.  
687
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, OJ L 303/16.   
688
 In accordance with Article 13 EC (now Art.19 TFEU) the Council may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. See also 
judgment in case C-13/05 Sonia Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR I-6467.  
689
 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 15 November 2006 in a cassation case, I UK 150/06.  
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of EU law, that is supremacy and direct effect, whereby it have sent a signal to lower courts 
how they should proceed with EU law related issues.
690
  
 
6.2. Harmonious interpretation of EU law versus the national legal culture  
 
The doctrine of consistent interpretation between national and European law does not find any 
explicit mention in either the Polish Constitution or any regulation. Nonetheless, it does seem to 
occupy an important place in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme 
Court, also in the judgments preceding the membership in the European Union for, at that point 
in time, the principle of consistent or interpretation was seen as a means to approximate the 
national law to EU law. Elsewhere it is argued that conforming interpretation has become the 
most cardinal tool of judicial application of EU law from the moment Poland became a member 
of the EU.
691
 Already in 1997 the Constitutional Tribunal held that, despite of the fact that EU 
law has no binding force in the country, Poland is obliged to first of all ensure that the future 
national legislation is in conformity with EU legislation and, what is more, the existing 
legislation should be “interpreted in such a way as to ensure the greatest possible degree of such 
compatibility.”692 In judgment K 2/02 the Tribunal extensively elaborated on the obligation to 
interpret national law in the light of acquis communautaire.
693
 Likewise, in judgment K 11/03 
concerning the referendum on Poland’s accession to the European Union the Tribunal held that: 
 
“The interpretation of binding statutes should take into account the constitutional 
principle of sympathetic predisposition towards the process of European 
                                                 
690
 See Miąsik (2008), p.383. Yet, it should not have been forgotten that the Supreme Court has not addressed the 
issue of absolute supremacy of EU law in its case-law.  
691
 See for instance Górka&Mik (2005), p.28.  
692
 See judgment K 15/97 of 29 September 1997, part III point 4 of the reasoning, similarly judgment K 27/99 of 28 
March 2000, part III point 3 of the reasoning and judgment K 35/99 of 5 December 2000. All the cases concerned 
the problem of difference in age of retirement between males and females.  
693
 See judgment K 2/02 of 28 January 2003 concerning fight against alcoholism, see especially point 5 and 8 of the 
reasoning. The Tribunal held also that interpretation of national law in harmony with EU law can and should be 
employed as a cheapest and fastest instrument aiming at the accomplishment of the obligation of harmonization of 
national law with EC law in the pre-accession period. Such a stance of the Tribunal was criticised in the academic 
writing for harmonious interpretation should be considered a subsidiary tool and not a surrogate of harmonization. 
See Górka&Mik (2005), p.30.  
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integration and the cooperation between States (this conclusion may be derived 
from the Preamble and article 9 of the Constitution).” 694 
 
Following the accession, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has pronounced several judgments 
touching upon the problem of conforming interpretation which more or less repeated the 
reasoning included in the case-law preceding the accession.
695
 However, in line with its own 
stance towards the principle of absolute supremacy of the Polish Constitution, the Tribunal held 
that the principle of sympathetic interpretation of national law has it limits and may not lead to 
results which would be at variance with explicit wording of the constitutional norms or not 
conforming to the “minimum guarantee functions realized by the Constitution.”696 Thus, the 
judgment illustrated that the obligation of harmonious interpretation has its limits and may not, 
in view of the CT, contradict the explicit wording of the Constitution. 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court pronounced several significant judgments touching 
upon the problem of conforming interpretation.
697
 In its judgment of 18 August 2004, which 
concerned a situation prior to accession, the Supreme Court held that the principle of 
conforming interpretation may not lead to contra legem interpretation of national provisions 
binding at that time, even if those were at variance with EU norms.
698
 In its judgment of 5 
December 2006 the Supreme Court held that in accordance with a consistent line of 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, a national court which is interpreting national laws, which were issued 
                                                 
694
 See judgment K 11/03 of 27 May 2003 on referendum on Poland’s accession to the European Union, point 1 of 
the principal reasons for the ruling. See also Piqani (2007), pp.4-9. See also judgment in case K 33/03 of 21 April 
2004 on bio-components in gasoline and diesel.  
695
 See for instance judgment in case K 15/04 of 31 May 2004 on the participation of foreigners in European 
Parliamentary elections, point 10 of the principal reasons for the ruling which reads: “Whilst interpreting 
legislation in force, account should be taken of the constitutional principle of sympathetic predisposition towards 
the process of European integration and the cooperation between States.” Or the judgment in case K 34/03 of 21 
September 2004 on the constitutionality of norms regarding the obligation to install cash registers point 3.4.2. of 
the reasoning in which the Tribunal held that due to the principle of interpreting domestic law in a manner which 
will enable an efficient functioning of economy in the framework of the EU integration implies the necessity of 
interpreting national law in line with EU law. This obligation stems from article 5 EC and aims at assuring the 
compatibility of between national and European law. This, in turn, implies that interpretation of national law which 
would lead to the results which would be at variance with EU law may not be accepted.  
696
 See judgment K 18/04, point 14 of the principal reasons of the ruling.  
697
 For an overview of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court touching upon the problem of conforming 
interpretation see Maniewska (2005), pp.49-57. It is necessary to acknowledge that the SC several times referred to 
the principle of harmonious interpretation in the pre-accession period, for instance in judgment of 4 April 2003, I 
CKN 308/01 or judgment of 17 February 2004 I PK 386/03.  
698
 See judgment of Supreme Court of 18 August 2004 I PK 489/03.  
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both before and after the directive in question went into force, is obliged to interpret those 
national provisions as far as possible in the light of aims of the directive.
699
 Put differently, 
national law must be given a meaning so as to conform to the directive and to achieve an 
outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive. For those reasons, the court 
hearing the dispute at issue was supposed to interpret the provisions of national law in the light 
of 80/987/EEC Directive. In this judgment the Court directly referred to the Mau case in which 
the ECJ claimed that a national court interpreting national provisions “is required to do so, so 
far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve 
the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 
EC.”700 In its decision of 20 February 2008 the Court held, among others, that article 4 of 
Directive 2002/21/EC is not directly effective since it is not unconditional. For those reasons the 
plaintiff could not directly derive from that provision the right to bring an action against the 
decision of the president of the Office for Telecommunication and Postal Regulation. 
Nevertheless, the right which the plaintiff wished to derive from the directive should be based 
on the obligation of the national court to interpret national law implementing provisions of a 
directive in the light of that directive. In consequence, national provisions implementing the 
respective directive should be interpreted in such a manner as to ensure to the plaintiff the right 
to bring an action against the decision of the aforementioned Office. Different interpretation 
would namely deprive the plaintiff of the right to effective judicial review which is guaranteed 
by EU law and would be contrary to the general principles of EU law and article 6 and 13 of the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
701
 With 
everything considered, it may be claimed that both highest courts in Poland take a positive 
stance towards the obligation to interpret national law in harmony with EU law and attempt to 
encourage the national lower courts to resort to this methodological tool. Nonetheless, it has 
become visible that the principle is differently interpreted by the respective courts. Whereas the 
Constitutional Tribunal speaks of the principle of conforming to EU law interpretation in very 
general terms, the Supreme Court seems to be much more accurate and detailed in its 
                                                 
699
 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 December 2006 in a cassation case, II PK 18/06.  
700
 See case 160/01 Karin Mau v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2003] ECR I-4791, paras.35-36. 
701
 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 20 February 2008, III SK 23/07.  
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jurisprudence and refers to the principle of harmonious interpretation with regard to particular 
situations when an EU directive the plaintiff wished to rely on was not directly effective. This in 
turn leads to a certain terminological obscurity and blurring the dividing line between direct and 
indirect effect.
702
 
In view of the foregoing the execution of the doctrine of consistent interpretation may, 
arguably, encounter some difficulties which have their roots in the Polish legal culture and more 
precisely the interpretation methods traditionally practiced by national courts. The Polish judge 
functions in the realm of a very positivistic, highly formalized and legalistic legal culture where 
strictly literal (textual) interpretation of “the most-locally-applicable-rule”703 is the main and 
often the only methodological tool.
704
 The point of departure for a Polish judge are the text of 
the law and the clara non sunt interpretanda and claritas doctrines.
705
 In that sense, sticking to 
the letter of law is the paramount objective of a national judge.
706
 As argued by Zirk-Sadowski 
                                                 
702
 This terminological vagueness is also present in the academic writing where the term of conforming 
interpretation is sometimes used to refer to the principles of supremacy and direct effect, see for instance 
Wentkowska (2009), p.135 who refers to the obligation to refuse to apply national law if in conflict with EU law as 
to the interpretation in conformity with EU law.  
703
 From Matczak et al (2010), p.82. 
704
 As claimed by Łętowska&Wiewiórska-Domagalska (2007), p.283: “Another serious problem, based in fact on 
the lack of openness, is the problem of legal interpretation – in other words a very strong attachment of the Polish 
courts to the literal interpretation of law. The courts are unwilling to do anything but provide a faithful 
reproduction of the wording of the rules, which creates problems with, for example, the application of general 
clauses.”  
705
 See Zirk-Sadowski (2005), p.95. The author argues elsewhere that: “Among lawyers, a conception of the 
profession prevails referring to legal positivism in which law is regarded as an object entirely external in relation to 
a lawyer, who is not responsible for its content. In Poland, legal positivism played from this point of view the role 
of a doctrine which protected Polish lawyers’ education after the war against excessive ideologisation since 
positivism as a method offers a conviction about the autonomy of law in relation to political and economic 
developments. Positivism showed that the notional apparatus of law and jurisprudence used by the lawyer is 
universal. Using this method in education greatly protected Polish legal culture from the belief that law was only a 
derivative of economic and political phenomena. Thus positivism, at least in its methodological sense, formed a 
pattern of the lawyer which was easily applicable also in the concept of the state of the rule of law. It regards law as 
the sovereign’s order which the lawyer, equipped with the methodology of law, only subjects to formal analysis 
and arranges notionally. In this way, law as the content of the sovereign’s will become the subject of lawyers’ 
cognition”, see Zirk-Zadowski (2006a), p.308. “A harshly positivistic approach” is also presented towards national 
case-law, see Mańko (2005), p.535.  
706
 See Kühn who claims that Central European judges are “enslaved by textual positivism” and “consider 
themselves to be bound only by the law, which means written law as enacted by the legislature. The very post-
communist concept of judicial independence means that judges must decide only ‘according to the law’ (…) The 
judges do not need to listen to precedents, legal writings, the intention of legislature, the rationally reconstructed 
purpose of the law; they must stick only to the letter of the law, and where the letter of law does not offer any 
solution, pure arbitrariness and unpredictability often enters the scene.” Kühn (2004), pp.549 and 558 respectively. 
Similarly, Emmert points to the problems in Central and Eastern Europe by observing that “first of all, the judges 
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“(…) In Poland, legal positivism entirely leaves out this cultural and communicative character 
of law by assuming that the content of law becomes known due to the linguistic correctness of 
the text which guarantees, to a significant degree, its reading in accordance with the legislator’s 
intention.”707 Hence, exploring the objectives and the spirit of the legislation would not be 
deemed feasible and substantial and definitely not the way the judge would proceed with in the 
context of a purely domestic dispute.
708
 What is more, such an approach to legal provisions 
might be deemed improper for it easily lends itself to manipulation and may endanger the rule 
of legalism.
709
 By and large, the purposive and teleological methods which constitute the core of 
the principle of harmonious interpretation are foreign and abstract tools to Polish judges. Also in 
the Polish writing, the supreme position of literal interpretation is emphasized and it is argued 
that pro-European interpretation should take place only in situation when literal interpretation 
does not provide with clear solutions to the problem.
710
 By the same token, the comparative 
method, which would allow to parallel different language versions of the same legal act, is not a 
common tool employed by Polish courts.
711
 As it is suggested by various scholars, the lack of 
skills and willingness to employ distinct methodological tools is one of the most heavyweight 
problems rendering the proper functioning of the national judicature as EU courts difficult.
712
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
are trained to apply the law and the (written) law only. They have no training to overcome lacunae in the law, for 
example, by recourse to general principles of law, such as the notion of unjust enrichment. Second, the judges have 
no experience with the concept of justice in contrast to the concept of law. This can lead to cases where the letter of 
law is duly followed but the results is obviously unjust, if not outright absurd”, Emmert (2003), p.295.  
707
  From Zirk-Zadowski (2006a), p.310.  
708
Zirk-Sadowski points out that the problem is not as such rooted in the differences between the methodological 
categories but has a much more abstract level which originates from the styles and priorities attached to particular 
interpretation methods, Zirk-Sadowski (2005), p.98.  
709
Ibid, p.102.  
710
 See Zenc (2008), p.288.   
711
 Zirk-Sadowski (2005), p.99.  
712
 See for instance Bodnar (2005), pp.1617-1621; Łętowska (2005), pp.3-10; Łętowska (2000), p.235; 
Łętowska&Wiewiórska-Domagalska (2007), pp.285-286; Łętowska (2008), p.8, where the author observes that the 
fact that national courts are EU courts of first instance and that they are obliged to interpret national law in 
harmony with EU law does not imply that national courts want and are capable to fulfilling this task. The 
hypotheses are of a purely qualitative nature though, not supported by any empirical data. See also Bartosiewicz 
(2009), p.74 who observes that the reasoning methods practiced by the ECJ may be difficult to accept for the 
purpose of judicial application of law in Poland.   
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6.3. Preliminary ruling procedure  
 
The Polish doctrine refers to the preliminary ruling mechanism as to preliminary question, 
preliminary issue or a preliminary judgment.
713
 Before the accession to the EU it was discussed 
whether specific provisions regarding the mechanism of preliminary ruling procedure to the 
ECJ should be introduced in national procedural laws.
714
 Ultimately, the legislator has decided 
not to amend the procedural norms. As it is claimed, the lack of specific provisions with regard 
to the preliminary ruling procedure does not prevent national courts from referring their 
questions to the Court of Justice since the system of Treaties read in line with Art. 91 of the 
Polish Constitution offer sufficient normative basis for referring a question by a Polish court.
715
 
Nonetheless, the issue of purely procedural aspects of the preliminary question to the Court of 
Justice remains unregulated in the Polish law. Since the Polish procedural framework does not 
provide for an explicit and straightforward legal basis which can be employed for the purpose of 
sending a preliminary question to the ECJ it is argued that already existing legal institutions and 
provisions must be employed for the purpose of the procedure. 
 In accordance with article 390 of the Code of Civil Procedure if a national court hearing 
an appeal case which triggers some doubts may refer the controversial issue to the Supreme 
Court which will decide upon. Likewise, in accordance with Art.193 of the Constitution, each 
national court may refer a question concerning the compatibility of national provisions with the 
Constitution, ratified international agreements or statutes to the Constitutional Tribunal if 
resolving the issue is necessary for passing the judgment. In that sense, the preliminary 
questions to the Polish supreme courts share many characteristics with the preliminary question 
to the Court of Justice. Therefore, it is claimed that Polish courts should, by analogy, resort to 
article 390 of the civil procedure should they want to refer a question to the ECJ.
716
 However, it 
follows from this provision that the competence to refer preliminary questions to the Supreme 
                                                 
713
 See Zielony (2006), p.29 who argues that the most appropriate would be using a notion of legal question do the 
ECJ since it would resemble the institution of the legal questions which may be referred to the Polish Supreme 
Court and the Constitutional Tribunal.  
714
 See Biernat (2006), p.429; Szpunar (2003), pp.277-301; Półtorak (1997), p.269; Mik (1998), pp.12-38. 
715
 See Szpunar (2006), p.187 and Zielony (2006), p.31.  
716
 Zielony (2006), p.33.  
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Court is reserved for second instance courts which consequently puts into question such a right 
with regard to courts adjudicating in their first instance capacity. Provided that a civil court aims 
at referring its questions it should do so in line with art.354 of the Code of Civil Procedure
717
, 
i.e. by issuing a judicial decision.
718
 Subsequently, the national court is supposed to stay the 
proceedings. The Polish procedural norms again triggers some doubts in that respect though. In 
the academic writings it has been debated whether a decision to send a preliminary question 
should be followed by adjournment of the trial or staying/suspension of the proceedings.
719
 In 
accordance with the procedural norms, the parties to the proceedings may not compel the court 
to refer a question to the ECJ but one or both parties may a file a motion which will be recorded 
in the proceeding protocol
720
 for referring a question to the ECJ which may however be rejected 
by the respective court.
721
 It is acknowledged that the respective national court should refer its 
questions only after the factual and legal background of the case is established and the parties 
took their positions in the case.
722
  
In respect of the preliminary ruling mechanism it seems interesting to investigate the 
stance of the Polish supreme courts on this issue. In the previously discussed procedural 
decision of the Constitutional Tribunal P 37/05, the Tribunal decided on the inadmissibility of 
the case due to its lack of competence to safeguard EU law which belongs to the competences of 
the European Court of Justice. The CT explicitly stated that its task is to safeguard the 
Constitution, which is supreme law of the Republic of Poland, and not to decide upon individual 
matters aspects regarding the application of law, including EU law. Furthermore it stated that: 
 
                                                 
717
 In accordance with art.354 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court is expected to issue a judicial decision if the 
Code does not provide for passing a judgment or an order for payment.  
718
 Zielony (2006), p.33. 
719
 Ibid, p.34. The author argues that adjournment of the trail should take place in accordance with art 390 and 156 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The latter article states that a court may adjourn the proceedings in response to a 
motion of both parties if there is an important reason to proceed so. Resorting to the ECJ should therefore be seen 
as an important reason. Contrary to that opinion, Szpunar argues that the proceedings should be stayed/suspended 
in line with art.177 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides for a possibility of staying the proceedings if the 
final decision is dependent upon a decision which will be taken in another pending civil trial, see Szpunar (2003), 
p.289 and Szpunar (2006), pp.206-207. 
720
 See art.158 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
721
 See Zielony (2006), pp.36-37.  
722
 Ibid, p.37.  
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“(…) by virtue of Article 8 paragraph 1 of the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Tribunal is obliged to such recognition of its position that in fundamental issues 
relating to the constitutional system of the state it shall retain its status of “the last-
word court” The ECJ and the CT must not be positioned as competing courts. This 
pertains not only to the “duplication” of both courts or the double line of 
adjudication upon the same legal issues, but also to lack of functionality in relations 
between Community and domestic legal orders. It is essential to indicate the 
different roles of both courts.”723 
 
The CT thus acknowledged the competence of the ECJ which should not be seen as a 
competitor of the Constitutional Tribunal but rather a court of different competences. 
Furthermore, the CT admitted that if a national court has interpretational doubts with regard to 
EU law, it should resort to the ECJ and ask it for a preliminary ruling which would resolve the 
doubts.
724
 In the final part of the reasoning the CT stated that the ECJ is one of the pivotal 
organs of the EC the sole competence of which is to “elucidate the Community law provisions 
or adjudicate upon the binding force thereof.”725 The preliminary ruling procedure, in turn, 
constitutes a cardinal mechanism of judicial cooperation between the ECJ and national courts 
which rests on the division of the tasks of interpretation and application of the law between the 
former and the latter respectively. Importantly, the CT acknowledged that, in line with the 
Köbler ruling, the state may incur liability in damages if a national court delivers a judgment 
with an “apparent infringement of the ECJ jurisprudence.”726 What is more, in the opinion of the 
CT, a preliminary ruling is binding on the referring court and a failure to observe the ruling by 
the respective court shall be deemed the infringement of EC law which might result in an 
infringement procedure under Art.258 TFEU (ex Art.226 EC).
727
  
On 8 November 2005 the Supreme Court had its first chance to consider and elaborate 
on the issue of the necessity of employing the preliminary ruling procedure in a case pending 
before a national court.
728
 In this case the Supreme Court took its chance to present its opinion 
about the relationship between national courts and the ECJ. The Supreme Court pinpointed that 
the assessment of the necessity of referring a question to the ECJ is an autonomous prerogative 
                                                 
723
 See procedural decision of the Constitutional Tribunal 37/05, part II.  
724
 Ibid.  
725
 Ibid, part III, p.4.1. 
726
 Ibid.  
727
 For a detailed analysis of the decision see Łazowski (2008) and Łazowski (2011), pp.519-521.  
728
 Judgments of the Supreme Court of 8 November 2005 in a cassation case, I CK 207/05.    
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of a national court only and not of the parties to the dispute. Requests of the parties to the 
proceedings to utilize the preliminary reference procedure are not binding on national courts. 
The Court also added that the ECJ does not have any competence to interpret national laws and 
decide about their compliance with EU legal measures. That in turn implies that national courts 
may not refer questions in which they ask the ECJ to decide whether a national legal rule 
implements an EU measure in a proper way. It is rather straightforward that in its judgment the 
Supreme Court followed the reasoning presented by the ECJ in its case-law. It is settled 
jurisprudence of ECJ that it is up to the national court only to decide whether the preliminary 
questions should be asked.
729
 Another important aspect of the preliminary reference procedure 
was decided upon on the 12
th
 of October 2006.
730
 In its judgment the Court held that referring a 
question to the ECJ would be justified only in situations when serious enough doubts as to the 
interpretation or validity of an EU legal norm exist in the case pending before the national court. 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, in the case which was considered by the appellate court in 
question the condition of a serious enough doubt in the meaning of Article 267 TFEU was not 
fulfilled since the court was able to assess and decide on its own about the interpretation of a 
legal notion which was in question. Hence, this judgment implies to national courts that they 
shall resort to the preliminary reference procedure only when all methods of legal reasoning 
which they are familiar with are exhausted and yet they did not allow to establish how to 
interpret EU law at issue. From the foregoing it may thus be concluded that the Supreme Court 
perceives the procedure as the very last instance mechanism which should be utilized only when 
all other legal, including interpretative, mechanisms are to no avail whereby it seems to send a 
somewhat negative signal to the lower courts. By emphasizing that resorting to the preliminary 
ruling procedure can be justified only when, the SC seems to intend to discourage lower court 
judges from resorting to the mechanism which in fact is not in line with the spirit of Art. 267 
TFEU and should, therefore, be considered fault.  
 
                                                 
729
 See for instance case C-369/89 Piageme [1991] ECR I-2971, para. 10 and joined cases C-422/93, C-423/93 and 
C-424/93 Teresa Zabala Erasun, Elvira Encabo Terrazos and Francisco Casquero Carrillo v. Instituto Nacional 
de Empleo [1995] ECR I-1567, para.14.  
730
 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 October 2006 in a case alleging non-compliance with the law of the 
judgment of an appellate court, I CNP 41/06.  
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6.4. State liability 
 
The Polish legal framework does not provide for any distinct provision which would regulate 
the issue of state liability in damages for an infringement of EU law but it does establish general 
rules on state liability in damages. It is claimed that the general rules apply per analogiam to the 
situations concerning breaches of EU law.
731
 Importantly, the Civil Code regulations with 
regard to the problem of state liability were considerably amended in 2004 due to their 
incompatibility with the Polish Constitution.
732
 The new law repealed previous norms and 
introduced new provisions which brought the codical norms in line with the Constitution but 
also with the legal expectations on part of the European Union.
733
  
In article 77(1) the Polish Constitution provides that each person has the right to be 
compensated for any harm which is caused to him by any contrary to law action of an organ of 
public authority. The Civil Code, in article 417, para 1 included states that any harm caused by 
an act of an organ of public authority or lack of action on part of public authority which would 
be contrary to law shall be compensated by the State Treasury
734
 or territorial self-government 
or any other legal person which performs public tasks.
735
 If the damage was caused through an 
issuance of a normative act, a person may claim damages after the incompatibility of the 
                                                 
731
 The amendments of the Civil Code as introduced by the Act of 17 June 2004 amending the Civil Code and other 
acts, J.L. No 164, item 1692 were intended, inter alia, to bring the Polish provisions in line with the EU law, see 
the justification by the Commission for the Codification of Civil Law in the project amending the Civil Code, Druk 
Sejmowy No 2007 of 15 September 2003, Warsaw to be found at: 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf/%28$vAllByUnid%29/50FE398C4F4090C5C1256DA600492360/$file/2007.
pdf (last accessed 10 January 2011).  
732
 Act of 17 June 2004 amending the civil code and other acts, J.L. No 164, item 1692. See also see judgment of 
the Constitutional Tribunal of 4 December 2001 SK 18/2000 on the unconstitutionality of art 418 of the Civil Code 
and the justification by the Commission for the Codification of Civil Law in the project amending the Civil Code, 
Druk Sejmowy No 2007 of 15 September 2003, Warsaw, particularly point 4 of the justification, to be found at: 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf/%28$vAllByUnid%29/50FE398C4F4090C5C1256DA600492360/$file/2007.
pdf (last accessed 10 January 2011).  
733
 Art.417, 419, 420, 420(1), 420(2) and 421 were repealed and replaced by articles 417, 417(1), 417(2) and 421. 
The new regulation was aimed at eliminating the condition of the fault of a civil servant/public organ which would 
incur state liability. For more see Skoczylas (2005), pp.35-36.  
734
 In accordance with the Civil Code, the State Treasury (Skarb Państwa) is a legal person which is subject to civil 
rights and obligations relating to state property that does not belong to other state legal persons, see art.33 and 34 of 
the Civil Code. The State Treasury may be represented by various officials or institutions depending on 
circumstances.  
735
 Para 2 of the same article states that, provided that public authorities tasks were entrusted to a unit of local 
authorities or other legal person, joined responsibility for the damage caused is incurred by the executor of the 
public tusk entrusted and the unit of local authority or national Treasury that commissioned the task.  
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respective normative act with the Constitution, a ratified international agreement or a statute 
was found in an appropriate proceeding.
736
 If the damage is caused due to a valid judicial 
judgment or a final decision or, it can be repaired after the variance with the law of the 
respective judgment /decision is affirmed in an appropriate proceeding.
737
 This applies also to 
situations when a valid judicial judgment or a final decision had been based on a normative act 
which was incompatible with the Constitution, ratified international agreement or a statute.
738
 
Likewise, the damage caused by a lack of a judgment/decision, provided that in accordance with 
a legal norm such a judgment/decision should be pronounced, can be repaired after the variance 
with the law of the lack of a respective judgment/decision is affirmed in an appropriate 
proceeding, unless separate provisions provide otherwise.
739
 If the damage is caused by a lack 
of fulfillment of the obligation to issue a normative act, the issuance of which is provided by 
another legal provision, the infringement of law attached to the lack of the normative act shall 
be ascertained by the court hearing the liability in damages case.
740
 It seems that the foregoing 
provision aims at, inter alia, allowing individuals to claim damages in cases of a lack of 
implementation of EU legal acts.  
The conditions for the State to incur liability in damages as enshrined in the Polish 
norms resemble those provided for in EU law.
741
  The notion of breach of law is interpreted 
broadly as any infringement of law. The illegality of action/inaction may concern not only in 
terms of breach of provision of commonly binding law but also the rules of social relations 
(justness and fairness)
742
 and in some instances also moral and custom rules.
743
 Polish law does 
                                                 
736
 See art.417(1) para 1 of the Act of 17 June 2004 amending the Civil Code and other acts. It has been argued that 
also a national legal act which would be incompatible with an EU directive would fall under the respective article 
since it would at the same time be incompatible with art.2 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession the 
New Member states providing that new Member States are bound by the Founding Treaties and legal acts of the 
institutions.  
737
 Emphasis by the author. The respective article does not stipulate what is mean by the ‘appropriate proceeding.’  
738
 See art.417(1) para 2 of the Act of 17 June 2004 amending the Civil Code and other acts, J.L. No 164, item 
1692. 
739
 Ibid.  
740
 Ibid.  
741
 That is: occurrence of damage, breach of law caused by action or inaction by a public authority (National 
Treasury, a unit of local authority or other legal person), a clear causal link between the damage and the 
action/inaction on part of the public authority. In accordance with the doctrine, the damage includes both the actual 
damage and the lost profits (lucrum cessans) but also the non-material damage, see See Skoczylas (2005), p.327. 
742
 See art.417(2)  of the Act amending the civil code and other acts which states that of the damage is caused to a 
person due to a performance of public authorities tasks which are legal in accordance with the law, then the harmed 
 
  
 
Legal and Judiciary System in Poland  
 
171 
not provide for the condition that the law which was breached should bestow rights on the 
individual. This, in turn, implies that a breach of any legal provision may, provided that other 
conditions are fulfilled, incur state liability in damages.
744
 The fault does not play any role in 
establishing state liability.
745
 With everything considered, the conditions of illegality as 
enshrined in Polish law and interpreted in the doctrine are much less restrictive and more 
favourable for the individual than those established by the ECJ. Whilst the ECJ provided that 
the breach must be sufficiently serious
746
, neither the Polish Constitution, nor the codical 
regulations provide for such a condition.
747
 The Constitution and the Civil Code do not stipulate 
which authorities may be held liable whereas it speaks of the liability of the National Treasury, 
a unit of local authority or other legal person which performs the tasks of public authorities.
748
. 
By and large, it can be concluded that the Polish legal system regulates the issue of state 
liability in a satisfactory way in terms of its compatibility with EU law expectations and in fact 
provides for a normative framework which is more favourable for an individual that the one 
established by the ECJ.
749
 Nonetheless, some authors point to several procedural aspects of the 
codical regulation which may jeopardize the effective enforcement of the right to damages. 
Especially the fact that awarding damages is dependent upon prior finding of illegality in ‘an 
appropriate proceeding’, the notion of which is further not elaborated upon, is deemed to 
effectively hamper the enforcement of the right to damages in instances of infringement of EU 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
person may claim full or partial financial satisfaction for the damage suffered if the circumstances, and especially 
the inability of the harmed person to work or his/her difficult financial situation, indicate that such a way of 
proceeding would meet the reasons of justice.  
743
 See Skoczylas (2005), p.328.  
744
 Ibid, p.328. 
745
 See ibid, p.329, also Dzienis (2006), p.88.  
746
 See joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, para.51  
747
 See Skoczylas (2005), p.328, also Półtorak (1998), p.219, Dzienis (2006), pp.88-89. 
748
 In line with the constitutional doctrine, it should however be recognized that the notion of public authorities is 
understood as comprising legislative, executive and judicial bodies including territorial self-government and other 
national organs, see Skoczylas (2005), p.329. 
749
 See ibid, p.330. See also the opinion of the Committee of European Integration of 18 August 2003 on the 
compatibility of the Act amending the Civil Code to be found at: 
 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf/%28$vAllByUnid%29/50FE398C4F4090C5C1256DA600492360/$file/2007.
pdf (last accessed 10 January 2011).  
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law by state authorities.
750
 Such a condition implicitly indicates that only the Constitutional 
Tribunal has the competence to decide with regard to the incompatibility of a normative act with 
the constitution, a ratified international agreement or a statute and exclusively the Supreme 
Court may decide about illegality of a final judicial decision. Furthermore, it follows that an 
individual will be deprived of the right of being awarded damages in case of a breach of EU law 
by Polish courts of last instance which evidently is at variance with the Köbler judgment.
751
  
 
7. Preliminary conclusions 
 
The present chapter has illustrated the legal and operational framework the Polish civil judges 
are functioning in whereby it also allowed to see potential problematic aspects of the 
functioning of the Polish civil judges as decentralized EU judges. As it has been visualized, in 
general, the constitutional and procedural frameworks do not seem to pose major stumbling 
blocks to the fulfillment of the normative obligations following from EU law by the Polish civil 
courts. It has yet become apparent that the legal framework does not provide for any 
straightforward and explicit norms which could be utilized by national courts to apply EU law. 
Thus, the procedures of the application of EU law are communicated implicitly and are 
supposed to be derived from either other norms concerning national law or from the norms 
                                                 
750
 See Górka&Mik (2005), p.46 and Półtorak, Proceduralne aspekty dochodzenia roszczeń odszkodowawczych w 
tytułu naruszenia prawa wspólnotowego przez państwa członkowskie [in] Wróbel (2005), p.842 who claims that the 
fact that the court hearing the state liability in damages case may not independently decided about the alleged 
illegality will hamper the principle of effectiveness since the plaintiff will be deprived of the right of being awarded 
damages in case of a breach of EU law by Polish courts of last instance. See article 424(1) of the Code of Civil 
Procedure in which it is stated that the claim of illegality if judicial decision is only possible with regard to final 
judgments of a court of second instance which caused damages. It is not possible to bring a claim of illegality from 
judgments of second instance courts from which an appeal for cassation was brought to the Supreme Court and 
from the judgments of the Supreme Court themselves. See also Pecyna (2006), pp.62-64 and 81-98. The author 
extensively and critically analyses the Polish regulation with regard to state liability and more precisely the aspect 
of the claim of incompliance of legally valid judgment with the law and claims that the principle of effectiveness of 
EU law is jeopardized and ultimately leads to the situation where claiming damages for a judicial decision which is 
in breach of EU law by individuals is virtually impossible. The author adds that in cases where damages are 
claimed for infringement of EU law, the Polish court should disregard the Polish regulation and independently 
decide about the breach of EU law by a judicial decision, which will ultimately result in better and effective 
judicial protection, see pp.95-96. By and large, the author claims that present procedural regulation is not 
acceptable and jeopardizes the principle of effective judicial protection.  
751
 See Półtorak, Proceduralne aspekty dochodzenia roszczeń odszkodowawczych w tytułu naruszenia prawa 
wspólnotowego przez państwa członkowskie [in] Wróbel (2005), p.842.  
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pertaining to international law. With the exception of the problematic issue of the supreme 
position of the national Constitution, both the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court 
take rather positive, i.e. being in line with EU expectations, approach towards EU law and the 
obligation of national courts following therefrom. Be that as it may, from a theoretical point of 
view, several aspects which have their roots in the national system of sources of law or national 
legal culture might, arguably, hamper the processes of application of EU law. The first one 
pertains to the fact that case-law does not occupy a position of a generally binding source of 
law. Secondly, the interpretation methods commonly practiced by Polish judges and which 
originate in the national positivistic and legalistic legal culture seem to stand in contrast with the 
interpretation methods as they are expected from the national judges by the ECJ. Also, several 
procedural obstacles may hamper the effectiveness of enforcement of EU law in particular 
instances. The problematic nature of those issues originates in either the vagueness of the 
normative regulation or the organisation of the judiciary and the features of the Polish judicial 
community. Finally, the system of legal education and judicial training seems to pay a 
somewhat scant attention to the law of the European Union.  
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Chapter 4 
Polish Civil Judges versus the EU Legal 
Order: Knowledge, Experiences and 
Attitudes 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As it was observed in the previous chapters the research methods traditionally used in the legal 
academic discourse concerning the functioning of the national judges in the EU capacity do not 
lend themselves to answering the actual questions which were posed at the outset of this study. 
This Chapter adapts therefore a different approach which provides a distinct, theoretically and 
methodologically, outlook on the problem by focusing on the personal perspective on the 
judicial activity in the context of EU law. Not only does such an exercise make it possible to see 
how national judges work with EU law on the ground but it also allows to draw a picture which 
sheds light on distinct, more pragmatic aspects of the functioning of national judges as EU law 
judges.  
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study carried out among the Polish 
judges of district and regional civil courts. The analysis is predominantly based on the results 
stemming from the quantitative part of the study which take a form of simple proportion 
statistics of particular variables which were tested in the questionnaire. In order to achieve a 
better visualization selected data is presented in the form of charts and graphs. In some 
instances the method of contingency tables is employed in order to indicate the relationship 
between variables. The analysis is not confined to the quantitative aspect though. In many 
instances the outcomes of the quantitative part of the study are broadened by the insights from 
the qualitative part of the research. For that purpose quotations from the interviews are brought 
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up in order to faithfully reflect the views of judges and complement the quantitative data.
752
 In 
addition, the analysis is enriched by observations made by different legal and political science 
scholars who seem to offer plausible explanations of some of the results. Such a process of a 
between methods triangulation allows to validate and enhance the presented data and to draw a 
more complete picture of the situation.
753
 
The gained data is modeled in several clusters which address various aspects of the 
functioning of the national judges in the context of EU law. The first section is devoted to the 
aspect of the knowledge of EU law and the manner it operates among the judges. This is 
dictated by the assertion that knowledge of EU law is a one of the basic preconditions of an 
adequate functioning of national judges as EU judges. The subsequent section addresses the 
issue of, generally speaking, attitudes and conceptions concerning EU law and the legal order of 
the European Union. Finally, the actual experiences of judges with EU law are discussed. The 
analysis does not strictly follow the subsequent line of questions asked in the survey but aims at 
combining the results into the sets of problems which became evident and most significant in 
the course of the empirical study. It is also necessary to acknowledge that the empirical data 
pertains not only to the problem of a national judge vis-à-vis European Union law. As the reader 
will notice, it concerns the functioning of the Polish civil judicature in general for many 
problems attached to the application of EU law have their roots in the organisation of the 
judiciary system, the way it is managed and administrated. Next to that, it is shown how the 
constitutional framework, national judicial culture and the system of legal and judicial training, 
to name just the most crucial ones, bear on the functioning of national judges in the context of 
EU law. It should be emphasized that judges are just human beings which partly justifies the 
common contradictory opinions and views on EU law they shared during the empirical study. In 
fact, the vivid presence of the human factor has proven to be one of the most tangled and 
challenging aspect of the study. In that regard it should be reiterated that the entire analysis is 
                                                 
752
 The citations are literally translated from Polish to English and therefore they may contain some colloquial 
expressions. Such a practice allows to entirely reflect the perceptions of EU law among judges. Citations 
originating from the questionnaire are assigned a number, citations originating from the interviews are assigned a 
letter.  
753
 See note 108 for the definition of triangulation.  
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conducted according to the personal responses given to the individual inquiries by the judges. 
Those may seem self-evident and absorbing or amusing but at times also odd and paradoxical.  
 
2. Knowledge of EU law: iura novit curia?  
 
In the survey various aspects of the knowledge of European Union law and the way judges 
acquire that knowledge were tested and explored. It has also been attempted to examine what 
the most troublesome and perplexing features of conveying the knowledge of European Union 
law are. It should not be forgotten that the assessment of the level of knowledge of EU law 
judges represent must always be seen in a broader context of judicial functioning as well as in 
correlation with other aspects of the application of EU law. Hence, it has also been looked into 
various elements of the institutional framework such as, inter alia, system for judicial training 
and the availability of EU law courses. Also, it should be emphasized that the exercise of 
measuring the level of EU law knowledge among judges is marked with a high degree of 
subjectivity as it is very much a matter of expectations. Undoubtedly, an adequate level of 
knowledge of EU law, both material and procedural is necessary to properly function as EU 
judge. One can however ask what level of knowledge should actually be described as a 
reasonable and necessary. Both quantitative and qualitative data delivered various insights in 
that respect.  
 
2.1. General knowledge of European Union law  
 
When asked to assess the awareness of alterations and developments introduced in EU law only 
23 percent declared to be well informed in that respect whereas 88 percent ascertained to be 
well informed about changes in national law.
754
 Likewise, inquired to assess their knowledge of 
national law 92 percent declared to have a good or very good knowledge of it whereas only 12 
percent have such an opinion with regard to EU law. Furthermore, nearly 42 percent thought 
                                                 
754
 n=313 judges.  
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that their knowledge of EU law was (very) poor. The following graphs clearly show the stark 
contrast in the results. 
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The overwhelming number of judges who assessed their knowledge of EU law as (very) good 
have dealt with EU law on a more frequent basis in the course of the last 12 months which 
might suggest that practical experience with the application of EU law is the optimal manner of 
learning it.
755
 Interestingly, those were the younger generation judges who seem to be more 
sceptical with regard to their knowledge of EU law.
756
  
 
       knowledge 
age 
(very good) moderate (very) poor don’t know totals 
29-40 10 57 71 4 142 
41-50 15 47 41 2 105 
51-60 8 18 5 1 32 
60+ 2 1 2 0 5 
totals  35 123 119 7 284 
Table 1  
58 percent of the judges were of the opinion that their knowledge of EU presented the same 
level as their colleagues and 20 percent were not able to rate it. 21 percent thought that their 
knowledge of EU law was better than that of their colleagues.
757
  
During the personal testimonies the feelings of frustration and helplessness were 
frequently expressed about the lack of knowledge of EU law and the methods of its application. 
The personal testimonies and remarks provided to the anchoring vignettes have also shown that 
situations when judges are even not aware of the fact that some aspects are regulated by 
European Union law are present. Next to that, it has become evident that many misconceptions 
with regard to European Union law and its position vis-à-vis the national legal order are 
common. It has also been detected that the judges quite frequently have a blurred view of the 
                                                 
755
 60 percent of the group dealt with 6 and more cases in which EU law played a role in the last year.  
756
 With regard to the distribution of answers across gender, female judges were slightly more critical about their 
knowledge of EU law than male judges. 11 percent of female and 13 percent of male judges assessed their 
knowledge as (very) good; 40 percent of female and 46 percent of male assessed their knowledge as moderate and 
46 percent of female and 38 percent of male judges assessed their knowledge of EU law as (very) poor, n=282.  
757
 64 percent of those who thought that their knowledge of EU law is better than their colleagues dealt with more 
than 2 cases encompassing EU law element in the last 12 months. Only 1 percent assessed its knowledge of EU law 
as being worse than that of their colleagues.  
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role of the ECJ’s precedent in the legal system which supports the observations included in 
Chapter 3 concerning the vagueness of the issue in the context of the Polish legal order.
758
  
  
           
Judge No 25 declares that “We all know civil and criminal law and when we are confronted with 
any issue regarding those laws we know that there is one or another statute in which the issue is 
regulated and we know how to find it. We do not possess such knowledge with regard to EU law. I 
have applied some EU norms only because I came across them by accident. We need trainings 
which would address the problem of which areas and matters of law are regulated by the European 
Union and not about which EU institution in which procedure passes the laws.” 
 
Judge No 95 states: “Generally speaking Polish judges (including me) do not know European 
Union law so they do not apply it. They do not know it because both during our legal studies and 
legal training it was touched upon in a rudimentary way. Furthermore, the workload and number of 
cases we have to judge in makes individual training impossible in practice.” 
 
Judge No 233 declares the following: “I do not know EU law and I cannot assess whether, when 
and how I am supposed to resort to it.”  
 
Judge N: “During my legal studies there was very little of EU law, then during the judicial training 
I only touched upon it. Then we had some trainings, through the School. Those were fine, some 
very basics, just in case to know where I have to look for information if I need it. But a decent 
study? So far not. I cannot say my knowledge of EU law is sound (…) Actually nobody was 
interested to prepare us to this new function, no one , including the Ministry of Justice, has done 
something (…) They left us to our faith, that’s the way it looks really.”  
Box 1  
 
2.2. Knowledge of specific mechanisms of EU law application   
 
In the questionnaire also more specific knowledge regarding mechanisms of preliminary ruling 
and conforming interpretation was tested. From the survey it follows that 57 percent of the 
judges declared to know in which situations they are expected to refer a preliminary question to 
the Court of Justice of the EU.
759
 At the same time, 60 percent would know what to do with a 
judgment provided by the ECJ.
760
 As the qualitative part of the study seems to suggest, the 
foregoing does not necessarily indicate that the judges know the ins and outs of the 
mechanisms. Most of the group declared to know the objectives and the purpose of the 
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 See section 4 of Chapter 3. 
759
 24 percent declared not to know when to refer a question and 19 percent expressed a neutral opinion.  
760
 23 percent took a neutral stance and 17 percent disagreed.  
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preliminary ruling but admitted that it would take a whole process of learning how such a 
question should be formulated and which requirements it should meet.  
A relatively high number of judges knowing when to refer a question and how to 
proceed with a judgment given by the ECJ might be a corollary of the fact that most of them had 
followed some basic course in EU law and its institutions before and after Poland joined the 
European Union. The very basics of the preliminary ruling procedure constituted a necessary 
component of nearly any introductory course. Next to that, the qualitative data suggests that the 
process of a dialogue with the ECJ might be associated with comparable national mechanisms 
that were mentioned in Chapter 3, that is to say the preliminary question which may be referred 
to both the Constitutional Tribunal
761
 and to some extent to the Supreme Court.
762
 
 
 
 Judge G when asked about the preliminary ruling procedure states: “It is an excellent institution 
but I suppose it will remain a dead letter for a long time (…) I think there should be ready 
templates available so you would only need to fill in the factual situation; you would know how to 
build a question, how to formulate it; how to do it that it meets the expectations (…)”  
 
Judge N: “The procedure is not really clear to me. Yes, it was mentioned to during the trainings but 
my knowledge of it comes mostly from journal news. I know that administrative courts frequently 
send their questions but I do not know how it could relate to my daily practice (…) I assume that it 
would work like the preliminary question to our own Supreme Court. There, in order to ask a 
question, you must get acquainted with the issue which triggers doubts. But in order to find out that 
there is some uncertainty you must first know the law and relevant jurisprudence very well. So it is 
a vicious circle (…) The good knowledge of the law is a condition sine qua non of any application 
thereof.” 
 
Judge V: “Preliminary ruling? Yes, it is familiar to me, from my legal studies and trainings. They 
do mention it. I haven’t seen any relevance for my daily practice so far though. Well, I mean, it 
could be that I simply did not notice it could be relevant because I did not know that EU law should 
have been applied. “  
 
 Box 2 
 
With regard to the knowledge of the principle of harmonious interpretation the situation 
seems somewhat alarming. Only 18 percent declared to know the rules concerning the principle 
in their entirety, 51 percent know it partly and 31 percent does not know it at all.
763
 The 
qualitative research visualized that the knowledge of the principle is indeed limited. Some 
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 For more details see section 2.4 of Chapter 3.   
762
 For more details see section 2.3 of Chapter 3. 
763
 n=294.  
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judges were not aware of the existence of such a mechanism and many were only aware of the 
mechanism but were not able to substantiate it any further.  
 
2.3. Sources of EU law information and knowledge  
 
Only 5 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that they gained sufficient knowledge of 
EU law during their legal studies.
764
 This finding does not come as a surprise since, as shown in 
the previous chapter, EU law has become a part of legal studies curriculum only in the last 
decade.
765
 By and large, the system of trainings offered to judges by institutions other than their 
own court is the most important way of gaining knowledge and information about EU law. 
Nearly 65 percent of the judges have made use thereof to familiarize themselves with EU law. 
The qualitative data suggests that the trainings serve not only to propagate the knowledge of EU 
law, they also play a significant role in the process of socialization and exchange of ideas 
between the members of the group.
766
  
Direct consultation of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and legal handbooks are 
respectively the second and third most popular manners of broadening the EU law knowledge. It 
should be stressed that the number of the surveyed judges who directly consult EU law 
instruments such as regulations and directives does not exceed 50 percent. In fact, only 37 
percent of the judges directly consulted EU directives. More importantly, though, only 3 percent 
of the group declared to never search for any information concerning EU law. The following 
chart illustrates the numbers of judges that resort to specific source of information.
767
  
                                                 
764
 9 percent expressed a neutral stance, 29 disagreed and 58 strongly disagreed.  
765
 See section 3.2 of Chapter 3.  
766
 The socialization process might take various forms. In respect of EU law the trainings provide a platform 
whereby judges who so far have not dealt with EU law learn that the issues of EU law appear before courts in other 
parts of the country. This in turn makes them more alert and anticipating and induces them to broaden their 
knowledge of EU law. For more on the role of socialization within judiciary see Bell (2006), pp.24-26.  
767
 Multiply choice question.  
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From the qualitative part of the study it indeed follows that trainings in EU law have been and 
remain the most popular manner of gaining information about EU law which very much stresses 
how important role a (university) courses plays in the processes of mainstreaming EU law into 
the daily practice of national courts. The modern channels of communication through the 
internet receive increasingly more adherents but qualitative data suggested that some judges 
might treat them with mistrust. It is worth emphasizing that the traditional manners of learning 
such as finding the relevant information in the legal handbooks still play an important role in the 
processes of disseminating the knowledge of EU law. 
Quite a proportion of judges tend to consult other persons when confronted with EU law 
in their practice. 62 percent of those who have dealt with a question of EU law in the last twelve 
months declared to have consulted someone else with regard to the EU law problem that 
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occurred.
768
 It is evident that an overwhelming number of EU law related problems stay within 
the judicial circles since seeking any aid beyond the court is very exceptional a case. More than 
90 percent of those who sought help with EU law issues did turn to their colleagues, 10 percent 
approached an academic scholar and 6 percent the Ministry of Justice.
769
 Nonetheless, the 
institution of a judge-consultant who would be appointed in the court to offer a helping hand 
with EU law related issues is not popular. 14 percent of the group declared that such a person is 
available at their home courts
770
 but only 5 percent of the judges have ever resorted to such a 
possibility.
771
 Similar conclusions follow from the qualitative part of the study. It is apparent 
that judges mostly consult EU law related problems with their closest colleagues who they 
mostly work with. In the opinion of the judges, such an exercise renders establishing the same 
line of proceeding with a specific EU law issue possible and thereby assists with meeting the 
requirement of coherence and uniformity of judicial decisions. 
 
2.4. Forms and scope of EU law trainings  
 
The empirical data revealed that the methods of conveying the knowledge about EU law and 
subsequently processing that knowledge is rather complex an issue. As it has been illustrated, 
65 percent of the judges participated in some form of EU law training in the course of the last 
year.
772
 Nearly 60 percent of those trainings were organized by the National School for 
Judiciary and Prosecutors. The remaining courses were set up by either local courts and 
appellate districts or by various academic centres. Only 4 judges declared to have participated in 
the trainings organized by ERA in Trier.  
Importantly, only 22 percent of the judges deemed the courses to be of a high quality 
and only 26 percent agreed that the offer with regard to the trainings is satisfactory. What is 
more, two thirds of the respondents agreed that the trainings in EU law are too theoretical and 
                                                 
768
 That is 112 judges.  
769
 The ratios of responses concerning consultation with advocates, family, friends and judges in other countries 
were insignificant.  
770
 And 32 percent did not even know whether there was such a person appointed in their own court.  
771
 Of the total number.  
772
 Out of which 49 percent spent up to 10 hours on it (including preparations), 22 percent spent between 11 and 20 
hrs, 9 percent spent between 21-30 hrs, 5 percent spent 31-40 hrs, and 15 percent spent more than 40 hrs.  
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insufficiently focused on practice and only 19 percent agreed that the trainings in EU law 
provide sufficient information when and how EU law should be applied in a specific case. 
Answers provided to both inquiries are illustrated below.
773
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In response to the question concerning the matters which should be covered by trainings 
in EU law a high number which amounted to 92 percent pointed to the issue of obligations of 
national courts with regard to EU law. This finding suggests that the judges are not certain of 
the tasks which they are expected to fulfil with regard to EU law and frequently they are ill-
informed of the situations in which EU law becomes relevant. As much as 35 percent of the 
group pointed to the most basic matters such as the sources of EU law and its tenets. 73 percent 
of the surveyed group wish to learn more about EU material law and 64 percent pointed to the 
EU procedural law. 54 percent of those who directed to the material law of the EU wish to 
expand their knowledge of EU contract law and 40 percent of consumer protection. One-fourth 
of the group is interested in the area of labour and social security law and 17 percent in 
                                                 
773
 1 percent strongly agreed and 7 percent strongly disagreed that trainings provide sufficient information on 
whether and how to apply EU law. 32 percent strongly agreed that trainings are too theoretical and insufficiently 
focused on practice.  
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competition law. It does not come as a surprise that judges pointed to those fields of law which 
they specialize and adjudicate in.  
A clear disagreement exists with regard to the question of who should be in charge of 
giving EU law courses. One-third was of the opinion that only judges should teach EU law but 
36 percent disagreed with such a proposition. By and large, the quantitative study reflects that 
the range of issues which should be covered by trainings is very comprehensive and varies 
between the most basic aspects of EU law to detailed studies on selected EU material law 
issues. Likewise, there is no single form of EU law trainings which would be the most preferred 
one. 3 to 5 days long trainings in the country seem to have most adherents as they were chosen 
by 41 percent of the group and E-learning is the least supported form with 7 percent of the 
group choosing that option.
774
  
The qualitative part of the study confirmed the quantitative findings. Most of the 
interviewed judges emphasized that they had followed various trainings in EU law which were 
organized by different institutions and took disparate forms varying from one day trainings 
organized by their courts, several days long trainings organized by the School for Judiciary to 
postgraduate studies organized by different academic centres. It also follows that the quality of 
the trainings has varied considerably.
775
 Most importantly, judges feel a need to broaden their 
knowledge in two areas. The first area concerns the obligations EU law imposes on the national 
judiciary. The second area pertains to specific fields of material law regulated by the European 
Union which a judge specializes in. The most important objection was raised with regard to the 
fact that trainings are evidently too theoretical and very rarely capable of providing any 
information on how EU law should be applied in a specific case. In that sense, the empirical 
data, both quantitative and qualitative, reaffirmed the observations presented in the previous 
chapter concerning the positivist, abstract and passive approach to the teaching of law present in 
Poland.
776
 
 
                                                 
774
 20 percent prefer 1 day long trainings in own courts, 15 percent would like to follow trainings abroad, 17 
percent prefer postgraduate trainings.  
775
 From the personal testimonies also follows that occasionally contradictory information was provided.  
776
 See section 3.2 of Chapter 3 and notes 551 and 552.  
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Judge V says: “As for me, the biggest problem is that the system of trainings is completely other-
worldly and anything that they attempt to teach us does not translate to my own practice. Certainly 
there are some formulas but I do not know how to translate them and apply them in a concrete case 
(…) After all, it is a common rule of all the trainings: a trainer does not condescend to something 
as down-to-earth as a local judicial practice” 
 
Judge C says: “The trainings in EU law should foremost cover the issues of material law because 
that is what matters in practice. And they should take form of workshops where practical issues 
would be discussed and where we could work on cases from life.” 
 
Judge N when asked what kind of trainings she is need of states: ”In general: start from the basics. 
This also applies to my colleagues here (…)” 
 
Judge W asserts: ”The trainings are poor. Judges do not enjoy abstract issues, they want to learn 
things which are linked to their daily practice. But the trainings are really paltry and there are not 
enough of them. So it all must be accessible and must relate to what we are doing.”  
Box 3  
 
Finally, the last point to be made concerns a very pragmatic aspect of trainings which relates to 
the accessibility of EU law courses and the manner the information about the available courses 
is disseminated. Obviously, this aspect goes beyond the mere matter of EU law and pertains to 
the entire system of trainings for a professional judiciary. The attempts of the School for 
Judiciary to create one, comprehensive state-sponsored system for judicial training have not 
delivered the desired effects yet.
777
 Besides, there is no one, coherent source of information with 
regard to trainings and at times the information is not at all provided to the judiciary.
778
 The 
                                                 
777
 The way the National School for Judiciary and Prosecutors is organized, managed and operates in practice has 
recently become a point of a serious concern of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland which found the 
present state of affairs unacceptable, for more check the opinion of the Council of 29 July 2010 to be found at 
http://www.krs.pl/admin/files/200457.pdf  (last accessed 1 August 2010).  
778
 The National School for Judiciary and Prosecutor did not even have a schedule of trainings for 2010. Scraps of 
information were available from the official website of the School, some information is occasionally forwarded to 
the appellate courts which are supposed to disseminate information further. Moreover, various systems of enrolling 
for the courses exist. All in all, frequently it happens that judges who express the willingness to participate in the 
courses in EU law cannot find the relevant information and are convinced about inaccessibility of the trainings. The 
situation improved somewhat in 2011 since the School provided a schedule of trainings for the entire year. The 
schedule does not foresee trainings in EU law which would be open to civil judges as such, only several 
opportunities to follow courses abroad at ERA and the European Judicial Training Network. For the 2011 schedule 
see http://www.kssip.gov.pl/info/harmonogram_2011/harmonogram_2011 (last accessed 21 September 2011) and 
http://www.kssip.gov.pl/info/szkolenia_biezace for the current trainings. There are also several trainings in, inter 
alia, the problem of implementation of EU directives, the preliminary ruling procedure, the obligations of national 
last instance courts with regard to EU law and the judicial methodology in interpreting national and EU law which 
are financed by the European Social Fund and are organized in the framework of the School, see for instance 
http://www.kssip.gov.pl/edu/902 (last accessed 21 September 2011).  
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selection and enrolment processes are inconsistent and intransparent. In addition to that, a 
number of various, mostly academic, organizations offer their own, frequently paid, 
postgraduate courses which certainly enrich the range of available courses but at the same time 
they generate even more fragmentation in the system of training and may entail serious 
discrepancies in the levels of teaching, its merits and substance. Under the given circumstances, 
it might be therefore claimed that only those who are truly interested in EU law will eventually 
succeed in their endeavours to follow a proper training. Others will grope for anything or will, 
possibly, not embark on searching.  
 
2.5. Access to EU law sources versus language skills of judges 
 
In the survey the judges were asked to assess their access to the sources of EU law, including 
the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. From the quantitative part of the study it emerged that 
68 percent possess either a good or sufficient access to the sources of European Union law but a 
considerable number of judges which amounts to 25 percent of the group experience problems 
in that regard. The graph below illustrates the distribution of the answers.  
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The personal testimonies provided additional insights into the problem. It namely 
occurred that it is not that uncommon that judges experience a lack of or a limited access to the 
internet which in consequence may hamper a proper access to EU law sources.
779
 The gravest 
problems arise with regard to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice though. Many 
shortcomings in the access to translated case-law of the ECJ were identified during the 
qualitative part of the study. It has occurred that the jurisprudence preceding the membership is 
translated in a very fragmentary way and the existent translations are, in the opinion of judges, 
of poor quality.
780
 It can be also concluded that the language problem is of a twofold nature. On 
the one hand, there are frequently no proper translations and, on the other hand, foreign 
languages skills are virtually nonexistent among the judiciary.
781
 Similarly to other former ex-
communist states, only Russian language was a compulsory element of the educational system 
in Poland up to the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Next to Russian, it was possible to acquire 
knowledge of German but English and French were practically non-existent. In the 
transformation period the possibilities of learning other modern languages were mushrooming 
                                                 
779
 Each court takes its own responsibility for assuring that judges are offered a proper access to the sources of law. 
This, in turn, may very much depend on own financial resources of the court but predominantly on its management 
which is performed by its president. From the qualitative study it followed that situations when the internet access 
to, for instance, the website of the European Court of Justice is blocked are also present. In general it is however 
difficult to draw a clear map of the situation in Poland. In the course of the research trips in Poland it has been 
discovered that the courts in most desolated places might have better access to legal sources than courts in big 
urban concentrations.  
780
 See Łazowski (2011), p.523 who claims “(…)This “lost in translation” syndrome extended to the pre-accession 
case law of the ECJ which in Poland was only available in very modest quantities as purely private and academic 
endeavour. The special edition of the European Court Reports has never materialized and the availability of 
literally a few selected judgments on the website of the ECJ can be called anything but satisfactory.(…) several 
comprehensive textbooks available commercially should not replace access to fundamental tools – legal acts and 
case law (…)”.  
781
 The problem has also been identified in the European Parliament’s Draft Report on the role of the national judge 
in the European judicial system, 2007/2027(INI), p.15 from which it follows that: “Many judges from "new" 
Member States, in particular Poland, Slovenia and Hungary, complained that not all ECJ case-law prior to 
accession had been translated into their language. Several judges from "new" Member States were not aware that 
any of the acquis, and in particular that ECJ case-law existed in their own language. A substantial number of judges 
from a wide variety of Member States commented on the question of translation of judgments. Many judges 
expressed concern at the time it took for all linguistic versions of an ECJ judgment or Advocate General Opinion to 
be available. Numerous judges considered the quality or reliability of translations of Community acts or case-law 
into their language to be inadequate. A German judge also noted certain discrepancies between linguistic versions 
of a same Community act.” See also Tatham (2010), pp.17-26 who also underscores the issue of the lack of 
translation and the problematic aspect of the foreign linguistic capacities among Hungarian judges. From the paper 
it follows that Hungarian judges often translate respective ECJ’s case-law on their own. The author also points out 
that the knowledge of foreign languages results in more openness to EU law and in turn in a more frequent 
application of EU law.  
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but foreign languages skills are yet not occupying any prominent place in the legal training 
curriculum.
782
 By and large, it might be assumed that there are very few judges who are in fact 
capable of using other language versions of ECJ’s jurisprudence and EU legislative acts.  
The lack of foreign language skills is not, however, the only reason why judges would 
be resistant to resorting to other versions of either the case-law of the ECJ or EU legislative 
acts. As some judges suggested during the interviews, it would not be feasible to rely only on a 
foreign language version of a judgment/document since such a way of proceeding could, in their 
opinion, undermine the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation. To put it 
crudely, a decision of a court and the legal basis underpinning should be accessible and 
comprehensible to the parties to the dispute.
783
  
 
Judge Y: “First of all, it should be emphasized that the jurisprudence of the ECJ has received a 
very step-motherly treatment by our legislator. They translated the hard law but they paid a lip 
service to the case-law. So the jurisprudence up to 2004 actually does not exist in the official 
Polish version. Taking into account that binding legal rules follow from the precedents of the ECJ 
you must ask yourself: but how?! How can we convince a judge that she should apply EU law 
when he even cannot find the specific rule in his mother tongue? It’s unpardonable and 
incomprehensible that they disregarded this aspect.” 
 
Judge E: “Unfortunately I am handicapped with regard to foreign languages. I wish I could refer to 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ but it is mostly not translated. This simply renders a proper and 
decent adjudicating in EU law matters impossible.” 
 
Judge F: “I know that the case-law of the ECJ plays a cardinal role but I do not like referring to it 
since I do not have access to the translated versions. I am handicapped with regard to foreign 
languages. Moreover, I cannot know to what extent it is taken out of the context. Some cases are 
translated and then I read them but I do not apply it because it is not the original version of the 
case. “  
 Box 4  
                                                 
782
 For the problem of foreign languages competence of the judiciaries in the former Soviet bloc see for instance 
Bobek (2006), pp.24-25.  
783
 The issue of legal certainty and legitimate expectations in situations when there is no access to a translated EU 
legislation became a point of concern in the case-law of the national administrative courts. Even though the 
judgment in which the national court set aside an EU Regulation which was not published in Polish was given in a 
different context and by a court which is not of interest for the present study, it does yet indicate the potential 
problems attached to the issue. The court argued that applying EU Regulation at stake would undermine the 
principle of legal certainty as it was possible that addressees had not learnt about the rights and obligations which 
are put on them by means of the respective Regulation, see case I SA/BD 275/05 of 20 July 2005, voivodship 
administrative courts in Bydgoszcz. The issue of enforceability of EU measures which are not published in the 
language of the concerned Member State has finally been decided upon the ECJ in case C-161/06 Skoma-Lux sro v. 
Celní ředitelství Olomouc [2007] ECR I-10841 in which the Court decided that EU legal acts not published in local 
language are not enforceable against individuals. For more on the problematique of the application of unpublished 
EU legislation see Bobek (2007), pp.43-80.  
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With everything considered, for those judges who are eager to resort to EU law, the lack of 
translated jurisprudence of the ECJ often poses an insurmountable technical obstacle to the 
proper functioning as a decentralized EU court.
784
 In a nutshell, the application of the precedent 
of the ECJ cannot take place so long as there are no translations thereof into the Polish 
language. One will therefore agree with Łazowski who claims that “(…) certainly, it was a 
paradox. On the one hand, the judges of the new Member States were supposed to transform 
themselves into EU judges in a very short time. On the other hand, some basic tools were hardly 
available and one does not have to be a rocket scientist to appreciate the importance of primary 
sources (…)”.785 What is more, such a state of affairs might seriously jeopardize and hinder the 
participation of the Polish courts in the process of a dialogue with the Court of Justice. As it will 
be illustrated in the section concerning the functioning of the preliminary ruling procedure, the 
potential consequences of the acte éclairé and acte clair doctrines may suffice to deter courts 
from referring preliminary questions to the ECJ. Taking the foregoing arguments into account it 
becomes evident that the issue of the access to translated case-law has been so far gravely 
disregarded and awaits a proper attention on part of the national authorities and the European 
Court itself.
786
   
With regard to the preceding discussion a parallel can be drawn for the problem of 
resorting to different language versions of EU secondary legislation. From the quantitative 
results it follows that only 6 judges out of the whole group has ever consulted a different 
language version of an EU directive.
787
 In view of such a finding, the presented by the Court 
vision of a judge who reads and compares different versions of EU law, be it a judgment of the 
                                                 
784
 The most telling instance of how the lack of translations makes the application of EU law excessively difficult 
in practice is a case originating from a second instance social security court which finally found its end at the 
Supreme Court as a cassation case. First and second instance courts experienced problems with the terms “the date 
of the onset of the employer's insolvency” included Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer. Only the 
Supreme Court commissioned a translation of the jurisprudence of the ECJ regarding this problem and found out 
that indeed the term has been interpreted by the ECJ in a different way than it was commonly interpreted by the 
national courts. For more see judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 December 2006, II PK 18/06.  
785
 From Łazowski (2011), p.523.  
786
 In this respect it should, however, be observed that the availability of translations of the recent case-law of the 
Court has substantially improved.  
787
 See the section concerning the indirect effect of EU law.  
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Court or a provision of a secondary EU measure proves to be unrealistic and illusory.
788
 In the 
context of the Polish civil judiciary, the multi-lingualism of EU law seems therefore just an 
abstract concept which does have only a fractional bearing on the daily judicial practice.  
 
2.6. Need to broaden EU law knowledge  
 
The entire analysis pertaining to the aspect of knowledge of EU law reveals the magnitude of 
problems in each area concerning accessing and disseminating information concerning EU law 
and gaining, processing and conveying the knowledge of EU law. The lines of evidence should 
have made abundantly clear that deficiencies in knowledge of EU law exist in all areas and that 
not only do many judges lack a proper knowledge of EU material law but they also very often 
do not know whether and how EU law might be relevant for a dispute or how national and EU 
law correlate and intertwine. With everything considered, as both quantitative and qualitative 
data suggests many judges end up in a situation when they are either not aware of the fact that 
EU might be of importance for a specific dispute and they unconsciously disregard EU law or 
they do not possess sufficient knowledge of EU material law and ECJ precedents that would 
allow them to resolve the issue correctly and promptly and without much damage for other 
official functions. In that respect, the disorder in the manner the trainings are organized and the 
information about EU law is disseminated is undoubtedly worrisome. By and large, it has 
become apparent that the iura novit curia principle may by no means be taken for granted with 
regard to the Polish civil judiciary.
789
  
The aforegoing findings are even more magnified and emphasized if seen in the light of 
the fact that 91 percent of the judges declared to be in need of extending their knowledge of EU 
                                                 
788
 See also Zirk-Sadowski (2006b), p.23 who claims that “the requirement of recognizing the equality of different 
language versions of legal text in the Community law is not used by Polish courts. So, it is the reason that the 
comparative interpretation is rarely used as a method of interpretation of the Polish law.” See also Ballin&Senden 
(2005), pp. 90-93, based on empirical data, the authors also argue that recourse to other language versions is very 
uncommon and used only to solve grave interpretation problems. Similarly Paunio (2007), pp.397-398.  
789
 Bobek argues that the problem also applies to Czech Republic and Slovakia. The author puts forward that the 
amount of EU law and ECJ’s jurisprudence renders the principle virtually unfeasible, see Bobek (2008a), pp.10-12, 
Bobek (2006), pp.287-289. The author’s observations are not based on empirical evidence.  
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law and only very few did not find it a requisite.
790
 In a similar vein, 95 percent declared to be 
willing to participate in the trainings in EU law. Furthermore, as much as 64 percent agreed that 
trainings in EU law should be obligatory which stresses the necessity of upgrading the EU law 
knowledge among the judiciary even more.
791
 Those results have been confirmed in the 
personal remarks included in the questionnaire and the interviews. Virtually all judges, 
including those who deal with EU law on a daily basis and those who do not come across it at 
all, admitted that they are in a great need of upgrading their EU law knowledge.  
 
Judge No 265 declares: “My knowledge of EU law is not really impressive and there is really 
nothing to boast about in that regard. I however see the need, or actually a necessity to broaden my 
knowledge in that field. Yet I don’t have time to do so.” 
 
Judge No 230 states “I propose that EU law trainings are given on a permanent basis, in all 
possible forms and at all levels of jurisdiction in Poland.”  
 
Box 5 
This evidently clear need to broaden the knowledge of EU law underscores the fact that 
the present situation in that respect is indeed worrisome and leaves a considerable room for 
improvement. However, there is second side of this coin. The results also clearly show that the 
judges are aware of the deficiencies in their knowledge of EU law and, most importantly, that 
they wish to remedy the situation. Therefore, it could be put forward that the significance of EU 
law is not rejected and its importance for the daily practice is recognized. Those conclusions 
also indicate that the judges look ahead and anticipate an increasing occurrence of EU law in 
their daily practice.
 
To substantiate this view the interviewed judges referred to the fact that EU 
law is at present an integral part of legal studies which subsequently implies that the new 
generations of judges, attorneys and solicitors is familiar with EU law and will bring it to the 
courts on a more frequents basis. Undoubtedly, this willingness to broaden the knowledge of 
EU law should be interpreted as a very positive sign which, on the one hand, indicates that the 
judges do not reject the significance of EU law for their daily practice and, on the other hand, it 
also gives hope that the situation will improve in the course of time.  
                                                 
790
 8 percent did not have an opinion with regard to that.  
791
 And 57 percent agreed that obligatory trainings should take place yearly. It should be reiterated that there is no 
system of obligatory trainings in Poland, judges are free to choose the trainings and their subjects. 
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3. Attitudes towards the EU, its law and institutions  
 
One of the aims of this study is to explore how judges perceive the European Union, its 
institutions and the process of European integration in general and what their attitudes towards 
and conceptions concerning the legal order of the European Union are. Furthermore, it has also 
been attempted to examine whether the stance judges take towards the European Union and its 
institutions might have some bearing on the way they perceive their role as decentralized EU 
courts and in consequence on the way they function in the European capacity. The following 
discussion touches upon, inter alia, the way judges perceive the principle of supremacy of EU 
law, the membership in the European Union and its institutions.  
 
3.1.  Acceptance of the principle of supremacy of EU law 
  
One of the most significant and absorbing albeit perplexing matters with regard to the 
functioning of national courts as EU courts is their acceptance of and compliance with the 
principle of supremacy of EU law. The main question which arises with regard to the principle 
has been whether national judges accept that European Union law takes precedence over 
national law and conform to the rule. In the course of the present study it has been discovered 
that the aforegoing inquiry is not as straightforward and that the issue is characterized by 
various nuances and features which normally do not occupy much room in the academic 
discourse. Moreover, it has been observed that the principle of supremacy should be seen in 
correlation with other aspects of judicial application of EU law and foremost with the 
preliminary ruling mechanism. Arguably, the most important finding with regard to the 
functioning of the principle of supremacy in Polish civil courts is related to the fact that it, as 
such, seem to evoke a relatively slight objection and controversy on the part of the civil 
judiciary. It appears that in total 14 percent of the judges rejected the idea that EU law is 
supreme to national law.
792
  
                                                 
792
 66 percent of which had no or nearly no (1 case) experience with EU law in the preceding 12 months and 56 
percent of which assessed their knowledge of EU law as poor or very poor. None of the judges that declared not to 
accept the principle of supremacy assessed her knowledge as (very) good.  
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Further analysis of the quantitative results has shown that in the group which does not accept 
the principle of supremacy the youngest judges were slightly underrepresented but in general 
there are no stark differences between the age groups which is visualized in the subsequent 
graph.
793
 
 
 accept neutral reject totals 
age     
29-35 42 21 6 69 
36-40 47 12 11 70 
41-50 72 19 13 104 
51-60 21 7 6 34 
totals  182 59 36 277 
  Table 2  
 
                                                 
793
 The oldest group of the judges excluded from the analysis.  
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 n=277 
 
It is readily apparent that the majority of the judges which amounted to 65 percent of the 
group accept the principle. And yet, the number of judges who took a neutral stance to 
supremacy leaves much leeway for interpretation and evokes further questions. Also, the data 
following from another inquiry leaves one somewhat perplexed. It occurred that 22 percent of 
the group agreed that a national judge should give precedence to the judgment of the national 
Supreme Court and/or Constitutional Tribunal if the judgment was in collision with a judgment 
of the European Court of Justice.
794
 The qualitative study provided some insights into this issue 
which, however, do not seem fully exhaustive and satisfactory. One of the grounds which might 
explain the high rate of neutral answers is scant experience with the application of EU law and, 
consequently, difficulty with assessing how the principle operates in practice.
795
 The other 
possible explanation has its roots in the stance the Constitutional Tribunal has taken towards the 
principle which was discussed in Chapter 3.
796
 The remarks shared in the questionnaires and the 
qualitative part of the study revealed that the judgments of the Tribunal might indeed take their 
                                                 
794
 50 percent disagreed and 28 expressed a neutral stance.  
795
 52 percent of those that took a neutral stance had no or nearly no (max 1 case) experience with the application 
of EU law in the last 12 months.  
796
 See section 6.1 of Chapter 3.  
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toll and influence the manner judges accept and conceive of the principle. The fact that the 
Tribunal, on the one hand, opted for the absolute supremacy of the national Constitution in case 
of collision with EU law but, on the other hand, it agreed with the principle of supremacy of EU 
law in situations when national sub-constitutional law is incompatible with EU law seems to 
render taking an unequivocal position towards the principle difficult.
797
  
 
 
Judge X: “In my opinion the national constitution takes precedence. In my system the constitution 
is absolutely the supreme legal act. EU law may take precedence above any other sub-
constitutional legal acts. Anyway, this discussion is pointless since a collision between the 
Constitution and EU law is impossible on the level of a first instance court. I cannot see how this 
can bear on my own practice.” 
 
Judge V: “I think that our constitution takes primacy. It is my own feeling yet confirmed by the 
Constitutional Tribunal. In my opinion it also follows from the Constitution itself that it is the 
primary law.” 
 
Judge A: “I know the principle and I accept it. I have not dealt with an issue of conflict between 
national constitution and EU law and I’d rather not find myself in such a situation. I am capable of 
understanding why EU law takes precedence but how can I explain that to the parties to the 
proceeding? The system is so blurred and so unfunctional.” 
 
Judge No 329: “The ECJ has an exclusive competence to interpret EU law and EU law takes 
precedence over national law, but not the national constitution.”  
         Box 6 
 
Leaving apart those who either reject the principle of supremacy or take a neutral stance 
towards it, it follows from the personal testimonies and a multitude remarks provided to 
anchoring vignettes that the reasons of the acceptance of the principle of supremacy of EU law 
are in most instances very legalistic and formal in nature and boil down to the legal argument, 
which were illustrated in the previous chapter, that the national Constitution recognizes the 
primary position of international law over national statutory law and so do the judges.
798
 As the 
qualitative data shows, the normative legitimacy of EU law follows from the fact that Poland by 
entering the European Union consented to giving EU law the supreme position in the national 
legal order.
799
 In that sense, the data suggests that those judges who claim to conform to the 
                                                 
797
 On the respective jurisprudence see the section 6.1 of Chapter 3.  
798
 See section 6.1 of Chapter 3.  
799
 For more evidence see for instance Chapter 5, section 2.1.  
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principle simply take it for granted and believe in legitimacy and authority of EU law. Yet, the 
acceptance of and compliance with the principle of supremacy seem quite theoretical and 
abstract, i.e. the judges reiterate the rule, figuratively speaking, like a Buddhist mantra but are 
not able to give a practical shape to the principle.
800
 The qualitative data seems to suggest that 
the foregoing follows from the fact that the supremacy discourse does not occupy much space in 
the practice of Polish civil courts. This in turn implies that the principle remains a somewhat 
meaningless and elusive notion to the overwhelming part of the group.  
The seldom occurrence of the supremacy principle in the daily practice of civil courts 
might be explained by several grounds. First of all, it is necessary to observe that from the 
qualitative part of the study it followed that the judges interpret the principle of supremacy of 
EU law very tightly as the obligation to disapply national provisions if those are at variance 
with directly effective provisions of EU law. In that sense, supremacy does not exists without 
direct effect. Such stance has profound consequences for private law courts. As illustrated in 
Chapter 3 the process of implementation of EU directives in the area of private law in many 
instances took the form of a literal transposition of the concerned EU directives
801
 which 
implies that the instances of explicit incompatibility are nearly impossible. It should also be kept 
in mind that an overwhelming number of civil cases concern horizontal situations to which the 
principle of direct effect (of directives) is not applicable. All in all, in purely horizontal 
situations the principle of supremacy would not, crudely speaking, be applicable.
802
 Second, 
from the qualitative data it follows that judges seem to take for granted the good will of the 
legislator and believe that he has done anything to correctly implement EU law into the national 
legal system. In a similar vein, many judges are of the opinion that the task of eliminating the 
instances of incompliance of national law with EU law rests on the national legislator. Such a 
                                                 
800
 This may also be concluded from the remarks judges gave to the anchoring vignettes.  
801
 See section 5.1 of Chapter 3 and note 619.  
802
 The foregoing does not imply that there are no situations whatsoever when supremacy of EU law would be at 
stake. In the context of cases pertaining to social security or employment, one of the parties to the dispute, for 
instance the Social Insurance Institution, local authorities, public healthcare and public education institutions, is 
mostly interpreted as an emanation of the state which in turn may involve the principle of direct effect and in 
consequence that of supremacy. Social security and employment law chambers judges are therefore much more 
likely to deal with direct effect and supremacy principles than other judges. This is also reflected in the in the case-
law of the Supreme Court concerning EU law, in a considerable number of cases the dispute was taking place 
between individuals and social insurance bodies or individuals and public health care institutions. See for instance 
judgment of 6 June 2006, I PK 263/05. This has been confirmed in the qualitative phase of the study.  
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stance is a reflective of the national doctrine and the place of the judiciary vis-à-vis the 
lawmaker in the national legal system in accordance with which the law is an instruction 
established by the sovereign which must be followed by the courts.
803
 Put differently, courts are 
to resolve disputes and apply the binding law and are not to conduct judicial review of national 
legislation and scrutinize, make or amend the laws. As explained in Chapter 3, from the 
normative point of view, the power to review the constitutionality of legal instruments is namely 
reserved for the Constitutional Tribunal. The empirical, both quantitative and qualitative, data 
confirms that the Montesquie’s maxim referring to a judge as to the la bouche de la loi or a 
Subsumptionsautomat
804
, that is to say a passive representative of the lawmaker who 
mechanically applies the law seem to still have a solid standing in the Polish legal 
environment.
805
 In that sense, it may be claimed that for many judges the potential 
empowerment through EU law proves to be only an additional, unwanted and burdensome task. 
Many judges do not necessarily intend to exercise the job which is supposed to be practiced by 
the legislator and therefore they may be somewhat anxious about being confronted with the 
principle of supremacy in practice.  
 
 
Judge No 231: “In principle I am of the opinion that incompliance between national and EU law 
should be eliminated by the legislator. We should not forget that in judicial cases we are dealing 
with a set of norms which should not been put into question each time that, for instance, the ECJ 
decides something else.” 
 
Judge No 235: “I think that the legislator should meet the obligation of adjusting national law to 
EU law.” 
 
Judge C: “I have dealt with cases in which the parties argued the incompatibility of the national 
provisions with the EU consumer directives but in principle the new statute seems to implement it 
correctly. At least I think that the implementation should not be called into question. So it is 
enough to refer to the national law.” 
         Box 7 
                                                 
803
 See Zirk-Sadowski (2005), p.111. In that sense, the judicial role of a civil judge in Poland very much resembles 
that of the French civil judge who “is nothing more than a passive agent of the legislature, mechanically generating 
required judicial decisions by plugging fact scenarios into the all-encompassing matrix of the Civil Code”, see 
Lasser (2004), pp.60-61, 166-202. 
804
 See Mańko (2005), p.534.  
805
 This has also been pointed out in the literature as one of the obstacles to the full integration of the Polish 
judiciary in the process of legal integration in the EU, see Łętowska (2005), pp.3-10, Wyrozumska (2000), pp.222-
223. Similarly Bobek observes that Czech judges “perceive themselves as docile interpreters of the will of the 
legislator”, see Bobek (2008b), p.107.   
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In their responses to the subsequent question, 69 percent of the judges agreed that the 
principle of supremacy is a necessary pre-condition of the existence of the European Union 
legal order.
806
  
 The foregoing synopsis demonstrates that from a theoretical point of view the civil 
judiciary does not seem to experience grave problems with accepting the principle of supremacy 
of EU law, albeit the situation is marked by some perplexity and is far from being unambiguous. 
The rejection of the principle of absolute supremacy of EU law does not seem to have further 
consequences for the acceptance of the principle in case of collision of national statutory law 
with EU law though. And yet, it might be misleading to assume that the principle does not elicit 
much concern among the judiciary. It has namely emerged that due to the lack of supremacy 
discourse in the civil courts, giving a practical form to the principle and its enforcement might 
possibly pose a considerable problem to the judge.  
 
3.2.  Conceptions concerning the EU legal order 
 
Next to the attitudes towards the principle of supremacy of EU law the conceptions judges share 
about their place of EU law in the legal system and the role judges play in the process of 
enforcement of the law of the European Union have been examined. 71 percent of the group 
were of the opinion that EU constitutes part of the national legal system and there were few 
judges who would disagree with this statement. Likewise, 68 percent of the group declared to 
feel that they are part of the EU legal order. 
 
                                                 
806
 23 percent took a neutral stance and 8 percent disagreed with the statement.  
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Interestingly, fewer judges see themselves as EU law judges. This result may seem somewhat 
odd if seen in the light of the foregoing graph but as the further statistical analysis and 
qualitative data seem to suggest it could be explained by the seldom experience with the 
application of EU law.
807
 Importantly though, 79 percent thought that the application of EU law 
is an important task of the national judge.
808
 
                                                 
807
 66 percent of the group that took a neutral stance had no or maximum 1 EU law case in the last 12 months. 67 
percent of those who disagreed had no or maximum 1 EU law case in the last 12 months. In the group that agreed 
36 percent had no or maximum 1 EU law case in the last 12 months.  
808
 18 percent took a neutral stance and 3 percent disagreed.  
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Judge N when asked how she perceives the new role which is put on her by means of EU law 
states: “It is something that we should not question or discuss (…) I do not see as good or bad, it is 
the law and that’s it, I have to apply it. Another thing is that we are simply not prepared to do so.” 
When asked whether she feels that she is part of the EU legal system: “Well yeah… (laughing) . It 
is all about your skills or actually the lack thereof.”  
 
Judge C when asked whether she thinks that EU law is an integral part of the legal system 
declares: “Well, the last training made me realize that indeed it is part of the our legal system, 
albeit we are so much embedded in our national law that it is priority for us. If I had to 
spontaneously answer the question what kind of judge I am I would say I am a judge of a Polish 
court.”  
 
Judge D when asked how she sees the place of EU law in the legal system states: “It goes without 
saying: it is part of our national law; but I am afraid that I am in the avant-garde in that respect.”  
 
Judge G when asked whether he feels he is an EU judge says “It is still very abstract to me, I am 
rather ambivalent about it; it is not a living law (…)“ later on he adds however that “EU law is 
obviously an integral part of our law. That is natural. It is like that in the Treaty, isn’t it? It is more 
or less coherent but in the end it is one, integral thing.”  
 
         Box 8 
As it was mentioned in the context of the previous sections, the coherence and uniformity of the 
legal system(s) occupy paramount positions in the hierarchy of the judicial principles. In the 
quantitative part of the study, an overwhelming number of judges were indeed of the opinion 
that the uniform application of the European Union law in all the Member States is important. 
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The importance of generating coherence across the legal system(s) has also been confirmed in 
the remarks given to anchoring vignettes and the qualitative part of the study.  
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3.3. Views on Poland’s membership in the European Union  
 
The results concerning the conceptions regarding Poland’s membership in the European Union 
and the general picture of the EU are unambiguous and straightforward. Polish civil judges are 
definitely pro-EU and the proportion of judges being euro-skeptic is virtually insignificant. As 
much as 94 percent of the group see the membership of Poland in a positive way and slightly 
fewer – 89 percent - have a positive image of the Union.809 The following graph reflects the 
distribution of the answers. 
  
                                                 
809
 Those results show that the Polish civil judge is somewhat more enthusiastic with regard to the European Union 
than an average EU citizen. It occurs that 53 percent of Europeans perceive the membership in the EU as a positive 
thing and more specifically 65 percent of the Polish citizens see the membership as a positive thing. 56 percent was 
of the opinion that their country benefited from the EU membership, the ratio for Poland was higher and amounted 
to 73 percent. Accordingly, 45 percent of Europeans and 54 percent of the Polish citizens have a positive image of 
the EU. For the data see Eurobarometer (2010), pp.130, 134 and 174-175 respectively.  
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            n=293 
 
The above findings were confirmed in the qualitative part of the study. The membership in the 
European Union is associated with, inter alia, the economic growth, open borders, freedom to 
travel freely and the internal market which the country and foremost its citizens can greatly 
benefit from.
810
 It is yet necessary to acknowledge that the interviewed judges expressed 
somewhat more concerns and reservations with regard to the European Union seen as an 
international political organization and its functioning in practice. It should be however 
emphasized that despite some objections concerning the EU, its institutions and the manner the 
whole system functions, in the opinion of the respondents the beneficial aspects of the 
integration processes outweigh the possible negative consequences thereof. 
 
 
 
                                                 
810
 Which in turn very much overlaps with the conceptions concerning the EU the ‘ordinary’ citizens of the 
European Union have. In accordance with the Eurobarometer (2010), p.124 “For more than four out of ten 
Europeans, the European Union represents first and foremost the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in 
the twenty seven Member States.” It also occurs that the freedoms are more appreciated by people with a higher 
education level, see p.128.  
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3.4.  Trust in national and European political institutions 
 
The assessment of the level of trust to the particular EU institutions juxtaposed with the level of 
trust to the national authorities delivered very absorbing results. The most striking observation 
follows from the fact that the Polish judges reveal much higher level of trust in the political 
institutions of the EU than in the national parliament and the Ministry of Justice which 
administers the functioning of the national courts.
811
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At first blush, those are seemingly paradoxical findings which might be interpreted in manifold 
manners. It is yet equally important to observe that the level of trust in EU institutions, despite 
of being emphatically higher than that in the national political bodies, cannot be, as a matter of 
                                                 
811
 As the study did not pay attention to the possible background of those results any explanation is necessarily 
conjectural in nature. The potential causes of those results might relate to the whole spectrum of factors such as, 
inter alia, historical developments in Poland and the impact of the communist rule on the judiciary which at that 
time was just one of the tools at the hands of the political elite used to enforce the socialistic objectives, political 
turmoil after the collapse of the communistic regime, more present developments concerning the practice of 
administrative supervision of the Ministry of Justice over the courts and the questions of independence and 
impartiality and finally the aspects attached to the working conditions but foremost the relatively low salaries in 
the Polish judiciary.  
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fact, called high as such since it oscillates between 30 percent and 40 percent.
812
 What is more, 
a gross number of judges which accounted to approximately 50 percent of the group took an 
indifferent position towards the EU institutions.
813
 This result might indicate that judges are 
either not knowledgeable of what the particular institutions are in charge of or they are simply 
not interested in them.  
The principles of good governance such as transparency, participation and better 
regulation to name just a few, have also been touched upon in the interviews.  The judges have 
subjected the institutions of the European Union to much criticism which mostly pertained to 
the fact of overgrowth and remoteness of the EU machine, red tape, procedural complexity but 
foremost the overregulation and excessive complexity of legislation. 
 
Judge X: “You know, the law is a source of income for multitude of people so for them it is 
definitely favorable. But the scope of it is just devastating, no one is capable of embracing it. This 
is obviously a very negative development for in most instances they just split hairs and search for 
rules in simple, straightforward situations, they multiply provisions which only pervert any logical 
approach to normal functioning. If you have a simple situation and in order to resolve it you must 
approach a group of specialists then it is outrageous, isn’t it? (…) Anyway, the institutions of the 
EU can perfectly deal with this even without citizens. They have created a closed enclave and do 
not need any input from outside to continue their functioning. ” 
 
Judge K: “There is so much of it! Who is going to read that all? And the whole jurisprudence, how 
can one ever embrace it?!” 
 
Judge W: “Of course it’s a huge body of law but I am of the opinion that it’s the reality of the 
present times. Our national law is also very excessive. It has become standard thinking that we 
must regulate any possible issue.” 
 
Judge G:” The more law the worse. If you start to regulate all realms of life which should never be 
touched upon then you are very wrong. In that sense, the direction the EU is taken is wicked. You 
cannot regulate everything since it means closing in a vicious circle of positivistic law and this can 
only lead to degeneration and Orwell’s Animal Farm (…) You mustn’t normalize actual states of 
nature! It’s absurd.” 
 
 Judge F: “Yes, we definitely face a process of inflation of legal regulation in the EU. They try to 
regulate too many spheres of social relationships. Is it right? It does not easily lend itself to a 
straightforward assessment. It is yet possible to establish a system of law, look for instance the 
code of Napoleon, which would be universal enough and would not have to pertain to any single 
                                                 
812
 In that sense the extent of trust to the institutions of the Union presented by the judges is only very slightly 
lower than that presented by the average European citizens. It follows that in Autumn 2008, 51 percent of 
Europeans and 52 percent of the Polish citizens, trusted the European Parliament and 47 percent of Europeans and 
47 percent of the Polish citizens trusted the European Commission, see Eurobarometer (2010), pp.165-167.  
813
 49 percent with regard to European Parliament, 52 percent with regard to European Commission and 58 percent 
with regard to the Council of the EU.  
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aspect of social life and which would leave considerable leeway for interpretation.” 
 
Judge V: “The amount of EU law regulation makes one’s hair rise! It is definitely harmful since the 
problem of finding the relevant provisions becomes very evident. The scope of this law has 
achieved such an extent that I heard from my friends working in the advocacy that they use the 
arguments of EU law just because the judge hearing the case would not be capable of finding the 
provision at issue!”  
 
Judge O: “My motto is the less (regulation) the better. It is just impossible to apply it all. It is easily 
said ‘iura novit curia’ but the ignorance of the law has its roots in the nature of that law, which, as 
all of us can see, the way it is…”  
 Box 9 
 
From the quantitative and qualitative results it yet followed that that the functioning of national 
political institutions has been subjected to much more devastating criticism.
814
 This is however 
an issue which cannot be expounded here in more detail. Suffice it to say that from the 
qualitative part of the study it follows that the personal attitudes of judges towards the European 
Union and its political institutions but also the national legislator do not seem to bear on the way 
the judges function in their professional capacity and apply the law. Arguably, the 
overwhelmingly positive stance towards the EU and the prevalent negative attitude towards the 
national legislator would, otherwise, imply much more eager engagement with EU law on part 
of the judiciary and arguably the rejection of the national legal sources, which is, as it will be 
shown in the following sections, not the case. Likewise, it could be conjectured that the judges 
would frequently resort to the procedure of the preliminary ruling to the ECJ. In a similar vein, 
the potential democratic deficit in the Union might be considered a problem by judges but it 
does seem to significantly affect the way judges approach EU law. This finding seems to be 
suggested by the quantitative results. 6 percent of the group declared to apply EU law with 
reluctance due to the democratic deficit in the Union whereas as much as 63 percent disagreed 
with the statement.
815
 All in all, the whole debate pertaining to the level of confidence to the EU 
and its institutions, albeit very absorbing, comes down to the conclusion that the Polish 
judiciary does endeavor to distance itself from any political discourse and does not seem to 
condition the application of law on their political inclinations and aversions. The qualitative 
                                                 
814
 The most important reason of criticism follows from the fact of disregarding the demands of rising the salaries 
in judiciary and improving the work conditions, not addressing the problem of the workload and efficiency in a 
proper way and many concerns about the attempts to encroach on  the independence of judiciary.  
815
 30 percent took a neutral stance, n=289.  
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results seem to indicate that the rule of law and the principles of judicial objectivity, 
independence and impartiality preponderate other concerns.  
 
3.5.  Trust in national and transnational judiciary 
 
In view of the preceding section the level of trust in the national and EU judicial bodies would 
seem a more significant aspect for the functioning of national courts. The following graph 
illustrates the distribution of answers concerning the trust in the national and transnational 
judiciary.
816
 By and large, the Supreme Court enjoys the highest level of trust (and the lowest 
level of distrust) among the judges. As it stands, the national highest courts receive somewhat 
more trust than the Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. 
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 22 percent took a neutral stance and 5 percent had (very) low trust to the ECJ, 10 percent took a neutral stance 
and 1 percent had low trust to the Supreme Court, 13 percent took a neutral stance and 6 percent had (very) low 
trust to the Constitutional Tribunal, 21 percent took a neutral stance and 5 percent had (very) low trust to the 
ECtHR.  
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Equally important to notice is that the level of distrust to the international judicial bodies 
fluctuates around 5 percent which again might indicate that the rest of the judges who took a 
neutral stance to the Court of Justice and ECtHR could not directly see the relevance of the 
bodies for their practice.
817
 Arguably, the most important finding relates to the fact of a 
decidedly higher trust to the judicial bodies if confronted with that to the political institutions. 
This can be deduced from the next graph which collates the entire set of the results.  
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The trust in the Court of Justice of the European Union is the most heavyweight concern in the 
present analysis. Even though the EU judiciary enjoys a relatively high level of confidence it 
should be emphasized that during the qualitative part of the study several judges did express 
some reservations as to the functioning of the Court. The problem of judicial activism, output 
legitimacy of judge-made law and the extensive use of the teleological method of interpretation 
but also the length of the proceedings at the Court have proven to be prime concerns and the 
major points of criticisms among the judges. Indeed, in the quantitative part of the study 22 
                                                 
817
 22 percent and 21 percent took a neutral stance to respectively the Court of Justice of the EU and the ECtHR. 12 
percent and 13 percent took such a stance with regard to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional tribunal.  
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percent of judges did agree with the statement the ECJ adapts too active a role when it interprets 
the law of the European Union whereas as much as 64 percent took a neutral stance and 14 
percent disagreed with the statement.
818
 
 
 
Judge H: “ECJ creates new, in its own opinion desirable, social phenomena and that is all done by 
few people who are not controlled whatsoever. What is more, they even don’t observe the 
standards they have once made. They expect from us but they themselves are not capable of doing 
it. The ECJ has too much power and cannot say what is in its own competences. They make abuse 
of it and none can negate it so they go on. It is undemocratic (…) Those are law professors and 
that’s the problem. They are in their own enclave and have nothing to do with reality. An elite 
which does what it wants.” 
 
Judge A: “I dislike this manner of adjudicating where they create legal rules and principles in 
situations where there is no legal basis for it. The ECJ makes law and that is alien to my way of 
perceiving the role law plays in general. A court applies the law, it mustn’t make the law. I know 
the arguments of the Court why they do it but I do not agree with them. So you suddenly discover 
that there is something which in fact is not there.” 
 
      Box 10  
 
Importantly though, those judges who were critical about the activism of the Court admitted that 
their position towards the ECJ should not, in principle, influence the practical application of 
their judgments. The obligation to observe the rule of legality, the principle of supremacy of EU 
law and the necessity to ensure uniformity and coherence of jurisprudence proved to be absolute 
values for the judges. However, as the following chapter will illustrate, there is some room for 
exercising discretionary powers in the context of judicial application of ECJ’s judgments which 
might have bearing in situations when a judges does not agree with a view presented by the 
Court in its judgment.  
 
3.6. Attitudes towards further harmonization  
 
Having observed the way judges view the EU law and its place in the entire legal order it is 
interesting to examine the attitudes judges have towards further process of harmonization of law 
on the EU level which might have taken a form of one common civil code and code of civil 
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procedure. The results revealed a clear dichotomy in the group but those supporting this form of 
harmonization evidently outnumbered the opponents. In the course of the qualitative study the 
judges also expressed mixed feelings with regard to further harmonization of national laws.  
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Those results which should be seen in the light of the prior findings yield themselves to various 
interpretations. First of all, they seem to suggest that the Polish civil judge is not strongly 
attached to the present system of law. This finding is not surprising as it can be explained with 
the tremendous alterations the national sources of law have passed through in the last decades. 
As observed by Mańko “Polish culture of private law does not have a ‘unique’ or ‘original’ 
character when compared to other continental systems of private law.”819 The constant change 
across all branches of law and multiplication of its sources has not allowed to become attached 
to any kind of law. Moreover, as it has been observed in Chapter 3, the process of fragmentation 
of private law in Poland which has been intensified by the impact of EU law on the national 
legal sources has reached a stage where we can no more speak of a coherent system, not to 
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 See Mańko (2008), pp.135-136, see also Mańko (2007), pp.83-103.  
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mention a unitary one.
820
 In addition to that the snatches of EU law and the terminology 
employed therein do not easily fit in the national law.
821
 The qualitative data suggests that in the 
opinion of the judges, the thick of provisions, regulations, legal acts, jurisprudence, norms and 
principles dangerously undermines the principles of legal certainty on part of both the judiciary 
and the individuals at stake. All of the foregoing seems to justify the relatively high support for 
one, common, coherent and united civil code which could greatly facilitate the daily life of a 
judge. Also, as both parts of the empirical study have shown, the intricacies judges experience 
with the EU regulations relating to the transnational judicial cooperation between the courts in 
civil matters which are applied on an increasingly more frequent basis explain why one code of 
civil procedure binding across the European Union gains even more adherents. The fact that the 
majority of the Polish preliminary references originating from the civil courts pertain to the 
issues of cross-border judicial cooperation might indicate the significance of the problems 
attached to the issue.
822
 The introduction of such a general tool of harmonization as a common 
civil code would, however, mean a revolutionary change in the daily practice of the courts 
which, arguably, would not be feasible.  
 
4. Experiences with resorting to and applying EU law  
 
Having discussed the issue of knowledge of EU law among the civil judges and their attitudes 
towards and conceptions about the legal order of the EU, it is necessary to turn to the problem 
of the factual experiences with the application of Union’s law in the daily judicial practice. The 
subsequent section visualizes the impact on and significance of EU law for the daily practice of 
Polish civil judges but also the feasibility of the specific mechanisms of the application of EU 
law.  
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 See section 5.1 of Chapter 3.   
821
 See section 4.5 of this chapter.  
822
 See section 4.4 of this chapter.   
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4.1. General presence of EU law in the daily practice of Polish civil courts: much 
ado about nothing?  
 
The analysis preceding this section should have already made clear that Polish civil judges have 
a rather scant experience with resorting to and applying EU law. Indeed, from the empirical data 
it follows that the relative impact of EU law on the functioning of the courts has so far been 
fairly limited. According to the responses, 41 percent of the judges who participated in the 
survey have not dealt with any case involving EU law in the last year, 27 percent have dealt 
with 1-3 cases in which they resorted to EU law and 4 percent dealt with more than 20 cases 
involving an EU law aspect.
823
 The other essential point to note is that from the inquiry 
concerning the preliminary ruling procedure which was included in the questionnaire it follows 
that approximately 40 percent of the judges have not ever dealt with any EU law issue in 
practice. The following chart illustrates the numerical ratio of cases comprising EU law 
elements in the preceding 12 months.  
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 Under the notion of EU law aspect it was understood: a direct reference to or an application of EU law source 
such as for instance EU Treaties, directives, regulations or jurisprudence of the ECJ.  
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From the subsequent statistical analysis it has been concluded that the occurrence of EU law 
takes the highest rate in company law chambers. 82 percent of company (commercial) law 
judges declared to have dealt with EU law in the last 12 months. The employment and/or social 
security judges deal with EU law to a much lesser extent (60 percent) and civil judges occupy 
the last position in that respect (50 percent).  
The foregoing figures must be interpreted in the context of the absolute numbers of 
cases judges are confronted with yearly. From the quantitative results it follows that nearly 55 
percent of the judges dealt with 400 and more case in the course of the last 12 months. The 
qualitative phase of the study showed that the numbers in some instances exceeded 1500 cases 
per annum.
824
 The statistical records of the Ministry of Justice are also very telling in that 
respect since they show a sharp increase in the number of cases year by year.
825
 According to 
the qualitative study and available studies and reports, the fact of overload and, in its aftermath, 
backlog and overwork is a systemic and grave problem which the judiciary suffers from for long 
years and which has a profound influence on the functioning of national courts, their efficiency 
and the length of the proceedings and the quality of the decision-making.
826
 The institutional 
and administrative capacity of the Polish judiciary was therefore a point of concern in the pre-
accession process
827
 and remains a highly criticized characteristic present in the daily 
functioning of the Polish judiciary.
828
  
 
                                                 
824
 The highest registered was 2200 cases. It must however be recognized that in the extreme instances the gross of 
cases should be considered utterly routine decisions of administrative nature which mostly require barely signing of 
relevant documents. The interviewed judges shared the feelings of frustration with regard to the workload but also 
the nature of cases which they deal with. Many were of the opinion that the overwhelming number of the cases 
could be handled by assistants to judges since they do not require much processing and relatively basic legal 
knowledge would be sufficient to resolve the issues. The fact of bringing the role of a judge down to the role of a 
clerk is strongly emphasized and criticized by diverse authors in Ignaczewski (2010).  
825
 In 2006 the absolute number of cases dealt with by civil chambers was 5 040 201, in 2007 in increased to 5 508 
180, in 2008 it reached 6 214 982 cases and in 2009 6 701 686 cases. The statistical data is available on the website 
of the Ministry of Justice at http://bip.ms.gov.pl/statystyki/statystyki.php (as of 31 August 2010).  
826
 See Chapter 3, section 3.5.  
827
 See Open Society Institute (2002), pp.153-168.  
828
 See for instance Report of the World Bank et al (2006), p.38 and the report by Ignaczewski (2010).  
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After having juxtaposed the number of cases yearly with the number of cases comprising EU 
law, it may be claimed that the ratio of occurrence of EU law issues is for most of judges 
insignificant, or put differently, the impact of EU law on national civil courts is relatively 
limited and incidental. The observation that EU law plays a marginal role in the practice of 
national courts has also been confirmed in the personal interviews. Most of the judges have 
admitted that, despite the fact that EU law occasionally occurs before national courts, it yet 
remains an abstract and remote aspect of judicial reality.
829
  
 
 
Judge V: “The infrequency of the occurrence of EU law is actually one of the biggest problems 
attached to it. If one case in a thousand cases has to do with EU law then you do not associate this 
law with something that is relevant, something that you can establish clear links with.” 
 
Judge U: “Before we entered the Union they used to threaten us about EU law. That a tide of EU 
cases is coming, that everyone will base his claims on EU law. But it all has proven to be a total 
falsehood! So far I have not dealt with any EU law issue. All the knowledge of EU law I gained 
before we entered the EU is actually lost, what a shame.” 
 
Judge W: “So far I have dealt with one case only but you would expect that there would be more 
cases. I know that in my court two other judges were confronted with some EU law issues but 
further there are simply no cases. Well, I must admit we simply have no time to engage with EU 
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 And those who deal with EU law on a more frequent basis stipulate that they are forerunners and their situation 
is different from their colleagues.  
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law and I even know judges who knew there might be incompliance between national and EU law 
but decided not to touch upon that because it would cost them a few days of extra work.” 
 
Judge S: “I have come across only one case so far. My colleagues do not deal with those issues 
either. Maybe in the future? I don’t know. Somehow the European Union law has not caught on 
here.” 
 
Judge F: “My contact with EU law is very marginal so the whole issue remains a rather abstract 
one. It is different, interesting but irrelevant.”  
 
Judge A: “EU law is like a country behind the mountain. It does exist and we are aware of its 
existence and very occasionally someone from this country visits us, but it is really very 
exceptional.” 
 
 Box 11  
 
With regard to the nature of EU law aspects which judges deal with, it occurred from the 
qualitative study that that frequently the same questions of EU law or similar claims based on 
EU law occur across the country.
830
 In that sense we can speak of tides of identical suits and 
subsequently the same EU law arguments. Furthermore, according to the personal testimonies, 
the nature of the EU law which mostly occurs in practice is, first of all, the application of EU 
regulations pertaining to the judicial cooperation in cross-border litigation
831
 and, second of all, 
reference to the jurisprudence of the ECJ. With regard to the latter it should nonetheless be 
observed that the interviewed judges have referred to case-law of the ECJ mostly for purpose of 
finding ancillary and subsidiary arguments. In that sense, EU law does not constitute the 
decisive argument for resolving the dispute but only one of the arguments which support the 
line of the adopted reasoning.  
 
4.2. Reasons of infrequent occurrence of EU law in the daily judicial practice  
 
From both the quantitative and qualitative data it follows that the reasons behind the infrequent 
presence of EU law in the daily practice of Polish civil courts are multifold and complex. The 
seldom occurrence of EU law discourse seems to be closely interrelated with, inter alia, the 
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 Such as for instance package travel, holidays and tours and the vehicles licences cards. 
831
Such as EU Regulation 1393/2007 on service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial 
matters, Regulation 805/2004 on European Enforcement Order or Regulation 1896/2006 on European Payment 
Order.  
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position judges take towards the issue of the application of EU law of a judge’s own motion 
which goes hand in hand with judges’ acquaintance with EU law and the fact that the private 
parties and more precisely their attorneys are not eager to reach for European sources of law. 
Furthermore, the daily operational context seems to play a significant role in that respect.  
From the empirical study it follows that the aspect of ex officio application of EU law 
goes far beyond the issue of national procedural autonomy and eventually comes down to a very 
essential question concerning the position of European Union law in the national legal order and 
the role both the judiciary and the parties to the proceedings play in the process of application 
and enforcement of European Union law. Likewise, as the qualitative data seems to suggest, it 
has a direct bearing on the frequency of occurrence of EU law in civil courts. From the 
quantitative and qualitative part of the study it follows that the issue of ex officio application of 
European Union law is one of the most complex and tangled aspects of judicial application of 
EU law in Poland. It emerged clearly that there is a significant legal uncertainty with regard to 
this field which in consequence may entail many different outcomes in various respects of the 
judicial decision-making. It occurs though that this aspect concerns a whole range of problems 
in which the somewhat incoherent and blurred jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
regarding the issue of ex officio application of EU law by national courts constitutes but one of 
the elements. The issue seems to be interrelated with the national legal culture and legal 
doctrine and, to some extent, with the opinion of the national Supreme Court in that regard. 
Furthermore, it does not come as a surprise that the whole question is dependent upon the 
judges’ familiarity with EU law.  
According to the quantitative results, 48 percent of the judges were of the opinion that it 
is clear when European Union law should be applied ex officio.
832
 This in turn implies that more 
than a half of the group does struggle with a question whether and how they are responsible to 
point out that EU law might play a role in a dispute. From the qualitative study it follows that a 
gross number of the judges is of the opinion that EU law applies exclusively in cross-border 
cases which might indicate that many of those who declared to know when EU law should ex 
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 Out of 313 judges. 19 percent displayed a neutral stance and 33 percent disagreed.  
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officio be taken into consideration would in practice do it only when confronted with a foreign 
element in a dispute.  
The conducted interviews visualized that judges have contrary views with regard to this 
problem. Part of the judges is of the opinion that it is the role of the judge to point out that EU 
law is applicable in the dispute. Those have indicated that the parties and their professional 
representatives may play a role in that regard, it is yet mainly the judge whose active role is of a 
crucial importance in this area. But yet, even those judges pointed to the aspects of operational 
context which render the whole process of ex officio application of EU law very intricate.  
 
 
Judge X “The parties are not obliged to point whether EU law should be applied. The parties are 
not obliged to show any legal basis for their claims, you cannot expect that from them. If there is a 
need to apply EU law then it rests only on the judge’s shoulders. It is the judge who must find the 
legal basis and reason for giving a judgment. If you say that it is only up to the parties then you’ve 
got it completely wrong.“ 
 
Judge O “I know “my” EU law and I apply it on a daily basis but in practice of an ordinary civil 
judge the presence of EU law is purely theoretical and it’s totally abstract. The judge is however 
supposed to know that law and apply it but a Polish judge does not know EU law, let’s face the 
truth (…) It is however easy to say ignorantia iuris nocet but the ignorance of EU law has its roots 
in the nature of that law. It is impossible to get acquainted with this enormous body of law. So 
indeed, it is the role of the judge to know when and apply the law but from a practical point of 
view very much depends on the parties and whether they show that EU law might be applicable.” 
 
Judge 170: “It does not matter whether the parties point out that EU law might be applicable or not 
because I have to apply EU law of my own motion.”  
 
          Box 12 
 
On the opposite bank, there are judges who reckon that so long as the parties do not base their 
arguments on EU law, there is no necessity to resort to EU law of a judge’s own motion. Those 
have accordingly pointed to very pragmatic reasons standing behind such a claim. First of all, 
the incompetence in EU law matters, that is to say the lack of knowledge of EU law and the 
relevant jurisprudence of the Court of Justice entails that it is impossible to see whether it may 
play a role in a dispute and whether there might be inconsistencies between national and 
European Union law.
833
 Indeed, in the survey nearly 60 percent of the judges admitted that it is 
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 This in turn is very closely connected to the problem of the lack of time, i.e. there is no time to investigate 
whether and how the issue is regulated by EU law.  
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hard to see whether EU law plays a role in a dispute if the parties and their representatives to the 
proceedings do not point out the relevance of EU law.
834
 This becomes however paradoxical if 
taken into consideration that every judge participating in the interview admitted that the 
knowledge of EU law of legal professionals (attorneys) is poor and if they decide to bring EU 
law issues into the dispute they mostly are not capable of amplifying this argument. 
Furthermore, some pointed out that in a civil procedure the judge should not go beyond the 
ambit of the dispute and the claims of the parties. What is more, it has emerged from the 
qualitative study that the national law is frequently considered the law which is apposite and 
directly at the judge’s disposal and remains the law which is most close to the individual. As a 
result, any engagement with EU law seems to be redundant. It was also underlined that EU law 
seems to be correctly implemented by the legislator which implicates that any engagement with 
EU law would be pointless. Finally, some judges directed to the principle of adversarial 
proceedings to support their stance.
835
 Given the reach of Union’s law into the area of private 
law, the opinions reflected by the judges obviously open up various complex inquiries with 
regard to the factual role and place of EU law in the judicial practice. 
 
 
Judge A when asked whether he has dealt with EU directives states: “I do not have any experience 
with directives. But I must admit that I have never really engaged in this issue out of my own 
motion and willingness. Why shall one make this effort when a case can be based on national 
provisions which are moreover clear and evident? Furthermore, this would make the whole process 
of adjudicating much longer and as you know statistics play much more important role here.” Later 
on he adds “I have never dealt with a problem of a collision between national and EU law 
provisions which would entail the application of the principle of primacy. The conflicts simply do 
not happen! And even if they happen then I am not conscious of that, to be honest with you. On the 
other hand, in order for EU law to become relevant for the dispute a cross-border issue must 
appear therein and there are not that many cases with cross-border aspects at all. However, taking 
into consideration the magnitude of EU law regulations I am never really sure whether I processed 
with an issue correctly, whether I have not overlooked, omitted something. This feeling of anxiety 
is continuously present since my knowledge of EU law is too general (…) So indeed, there is a 
high risk that EU law elements pass by totally unnoticed (…) The will of the parties should be 
decisive here though. It is up to them to support their claims and adduce evidence so also to prove 
that  EU law can be at stake” 
 
Judge C says ”EU law requires much engagement but since we know our national law so well we 
lack determination to consult EU material law or the jurisprudence of the ECJ directly. It’s a 
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 22 percent disagreed.  
835
 Which means that it is up to the parties to collect and present the evidence supporting their claims, see section 
5.2 of Chapter 3.  
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system of connected vessels: the parties do not touch upon it so we don’t deliberate whether EU 
should be applied. We don’t split hairs and we simply apply national rules. And if the parties do 
not refer to it then nobody is going to be bothered. It also follows from the fact that the judges are 
overworked and have no time.”  
 
Judge G declares that “It is absolutely and evidently in the interest of the parties to bring up the 
issues of EU law and it is up to them to show to the court that EU law is relevant in the dispute. 
The court should not go beyond the ambit of the dispute. Our assumption is that we apply local 
law, national law that is. We don’t apply EU law when national law is just here at our disposal, on 
our desk. EU law would require more effort, more time and that is the biggest technical obstacle to 
the application of EU law.” 
 
Judge K says “It might be that the European aspects of the cases which we deal with are totally 
disregarded. It is due to the fact that we have so much work to do - you know, the statistics rule 
over the courts - and never enough time to do it.  Put differently, if a party to the proceeding does 
not enlighten the judge that EU law should be applied in the case then there is no chance that the 
judge can detect it on his own. So far I have been applying national law only, this is the law which 
is closer to me.” 
 
Box 13 
 
The legal uncertainty with regard to the obligation to ex officio apply EU law is caused 
by several factors. The most important one seems to have its roots in the legal doctrine and the 
nature of civil procedure. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the Polish system is based 
on the iura novit curia principle which implicates that the court knows the law and applies the 
binding law of its own motion. Taking into account that European Union law constitutes an 
integral part of the national legal order and must be applied in the same manner as national law 
(principle of equivalence) and in line with the discussed in Chapter 2 Van Schijndel case in 
which the ECJ held that the national court is obliged to invoke ex officio points of EU to the 
extent that similar obligation exists under national law, it might be put forward that a national 
judge would always have to raise issues of European Union law of its own motion.
836
 This 
argument seems to be supported by the national Supreme Court.
837
 Be that as it may, such 
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 See similar Bobek (2008a), pp.4-5 and 10-13.  
837
 See Judgment of the Supreme Court of 18 December 2006 II PK 17/06. In this quite far-reaching case the Court 
indicated that every case in which a national court decides on a basis of national provisions implementing an EU 
directive belongs to the group of so-called “Community cases”. As it follows from the respective reasoning and the 
academic discussion with regard to the respective judgment, the Supreme Court implicates that national courts do 
function as European Union law courts not only when they apply directly effective provisions of EU law or when a 
cross-border element occurs in a case but also in every situation when national law which implements EU law 
constitutes the legal basis for the judgement. This reasoning would imply that in each dispute in which national 
legal provisions implementing EU law are applicable, the court would be obliged to ex officio take EU law into 
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expectation is based on a rather naive and unrealistic assumption that a judge indeed knows the 
entire body of law, including EU law which as this chapter has shown not the case. Moreover, it 
clashes with the common belief in the good will of the legislator who has done anything to 
correctly implement EU law. What is more, it optimistically presumes that a judge has plenty of 
time at her disposal to embark on yet another activity. In concluding the discussion on the ex 
officio application of EU law it is worth mentioning that more than half of the group took 
indifferent stance to the question whether ex officio application should be broadened.
838
 This 
result is reflective of the fact that the whole issue is somewhat ambiguous and hazy and leaves 
much leeway to the judge.  
Another factor, which goes hand in hand with the issue of ex officio application of EU 
law, that influences the infrequent occurrence of EU law disputes relates to the daily operational 
context. The qualitative part of the study provided significant insights with regard to this 
problem. The workload and backlog the judges are confronted with were pointed out as those 
aspects which incur plenty of concerns among judiciary. Practice shows that the judicial 
performance is mostly assessed on the basis of quantitative, not qualitative, measures, i.e. 
compliance with statistical expectations and her reversal rate by the appeal court. In very crude 
terms, judges are expected to resolve as many cases as possible in as little as possible time and a 
judge’s performance is reflected through her backlog and reversal rate. Consequently, a judge’s 
promotion will be dependent upon her (high) efficiency and (low) reversal rate. On the other 
hand, as it will be illustrated hereafter, the processes of application of EU law or generally 
speaking any engagement into an EU law discourse requires much more time and labour input 
on part of a judge than in a purely domestic dispute in which only national provisions would be 
applied. This combined with the incessant lack of time on part of judges and evident gaps in EU 
law knowledge seems to have profound consequences for the functioning of national judges as 
EU law judges. Seen from that perspective, the claim of Baum that “a trial judge who struggles 
with a flood of cases may come to care less about interpreting the law well and more about 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
account and scrutinize whether national provisions are in compliance with EU provisions. See Miąsik (2007), p.63 
and Miąsik (2008b), pp.16-22.  
838
 29 percent agreed with the proposition and 20 percent disagreed with it.  
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copying with the work load” seems very plausible.839 It is certainly true that in this respect the 
institutional framework or more precisely the efficiency expectations, tremendously bear on the 
way EU law is (not) integrated into the daily practice of civil courts. Trivial as it may sound, 
according to the quantitative and qualitative study an overwhelming number of judges have 
hardly ever sufficient time at their disposal to, first of all, broaden their knowledge of EU law 
and, second of all but most importantly, ex officio engage within any EU law discourse which 
would go beyond of what is deemed absolutely necessary to resolve a dispute. In that sense, a 
rational calculation, judicial economy and self-interest might influence the way judges (do not) 
engage with EU law.
840
 By and large, from the preceding analysis not a very optimistic picture 
of the judicial reality emerges. A reality where, as it has been illustrated, production numbers 
prevail over a legal discourse and where judges do not find any room to engage with the sources 
of EU law or, what is more and much worse, reality where any engagement with a EU law 
discourse may even cause some reversal effects to the judge.  
There is another side to this coin as well. Provided that a Polish civil judge is indeed 
always supposed to apply EU law of her own motion but taking into account that most likely 
she will have a rather poor knowledge of that law and very rarely enough time to engage with 
EU law, the question arises to what extent judges disregard and do not apply EU law, albeit 
mostly unintentionally and unconsciously. Obviously any answer to this inquiry would be 
conjectural and speculative and no research methodology would be capable of providing a 
legitimate response. Arguably, the amount of cases in which EU law has been detected and 
scrutinized by Polish civil courts constitutes only a scant part of the whole body of cases in 
which EU law might indeed have played a role but went unnoticed. As a result, an argument 
may be advanced that the acceptance of the role EU law plays in the national legal order and 
conformity to the supremacy, direct effect and harmonious interpretation tenets might be totally 
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 See Baum (1997), p.15.  
840
 See Posner (2008), pp.19-56 where the author provides an overview of nine theories of judicial behaviour. In 
accordance with the economic theory of judicial behaviour a judge is a “rational, self-interested utility maximizer.” 
In that sense, the goal of limiting workload (or put differently preference for leisure or minimizing efforts) may 
bear on the choices of judges. Likewise, social psychology research proves that institutional framework influences 
judicial behaviours, see Baum (2007). With everything considered a positive economic theory of judicial behaviour 
provides for many interesting and plausible insights into the judicial behaviour and the determinants thereof, see 
also Posner (2000), pp.219-259.  
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meaningless concepts when the practice shows a very down-to-earth reality where judges do not 
know the skills and ‘time-space’ to explore the possible EU law relevance and in consequence 
do not resort to it and apply it.  
 
4.3.  Experiences with the principle of harmonious interpretation  
 
From the perspective of private law the principle of harmonious interpretations seems to be an 
indispensable instrument placed at the disposal of any civil judge. As it has already been 
indicated, the principle of harmonious interpretation is of utmost importance for the proper 
functioning of national civil law courts as EU courts and in the enforcement of individuals’ 
rights flowing from EU law. This observation is a corollary of the foremost horizontal nature of 
the disputes civil courts deal with and the fact that the area of private law is in its gross part 
harmonized by means of EU directives.  
Before embarking on the issue of indirect effect it shall be recalled that the knowledge of 
the mechanism among the surveyed judges is evidently unsatisfactory. Subsequent survey 
questions showed that 22 percent have ever resorted to the mechanism in their practice
841
 but 
only 31 percent of those who have employed the mechanism found the rules regarding the 
indirect effect fully practicable.
842
 Those judges who have had experience with harmonious 
interpretation used the following sources to gain information about the directive in question.   
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 That is 64 judges. Interestingly 7 percent did not know whether they have employed the principle in practice. 
842
 Out of the total number 18 percent thought that the rule concerning harmonious interpretation are practicable. 
Not surprisingly 51 percent did not have any opinion about it. There were no judges who would find the principle 
not feasible at all though.  
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With regard to the above data it can first of all be observed that the case-law of the ECJ and the 
wording of the directive would be the primary sources to look for supplementary information 
about the directive in question. Importantly, only 6 judges interpreted a directive in the light of 
other language versions and less than half factually scrutinized the aims of the directive. It 
should therefore be recognized that in fact only a marginal number of judges fulfils the exact 
obligations following from the Marleasing formula and many interpret the principle as the 
obligation to resort to and apply the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. 55 percent of those 
who resorted to the mechanism of indirect effect have interpreted the national provisions at 
issue in a manner which would deviate from the usual way of reading them.  
In the light of the significance of the indirect effect tool for the civil judiciary, the 
aforegoing findings are somewhat worrisome. The grounds of such a situation are multifold. 
The fact that this aspect of judicial application of EU law has been given a step-motherly 
treatment (or no treatment at all) during the trainings for the judiciary partly explains the low 
level of knowledge of the principle. Further reasons may also be found in the national legal 
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culture and the methodological tools at the disposal of a judge, that is to say the interpretation 
methods which are traditionally employed by Polish courts. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the 
Polish judge functions in the realm of a very positivistic legal culture and the strictly literal 
(textual) and legalistic interpretation of legal provisions is the main and often the only 
methodological tool.
843
 Looking for the objectives and the spirit or telos of the EU legislation 
would, therefore, not be deemed feasible and substantial and definitely not the way the judge 
would proceed with in the context of a purely domestic dispute.
844
 What is more, such manner 
of approaching legal provisions might be deemed improper for it easily lends itself to 
manipulation and may endanger the rule of legalism.
845
 As it was illustrated in the section 
concerning the trust into the transnational judiciary, many judges express their concerns and 
reservations about the teleological method of interpreting the law as exceeding the boundaries 
of judicial decision-making or even as in some instances being contra legem.
846
 In that respect it 
is equally important to acknowledge that for some older judges who adjudicated in the 
communist period the obligation to resort to the purposive method of interpretation in order to 
ensure effet utile of EU law might to some extent resemble the old days when teleological 
method of legal reasoning was extensively used to serve the interests of the dominant workers 
class and to secure the victory of socialism.
847
 Paradoxical and seditious as the foregoing thesis 
may sound, this concern has been expressed in the academic writing
848
 and confirmed in the 
qualitative part of the study.  
 
 
Judge D: “Yes, it does raise some concerns. We have established that we apply the letter of law 
and suddenly we discover that the precedent and the teleological method of interpretation are more 
important. We are very closely attached to the textual interpretation of law but with EU law you 
must see the context and the objectives. You are supposed to look for the spirit, but it is difficult 
for us. It goes too far in our eyes and somewhat reminds me of the communistic times. I don’t like 
crossing the same river twice.“ 
                                                 
843
 See section 6.2 of Chapter 3.  
844
 Zirk-Sadowski (2005), p.98 points out that the problem is not as such rooted in the differences between the 
methodological categories but has a much more abstract level which originates from the styles and priorities 
attached to particular interpretation methods.   
845
 Ibid, p.102.  
846
 See section 3.5 of the present chapter.  
847
 On the judge being a bouche de la societé see for instance Mańko (2008), pp.120-122.  
848
 See for instance Bobek (2008a), p.23, Bobek, The New European judges and the limits of the possible [in] 
Łazowski (2010), p.145. Similarly Albi (2010), p.816.  
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Judge H: “When you apply the dynamic methods of interpretation you run a great risk, you stray 
from the most pivotal role the law plays in the society, the stabilizing role, because you don’t know 
what to expect, you don’t know what you are standing at (…) A dynamic way of interpreting legal 
provisions means that from A I will arrive at G, that is to say A provision will become something 
totally different (…) It’s a great risk.”  
 
Box 14 
 
By and large, the empirical data seem to support the arguments put by different scholars 
that the purposive and teleological methods of law interpretation remain rather foreign and 
abstract tools to Polish judges. The attempts of the Polish Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Tribunal to disseminate the knowledge about harmonious interpretation and encourage the 
judges to employ it in their daily practice do not seem to bring about the desired effects yet.
849
 
By the same token, as it has been illustrated, the comparative method, which would allow to 
parallel different language versions of the same legal act, is not a common tool employed by 
Polish courts.
850
 With everything considered, it may be corroborated what was already observed 
in the foregoing chapter, i.e. from the methodological point of view the Polish judge seems to be 
considerably handicapped which certainly hampers a proper functioning as EU judge and may 
badly endanger the effectiveness of EU law. 
 
4.4. Feasibility of the preliminary ruling procedure 
 
As the previous sections suggest, the participation of national judges in the preliminary ruling 
mechanism is deemed to be one of possible manners to assess the reception and integration of 
the European Union legal order by the national judiciary. From the section concerning the 
knowledge of the mechanism it follows that, in principle, judges are aware of the existence of 
the procedure and its general purpose. However, the data shows that only 41 percent found the 
procedure of the preliminary ruling mechanism clear.
851
 The high rate of neutral and negative 
                                                 
849
 The Supreme Court frequently points to the mechanism of harmonious interpretation as to a tool which can 
facilitate the judicial application of EU law, see for instance the judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 December 
2006 in case II PK 18/06.   
850
 Zirk-Sadowski (2005), p.99.  
851
 38 percent expressed neutral stance and 21 percent disagreed.  
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answers to the query might be interpreted in the light of a lack of practical experiences with the 
mechanism. To date of the empirical part of the study there were only four references to the 
European Court originating from the Polish first and second instance civil courts.
852
 Next to that 
there has been one referral coming from a criminal court and 4 referrals from the Supreme 
Court.
853
 This somewhat modest number of references stands in stark contrast to the national 
administrative jurisdiction which seems to eagerly participate in the process of dialogue with the 
European Court.
854
 Strikingly, the majority of the recent preliminary questions sent by the 
Polish civil courts concerns interpretation of directly applicable EU regulations pertaining to the 
                                                 
852
 See: judgment in C-499/06 Halina Nerkowska v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Koszalinie [2008] 
ECR I-03993 referred by a regional court in Koszalin concerning the interpretation of Article 18(1) EC; order in C-
134/07 Piotr Kawala v. Gmina Miasta Jaworzna [2007] ECR I-10703 referred by a district court in Jaworzno 
concerning the interpretation of Articles 25 and 90 EC; judgment in C-444/07 Insolvency proceedings opened 
against MG Probud Gdynia sp. z o.o.[2010] ECR  n.y.r. referred by a district court in Gdańsk concerning the 
interpretation of Regulation 1346/2000; judgment in C-283/09 Artur Weryński v Mediatel 4B Spółka z o.o.[2011] 
ECR n.y.r. referred by a district court in Warsaw concerning the interpretation of Council Regulation 1206/2001. 
One of the four judges has been approached personally in the course of the empirical study. Until July 2011, five 
more references were sent in cases: C-589/10 Janina Wencel v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych w Białymstoku 
concerning the issue of social security of migrant workers by an appellate employment and social security court in 
Białystok; C-115/11 Format Urządzenia i Montaże Przemysłowe v. Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych I Oddział w 
Warszawie concerning interpretation of Council Regulation No 1408/71 by an appellate court in Warsaw; C-116/11 
Bank Handlowy, Ryszard Adamiak, Christianapol sp. z o. o. concerning interpretation of Council Regulation 
1346/2000 by a district court in Poznan; C-325/11 Krystyna Alder, Ewald Alder v. Sabina Orłowska, Czesław 
Orłowski concerning interpretation of Regulation 1348/2000 by a district court in Koszalin and C-215/11 sent by a 
regional court in Wrocław concerning the interpretation of Regulation 1896/2006. All five references are still 
pending.  
853
 See: judgment in case C-344/08 Criminal proceedings against Tomasz Rubach [2009] ECR I-7033 referred by a 
criminal chamber of a district court in Kościan; judgment in C-99/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. v. Prezes 
Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej [2011] ECR n.y.r. referred by the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation 
of Directive 2002/22/EC; judgment in C-375/09 Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v. Tele2 
Polska sp. z o.o., now Netia SA [2011] ECR n.y.r. referred by the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of 
Council Regulation 1/2003; judgment in C-410/09 Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa sp. z o.o. v. Prezes Urzędu 
Komunikacji Elektronicznej [2011] ECR n.y.r. referred by the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of the 
Accession Treaty; judgment in C-440/09 Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Nowym Sączu v. Stanisława 
Tomaszewska [2011] ECR n.y.r. referred by the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of the Council 
Regulation 1408/71.  
854
 Up to date there were 25 references to the European court originating from administrative courts including the 
Supreme Administrative Court. All references can be found on the website of the Supreme Administrative Court 
www.nsa.gov.pl . The frequent occurrence of EU law (and in consequence its application) may partly be explained 
by the tremendous influence EU law exerts in the area of administrative law and more precisely in the realm of 
taxation and customs: 20 references out of 25 concerned solely taxation issues. The topic of the application of EU 
law by Polish administrative courts is definitely worthy of separate examination which is however beyond the 
scope of the present project, foe a general overview of the functioning of Polish administrative courts in the 
European capacity see Jaremba (2011).   
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area of judicial cross-border cooperation between the Member States.
855
 This, in turn, supports 
the observation that the application of EU regulations in the mentioned area seems the most 
frequent aspect which the Polish civil courts deal with.  
But yet, this limited number of references can by no means indicate that the procedure is 
rejected by the Polish civil judges. The data illustrates that, likewise the principle of supremacy, 
the preliminary ruling procedure gains considerable acceptance and support on the major part of 
national civil courts. 66 percent of the judges agree that the mechanism of the preliminary 
question is a useful one and only 3 percent disagreed with the statement.
856
 From the findings it 
also follows that 6 percent of the group declared to definitely be willing to employ the 
procedure in case of doubts concerning interpretation of EU law in and 48 percent would 
probably make use of the procedure. 28 percent would not resort to the mechanism and 18 
percent did not know how they would proceed. The following graph illustrates the distribution 
of the responses. 
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855
 In total there has been eight preliminary references concerning the problem of interpretation of EU regulations 
pertaining to the problem of cross-border judicial cooperation sent by the Polish civil courts (including appellate 
courts and the Supreme Court).  
856
 31 percent took a neutral stance.  
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A cross tabulation between the results concerning the willingness to employ the procedure and 
the manner judges assessed their knowledge of EU seems to suggest that poor level of EU law 
knowledge might negatively influence the willingness to resort to the mechanism.   
 
 (very good) moderate (very) poor totals 
would ask  27 77 52 156 
would not ask 5 25 46 76 
don’t know  4 22 23 49 
totals 36 124 121 281 
  Table 3 
Taking into consideration a rather high ratio of judges that would be willing to resort to the 
procedure one might wonder why there are so few cases in which judges in fact employed the 
mechanism. When enquired to give reasons of not having resorted to the procedure yet, the 
judges mostly pointed to the fact that they have not dealt with EU law so far in their practice or 
that they found the respective EU law provisions clear and comprehensive. After excluding the 
aforementioned grounds, it becomes apparent that the fact of the daily overwork and overload 
again prove to be one of the most cumbersome obstacles to the proper functioning of judges in 
the EU capacity.
857
  
 
                                                 
857
 Multiple answer question.  
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The qualitative research delivered some additional and arresting clues and insights into the 
issue. The length of the procedure itself but foremost the problem of finding time to familiarize 
oneself with, on the one hand, the mechanism and, on the other hand, substantive EU law at 
stake to such an extent that formulating a (correct and faultless) question would be possible 
have been the most frequently occurring arguments. Indeed, as plausibly observed by Ramos, 
preparing a question is time- and cost-wise perplexing an issue.
858
 This in turn should be seen in 
relation to the already discussed aspect of the daily operational context which clearly shows that 
output numbers is one of the paramount priorities for the Polish civil judges. In other words, a 
judge engaging with the procedure runs a risk that she will be forced to put other daily tasks 
aside as the process of preparing a question is so much effort- and time-consuming.  
Further exploration of this aspect brought another absorbing thread into the issue. It 
emerged that anxiety of referring a wrong question, i.e. improperly formulated or not meeting 
                                                 
858
 See Ramos (2002), p.12 who observes: “making a reference is costly because the judge must prepare it, explain 
the facts and point to the legal issues. It is an activity that would require her to invest resources in law-finding that 
go beyond the scope of her ordinary tasks.”  
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the formal requirements established by the Court
859
, concerning an issue which has already been 
judged upon by the Court, would be one of the most important impediment factors.
860
 Put very 
crudely, being afraid of losing face and discrediting oneself might effectively suppress a judge 
from any engagement within the procedure. In that sense, inappropriately referred/formulated 
question may harm the professional reputation of a judge and, what is more, it might also reduce 
the chance to be promoted.
861
 In a similar vein, referring a question might be captured by other 
judges as a sign of incapability of coping with the legal issue unaided and on one’s own.862 
Thus, invoking the preliminary ruling procedure might be equated with labelling oneself as ‘the 
incapable’ and therefore might be one of the stumbling blocks to mobilizing the procedure.  
 
 
Judge H: “If I could avoid employing the procedure then I would definitely do so. First of all, the 
length of the procedure, second technical problems and lack of know-how. Furthermore, I would 
have to master this issue and EU law so I would ask a wise question. To ask a question is never 
difficult but to ask a good question so the Court of Justice would not ridicule you is a different 
thing. So it is all about not making a fool of yourself. But that costs time and effort. You must 
thoroughly investigate the issue. But eventually, after knowing all ins and outs of the legal 
problem, why shall I still ask them? Then I can resolve the problem on my own, can’t I? All in all, 
it would be a useless effort which could be utilized in other manner.” 
 
Judge R: “If there was a need then I would refer a question. Those 16 months would not be a 
problem. The parties here have to wait 6 months for our decisions so they will also wait 16 
months. But the Polish judge has many complexes and they are not using the mechanism. They are 
afraid to speak out, they are afraid of losing their face so they don’t make use of it. So you must be 
very courageous to ask a question. Judges tend to think that it is better not to step out of line.” 
 
Judge C: “I would consider all ins and outs, all pros and cons because resorting to the preliminary 
ruling is in some sense equivalent to admitting that you lack judicial skills to decide the issue on 
your own; to interpret the provisions correctly.” 
 
Judge F: “I do not think I would make use of the procedure. It is long, too long. It is easy to stay 
the proceedings but I must always justify myself if I do it. And the parties have to wait so if they 
wanted me to refer a question then I would do it. But what if only one of the parties wanted it? I 
could suspect that they wanted to deliberately prolong the proceedings.”  
 
                                                 
859
 See section 8.5 Chapter 2.  
860
 This shall be seen in correlation with the fact that much case-law is not translated into the Polish language which 
in view of foreign languages barriers renders the claim even more legitimate.  
861
 In a similar vein judges avoid reversal since it is believed that it harms their reputation and bears on the career 
track and promotion, see Kim (2007), p.401, see also other authors referred to by Kim at note 69.  
862
 Also signalled as one of the hindrances to the participation of judges in the preliminary ruling procedure by 
Łętowska (2000), pp.229-238 who claims the reluctance of the national judiciary towards any feedback. Elsewhere, 
it is pointed that “(…) some judges appear to believe that asking questions is also a form of curtailing judicial 
independence (…)”, see Open Society Institute (2001), p.314.  
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Judge L: “Preliminary question? Yes, it’s a very interesting institutions but God forbid !...I mean, 
with my lack of experience with the procedure itself it would take me so much time and 
intellectual effort to prepare a question, and alas, I don’t have that time. Besides, I cannot imagine 
that the parties to the proceeding would agree to stay it for such a long time.”  
 
Judge O: “I am not going to refer a question. Full stop. It takes way too long. I could come up with 
many questions which bother me but referring a question would mean staying 50 percent of the 
cases which are pending before me. You can imagine that I cannot afford that.  I would run too 
much risk (…)” 
 
Judge G: “Because every judge is very much afraid of one thing: that she will make a fool of 
herself, that others will see that she is not capable of doing something correctly. So the anxiety that 
others could see that I did not really know what I was doing stops me from engaging with this 
issue.” 
 
Judge D: “On the contrary, referring a question would be taken wrong by others. You would see 
that the management of the court would become angry with you that you prolong the proceedings. 
Every month I would have to excuse myself in writing why I have sent a preliminary question. 
Moreover, other could totally misinterpret it: you are either not good enough to deal with it on 
your own or you are showing off.”  
 
Judge Z who sent a preliminary reference to the ECJ: “You know, it was first such a question here 
so, in order to avoid blunders at the international level, and to be sure that nothing was missing in 
the reference, so they would not reject it we had to consult it with many other people, with the 
Ministry of Justice.” 
 
 Box 15 
 
The foregoing arguments visualize how extra-legal factors such as the societal context, ties with 
other judges and the interaction between them and particular features of judicial environment 
but most importantly the status and reputation anxiety might bear on the willingness to employ 
the mechanism. In that respect, Baum’s theory of personally motivated self-presentation seems 
very plausible by pointing to personal audiences of the judges, in this case their colleagues, 
which may bear on the way judges make decisions.
863
 Next to that, Posner convincingly points 
to the factor of reputation as determining judicial behaviour.
864
 
                                                 
863
 See Baum (2008) who provides an elaborate account of what motivates judges in their decision-making 
processes. The author points to the so-called personally motivated self-presentation, also called impression 
management, in which personal audiences of the judges, such as for instance their colleagues, may bear on the way 
judges make their decisions. As observed by Oldfather (2007), p.143: “Judges are susceptible to all sorts of 
influences and psychological processes as they make decisions, only some of which are consistent with the 
dispassionate, rational, Olympian figure at the heart of our conception of judging. In this respect judges are – like 
the rest of us – human.” 
864
 See Posner who points to the factor of reputation as determining judicial behaviour, as he claims “Reputation is 
a function of effort, but, for the judge of ordinary abilities, only of a minimum effort. Effort beyond that level may 
actually make a judge unpopular among his colleagues, and this in two ways: first, by making him seem a rate 
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This aspect has also another, more institutionalized dimension. It has been explained in 
the preceding chapter that national law allows the parties to the proceeding to file a complaint 
against the court which hears their dispute in situations of infringement of the right of the party 
to the proceeding to hearing of his case without undue delay.
865
 The party may claim damages 
in cases of inaction and in cases of undue actions. A preliminary question to the ECJ which by 
reason of an existing acte clair or acte éclairé situation would result in a reasoned order instead 
of a judgement might, arguably, induce the parties to the proceeding to file a complaint against 
the national court at stake and claim state liability in damages for an unnecessary protraction of 
the proceedings. Of course, the foregoing observation is of a very conjectural nature. Yet, it is 
no doubt true that in view of the immensity of the case-law of Court of Justice, especially that 
preceding the membership, which in many instances is not translated into Polish the foregoing 
argument might play a role and only those judges who are absolutely certain of the correctness 
and legitimacy of their questions would refer them to the Court. With all the foregoing 
arguments considered, a rather thin knowledge of EU law among judges and the procedure 
itself, very limited experiences with the application of EU law, the lack of ‘space-time’ and 
courage to step out of line result in a situation when the mechanism seems reserved to the very 
few brave ones.  
 
4.5.  Intelligibility of EU law sources  
 
One of the objectives of the present study has been to examine how intelligible and accessible 
the sources of EU law are. Any process of the application of EU law will mostly commence 
with the seemingly trivial tasks of finding the relevant legal provisions. Nearly 40 percent of the 
judges were of the opinion that finding EU law provisions is an intricate task and 61 percent 
agreed that searching for EU provisions is a time-consuming process.  
                                                                                                                                                           
 
breaker, show off, or know it all (…) Second, a busy, active, forceful judge can impose costs on his colleagues by 
writing many separate opinions to which they have to respond, by criticizing their work, and by making arguments 
that they have difficulty answering.”, see Posner (2000), p.233.  
865
 See section 3.5 of Chapter 3 on the Law on a complaint concerning the infringement of the right of the party to 
the proceeding to hearing of his case without undue delay.  
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EU provisions are easy to find n=298  
Finding EU law provisions is a long lasting process n=295 
 
The following inquires concerned the transparency and legibility of the provisions of EU law. 
The answers to the questions suggest that dealing with the sources of EU law might pose 
considerable problems to the Polish civil judge. Only 16 percent of the group agreed that the 
provisions of EU secondary law are clear and comprehensible and 29 percent found the primary 
EU law unambiguous and plain. In a similar vein, the jurisprudence of the Court is 
comprehensible to a rather limited part of the group. A high number of judges again expressed 
an ambivalent stance.
866
 Likewise, only 21 percent of the group found the rules concerning the 
obligations put on the national court with regard to state liability in damages legible.
867
 The 
following graph collates the reception with regard to particular sources of EU law. 
 
                                                 
866
 40 percent of those that took neutral stance to the motion that primary EU law is clear assessed their knowledge 
as moderate and 50 percent declared their knowledge to be (very) poor. 
867
 26 percent found them clear and as much as 53 percent took a neutral stance to the problem.  
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It emerges that nearly half of the group found the judgments of the Court of Justice difficult to 
comprehend and ambiguous.
868
 This finding was investigated in more detail in the qualitative 
part of the study. Leaving aside the already discussed problem concerning the lack of translated 
judgments and the problematic issue of the role of Court’s precedent in the entire system, it 
should be mentioned that the style of judgments and the language the Court utilizes but also 
such a trivial reason as the extensiveness of the rulings seem to constitute a significant obstacle 
to many judges. Moreover, as the qualitative data seems to suggest, the abstractness of rulings 
may dishearten a potential judge from becoming acquainted with it. In that regard the judges 
might tend to resort to the available literature which analyses and comments on the case-law of 
the Court in order to consolidate their views on a particular ruling.   
 
                                                 
868
 29 percent took a neutral stance and 25 percent found the judgments clear and comprehensive.  
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Judge Y: “The judgments of the Court are written in other language which is very much different 
from the language we are used to. So we assume that an ordinary judge will start reading any 
judgment of the Court then he will fall, to be honest. Here we seriously need an icebreaker to 
overcome the barriers in mentality and approach.” 
 
Judge N: “I have tried to read the Leitner judgment but unfortunately it is not easily asimilable, the 
terms and definitions are seemingly the same but they are understood in a different manner. I could 
handle and manage that only by means of available literature on the subject. I assume that other 
people have carefully thought it out and I therefore applied their approach to the judgment.” 
 
Judge C: “It is written in a different language, different from the one we are used to. Our style is 
more formal and “dry” whereas when you read EU law it sometimes even seem colloquial and 
definitely very descriptive. In our law everything is more definite.” 
 
Judge B: “I have read two judgments of the Court. I don’t have time to read them just like that, 
without a reason. They are way too long, I can’t afford reading 60 pages, I have other tasks to 
complete. But in general it reads well, it is written in a very professional language though.”  
 
Case D: “Those judgments have, let’s call it, Byzantine style. They are scattered and very formal. 
Too much description and lengthiness. It is just too much so it is understandable that judges have 
issues with it.”  
 
Judge V: “I must confess that I tried reading it and I gave up. I could not see how it could affect 
my own practice. Those rules were so general and abstract. Maybe I was unlucky and did not come 
across a case that I could apply in my down-to-earth reality?” 
 
Box 16 
 
The problem of different understanding of legal definitions and terms used in EU law sources 
was also tested in the questionnaire. As discussed in Chapter 3, the process of implementation 
of private law acquis has taken various forms.
869
 It follows that some of the respective EU 
directives have been integrated in either the Civil Code or in distinct statutory acts or are partly 
regulated in the Code and partly in separate legal acts. Next to that, those provisions which were 
implemented in the extra-codical mode were often faithfully and literally reproduced, which 
implies that the legal concepts and terminology used in the original EU legal instruments were 
often copied and pasted in the national legislation. In that context, in the present study the 
judges were asked to assess whether the terminology which introduces specific EU legal 
concepts easily fits in the national legal system.
870
 Only a limited number of judges which 
                                                 
869
 See section 5.1 of Chapter 3.  
870
 On the problem of the difficulties attached to translating legal language see Lindroos-Hovinheimo (2007), 
pp.367-383. As the author observes: ”the terms possess special meanings in the legal context and only the use of 
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amounted to a mere 15 percent of the group agreed with the foregoing motion.
871
 Such a finding 
renders the claims with regard to incoherent and incohesive transposition and implementation of 
the EU acquis even stronger but is also adds up to the discussion concerning the universalism of 
EU private law regulation. Eventually, only 11 percent of the judges were of the opinion that the 
process of application of EU law proceeds swiftly and smoothly.  
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In light of the foregoing data it may be concluded that the entire process of application of EU 
law, proceeding from searching and finding the relevant provisions and their interpretations 
provided by the Court of Justice, through interpreting and understanding thereof up to 
employing them in a specific case amounts, in the opinion of the respondents, to a time 
consuming, laborious and troublesome process. This becomes much more significant if read in 
the context of the daily functioning of the national courts and in particular in the light of the 
congestion which is so vividly present in the everyday practice of the courts. In addition to that, 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
certain words can produce a certain legal effect. However, the terms at language-specific, even legal system-
specific, and thus may hinder successful transportation of a text into another language.” See also Paunio (2007), 
pp.385-402 on the issue of different meanings of legal concepts in different legal traditions.  
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 43 percent took a neutral stance and 42 percent disagreed; n=289.  
  
 
Polish Civil Judges versus the EU Legal Order: Knowledge, Experiences and Attitudes 
 
 
237 
the relatively negligible occurrence of EU law aspects implies that the processes of its 
application remain very exceptional and in consequence perplexing each time an EU law issues 
occurs. Put differently, so long as EU law does not become a common element of adjudication 
its application will remain an incommodious aspect thereof.  
 
5. Preliminary conclusions 
 
This chapter has brought the quantitative and qualitative results concerning the functioning of 
Polish civil judges as EU law judges together into one analytic frame, thereby attempted to 
bridge the gap between the formal obligations and expectations imposed on national judiciaries 
by EU law and the manner the judges work with EU law on the ground and experience it in their 
daily practice. In fact, the present chapter has considered the phenomenon of judicial behaviour 
but it has not touched upon the way judges reach their final decisions. Put differently, the issue 
of judicial decision-making has not been explored, it has only been looked into the problems 
which national judges may come across in their daily practice and factors which may possibly 
influence the way judges operate in the context of EU law. In that sense the scope of the present 
analysis has been much broader and pragmatic and pertained to various aspects of daily judicial 
practice reflected through a social prism. Put differently, the aspects of judicial functioning 
which have been discussed in the present chapter take very much place out of the public eye and 
its control.  
One of the most striking outcomes of the quantitative part of the research has been the 
relatively scant practical experience with resorting to and applying EU law. Although it may 
sound like a mere cliché but the data suggests that a direct experience with EU law is the 
paramount determinant in the process of learning and consequently in the process of applying 
EU law. Some concepts of EU law, including the most pivotal systemic tenets thereof which 
constitute the core of the functioning of national judge as EU law judge, remain meaningless 
and abstract notions to many of the judges due to the lack of any practical experience with them. 
By and large, the limited knowledge of EU law together with a very scant experience with the 
application of EU law result in a viscous circle situation. As the data seems to suggest, due to 
the limited and scattered knowledge of EU law many judges are unable to see the relevance of 
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EU law for the daily practice whereby they are simply not confronted with EU law cases. This 
lack of cases, in turn, does not allow to broaden and consolidate the knowledge of EU law. 
Finally, it should be observed that those judges who have some experience with resorting to and 
applying EU law find the whole process rather troublesome and laborious. With everything 
considered, the empirical findings put in question the feasibility of the expectations which are 
put on the national judges by EU law                                                           . 
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Chapter 5  
Engagement, Passivity or Resistance? 
Study of Legal Consciousness 
 
 
1. Introduction: methodological challenges  
 
Chapter 1 indicated that one of the ultimate objectives of the present study is to contribute to 
the Legal Consciousness discourse. To recall, “the study of legal consciousness traces the 
ways in which law is experienced and interpreted by specific individuals as they engage, 
avoid, or resists the law and legal meaning.”872 One of constitutive theories in this field has 
been established by Ewick and Silbey who constructed three varieties of legal consciousness. 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 1 those are: conformity before the law, resistance against the 
law and engagement with the law.
873
  
The original theoretical and at the same time methodological assumption of the present 
study was to explore and assess the three embodiments of legal consciousness through the use 
of six vignettes which were included in the questionnaire and which were supposed to test the 
particular forms of legal consciousness.
874
 The vignettes revolved around, generally speaking, 
the issue of supremacy of EU law. It was assumed that the manner the judges would approach 
the hypothetical issues would allow to classify them as either being with, before or against EU 
law. The vignettes delivered absorbing but at the same time somewhat puzzling results which 
went much beyond the initial theoretical assumptions. The explanations provided by the 
judges to their choices of a specific answer showed that multifarious legal and extra-legal 
factors might have played a role in the way they proceeded with the respective hypothetical 
case. More importantly, the remarks illustrated that the reasons which prompted a judge to 
                                                 
872
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 Ewick&Silbey (1998), pp.45-49. See section 2.2. of Chapter 1.  
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 See section 2.2 of Chapter 1. 
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choose a particular answer might be different from those presumed at the beginning of the 
study. Additionally, the in-depth interviews conducted among Polish civil judges provided 
further threads to the whole discourse. They also emphasized the intricate aspect which partly 
emerged in the anchoring vignettes, that is the interferences between institutional capacity of a 
judge and her personal capacity.
875
 The later perspective focuses on an individual judge, i.e. 
her views, attitudes, opinions and motivations which however might not necessarily reflect 
how the judge would proceed with a specific legal issue in practice. This is because the law 
and its institutions, rules and standards but also the judiciary as organisation naturally 
constitute constrains to the judge. In that sense, it can be observed that “in making decisions 
and engaging in activities, judges will be acting in an institutional, and not a personal 
capacity.”876 Finding a proper balance between those two dimensions proved, therefore, to be 
a challenging enterprise.  
In addition to the foregoing, the personal testimonies proved that confining the 
discourse on the functioning of national courts as decentralized EU courts to answering the 
question whether judges conform to the principle of supremacy of EU law is not satisfactory 
an approach, neither for seeing how national courts function as decentralized EU courts, nor 
for assessing the varieties of legal consciousness among the national judges. The conducted 
interviews disclosed that knowing whether a judge unconditionally or conditionally conforms 
or not to the principle of supremacy of EU law does not suffice to establish how a national 
judge experiences and constructs the legality of European Union law. The manner the 
anchoring vignettes were constructed did not take into consideration the fact that for a national 
judge there is an entire process of arriving at the point whether EU law could be at stake at all 
to the dispute at issue. In the opinion of the author and in the light of the qualitative data, this 
process preceding the ultimate application of EU law is decisive to the final assessment of the 
form of legal consciousness. Finally, the significant number of judges who did not take a 
definite stance towards the vignettes and admitted not to know how to proceed with EU law 
issues again gave room for manifold interpretations which do not easily fit the with – before – 
against categories. By and large, the analysis of the responses which were given by judges 
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revealed that the study of legal consciousness is much more nuanced than initially anticipated. 
All the foregoing implied that the final assessment of accounts of legal consciousness had to 
be treated with much caution and prudence. By and large, this study verifies Nielsen who 
claims that only in-depth interviews technique allows to capture “the more complex and subtle 
character of legal consciousness.”877   
 The preceding inventory of arguments speaks in favor of qualitative and ethnographic 
methodology for the purpose of legal consciousness studies, it is not however aimed at 
discrediting the use of vignettes. Conversely, the vignettes have proven to offer an invaluable 
and exquisite set of data which enabled to complement the qualitative data, explore some of 
the elements of legal consciousness and to detect potential factors which may bear on the 
manner judges make decisions. The results delivered by the vignettes are therefore included in 
the subsequent analysis and are followed by the qualitative exploration of legal consciousness 
which allows to conceptualize and to define the varieties thereof.  
 
2. Results of the vignettes 
 
The six vignettes comprised various hypothetical cases in which EU law was at stake. Each 
set of two vignettes was designed in a manner that would allow to visualize to what extent 
judges: 
- unconditionally conform to EU and the principle of its supremacy (2.1.);  
- condition the application of EU law on other factors (2.2.); 
- reject EU law and the principle of supremacy (2.3.). 
 
In addition to choosing one of the options the judges were asked to reason their choice. The 
explanations provided by approximately 25 percent of the group provided invaluable insights 
into the problem which, as it has been already indicated, entailed the necessity to alter some 
theoretical assumptions underpinning the study.
878
 In the following section each set of 
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 Nielsen (2000), p.1057.  
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 The number of remarks differed between the vignettes and oscillated between 50 (vignettes 6) and 74 
(vignette 2).  
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vignettes is considered separately. At times the analysis is enriched by a simple cross 
tabulation of the answers to the vignettes with other selected variables.  
 
2.1. Unconditional conformity with the supremacy of EU law  
 
In two vignettes the judges were confronted with a case in which the hypothetical judge 
unconditionally complied with the expectations which are put on her by means of EU law and 
the principle of supremacy of EU law.  
 
Vignette 1 
In its recent judgment the ECJ has ruled that a certain national regulation is in 
conflict with European Union law. You have to judge over a case whereby this 
national regulation stands central. However, the national legislator has so far not 
undertaken any action to change the respective national provisions. You do not 
agree with the interpretation by the Court of Justice but you apply this 
interpretation to the case pending before you because you are of the opinion that 
EU law should take precedence over national law. 
 
The judges took the following stances to the vignette: 
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A cross tabulation between the way the judges proceeded with the vignette and the way they 
assessed their knowledge of EU law seems to suggest that those who assessed their knowledge 
as very (good) were more likely to proceed the same way as the hypothetical judge and 
unconditionally accept the principle of supremacy of EU law. 
   
 Would proceed the 
same way 
Would not know 
how to proceed 
Would proceed 
differently 
Totals  
knowledge      
(very) good  30 8 1 39 
moderate  69 40 7 116 
(very) poor  49 51 17 117 
Totals  148 99 25 272 
  Table1  
 
The results show that 54 percent of the group would unconditionally apply the judgment of the 
Court of Justice and thereby conform to the principle of supremacy but as much as 37 percent 
would not know how they would proceed in the respective situation. The remarks provided to 
this vignette delivered interesting insights into the reasons of the particular choices. Those 
which belong to the supporters of the principle of supremacy referred in most instances to the 
rule of legality and the authority of EU law, effectiveness of EU law, uniformity and 
coherence of the EU legal system and jurisprudence, lack of discretionary powers in that 
regard or simply the binding force of EU law and the obligation to observe the primary role of 
EU law. Expressed differently, the supporter revealed a legalistic, hierarchical approach to the 
legal system in which EU law takes a supreme position. Those who would proceed differently 
based their opinion on, inter alia, the fact that the interpretations of EU law by the ECJ are not 
binding on a national judge, national law should prevail and take precedence over EU law, a 
judgment in which the judge would resort to EU law would be quashed by a higher instance 
national court, the manner of interpreting the law is in discretionary powers of the court and 
warrants the independence thereof, the instances of incompliance should be eliminated by the 
legislator. Finally, those who did not know how to proceed claimed that they would have to 
know the factual and legal circumstances of the respective case to make the decision, it is 
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necessary to adjudicate in the way which is clear for the parties to the dispute, it is up to the 
parties and the agreement between them to decide about the legal relationships between them 
and whether they were aware of the incompliance of national provisions with EU law. Many 
of those who were not certain how to behave referred to the lack of any experience with such 
an issue and/or the lack of knowledge of EU law which did not allow them to take a definite 
position in such an abstract case.
879
 The remarks have also illustrated how some 
misunderstandings with regard to the position of EU in the national legal order and the role of 
the Court’s precedent influenced the decisions the judges made in the hypothetical case.  
 
Judge 8 who would probably proceed in a different way: “If my view of the respective legal 
provisions applicable to the case in question differs from the one presented by the ECJ then I 
will pass the judgment in accordance with my own view since I am bound by EU law but not 
by interpretations provided by the ECJ.”  
 
Judge 25 who would not know how to proceed: “I would have to know more details about this 
case. The ECJ is however just a court which interprets EU law, if my interpretation was 
different then I would stick to it.” 
Judge 35 who would probably proceed in a different way: ”I do not agree that EU law takes 
precedence over national law.” 
 
Judge 53 who would not know how to proceed: “I think that I have to adjudicate in a way 
which is clear to the parties. Different judgments, based on different legal provisions may 
hamper a proper reception of the law by persons who are mostly concerned, that is the parties 
themselves.” 
 
Judge 82 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “I find it necessary to ensure the 
uniformity of jurisprudence.” 
 
Judge 91 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “A judge is obliged to apply legal 
norms even if she does not agree with them.” 
 
Judge 93 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “A judge is bound by the 
constitution and statutes. Since the constitution provides for primacy of EU law then a judge 
is obliged to apply that law first. The Court of Justice has the competence to interpret that 
law.” 
 
Judge 101 who would probably proceed in the same way: “Since we are a member of the EU 
and we are bound by its legal norms then we have to submit to specific principles.” 
 
Judge 145 who would not know how to proceed: “It would all depend on the circumstances of 
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 Also, further analysis has shown that as much as 81 percent of the group who did not know how to proceed 
declared to have deal with a maximum of 3 cases in which EU law played a role in the preceding 12 months. The 
foregoing seems to suggest that those with less practical experience with resorting and applying EU law were 
more likely to take an ambivalent stance to the vignette.  
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the case in question, the way national provisions regulate the issue, the agreement between the 
parties about the legal relationships between them before the dispute arose, and whether the 
parties were conscious of the incompliance of the national legal norm with EU norm.” 
 
Judge 151 who would not know how to proceed: “When deciding a case a judge always has to 
take into consideration the specific factual circumstances of the case.”  
 
Judge 148 who would probably proceed in the same way: “The principle of supremacy of EU 
law applies and binds” 
 
Judge 211 who would not know how to proceed: “I have not dealt with such a problem yet so 
I do not have an opinion about it.” 
 
Judge 214 who would probably proceed in the same way: “I think that the ECJ in its 
interpretations goes beyond its competences and EU law is too broad but I have to keep in 
mind the principle of the uniformity of the legal system.” 
 
Judge 220 who would probably proceed in the same way: “EU law takes precedence over 
national law but the way a court interprets the law is in its discretionary powers and warrants 
the independence of the court. And that is what matters most in my opinion.”  
 
Judge 231 who would probably proceed in a different way: “It depends on the subject matter 
of the Court’s ruling but in principle I think that instances of incompliance should be 
eliminated by the legislator. One should remember that in judicial cases we deal with a 
systems of norms which should not be put into question each time ECJ decides something 
else.”  
 
Judge 275 who would probably proceed in a different way: “I think that in such a situation I 
should decide the case on the basis of national provisions.”  
 
Judge 297 who would probably proceed in the same way: “It is the consequence of the 
principle of supremacy of EU law”, similarly Judges 303, 311, 316, 330,345, 366, 367.  
 
Judge 329 who would probably proceed in the same way: “If the national constitution was at 
stake I would choose for the constitution. 
 Box 1 
 
 
Vignette 5  
You are uncertain whether particular national provisions are in compliance with an EU 
directive. As you believe it is your duty to apply European law and ensure the 
effectiveness of EU law you refer a preliminary question to the ECJ concerning the 
interpretation of the directive. The ECJ rules that the national regulation is in conflict 
with the directive. Consequently, you set aside the national provisions and follow the 
ruling of the ECJ.  
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The judges took the following stances to the vignette:  
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       n=285  
In this case the distribution of answers resembles the preceding vignette. There are slightly 
more judges who would resort to the preliminary ruling procedure and, consequently, would 
unconditionally apply EU law which resulted in fewer judges which would not know how 
they would proceed. A cross tabulation between the manner judges proceeded with the 
vignette and the way their assessed their knowledge of EU presents as follows.  
 
 Would proceed the 
same way 
Would not know 
how to proceed 
Would proceed 
differently 
Totals  
knowledge     
(very) good  27 7 1 35 
moderate  70 34 9 114 
(very) poor  63 41 14 117 
Totals  160 82 24 266 
  Table 2 
Similarly to the foregoing hypothetical case, the judges who would unconditionally apply EU 
law explained their choices by referring to the principle of primacy of EU law and the binding 
force of EU law and the authority of the European Court of Justice. Those who would decide 
differently referred to the lack of time to engage with the preliminary ruling procedure and the 
primary role of national law for their practice. Likewise, judges who did not know which 
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option to choose, pointed to the necessity of knowing the legal and factual circumstances, the 
position of the parties and their lack of knowledge of EU law.  
Judge 15 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “My decision would be based on the 
principle of supremacy of EU law and the binding consequences of ECJ’s judgments.“ 
 
Judge 25 who would probably proceed in the same way: “I am afraid of sending any question 
to so-called wise men in this world such as the Supreme Court, Constitutional Tribunal or the 
ECJ. You have to wait long for their decisions, you must take pains to write it in a right form 
which is more important than a right substance and eventually they will send you back 
something like “we refuse to make a decision”. Despite those concerns, if I was really sure 
that I was right and had time to write such a “dissertation” then I would refer a question.” 
 
Judge 35 who would not know how to proceed: “It would all depend on the position of the 
parties in that regard.” 
 
Judge 43 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “I do not have time for that.” 
 
Judge 66 who would probably proceed in the same way: “For the uniformity of the legal 
system of the Union.”  
 
Judge 80 who would probably proceed in a different way: “Because I apply national law if I 
adjudicate in Poland.” 
 
Judge 93 who would probably proceed in a different way: “The preliminary ruling procedure 
takes too long. If it was possible, EU law should be applied directly.” 
 
Judge 104 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “I think that if a court decided to 
send a question then it must comply with the judgment”, similarly Judge No 145.  
 
Judge 232 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “The judgment of the ECJ is 
binding on me”, similarly Judges No 266, 364.  
 
Judge 275 who would probably proceed in a different way: “I would apply national law.”  
 
Judge 297 who would probably proceed in the same way: “I think that the judgment of the 
Court would be binding on me. The problem is that so far I have not dealt with such an issue, 
neither have I considered such a problem in theory. I guess I would proceed in a same way as 
with a preliminary question to the Constitutional Tribunal.”  
 
Judge 303 who would probably proceed in the same way: “I cannot take a decision without a 
detailed analysis of the files of the case.” 
 
Judge 347 who would probably proceed in the same way: “First I would consult with other 
judges in my environment whether there is indeed a case of incompliance of national law with 
EU law. If other judges agreed that indeed there is incompliance I would refer a question to 
the ECJ.”  
 
Judge 367 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “I would not refer a question if I 
did not want to apply the judgment later on.” 
 
Judge 373 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “Primacy!”  
 Box 2 
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2.2. Conditional conformity with EU law 
 
The following two vignettes were constructed in a manner that seemingly gave the 
respondents a choice between national and EU law. The claims of the parties to the 
proceedings or own conviction that particular provisions could offer a better solution would 
determine the way the judge proceeds with a specific issue. From the results gained in this set 
of vignettes, the distribution of answers and the remarks shared by the judges it stems that 
those were the most perplexing hypothetical cases.  
 
Vignette 3  
You are presiding over a case where national and EU law provisions can apply. Both 
parties to the dispute are of the opinion that national law regulates the issue way in a 
satisfactory way and therefore you are not referring to EU law in the respective case. 
In a similar dispute you decide to resort to EU law because the parties to the 
proceedings wish so. You are of the opinion that it does not matter what kind of rules 
are applied, as long as the dispute is settled. 
 
The judges took the following stances to the vignette:  
 
19
33
48
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
would proceed the
same way
would not know how to
proceed
would proceed
differently
%
vignette 3
 
         n=285  
From the vignette it followed that nearly half of the group would proceed in a different way 
but as much as 19 percent would take a stance similar to the one presented by the hypothetical 
judge. The proportion of hesitant judges was again considerably high and amounted to 33 
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percent. From the explanations provided for the respective choices it followed that the reasons 
which would determine the conditional approach to EU law boiled down to, inter alia, the 
nature of civil law relationships which are, in the opinion of the judges, agreements between 
the parties and their will to regulate the relationships between them. However, the judges very 
often stipulated that from the vignette it did not follow whether there was an instance of 
incompliance between national and EU law; in such a case the priority would often go to EU 
law. Judges being on the opposite front pointed to the primary role of EU law and the 
necessity to apply it ex officio but predominantly they emphasized the fact that it is not for the 
parties to the proceedings to decide which law will be applied and underlined their obligation 
to ensure the consistency of jurisprudence. The necessity to generate coherence and 
consistency which implies that it is not permitted to decide differently in similar cases would, 
therefore, be the most important factor determining the choice of a specific answer. The 
undecided judges again pointed to the fact of the lack of incompliance between national and 
EU law, the lack of knowledge of factual and legal circumstances of the case and the lack of 
knowledge of EU law and experience with it. This vignette again underlined the problem of 
the role of a judge in the application of EU law and the evident discrepancy between those 
judges who reckon that they are obliged  to apply EU law ex officio and those who will adopt 
a passive approach in that regard.  
 
Judge 15 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “EU law, in case of collision with 
national law, is applicable when the parties refer to that collision and base their claims on it.” 
 
Judge 25 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “ Everyone in Poland is bound by 
the same law, it is up to the court to what extent the matter in question is regulated by EU law 
and by national law (EU law takes precedence but it leaves it up to the Member State to 
decide about more detailed issues). Everyone going to the court in Poland must be sure that 
his dispute will be decided in the same way as other disputes were similar claims are at issue. 
Another thing is that I do not always realize that some aspects are regulated by EU law…” 
 
Judge 42 who would probably proceed in the same way: “Civil law is first of all an agreement 
between the parties. It is the will of the parties how to regulate the relationship between them 
and which law should be applicable to it. If there is an agreement between them I will apply 
the law both parties agree upon.” 
 
Judge 53 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “EU law takes precedence over 
national law. If Polish law provides for possibility of deciding the case on the basis of EU law 
then EU law should be equally applied to all cases falling into the same category. It is not up 
to the parties to choose the law applicable.” 
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Judge 77 who would probably proceed in the same way: “The will of the parties (it’s their 
dispute) and respect for their wills are the most decisive factors here, in the limits of the law 
of course.” 
 
Judge 83 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “Jurisprudence requires uniformity 
and the obligation to apply proper legal norms rests on the court.” 
 
Judge 93 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “A proper application of the 
binding law is the obligation of the courts; not the procedural opportunism.” 
 
Judge 101 who would probably proceed in the same way: “First of all, I would simply not 
look for EU law provisions.”  
 
Judge 107 who would probably proceed in a different way: “Since the national provisions 
were not incompatible with EU law provisions, then referring to EU law, next to referring to 
national law, would only enhance the legitimacy of the passed judgment.”  
 
Judge 145 who would probably proceed in the same way: “If both parties are conscious of the 
differences between national and EU law and the consequences thereof, and if they want me 
to decide the case on the basis of one of the legal systems then I would accept their 
argument.”  
 
Judge 156 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “A judge should, in principle, 
apply the binding law ex officio.” 
 
Judge 170 who would definitely proceed in a different way: ”It does not matter whether the 
parties refer to EU law because I have to apply it ex officio.” 
 
Judge 364 who would not know how to proceed: “It depends on whether national law was 
colliding with EU law. In case of collision the EU law provisions would take precedence.”  
 Box 3 
 
 
Vignette 6 
You have to decide in a case to which both European and national rules can apply. 
You consider both sources and decide to apply European Union rules to this case, 
because those rules offer a better solution to the dispute.  
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The judges took the following stances to the vignette:  
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In the present vignette a predominant part of the group preferred to proceed in a manner 
similar to the hypothetical judge. The remarks judges shared in this case showed that those 
who agreed with the choice of the hypothetical judge pointed to the fact that EU law was more 
advantageous and to the personal conviction of the rightness of such solution. Some pointed to 
the fact that EU law takes precedence so it has to be applied. Similarly to the previous vignette 
several judges pointed to the fact that it is ambiguous whether there is incompatibility between 
national and EU law. In that sense, it has again become visible again that the relevance of EU 
law is seen through the prism of a clear incompliance between both sources of law.  
 
Judge 15 who would not know how to proceed: “It is impossible to say what the term better 
solution means and I need to know whether there is incompliance between the national and 
EU legal provision.” 
 
Judge 25 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “What does it mean a “better 
solution”? For one party it is better for other party worse, I may not give preference to one of 
the parties. In the end, EU law takes precedence so I will apply it.” 
 
Judge 33 who would definitely proceed in a different way: ”If I apply EU law then I would do 
it in all cases and not just this one, due to the principle of supremacy of EU law.” 
 
Judge 35 who would not know how to proceed: “That depends on whether the principle of 
equality of the parties was observed.”  
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Judge 42 who would probably proceed in the same way: “Provisions of national and EU law 
are tools to the judge’s disposal which help her to take a proper, in her opinion, decision.”  
 
Judge 83 who would not know how to proceed: “My knowledge of EU law is not sufficient to 
take a position.” 
 
Judge 145 who would probably proceed in the same way: “It all depends on the legal 
agreement between the parties before the dispute occurred and whether the parties were aware 
of the incompliance between the norms. If there were no agreements as to the law applicable 
then I will apply EU provisions which offer a better solution.” 
 
Judge 225 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “We apply EU law if it is more 
advantageous.”  
 
Judge 275 who would probably proceed in a different way: “I would apply national law.”  
 
Judge 329 who would not know how to proceed: “EU law takes precedence so it does not 
matter whether it is more or less rational than national law.” 
 
Judge 346 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “I apply EU law first not because 
the parties are better off but because I have to.”  
 
Judge 359 who would probably proceed in the same way: “In the name of justice and 
rightness.” 
 
Judge 366 who would not know how to proceed: “Everything depends on the scope and kind 
of claims made.”   
 
Judge No 372 who would not know how to proceed: “Everything depends on the concrete 
factual circumstances of the case.”  
 
Judge 375 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “I would apply EU law because it 
takes precedence and not because it offers a better solution.” , similarly 376,  
 Box 4 
 
2.3. Rejection of EU law 
 
The final set of vignettes was aimed at examining to what extent national judges reject EU law 
and the principle of supremacy thereof. The results gained from the vignettes seem 
straightforward: there are relatively few judges who would in general reject EU law. The 
analysis of the remarks shared to the vignettes provided however various insights into the 
problem. 
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Vignette 2  
In a dispute pending before you, one of the parties draws your attention to the EU legal 
character of the case. You decide, however, not to pay attention to this aspect, as you 
do not think you are responsible for the application of EU law. 
 
The judges took the following stances to the vignette:   
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The results clearly show that an overwhelming number of judges would proceed in a different 
way than the hypothetical judge. Nonetheless, the remarks provided to the vignette have 
illustrated that the reasons which prompted the judges to chose another option are not only 
underpinned by the fact that EU law constitutes a part of the national legal order and takes a 
supreme position and therefore cannot be disregarded. Frequently and overwhelmingly the 
judges pointed to the fact the claims made the parties may not be ignored and must be given a 
proper consideration. Interestingly, vignette 2 is the only vignette where the ratio of undecided 
judges is much lower and does not exceed 10 percent. The remarks that go along with this 
vignette firmly support the findings included in the previous chapter: if the parties refer to EU 
law, judges will not shun their responsibility following from EU law and will consider such a 
point. To reiterate, at present the claimants and their representative play the paramount role in 
the process of mainstreaming EU law into the daily practice of Polish civil courts. The 
foregoing does not yet imply that the judge will correctly proceed with an EU law issue since 
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she might lack EU law knowledge, experience and/or appropriate skills to make a proper 
decision.  
 
Judge 8 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “It is necessary to find and become 
acquainted with the legal act the parties wish to rely on. Then I will decide whether it is 
applicable to the case in question.” 
 
Judge 13 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “It is my obligation to examine the 
case including the arguments and claims of the parties.” 
 
Judge 27 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “EU law should be seen and 
treated as a part of the national legal order.” 
 
Judge 53 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “In a situation when a party wants 
to rely on EU law and such a claim is justified then undoubtedly it would be necessary to 
apply EU law.”  
 
Judge 77 who would definitely proceed in a different way “The case must be decided in 
accordance with the law and not an arbitrary opinion of the judge.”  
 
Judge 80 who would proceed in the same way: “I’d rather apply Polish law because I live in 
Poland.” 
 
Judge 82 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “EU legal norms are binding and I 
cannot disregard them.” 
 
Judge 91 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “The claim of the necessity of 
applying EU law obliges me to consider such a possibility.” 
 
Judge 93 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “A court is responsible for a 
proper application of binding legal norms, also EU legal norms.”  
 
Judge 104 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “If the party brings such a claim 
then we are not allowed to ignore it. You must make a decision whether EU law should be 
applied or not.” 
 
Judge 148 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “Since the 1s of May 2004 such a 
way of thinking is not acceptable and shows a lack of elementary knowledge of the 
consequences of Poland’s accession to the EU.” 
 
Judge 210 who would probably proceed in a different way: “Because it is necessary to 
examine all the circumstances of the cases, both the factual and legal ones.” 
 
Judge 231 who would probably proceed in a different way: “I would consider whether EU law 
provisions should be applied but one should not forget that the claims and views of the parties 
are not binding on the court.” 
 
Judge 245 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “I would definitely analyze the 
EU law provisions the parties refer to.” 
 
Judge 265 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “As a national judge I am obliged 
to apply EU law because it takes precedence over national law.” 
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Judge 266 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “I would draw attention to this 
aspect. I would not be able to pass the judgment without knowing the regulation in question.” 
 
Judge 275 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “Indeed, I don’t think that I’m 
responsible for the application of EU law.”  
 
Judge 297 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “I am of the opinion that a judge 
should always consider whether EU law might be applicable to the case.”  
 
Judge 325 who would definitely proceed in a different way “If I decided not to apply EU law 
provisions then I would do so not because I think that I am not responsible for applying EU 
law but because in a specific case EU law  would not be applicable.”  
 
Judge 359 who would definitely proceed in another way: “I always have to consider legal 
provisions which may constitute basis for the decisions, regardless of their source. Especially 
when the party wishes to rely on it.”  
 Box 5 
 
Vignette 4:  
The European Court of Justice renders a ruling in line with which specific national 
provisions are in conflict with EU law. You preside over a case in which those national 
provisions constitute the legal basis for the judgment. You are familiar with the 
judgment of the Court but you do not refer to it in the respective dispute. You are of the 
opinion that a national judge has to apply the law which is enshrined in the national 
civil code and national statutes and not the case-law of the ECJ.  
 
The judges took the following stances to the vignette:  
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The respective vignette prompted somewhat more confusion among the judges. Although the 
number of judges who would proceed in the same way is not much higher than in the 
previously discussed vignette, the amount of those who would not know how to proceed is 
evidently higher.
880
 A cross tabulation between the manner judges proceeded with the vignette 
and they way they assessed their knowledge of EU law looks as follows.  
 
 Would proceed the 
same way 
Would not know 
how to proceed 
Would proceed 
differently 
Totals  
knowledge      
(very) good  2 6 27 35 
moderate  7 35 80 114 
(very) poor  11 40 63 114 
Totals  20 81 170 263 
  Table 3 
 
In fact, this hypothetical case is a reversed vignette from the unconditional conformity set. As 
the reader will notice the distribution of answers also resembles those from the first set. In that 
sense, those who would unconditionally conform to EU law oscillate around 60 percent of the 
population and approximately 30 percent does not know how to proceed with the case. The 
number of those who reject EU law oscillates around 7 percent. This vignette and the remarks 
provided to it seem to support the finding that the precedential value of the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice as a legal source is a perplexing issue for the Polish civil judges.  
 
Judge 15 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “The principle of supremacy of EU 
law.” 
 
Judge 42 who would probably proceed in a different way “I would get familiar with the 
judgment of the ECJ, analyze and refer to it but it does not imply that I will agree with it and 
apply it.” 
 
Judge 43 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “I do not know many judgments of 
the ECJ.” 
 
                                                 
880
 Further analysis has shown that 75 percent of the group which did not know how to proceed dealt with a 
maximum of 3 cases where EU law played a role in the preceding 12 months.  
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Judge 53 who would probably proceed in the same way: “The law must be comprehensive to 
everyone. If the national norm does not regulate the issue in a way which complies with the 
ruling of the ECJ then it is necessary to first change the national law so the respective decision 
of the court could be observed.” 
 
 Judge 66 who would probably proceed in a different way: “The interpretation of national law 
should take into consideration the judgments of the Court of Justice.” 
 
Judge 77 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “A judge can choose between both 
legal systems, i.e. national and European. The systems are namely parallel. However, the 
judgments of the ECJ create individual and specific rules which are applicable only you 
specific circumstances and as such cannot be applied directly to other cases. EU material law 
is yet another story.” 
 
Judge 93 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “The system of legal sources 
clearly indicates which rules are applicable in case of collision.”  
 
Judge 170 who would definitely proceed in a different way: ”I am bound by the judgments of 
the ECJ.” 
 
Judge 172 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “It is necessary to resort to EU 
law because it takes precedence over national law.”  
 
Judge 231 who would probably proceed in the same way: “I am of the opinion that 
substantive civil matters do not fall under the principle of supremacy of EU law.” 
 
Judge 247 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “EU law is binding and takes 
precedence”, similarly, Judges No 232, 241, 311, 316, 335, 359.  
 
Judge 275 who would definitely proceed in the same way: “I think that I am obliged to apply 
the norms enshrined in national law.” 
 
Judge 291 who would not know how to proceed “Specific factual circumstances of the cases 
would determine my own stance.” 
 
Judge 329 who would probably proceed in a different way: “Interpreting EU law is the task of 
the ECJ and EU law takes precedence over national law. Except our constitution.”  
 
Judge 346 who would definitely proceed in a different way: “I refer to the judgment of the 
ECJ and I am looking for a legal norm which would be in line with the arguments of the 
Court.”  
 
Judge 364 who would probably proceed in a different way: “Since national law was not in 
compliance with EU law then you must take that into account. However, everything depends 
on specific circumstances of the case in questions.”  
   Box 6 
 
The foregoing analysis confirms and complements the findings which were included in 
the previous chapter. It occurs that the majority of judges adopts a legalistic and hierarchical 
approach to law by accepting the supreme position of the legal order of the European Union 
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over the national legal order. It has also become evident that the ratio of judges who directly 
reject the principle of supremacy and the relevance of EU law for their daily practice and 
reckon that national law is the supreme law is relatively low. Nonetheless, the vignettes show 
that a considerable number of judges would condition the application of EU law on other 
factors such as circumstances of the case, equality of the parties, the nature of the civil law 
dispute, coherence and consistency of the line of jurisprudence. In addition to that, the notions 
of rightness and justness of judicial decisions were sporadically mentioned. The analysis of 
the vignettes again indicates that the supremacy of EU law is a principle which is not absolute, 
does not receive straightforward response and is frequently misinterpreted. Finally, a 
considerable group of judges admitted that their insufficient knowledge of EU law or the lack 
of experience with the application thereof rendered making a decision in the hypothetical 
cases impossible. Likewise, the abstractness of the vignettes impeded selecting a concrete 
answer.  
All in all, in line with the results from the vignettes four general types of judges could 
be distinguished. The overwhelming number would belong to the group which 
unconditionally complies with the supreme position of the law of the European Union. The 
second group could be characterized as those who in general conform to EU law and respect 
the relevance of it for their daily practice but in each case they would condition the application 
of it on other factors. Finally, a very limited in number group of judges clearly favors national 
law by assigning a supreme position to it and disregarding EU law. Eventually, the remarks 
shared with regard to the vignettes allow to establish a fourth group of judges whose 
deficiencies in knowledge of EU law and the mechanisms of its application and/or the lack of 
experience with EU law does not enable them to take a definite position towards EU law. 
Interestingly though, those judges are aware of their ignorance in the area and 
straightforwardly admit that. With regard to this group it is difficult to forestall the way they 
would proceed with EU law issues. Undoubtedly any engagement within EU law discourse 
would require from them a thorough process of getting familiarized with EU material law but 
foremost the principles of EU law and its application. Finally, similarly to the previous 
chapter, the vignettes visualized that many misconceptions with regard to EU law and its 
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application are present among the Polish judges. Those undoubtedly bear on the way judges 
proceed with EU law related issues.  
 
3. Personal testimonies 
 
The preceding overview explores the way judges would behave when confronted with a 
concrete EU law problem which has already emerged in a dispute before them. The results 
provided to the vignettes enabled to examine what stance the judges take towards the principle 
of supremacy of EU law and the role Union’s law play in the legal system. Nonetheless, as it 
has been argued in the introductory section of the present chapter, the way a judge proceeds 
with specific EU law issue which has already occurred before her reflects only a part of the 
whole process of judicial application of EU law. Only the in-depth interviews illustrated that 
the final assessment of the varieties of legal consciousness among the Polish must take into 
account the process in which national judges get to the point whether EU law could at all be 
relevant to the dispute at hand. The vignettes only signaled the matters attached to the judicial 
application of EU law the judges might be critical about. In turn, the personal testimonies 
allowed to see how the knowledge of and experiences with EU law may affect the form of 
legal consciousness. Moreover, the interviews made it possible to assess how significant EU 
law is for the judges and what importance they attach to it. By means of information provided 
in the testimonies it has been established that there are three general schemes in the manner 
judges approach EU law and understand and participate in the process of constructing the 
legality of EU law. Hereafter these schemes are referred to as: engagement, passive formalism 
and criticism. As it will be illustrated, those three embodiments of legal consciousness only 
partly overlap with the forms presented by Ewick and Silbey. In addition, the issue of EU law 
rejecters is discussed. This part of the study is of ethnographical nature and may therefore 
seem somewhat discursive. Such an exercise is however necessary to accurately reflect the 
nuanced variations of legal consciousness.   
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3.1. Conformity and engagement with EU law: activists 
 
The pattern of legal consciousness which is referred to as conformity and engagement rests 
predominantly on the own willingness of the judge to engage with EU law of her own motion 
and openness to the legal order of the European Union. Judges who revealed this form of 
consciousness are very positive, not to say enthusiastic, about EU law, they evidently assign 
the primary position in the legal order to it and they frequently refer and resort to it in their 
own practice. Put differently those are judges who can truly be assigned a label of guardians 
of EU law.  
 Judge E – a 55-years-old male second instance employment and social security judge 
claims that EU law has become an axiomatic part of his job and he applies it actually 
whenever the case allows. In the opinion of the judge there are no trails where some elements 
of EU law would not be touched upon. He has been applying EU law from the moment Poland 
entered the EU but some elements of it occurred even before Poland joined the Union. The 
nature of EU law applied by E varies between directives, regulations, case law of the 
European Court of Justice but also soft law of the Union which the judge frequently refers to 
and interprets. E thinks that such a frequent occurrence of EU law is a natural corollary of the 
fact that the area of labour and social security law is so highly harmonized and the original 
source of national rules may simply not be ignored. Importantly, the judge will not wait for 
the parties to the proceedings to bring an issue of EU law before the court. Likewise, judge R 
who is a 30-years-old female judge adjudicating in the first instance civil court claims that 
approximately 10 to 15 percent of the cases she presides over touch upon EU law. The matters 
she has dealt with so far concerned mostly the issues of consumer protection, abusive clauses 
in contracts, competition, incorrect implementation of EU directives and their interpretations 
and the application of the Regulation on European Order on Payment Procedure. The judge 
states that it is impossible to disregard EU law: 
 
“We have to directly refer to the sources of EU law. If I did not directly refer to the 
sources, for instance the directives on consumer contracts and case-law of the ECJ 
concerning this area, then I would not know how to apply the respective rules. I 
cannot imagine that some judges pretend this is not binding on us!” 
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Judge O, approximately 45-years-old judge of first and second instance civil and commercial 
chambers claims that the area of intellectual property and commercial law that she mostly 
adjudicates in entails a constant application of EU law. “It is just the peculiarity of this field”, 
she reckons. The judge refers to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in virtually each case 
she presides over. Often she resorts to the original language version of case-law of the Court 
and translates it on her own since, as she claims, the translations are of an outrageous quality 
or they are non-existent at all. She reckons that there is no national jurisprudence in the area 
and the doctrine is developed to a very limited extent so it is necessary to resort to other 
sources of law.  
R thinks that the number of problems concerning EU law is growing. It follows from 
the fact that EU law encroaches on increasingly more areas of national law and the fact that 
the results of transposition and implementations processes are not always satisfactory. She 
claims that the way several EU directives are implemented is flagrant:  
 
“They directly, thoughtlessly transposed the directive into our own legal system. 
They even did not read it beforehand. It’s just a collection of formulas and legal 
terms which altogether make up a statute but do not make sense so long you don’t 
consult the source directly and the case-law of the ECJ on that. Otherwise there is 
no chance you can correctly solve it. I do not understand how a judge can apply the 
law without referring to its sources and origin.” 
 
The judges are of the opinion that professional representatives are rather poor with regard to 
EU law. Judge E claims that he has to “enlighten them how it works” and R reckons that there 
are very few ambitious advocates who refer to EU law but in most cases they do not realize 
the potency it has. In consequence, in most instances the finding out that EU law is relevant 
and applicable is very much dependent on the court and its own initiative to deepen the 
problem. O thinks that in present circumstances the professional legal representatives of the 
parties are of utmost importance for the process of mainstreaming of EU law into the judicial 
practice of other Polish civil courts but the knowledge of EU law among the representatives is 
unfortunately very poor.  
A significant experience with EU law does not yet imply that the application of EU law 
has become automatic in all cases for the respective judges. They admit to have problems with 
particular issues of EU law. Judge E claims that even though issues such as direct effect and 
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supremacy are already well “judged upon” and do not trigger off any controversies or 
problems, the application of EU law is not always straightforward. In his opinion, there are 
some interpretative problems and aspects which are not that clear in the Polish legal order and 
due to local circumstances might be interpreted differently. The judge refers to, for instance, 
the issue of the emanation of the state which does not translate so easily in the local 
circumstances.
 
 Likewise, judge R says that the principles of supremacy and direct effect are 
fully accepted and applied but it does not imply that the application of EU law is easy and 
straightforward. In the opinion of R it requires much effort and deliberations, mostly because 
EU provisions can be interpreted in various ways so all pros and cons must be considered in 
order to chose a correct solution. The judge admits that EU law demands switching over to 
other judicial tools and methods.  
The judges are very much in favour of the preliminary ruling procedure, although they 
admit that the institutional context and procedural economy could hinder their own 
engagement with the mechanism. In case of E it would be the lack of access to the translated 
jurisprudence of the ECJ. Later on he also reveals that referring a question requires much 
time, work and efforts. In that sense, a direct interpretation and application of EU law might 
be a better solution.  
 
“You must gather all the arguments, facts, all the pros and cons yourself. You must 
read the literature, the case-law, get acquainted with the doctrine. It all is very time 
consuming. Do you realize how many judgments and their reasoning I will write in 
the meantime? Moreover, once you have done it all, you may venture to interpret the 
matter at stake on your own and resolve the issue without involving the ECJ. It is 
simply easier.”  
  
Judge O claims that she would be very much willing to refer a preliminary question but the 
length of the procedure definitely works to its disadvantage. In her particular case referring 
one question would imply staying half of other cases and that would be too hazardous for both 
the parties and the judge herself. Judge R does not have any reservations with regard to the 
mechanism. Even though she finds the procedure somewhat long she does not think it would 
dishearten her from referring a question if such a necessity occurred in her own practice.  
 All three judges claim to have a good or very good knowledge of EU law in the area of 
their expertise and admit to be in need of constant training in this regard. Not surprisingly, 
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only in case of judge R the issues of EU law constituted part of the legal studies. Many of the 
postgraduate trainings were followed of pure personal interests, some of them abroad and 
there are even situation when judges themselves cover the costs of the trainings. Two older 
judges admitted that they were learning EU law “on the spot” because the disputes they were 
presiding over required engagement with the EU law.  
There is a difference in the attitude judges take towards the possibility of further 
harmonization of EU law. In that sense, E goes as far as to say: 
 
“I know I am different from my colleagues in that regard but I think that everything 
should be regulated by EU law only.(…) I am definitely part of the European legal 
order but it would be even better if national law could disappear completely. I 
really feel I am an EU judge and that I constitute part of the European legal order 
but as for me I could become an EU judge only. I don’t trust national law and it is 
often of a very bad quality. I would applaud a common European code of labour 
law (...) I have never developed any attachment to any law. I was not given the 
chance to do that, everything has been changing so much in the course of the 
decades. But look, this new, European system, so many nations, so many countries 
can function with it. So why shouldn’t I say that it is good? So go ahead, harmonize 
it all! ” 
 
Judge O and R are more restrained in that respect and express some reservations as to the 
process of over-regulation done by the European Union. Judge O reckons that the fact that 
Polish judges do not know EU law has mostly roots in the nature of that law which is too 
extensive and too detailed.  
All three judges are enthusiastic about the European Union, open borders, foreign 
contacts, economic grow. They also admit to be personally attached to the EU and the 
processes of integration, Judge R say: 
 
“I am an optimist and I see EU in a very positive way. I appreciate the freedom it 
gives us to travel, to meet people from abroad. I am curious of the world.”  
 
Judge O admits: 
“Yes, I very much feel I’m a part of the EU legal order. But it is very much my 
personal attitude, how shall I put it… I am simply not that much “Polish” in that 
respect (…) I very much appreciate foreign contacts and I use foreign languages to 
make it all even easier.” 
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Judge E says:  
“From the beginning I was very pro-European, even though I actually did not know 
what it meant. EU should become a super state with Brussels functioning as its 
management centre. I would be happier then. I do not have any reservations to the 
law of the EU and the Union itself. Of course there are some problems attached to 
the judicial application of EU law such as the lack of translations of case-law of the 
ECJ but further problems can have roots in my own laziness only (…) 
 
Judge E also regrets his knowledge of foreign languages is limited. He calls it a serious 
handicap which does not allow him to resort of EU law sources in other languages and does 
not allow to exchange contacts with foreign judges.  
 The present examples shows that own initiative, openness, engagement and ambition 
but also the feeling of being responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of EU law determine 
the way the judge engage with and apply EU law. The judges fully accept the authority and 
legitimacy of EU law and perceive it as an integral part of the national legal order. The 
features of enthusiasm and own initiative together with a good knowledge of EU law and the 
mechanisms of its application are sine qua non of this embodiment of legal consciousness. 
Furthermore, a very open attitude to foreign influences and foreigners, the feeling of being a 
part of a common European legal order seem indispensible. Finally, elements of distrust to the 
national legal order, the national legislator and his legislative function and the quality of the 
legislative work it performs are traceable. All judges claim EU law has become an axiomatic 
part of the national legal order. Moreover, all the judges are of the opinion that it is often up to 
a judge to resort to EU law own willingness to engage with EU law. They go so far as to say 
that resorting to EU law requires courage and stepping out of line. As R claims, a judge must 
be willing to go beyond a literal interpretation of the provisions she applies but this task 
requires, in the opinion of R, much more work, effort and courage. 
 
 “The judges are very often afraid to step out of line, to decide in the way which 
differs from the rest, to bring new elements into the dispute. They are also afraid of 
the higher instance which may quash their judgments (…) They fear to speak out 
because they are think they will make fools of themselves (…) I know I have to 
apply EU law, it is an obligation which was put on me so I fulfil this function as 
well as possible. The workload here is huge but I manage. Frequently, we do not 
have enough time to deepen the knowledge of EU law but without continuous 
training you can never function properly. If you really want you will always find 
your way to achieve it (…)”  
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Interestingly, all three judges emphasized their own “exceptionality” with regard to their 
attitude to the judicial application of EU law. They also claimed to be those who other judges 
ask for advice concerning EU law issues.  
The preceding inventory of arguments and pictures of the way judges construct the 
legality of EU law indicates that the described judges would to some extent reflect the variety 
of legal consciousness which is classified as with the law. Thus, this embodiment rests on the 
notion of engagement. In that sense, the judges are with EU law which becomes “enframed” in 
everyday practice, becomes a natural part of it. For this category judges the national and EU 
legal orders evidently intertwine, correlate and complement each other. The judges utilize EU 
law not only because they think it is an obligation resting on them but also because they find it 
interesting or better in terms of quality. They are committed to EU law but they are also 
committed to making good legal policy and reading and interpreting the law well which 
implies that they devote their best effort to “get decisions right, however they may define 
right.”881 What is more, the fact of resorting to EU law would, in their views, reflect their 
progressive thinking, worldliness and the openness to the outside world. At the same time they 
feel it is their obligation to consult EU law. Nonetheless, an insufficient access to the sources 
or interpretative doubts attached to EU law may pose some constrains to the judge. Openness, 
good knowledge of EU law, courage, initiative, ambition, motivation and commitment and 
devotion are the capacities which prompt the judge to resort to EU law also in cases in which 
seemingly there is no such necessity. By doing so they not only deepen their knowledge of EU 
law even more but they also gain increasingly more experience which makes the application 
of EU law nearly a normal, everyday judicial activity.  
 
3.2. Conformity and passivity towards EU law: formalists 
 
The subsequent variety of legal consciousness is based on conforming with EU law but at the 
same time a rather passive or indifferent attitude towards it. Judges belonging to this group 
will accept the supreme position of EU law, they will see it as a majestic and distinct legal 
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 See Baum (2007), pp.15 and 18.  
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order but at the same time as a somewhat abstract and irrelevant aspect of adjudication. In that 
sense, EU will constitute an element which they will most instances engage with only if it is 
really necessary, i.e. parties to the dispute will claim that EU law is at stake, EU regulation 
ought to be applied in the case. In this group a clear border line between those judges who 
have an insufficient knowledge of EU law and those who have significant knowledge of EU 
law can be drawn. In the former group quite a common feature would be a feeling of 
frustration attached to the lack of knowledge of EU law and the methods of its application and 
sometimes a feeling of anxiety and insecurity with regard to EU law. Many of those will 
display diverse misconceptions and misunderstandings with regard to EU law. On the opposite 
front, there are those who are essentially prepared to solve EU law issues but yet they either 
claim that the parties should bring those issues to the attention of the court, they do not find 
time to engage with EU law discourse on their own or they admit that it is better not to stand 
out. All the judges in the group indicated the problem of the lack of time. Some referred to the 
workload as horrible and threatening, others as to overwhelming and enormous. The judges 
reckon that there is no time to deepen the knowledge of national law, leaving apart the 
European, and consequently there is no room to reach for EU law and legal solutions 
enshrined therein. They work under the pressure of time in order to solve as many cases as 
possible in a possibly shortest time. The operational context does not leave much space for 
self-education and this in turn leads to gaps in the knowledge of EU law. 
Many of the judges in the group shared the opinion that EU law becomes only relevant 
when there are instances of incompatibility between national and EU law. Those, in turn, are 
virtually impossible because in many instances the national legislator copied EU directives to 
the national legal order and it is useless to question the way the legislator implemented EU 
law and look any further than national law. Judge M – a male 45-years-old civil and 
employment first instance judge says: 
 
“During one of the EU law trainings we were asked to write a hypothetical 
preliminary question. So I consulted EU law sources but I couldn’t find instances 
of incompatibility between national and EU law. In my opinion incompatibility is 
just impossible.” 
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Judge C – a female 32-years-old first instance civil chamber judge – believes that it is 
sufficient to refer to the national law since it corresponds with EU law, there are no 
controversies between both sources of law which would imply the necessity of resorting to EU 
law. Similarly Judge Z – a female 35-years-old first instance employment chamber judge says: 
 
“There are very few cases where EU could play a role. If we don’t have to then 
we do not resort to European law. If the parties do not refer to EU law and there 
are no doubts in national law why shall you bother and resort to EU law and EU 
directives? (…)  Here we mostly make use of national law. And that’s enough for 
us. “ 
 
Consequently, judges categorized as conforming but passive with regard to EU law will have 
a scant experience with the application thereof. As for instance Judge G who is a 40-years-old 
first instance judge adjudicating in civil law area and who has dealt with one case where EU 
law was at stake. The lack of cross-border aspects is, in the opinion of the judge, the reason 
why EU law does not come before the court. He reckons that even the consumer protection 
cases do not touch upon EU law since there are no cross-border elements in them. Moreover, 
the judge points to the parties which, as he reckons, should be responsible for bringing an EU 
law aspect to the knowledge of the judge. With regard to this issue, an evidently contradictory 
and incoherent approach is visible. Judges often admit that it is their role to know the law, 
including EU law, and apply the law of their own motion and yet they push the responsibility 
of pointing out that EU law could be at stake to the parties. Judge Y – a male second instance 
civil chamber judge – also blames it on the passivity of the parties. 
 
“One of the reasons why EU law does not occur in the courts is the fact that 
parties do not signal it. Certainly in our system we have the iura novit curia 
principle and I guess also the ECJ is of the opinion that EU law should be applied 
ex officio. Anyway, attorneys are totally ignorant of EU law and are incapable of 
pointing put that EU law could be applicable. Even if they refer to EU law then in 
a very general way, for instance that the national provisions originate from a 
directive but further they cannot even say what that means in practice. So, it is 
obviously the role of the judge to know that EU law could be at stake but that’s all 
in theory. Since we don’t know EU law we must rely on the parties to show us its 
relevance (…).” 
 
Similarly judge Z says: 
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“If the representatives of the parties pull this out then of course you must scrutinize 
it, check it whether indeed it makes some sense. But they do it very rarely because 
they simply do not know EU law. We even have here advocates who state that they 
are legal practitioners in Poland and that they know Polish law only.” 
 
The foregoing discussion is not aimed at implying that the judges would disregard the 
principle of supremacy of EU law. Conversely, the judges belonging to this group will 
reiterate that EU law takes precedence over national law, i.e. they take a legalistic and 
hierarchical stance to law. The judges will simply obey the EU rule just because it is the 
binding law. For them the rules of EU law legitimate, regardless of their source or content.
882
 
Nonetheless, the foregoing points out that the judge will not easily engage with EU law of her 
own motion. The lack of any engagement with EU law sources, on the one hand, and the fact 
that the parties rarely bring the issues of EU law to the courts’ attention, on the other hand, 
result in a situation when EU law and its supremacy remains a theoretical and abstract 
concept.   
In the opinion of the judges, time constrains attached to the managing of considerable 
case-load is the biggest obstacle to refer to EU law or to deepen the knowledge of it. Some 
will observe that resorting to EU law may see a sort extracurricular activity which is just a 
waste of time when national law is directly at the disposal of the judge. Judge G clearly points 
to the national law as the law which is readily available to a judge. 
 
“I assume that the local law which is directly at our disposal, in our reach should 
be applied first. If I want to look any further than national law then time 
constrains will anyway not allow me to do that.” 
 
Furthermore, he observes that the EU law discourse is something that seems more 
sophisticated than the usual daily practice. 
 
 “I would love to reach for EU law, especially civil law because I think that it is of a 
very good quality and the case-law in this realm is excellent. But I am just a simple 
judge, a public clerk who cannot afford spending time on these higher class 
activities”. 
                                                 
882
 See Friedman (1977), p.139 on the concept of legitimacy and the reasons why people obey the law.   
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The examples also show how the ignorance of EU law influences the way judges deal with 
EU law issues. Judge I who is 35-years-old male judge and adjudicates in a first instance civil 
court admits to be a total ignorant in the area of EU law. He says that he is aware of the 
principles of EU law such as supremacy and direct effect and he claims to conform to them 
but he admits not to know what they mean in practice since he has so far dealt with one case 
in which an element of EU law occurred. His example shows how the unfamiliarity with 
distinct legal interpretation methods makes adjudicating in EU cases a very intricate task.   
 
“So far I have dealt with one case. They wanted to rely on EU law, on this, you 
know, the Treaty and the freedom of movement of employees, that’s the way you 
call it, right? Their claims were totally not adequate to the legal provisions they 
wanted to rely on though. I just literally interpreted this provision of the Treaty 
and in my opinion it had nothing to do with the claim so I rejected the argument “ 
 
Judge I admits that EU law remains a totally remote abstract aspect of adjudicating. Therefore 
he does not see himself as an EU judge and has a rather indifferent attitude to it. A possible 
resort to and a subsequent application of EU is made totally conditional upon the parties to the 
dispute. The fact of ignorance in EU law area would also mean that the judge would in no case 
be willing to refer a question to the ECJ. Similarly, Judge D – a 50-years-old female judge of 
first instance civil court - has virtually no experience with the application of EU law, except 
one reference to the case-law of the ECJ. In a similar vein Judges J, K M, U and S have no or 
very scant experience with the application of EU law and express the feeling of anticipation 
with regard to EU law. However, many admitted that it is possible that they unconsciously 
disregard aspects of EU law due to either a lack of knowledge of EU law or a lack of 
experience with it. Judge U – a female 50-years-old employment chamber judge says:  
 
“They threatened us with EU law before we joined the Union. They said there would 
be a tide of EU law cases coming but it has proven to be totally false (…) Of course it 
might be that EU law issues escape our attention. Difficult to say (…)”  
 
Judge S who has dealt with one EU law case so far, claims that the parties do to resort to EU 
law and the judges are not capable of knowing everything. She thinks that she might even not 
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be aware that EU law could be at stake in her disputes and she does not have enough time to 
sound the problem.  
 
“In principle it is not difficult to find the sources of EU law, for instance EU 
directives. If you really want you will find (…) Of course we apply the implementing 
provisions but the parties do not claim that EU law could be incorrectly 
implemented. And frankly, we also do not know whether it is correctly implemented 
(…) So yes, of course we apply the implementing provisions but obviously we do not 
check whether in fact the implementation is correct (…) I must admit I would never 
engage with scrutinizing whether the implementation is correct of my own motion.” 
  
Jude W – a 38-years-old female civil chamber judge in the capital – admits that the lack of 
time hinders any engagement with EU law. She also discloses a clear aversion to reversal by 
the appeal court. In the opinion of Judge W the higher instance courts will quash the cases in 
which EU law is referred to. She says:  
 
“All first instance judges are afraid of the appellate court. They will anyway quash 
your case where you resort to EU law. And each reversal of your judicial decision 
will have a negative bearing on your promotion. So it is better not to distinguish 
oneself, not to dare them, not to step out of line.” 
 
In a similar vein, judge N observes that claims based on EU law, even if they are accepted by 
a court of first instance will be quashed by a court of higher instance.  
 
“So it follows that even if you, as a judge of first instance court, apply those EU law 
provisions then second instance will reject it anyway. That’s my experience so far. 
So in my opinion you must train them all in EU law, not only first instance judges!” 
 
Despite all, judges belonging to this group expect that EU law will sooner or later become a 
usual part of many proceedings. The feeling of anticipation with regard to EU law was clearly 
traceable. As I reckons:  
 
“Those young people learn EU law as a regular part of their legal training. You can 
see, they know much more and it is not foreign law for them. It is something you can 
advance your claims with. Recently I have for instance learnt that an individual may 
claim compensation for his holiday if he is not satisfied with it and that he may rely 
on EU law so you see, it is there but we just must know that. I do realize we must 
start preparing.” 
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As a matter of fact, the judges set their hopes in the new generation of legal practitioners 
which are definitely better in the issues of EU law and will very likely refer to EU law on a 
more frequent basis. As Judge D observes:  
 
“It is unavoidable. They do not have that mental barrier. The young ones are more 
courageous.”     
                                                                                               
Judges in this group take different stances towards the preliminary ruling procedure. 
All of regard it as an important mechanism but most of them find it a rather an abstract and 
vague one. Judge N claims that the preliminary ruling procedure remains rather ambiguous 
mechanism.  
 
“In my daily practice, I would not know how I could employ it. I would be willing to 
employ it, definitely, because I like all sorts of novelties but it would require sound 
studies about the how and why on my part so I would know how to apply it and not 
to make a fool of myself.” 
 
According to Judge G the preliminary ruling procedure is a dead institution and will remain a 
dead institution in Poland for some time. As such it is a great mechanism but it is rather 
complex and not very clear. In the opinion of the judge, ready-made reference templates 
should be made available which could greatly facilitate referring questions to the ECJ.  
 
“Every judge is afraid of one thing, that he will make a fool of himself, that he 
won’t know how to proceed, that everyone will see how incapable he is. In that 
sense, such a template or alike system would offer a helping hand to judges. 
Preliminary ruling procedure is namely one of those factors which can virtually 
bring Poland and the judiciary to the European Union.” 
 
In the opinion of Judge S there has been no necessity of resorting to the preliminary ruling 
procedure yet but the length of the procedure was seen by her as a hindering obstacle. Judge S 
would be afraid that the parties to the proceedings could even use the fact that she employed 
the procedure against her to claim compensation for prolonging the proceedings. Moreover, 
she does not think that she would ever need a helping hand from any institution.  
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“I will sort it out on my own. So far it has never happened that I would not be 
capable of finding answers to some legal issues. If you do your best you will 
always manage to find a solution.” 
 
Judge C is reluctant about resorting to the mechanism: 
 
“I don’t think I would make use of it. First if all I would have to find 
incompatibility between national and EU law to even think about such a 
possibility. Then the waiting time is rather disheartening. To my knowledge our 
own law is adjusted to EU law. And lastly there is a system of state liability in 
damages for prolonging the proceedings. And even though such a prolonging 
would be only indirectly caused by me but theoretically I do not know how the 
appellate court would react if the parties had to wait 18 months. In such a context I 
think I should take into consideration the legitimacy of such a preliminary 
reference, so I’d rather try to resolve the problem on my own.” 
 
The most occurring criticism with regard to the European Union is the fact of 
overregulation and ambiguity of legislation. Few of the judges think that the amount of EU 
regulation (and regulation as such) is just the necessity of the present time. Most of the group 
was however of the opinion that the overregulation becomes absurd and damaging. Judge G 
thinks that the amount of EU law has become frightening. In his opinion, it strives to regulate 
all areas of life including those which should never be touched upon by the law. In the opinion 
of Judge G EU law does not fulfill the conditions of a common sense. He reckons that EU law 
became illogical since it tries to regulate real facts. Judge S admits that she is not aware how 
much law the Union “produces”. It has become so much and so detailed that she cannot 
embrace and define it. Judge J – 45-years-old female civil and commercial chamber judge 
without any experience with EU law – observes that: 
 
“Everything is so new and there is so much of it that I, we, can hardly embrace it. 
The amount of it is just scary! There is so much of it that I would have to read it 
again and again in order to grasp it and learn it.” 
 
Likewise, Judge C reckons: 
 
“The amount of EU law is horrible and it recalls of the common law system where 
you need to know particular cases. I see the same with regard to the ECJ where 
there is such an amount of categories, sorts of cases but you cannot see any 
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system in it. It is just a chaos. I just don’t know anymore. I have a feeling that I 
cannot comprehend the whole system.”  
 
Despite of all, the judges in the present group are evidently pro-European. The EU is 
associated with open borders, free travelling and the economical gain and yet the passive 
judges mostly do not associate themselves with the EU judiciary.  
As it has been mentioned, the level of knowledge in this group may vary considerable 
from those who have a rather unsatisfactory level of knowledge to those who will have a 
considerable knowledge of EU law. Judge G assessed his EU law knowledge as good since he 
followed several postgraduate courses in EU law, is familiar with the sources and case-law 
and the literature on the subject. He also admits that he is very interested in it and tries to 
deepen the knowledge whenever he can. He claims he wanted to be well prepared in case a 
dispute with EU law occurs. Similarly Judges D, Y and M state to have followed several 
various EU courses including those abroad and to be well prepared to apply EU law or to refer 
a preliminary question to European Court of Justice. In contrast to that, Judge I calls himself a 
laic and ignorant in the area of EU law and judge S states that one week before Poland joined 
the European Union each judge was hastily following an EU law course but furthermore there 
was no opportunity to substantially broaden the knowledge of EU law. Judge N is frustrated 
about the lack of access to a proper, thorough training, the fact that authorities are not 
interested in disseminating the knowledge of EU law and the workload which does not allow 
her to deepen the knowledge of EU law.  
The shortages in knowledge of EU law, the general lack of experience with EU law the 
distinctiveness of EU law make the whole processes of its application difficult. Judge L – a 
female 35-years-old first instance commercial chamber judge who has some experience with 
the application of EU regulations observes: 
 
“Couple of times I have applied the European Payment Order. The problem was 
that I had no idea how to proceed with it and nobody could give me a helping 
hand with it. I phoned the Ministry, I phoned various courts across the country 
and finally I found someone who had some experience. You know, the fact that EU 
law requires from us a different way of thinking and reasoning but also a different 
manner of reading and speaking is very troublesome. In fact they ask us to switch 
to another adjudication language. I have read the Regulation several times and 
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each time I am learning it from the start(...) you know it is perplexing, but I do it 
because it’s my obligation. ”  
 
With everything considered, this construct of legal consciousness shares many features with 
the before the law form. In that sense, judges find themselves before EU law which is seen as 
a distinct and removed from the normal (national) legal order. EU law is therefore considered 
as something different, something exceptional and authoritative and yet objective and 
impartial. In that regard, EU law is a “distinctive institutional phenomenon”.883 The judges 
belonging to this group do not discuss the place of EU law in the entire legal order, they just 
accept but at the same time they mostly adapt a passive attitude towards it. In that sense they 
are loyal to it because that is their understanding of legality and the rule of law. However, due 
to the lack of or a scant experience with it, EU law remains a dead letter, is not a living law. 
Similarly, the judges belonging to his group may express frustration, insecurity and 
uncertainty because they feel powerless in the face of the scope and enormity of EU law 
which often goes in hand with their deficiencies in EU law knowledge. The clear time-
constrains the judges are confronted with render the engagement with EU law virtually 
impossible. In that sense, the institutional framework considerably bears on the willingness of 
judges to resort to EU law, consult it and engage with it. Passive judges will very likely rely 
on heuristics while their decision-making, such an exercise speeds up the process of finding 
solutions to the disputes in situations when an exhaustive search is impractical due to the time-
constrains. Finally, this embodiment of legal consciousness illustrates how the social context 
may bear on the way judges adapt a passive attitude towards EU law. Nonetheless, once 
confronted with EU law issue in practice, judges belonging to this group will endeavour to 
solve the issue as properly and duly as they can so a proper consideration will be given to the 
EU law argument and if necessary a supreme position will be given to it. Finally, judges 
expressing this form of legal consciousness admit that resorting to EU law requires peculiar 
motivation, intellectual twist and ambition but also special judicial methodology since 
resorting to and applying EU law is not an ordinary judicial practice but something more 
intricate, subtitle and sophisticated.  
                                                 
883
 Ewick&Slibey (1998), p.106.  
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3.3. Conditional conformity and reservations towards EU law: critics 
  
The preceding form of legal consciousness is based on the conforming but at the same passive 
attitude towards EU law. The premises of the legal consciousness variety which will be 
examined in the present section will to some extent overlap with the features of the foregoing 
form of legal consciousness. Nonetheless, several distinct characteristics thereof support 
creating a separate category. The most significant hallmark of this variety which distinguishes 
it from the preceding one is the fact that the judges often do not accept the absolute primacy of 
EU law. Second, the judges belonging to this group express many reservations as to the legal 
system of the European Union and its legitimacy but foremost as to the role and position of 
the European Court of Justice and a judge-made legal order. In that sense, the judges disclose 
the feelings of distrust to EU authority and cynicism about its legitimacy.
884
 Those 
reservations, in turn, may in some instances bear on the way judges apply EU law. 
Furthermore, the complexity of a multi-level system and the implications thereof for the daily 
judicial practice may prompt judges to shun EU law, to try to omit it or disregard provided 
that there is room for exercising discretionary powers. With regard to the level of EU 
knowledge presented by the judges it might be observed that all of them expressed some 
concerns with regard to it but in general the level of knowledge could be assessed as moderate 
or good.  
 Judge H is a male 40-years-old first instance employment and social security judge 
with quite a considerable experience with the application of EU law. In his practice EU 
directives and regulations are frequently at stake but foremost the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
plays an important role. The judge claims that the parties sometimes refer to EU law but many 
of them refer to the Treaty in general.  
 
“In principle the more general rules you refer to, the worse advocate you are. Look, 
for instance they refer to gender equality, Art.141 EC Treaty and then still you need 
to get down to the national provisions and judge in accordance with the national 
provisions. Possibly you may refer to some jurisprudence. So the rule is general and 
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 See Nielsen (2000), p.1083 who distinguishes distrust to authority/cynicism about law paradigm as one of the 
legal consciousness embodiments.  
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then you have a problem. I do not want any power and general rules, I prefer a 
concrete and detailed provision to a concrete situation. I do not have time to rack my 
brain about any provision, I want to solve the problem at once. The more general 
rule then you must start interpreting it in conformity with EU law or with the 
constitution but in the meantime I could solve many other problems (…) General 
provisions give us power, maybe some judges want that power? I do not.” 
 
Judge X is a male 35-years-old civil chamber judge who claims that the parties sometimes 
refer to EU law but it is in the end useless since EU law is implemented. Similarly, Judge F - a 
40-years-old male first instance judge in employment and civil matters with a scant experience 
with EU law explains that in a recent dispute the legal representative referred to the Sales 
Directive which forced the judge to refer to EU law but in this case EU provisions were 
ideally pasted into the national legal system so in the end it was not necessary to refer to it at 
all. The judge is of the opinion that the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice seems to play the 
most important role in the judicial application of EU law but the judge himself does not resort 
to it for the translated case-law is not the original version thereof and may be taken out of 
context  
Judge V – a 38-years-old male first instance civil chamber judge refers to the impracticality of 
EU and its little bearing for the daily judicial practice, he observes:  
 
“There were some claims by the legal representatives that EU law could be at stake 
but in the end those always proved to be trivial arguments found somewhere on the 
internet. Those were no specific provisions but some general rules, for instance an 
EC Treaty article which establishes some general rule but you know, those never 
apply to the case.” 
 
Judge A – a male 35-years-old first instance civil chamber judge – admits that he never 
embarked on scrutinizing whether EU law is properly implemented: 
 
“I’ve never dealt with such a problem where I would have to set aside national law. 
If I knew that there was incompliance I would set aside national law provided that 
the solution was better for the party (…) If you can rule on the basis of national law 
why would you bother to look further? No, I don’t feel any need to look further and 
it would moreover terribly prolong the reasoning.” 
 
The judges point to the fact of complexity of the system, overlaps and distinctiveness of EU 
law as those aspects which render the issue much more perplexing. In that sense, EU law 
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becomes a substantial burden put on the shoulders of the judge which jeopardize the normal, 
daily functioning. EU law is thus seen through the perspective of additional and perplexing 
work. Judge H says:  
 
“The problem is not with EU law as such but with all those inter-systems collisions. 
Because those systems overlap but in practice it does not work as smooth as you 
would think. EU law yes, but how to use it in a particular case? Is the local 
government it the emanation of the state or not? Is it horizontal or vertical situation? 
And then all that jurisprudence! And then all the work time regulations and the 
results thereof. So I had to read and read and read it all. Luckily I could suspend 
other cases and I spend my time on reading it all. I had an assistant who was 
searching for the jurisprudence in Polish. There are no translations and I do not 
know what to do! Finally after all those efforts I could give a judgment.” Further on 
he adds: “It all costs too much time and effort so you do it only when you really 
cannot avoid it. So everyone avoids it.” 
 
Judge X observes:  
 
 “EU law is something next to the normal daily functioning. It is very exceptional (…) 
In principle it is integral with the national legal order, in practice totally distinct 
from it (…) National law is a priority for me because I know it. And if we want to 
apply EU law then we look for possible conflicts with EU law so you evidently look 
for distinctiveness, don’t you?”  
 
Judge F points to the complexity of the precedential system which seems one of the most 
hindering obstacles in the application of EU law.  
 
“They say that we are approaching a common law system where a precedent is 
more important and judge made law takes precedence over statutory law. But our 
legal culture, customs and habits must change first! It is different from what we 
know, difficult in reception, difficult in application but probably sooner or later we 
will look differently at this. So far it is just simply something totally different from 
what we have been doing so far (…)”  
 
Similarly, Judge V reckons:  
 
“EU law means more complexity in my daily work, the necessity to reach for other 
sources of law. Those are no reasons which would make me happy (…) for me EU 
law is not a natural thing, it is not an integral part of the legal order.” 
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As it has already been indicated, an incoherent approach to the principle of supremacy is 
noticeable within this embodiment of legal consciousness. Judge F illustrates how a recent 
problem concerning the interpretation of provisions implementing EU directive on collective 
redundancies despite of discrepancies between national and EU law prompted him to choose 
for a national solution of the problem because it was more favourable for the party. He 
observes: 
 
“That’s the way our legal system works. Our provisions have to be interpreted in a 
way which would be as favorable as possible for employees.  
So there were some differences between national and EU law and I chose for our 
own codical guideline.” 
 
Importantly, in the opinion of the judges, the national Constitution takes absolute primacy and 
plays a paramount role. Judge X says it in a straightforward way: 
 
“In my view as a national judge, the national constitution takes precedence. In my 
system it is absolutely a superior legal act.” 
 
Similarly, Judge V and A are of the opinion that the national constitution takes precedence. In 
the opinion of V it follows from the constitution itself and Judge A thinks that there are no 
legal reasons which would legitimize the supreme position of EU law. What is more, the 
judges express many various reservations as to the role the European Court of Justice and its 
jurisprudence play in the in the entire legal system. In that sense, many of them discredit the 
precedent of the Court if they do not agree with the Court’s line of reasoning. The notions of 
rightness, justness, rationality and reasonableness may be used to support the stance the judge 
takes towards a particular judgment of the Court. Some of the judges might question the 
authority of the Court in general and the binding force attached to its precedent. Judge X is of 
the opinion that: 
 
 “The ECJ plays an opinion-forming role. I assume that those are just people and 
they make mistakes like other people so you cannot take the jurisprudence of the 
Court unconditionally, cannot take it for granted. We all have our brains and we can 
think on our own and the fact that some wise men with huge experience decided 
something does not mean they decided it correctly. I might as well decide something 
else even in a similar case. Moral reasons for instance could make me decided in a 
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different way. The application of law must make sense and rest on moral premises 
and not only follow a rigid letter of law.” 
 
Further he adds: 
 
 “They may explain specific provisions but the way they interpret the law and their 
commentary are not binding on me (…) Anyway, it never happened to me that I 
would have to apply an ECJ judgment. I am just a first instance judge, over here the 
ECJ has no bearing.”   
 
Judges H and A are very critical of the European Court of Justice, its judicial activism and the 
methodological tools used by the Court.  
 
“In my opinion the Court goes too far in its jurisprudence. No one can control them 
and they do what they want. The only way they can be criticized is through the 
media. They think they have power and finally it goes to their heads and they create 
politics. There are no checks and balances there, the only emergency brake is the 
self-limitation and self-restrain. So long they were creating institutional law it was 
fine. But at present it starts to become absurd, it touches upon a normal citizen in an 
absurd way. When you start employing the dynamic way of interpretation you 
abandon the most basic and general function the law plays in society They do have to 
realize how they can influence lives of simple citizens and do not forget that the 
conditions are different in France, on Malta or in Poland and that all the countries 
might have their own visions how the things should go. (…)” 
 
 
Judge A disapproves of deriving legal rules from legal vacuum and the idea of the judge-made 
law. In the opinion of A, the court should apply the law, not engage with processes of making 
it. In that sense, he has little trust into the whole system.  
 
“I dislike this manner of adjudicating where they create legal rules and principles in 
situations where there is no legal basis for it. The ECJ makes law and that is alien to 
my way of perceiving the role law plays in general. A court applies the law, it mustn’t 
make the law. I know the arguments of the Court why they do it but I do not agree 
with them. So you suddenly discover that there is something which in fact is not 
there.” 
 
Judge X and H argue that if they do not agree with the judgments of the Court they will try to 
find a way to omit it. Judge X says 
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“(...) so there is a flood of good judgments and a flood of wrong judgments (…) so if I 
did not agree with any of the judgments of the Court I would simply not apply it.” 
 
Judge H admits that: 
 
“My negative attitude to the ECJ may of course have bearing on the way I will apply 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ. We try to establish one line of jurisprudence and to 
avoid some absurd situations. So if I think that the ECJ went too far then I will apply 
another interpretation or will wink at it if it does not fit my opinion. The law is not 
sacred. You can omit it, pass it over in silence, wink at it. There is always a solution. 
For me the most important is that people will not be aggrieved.”  
 
A critical and cynical attitude becomes also visible with regard to the amount of EU 
regulation. The judges are of the opinion that the scope of regulation has become absurd and 
hazardous. Judge X goes so far as to call in a nonsense approach: 
 
 “The scope of EU law is very wrong. Too much of law is never good anyway. A man 
is not capable of embracing it all. They look for rules in simple, idiotic situations. 
They multiply regulations which pervert the logical approach to a normal human 
functioning. Look how complex it all got! If you need a staff of experts who after a 
long period of searching are not able to find a solution to one legal issue.  Even 
don’t say a proper solution but any solution then it is an utter nonsense.”  
 
In addition to the above, the judges also take a rather critical or skeptical stance towards the 
preliminary ruling procedure. The complexity of the procedure which is seen as an additional 
burden, the lack of time to engage with it determine the unwillingness to employ it. As H 
observes, the mechanism does not fit the daily reality of first instance courts: 
 
 “If it was really necessary and there would be no way to avoid it then I would 
refer a question, for instance the party asked me to do it and it is clear that it was 
necessary to ask. Moreover, technically it is too long, too difficult. I don’t have the 
knowledge to do it. First I would have to master the issue so I would not discredit 
myself. But if I master the issue, why shall I still refer a question? Waste of my 
effort which could be utilized in another way.” 
 
Judge X claims:  
 
 “I would not be willing to employ it because I don’t have time. I would need a 
couple of days which I simply do not have. If you are bored you may play with that 
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stuff but for me it would be just an additional, unnecessary burden (…) even if the 
parties wanted it then they would first have to guarantee that I have time to do it.” 
 
Likewise, judge F would be reluctant to employ the procedure. The length of the mechanism 
would play a dominant role in that regard.  
 
“I need to constantly explain each case which I suspend. And of course the parties 
are waiting. They are to decide whether they want it. If they ask me to send a 
question then I would do it. But I even would have a problem if only one of the 
parties wanted me to send a question because I could expect that it want to prolong 
the proceedings.” 
 
Regardless of the foregoing arguments and opinions, the judges do not perceive the Union as a 
wrong or harmful formation. They admit that the underpinning ideas of integrating, open 
borders and free movement are noble and attractive and the country and citizens do profit 
therefrom. However, that idea has been somewhat perverted in the course of time and the 
system has become untransparent, complex and overmuch expanded.  
The foregoing analysis shows how a critical approach to EU law and the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Justice and the complexity of the mechanisms of application of EU 
law may dishearten the judges from resorting to it and employing it in the daily practice. In 
that sense, the judges are at times opposing EU law, trying to omit it or resist it. In that sense, 
the present embodiment shares some components with the against the law legal 
consciousness. One of the situations of resistance would be a deliberate omission of EU law 
aspect due to the lack of time to consider this point in a detail. Another would be ignoring EU 
because the solution it would provide would be seen as unjust or unreasonable. However, 
those instances of omissions would take place exceptionally and only in situations when the 
judge could exercise some discretionary powers, for instances specific factual circumstances 
of the case could be used as a ground not to apply the precedent of the ECJ or the issue leaves 
some room for different interpretation. In that sense, the judicial discretion becomes a capacity 
used by a judge to advance his own, better solution to the problem. All in all, in most 
situations, the judges would still conform to EU law since, in the end, they are subordinate to 
the principle of supremacy of EU law and they are aware of it. At the same time, the judges 
belonging to this group will very likely reject the notion of absolute primacy of EU law. The 
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national constitution is considered the paramount source of law. They also might express 
cynical opinions with regard to the legitimacy of EU law and the authority of the European 
Court of Justice. With everything considered, it may be claimed though that the similarly to 
the preceding form of legal consciousness the judges belonging to this group will perceive EU 
law as a distinct and discrete legal order which however clashes with the national legal order. 
The distinctiveness of EU legal order and the complexity of judicial application thereof will 
be given as a ground legitimizing the attempts to evade the engagement with EU law. 
Contrary to the passive formalists, the critics do not take EU law and its place in the entire 
legal system for granted. They discuss it, express their critical and cynical points with regard 
to it and sometimes distrust and contest it.  
 
3.4. EU law rejecters?  
 
As the anchoring vignettes have illustrated the number of judges who would reject EU law in 
its entirety and the principle of its supremacy is very limited, but they do exist. Vignettes No 2 
showed that there are 5 percent of judges who would totally reject the relevance of EU law for 
their daily practice. Nonetheless, the qualitative part of the study proved that there are several 
methodological impediments which make tracing judges who entirely reject EU law a very 
perplexing task. The simple reason that those judges do not want to disclose themselves 
renders the whole exercise excessively difficult. Rejecting EU law means opposing the rule of 
law and that is at evident variance with the role of a judge in the legal system. And even 
though during the interviews some judges mentioned that they personally know other judges 
who are “totally resistant to EU law” it was yet nearly impossible to detect them throughout 
the qualitative part of the study. In one of the interviews a statement was made: “I do not 
apply EU law and I have never done so. We simply do not apply EU law here, only national 
law so I have nothing to say about it and it is useless to talk about it”, further the judge refused 
to proceed with the interview. This evidently does not allow to establish the components of 
cultural schemes which would determine this form of legal consciousness. In that sense, the 
‘rejecting’ form of legal consciousness remains a very elusive one, is not sufficiently 
supported by the qualitative evidence and from the methodological point of view remains a 
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troublesome issue. By and large, it could be put forward that the instances of a complete 
rejection of EU law would be of a very exceptional nature.  
 
4. Preliminary conclusions 
 
The present chapter has gone beyond the normative framework as established at the outset of 
this study and explored how diversely particular judges respond to EU law and the role it 
plays in both the legal order and the daily judicial functioning whereby it allowed to see the 
distinct ways in which the judges construct the EU law legality. From the present chapter it 
stems that the question why EU law occupies more space in practice of some judges than 
others may be better answered by incorporating the insights from legal consciousness theories. 
It has become evident that diverse schemes of legal consciousness may be distinguished 
among the judges and distinct characteristics are attached to each. Every embodiment reflects 
various explanations for any legal action (or a lack thereof) with regard to EU law and allows 
to situate the judge in different angles to EU law.  
The short summary of the varieties of legal consciousness as encountered among 
judges demonstrates that the features judges belonging to a particular group share overlap only 
partially with the models created by Ewick and Silbey. At the same time, the core of each 
form of consciousness remains the same and rests on either conformity, engagement or 
resistance premise. Next to reflecting the knowledge and experience, legal consciousness also 
mirrors the objectives, purposes and available resources and social schemes.
885
 By doing so it 
provides us with a much more nuanced and colorful picture of the functioning of national 
judiciaries in the European capacity.  
The constructs of legal consciousness presented in the foregoing sections are not 
aimed at being rigid and clear-cut. The presence and operation of EU law in the daily practice 
of national judges manifests itself in distinct manners and forms. Some judges may reflect 
mixed forms of legal consciousness depending on the factual and legal background of the 
case, claims of the parties or time constrains. It is necessary to reiterate the finding of Ewick 
                                                 
885
 Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.53.  
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and Silbey that pure forms thereof are difficult to come across.
886
 Indeed, legal consciousness 
is not a steady and rigid phenomenon. It is emergent and moving and evolves with the 
knowledge and experiences. Legal consciousness is therefore neither fixed, stable, unitary or 
consistent. It is something local, contextual, pluralistic, filled with conflicts and 
contradictions.
887
 Also, the role EU law plays in the practice of national courts is 
indeterminate and it leaves quite some margin of discretion to the national judge. Quite a 
number of judges reveal mixed forms of consciousness which, as has been illustrated, are 
manifested through, inter alia, an inconsistent approach towards the principle of supremacy or 
the preliminary ruling procedure. Sometime judges may also express contradictory legal 
consciousness. Those findings are however entirely in line with the theory of Ewick and 
Silbey who claim that “legal consciousness is not a permanent (…) aspect of a person’s 
identity or life, although it may end up being empirically stable.”888 In that sense, a judge who 
is very much passive and anticipating with regard to EU law may, arguably, become with or 
resistant to EU law with the lapse of time. The gained experience with the application of EU 
law may namely enlighten the judge of the potential might EU law may entail and offer to the 
judge. Knowing how to utilize EU law may, in turn, increasingly encourage the judge to resort 
to it. Conversely, adverse experiences with EU law (time consuming, perplexing) might also 
discourage a judge from resorting to it in the future and might, arguably, cause attempts at 
omitting or avoiding it.  
 
                                                 
886
 This fact has also been acknowledges by Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.45 who noted that one person may display 
three forms of legal consciousness depending on the situation he found himself in.  
887
 As Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.50 observed “a person may express, through words and actions, a multifaceted 
and possibly contradictory consciousness. As we use the term, then, legal consciousness in neither fixed nor 
necessarily consistent; rather, it is plural and variable across contexts, and it often expresses and contains 
contradictions.”  
888
 Ibid, p.50.  
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Chapter 6 
Germany, the Netherlands and Poland 
in Comparative Perspective 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The findings presented in the preceding chapters provide a novel picture of the functioning of 
national civil judges as EU judges but the results thereof are country specific and may, 
therefore, neither be stretched to other Member States nor can they be used to draw more 
general conclusions which might have a wider validity. It seems therefore plausible to 
juxtapose selected results of the present study with the outcomes of another corresponding 
research. Such a cross-national comparison across legal traditions leads to fresh, arresting 
insights and a deeper understanding of issues that are of central concern in different countries. 
It also allows to construct a somewhat more enhanced and complete picture of the situation 
within the European Union and the range of problems attached to the functioning of national 
judges as EU judges. The foregoing observation is not aimed at implying that by comparing 
several EU Member States a total and comprehensive picture of the situation across the EU 
can be drawn.
889
 It is necessary to acknowledge that the jurisdictions of all Member States 
would have to be included in this study in order to provide a complete picture of the present 
situation in the European Union. Nonetheless, a comparative analysis allows to identify 
common phenomena, that is to say general patterns (or a lack thereof) in adjudication across 
the juxtaposed countries. Finally, the purpose of this comparative exercise is to see whether 
                                                 
889
 The methodological problem of insufficient representation is inherently attached to comparative studies and 
frequently it is downplayed. For methodological problems of using a questionnaire in comparative studies see 
Schultz (2009), pp.173-184.  
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there are significant differences between the Old and the New Member States in the way their 
judiciaries function as EU judges.
890
  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the present study exploits the results which follow from a 
parallel empirical research for the Netherlands and the German federal state of North Rhine-
Westphalia (HiiL Report). The concerned project rested on virtually the same theoretical 
premises, research design and method as the present study. It should yet be underscored that 
the execution of the survey and the process of analysis took a slightly different form in each of 
the respective Member States.
891
 It is also important to note that the relevant project for 
Germany and the Netherlands is of a descriptive character, i.e. it illustrates the results 
stemming from the empirical survey without too much looking for the possible grounds, 
causes and explanations underpinning the state of affairs. Hence, the analysis included in this 
chapter focuses predominantly on the process of comparing the empirical evidence without 
too much touching upon the potential reasons of the situation found in the respective 
countries. In that sense, the subsequent section will focus on the general findings concerning 
the knowledge of, experiences with and attitudes toward EU law. Put differently, the general 
approach employed in Chapter 4 is followed but the analysis is conducted at a more aggregate 
level, i.e. it discusses the general trends which are common in the concerned countries. The 
comparative exercise is necessarily preceded by a general introduction to the German and 
Dutch legal system in which a special focus is put on the aspects of the organization of the 
judiciary, sources of law and the position and role of the judges in the entire system of the 
rights’ enforcement. Such a descriptive enterprise is essential to capture a more 
comprehensive view of the respective jurisdictions and the context in which national judges 
operate.
892
 It is also necessary to illuminate some of the empirical findings.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
890
 See General Introduction for the background of the assumption that there might be differences between the 
Old and New Member States in the manner their judiciaries function in the context of EU law.  
891
 See  section 4.4 of Chapter 1 for the differences.  
892
 De Cruz (1999), p.229.  
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2. Legal and judiciary systems in Germany and the Netherlands  
 
2.1. General overview of the court systems 
 
Due to its federal structure, decentralization and far-reaching specialization, the German court 
system can be classified as a rather complex one.
893
 The judiciary is independent of the 
executive and the legislative branches and judges are subject only to the law.
894
 The judicial 
power in Germany is vested in judges and at the federal level is exercised by the Federal 
Constitutional Court and other federal courts provided for in the Basic Law such as the 
Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), the Federal Finance Court 
(Bundesfinanzhof), the Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), and the Federal Social 
Court (Bundessozialgericht)
895
. At the state level the administration of justice is exercised by 
the courts of the respective Land.
896
 Next to the Federal Constitutional Court, nearly each 
Land has its own constitutional court
897
  which adjudicates disputes between land public 
bodies and resolves issues of constitutionality of Land legislation with the Land constitution 
(Landesverfassung).
898
 Each Land has also its own structure of courts of ordinary jurisdiction 
which consists of the District Courts (Amtsgerichte), Regional Courts (Landgerichte) and 
Higher Regional Courts (Oberlandesgerichte and Kammergericht for the state of Berlin
899
) 
                                                 
893
 For a comprehensive diagram of the German judiciary system see the European Judicial atlas to be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/judicialatlascivil/html/pdf/org_justice_ger_en.pdf (last accessed 15 March 
2011). See also Foster (1993), pp.39-47.  
894
 See Art.97(1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and the fourth chapter, section 25 of the 
German Judiciary Act (Deutsches Richtergesetz – DriG) in the version published on 19 April 1972, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I p.713 with later amendments.  
895
 Art 95(1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
896
 Art.92 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The German Basic Law refers to the Land and 
Länder in the official English version of the document. In the academic writing both notions, i.e. Land and state 
are used interchangeably.  
897
 Verfassungsgerichtshof, Staatsgerichtshof or Ländesverfassungsgerichte.  
898
 Each Land has its own constitution. On the role of Land constitutions see Gunlicks (1998).  
899
 The name Kammergericht has historic reasons and relates exclusively to the Higher Regional Court in Berlin.  
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being state courts of general jurisdiction.
900
 The Organization of the Courts Act 
(Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz - GVG) is the cardinal piece of legislation for the courts.
901
  
In a similar vein, the judicial power is the Netherlands is vested in judges who are 
independent and impartial. The Dutch judiciary is less complex than the German one and it is 
administrated in three instances and consists of 19 district courts (rechtbank)
902
, 5 appeal 
courts (gerechtshof) and the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).
903
 There are five units of 
jurisdiction (ressorten) which are headed by appeal courts.
904
 The district courts are divided 
into divisions, which may be civil, administrative, criminal or local/county (sector kanton). 
Courts of appeal are divided into civil, criminal or fiscal divisions. The Council for the 
Judiciary (Raad voor de Rechtspraak) supports the courts in the execution of their tasks.
905
 
Next to the ordinary jurisdiction, there are also the Central Appeals Tribunal which is an 
appellate court for legal areas pertaining to social security and the civil service and the Trade 
and Industry Appeals Tribunal, also known as Administrative High Court for Trade and 
Industry, which is a specialized administrative court that rules on disputes in the area of 
social-economic administrative law.
906
  
                                                 
900
 In North Rhine-Westphalia there are 3 Higher Regional Courts in Cologne, Düsseldorf and Hamm, 19 
Regional Courts and 130 District Courts. Next to that there are 30 labour courts and 3 labour regional courts, see 
Dyrch et al (2007), p.217.  
901
 The Organization of the Courts Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) Federal Law Gazette I p.1077 with later 
amendments. It is also referred to as the Constitution of the Courts Act and it dates back to 1879. For a broad 
overview of the organization and structure of the German judicial system see Murray&Stürner (2004), pp.37-68.  
902
 Each district court constitutes a so-called arrondissement.   
903
 See art. 2 of Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie (Wet RO).  
904
 Located in Amsterdam, Arnhem, Den Haag, Leeuwarden and Den Bosch. Since 23 November 2009 there are, 
however, plans to reform the judicial architecture in the Netherlands which foresee a reduction of the number of 
district courts to ten and a reduction of units of jurisdiction to four. At the beginning of September 2011 the new 
legislative proposal was submitted at the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer). For more see 
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/Recht-In-Nederland/ThemaDossiers/herziening-gerechtelijke-kaart-
nederland/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed 21 November 2011).  
905
 The created in 2002 Council for the Judiciary is part of the judiciary system but it does not perform judicial 
tasks as such. Its tasks are operational in nature and pertain to, inter alia, allocation of budgets, supervision of 
financial management, personnel policy, ICT and housing. The Council also promotes quality within the 
judiciary system, advises on new legislation which has implications for the system of judiciary, see website at: 
www.rechtspraak.nl (last accessed 15 March 2011). Next to the Council for the Judiciary, the Minister of Justice 
is responsible for the proper functioning of the judicial system and he can be held accountable to the parliament. 
Ministry of Justice ensures that the judiciary receives sufficient financial resources to execute its tasks properly. 
He can also draft legislation when this is deemed necessary to the better administration of justice.  
906
 Cases of an administrative nature are settled in a slightly different institutional and procedural framework 
which consists of administrative revision of the administrative order by the administrative body which issued it, 
judicial review of the administrative act in question by the administrative divisions of the District Court and an 
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Civil disputes in Germany are heard by the civil courts which are part of ordinary 
courts and the employment courts. Employment courts have jurisdiction only in respect of 
civil disputes which are strictly connected with an employment relationships. There are 667 
District Courts in Germany which hear cases involving minor criminal offenses or small civil 
suits. The District Courts have jurisdiction in civil disputes if the value of the dispute does not 
exceed EUR 5000 and if the Regional Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction.
907
 These 
courts also carry out routine legal functions, such as for instance probate. Disputes at the 
district level are heard by one judge sitting alone.
908
 There are 116 Regional Courts which 
have jurisdiction in respect of all civil disputes which are not allocated to the District Courts. 
Regional Courts also function as courts of appeal for decisions from the local courts and are 
first instance courts for most major civil and criminal matters. These are in particular disputes 
with a disputed value of more than EUR 5000. Regional Courts are divided into two sections, 
one for civil cases and the other for criminal cases. The two sections consist of panels of 
judges who specialize in particular types of cases. The disputes are heard either by a single 
judge or by a panel of three judges.
909
 There are 24 Higher Regional Courts which primarily 
review points of law raised in appeals from the lower courts.
910
 Similarly to the Regional 
Courts, Higher Regional Courts are divided into panels of judges with particular legal 
specialization. Disputes at Higher Regional Courts are heard either by a judge sitting alone or 
a chamber of three judges. Specialized courts deal with five distinct subject areas: 
administrative, labor, social, fiscal, and patent law. In that sense, labor courts also function on 
three levels and address disputes over, inter alia, collective bargaining agreements and 
working conditions.
911
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
appeal to the judicial division of the Council of State (afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State). In 
that sense the Dutch Supreme Court does not fulfill any judicial role with regard to administrative jurisdiction.  
907
 See section 23 (1) of the German Judiciary Act. 
908
 In criminal cases the judge is assisted by lay judges.  
909
 For more details about the competency of single judges and judicial panels in District and Regional Courts 
and the assignment of cases thereto see Rühl (2005), pp.912-914. 
910
 For cases originating in local courts, this is therefore the final appeal.  
911
 Likewise, social courts, organized at three levels, adjudicate cases relating to the system of social insurance, 
which includes unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, and social security payments. Finance, or 
fiscal, courts hear only tax-related cases and exist on two levels. Administrative courts consist of local 
administrative courts, higher administrative courts, and the Federal Administrative Court. Finally, a single 
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In the Netherlands, in accordance with recently amended Code of Civil Procedure, 
judges in local (kanton) divisions who hear civil cases sit alone and preside over simple cases 
which may pertain to (minor) civil issues such as, inter alia, money claims up to EUR 25 000 
and leasing of residential and business premises, landlords, tenants, rent or employment, 
including pay claims and cancellation of contracts of employment, consumer contracts and 
consumer credits without further financial limitation.
912
 Other disputes in private law are 
handled in the civil divisions of district courts. Such cases relate to, inter alia, financial 
disputes with more than EUR 25 000 at stake, bankruptcies, inheritance disputes or family law 
aspects. Civil divisions are usually formed by a single judge in relatively simple disputes 
(enkelvoudig). The treatment of a complex case (meervoudig) is handled by a chamber of 
three judges.
913
 Judges in appeal courts are divided into chambers consisting of three 
members, who jointly settle a dispute. The Supreme Court functions as a cassation court.
914
 In 
principle, each first instance judgment may be appealed to. There are however several 
exceptions to that rule, e.g. cases concerning claims smaller than EUR 1750 may not be 
appealed.
915
 An appeal is scrutinized on both the points of facts and the points of law.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Federal Patents Court in Munich adjudicates disputes relating to industrial property rights. The Federal Patent 
Court deals with issues attached to granting, denial or withdrawal of industrial property rights. It is a court of first 
instance in cases relating to declaration of nullity of a patent and as a court of second instance against the 
decisions of the German Patent and Trade Mark Office, for more see Hock (2009).  
912
 See art.93 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering – Rv). 
Importantly, the Code of Civil Procedure was amended in May 2011 by Wet tot wijziging van de wet op de 
rechterlijke indeling, het Wetboek van Burgelijke Rechtsvordering en enkele andere wetten naar aanleiding van 
de evaluatie van de modernisering van de rechterlijke organisatie en in verband met de regeling van het 
klachrecht inzake gedragingen van rechtelijke ambtenaren, Staatstblad 2011 255 which came to force as of 1 July 
2011. At the time of the empirical research the competences of kanton judges were more limited as they 
concerned money claims up to 5 000 EUR and did not include disputes concerning consumer credits and 
contracts. For a detailed list of the cases which belonged to competences of kanton judges before the concerned 
amendment see Meijknecht (2007), pp.17-19 and Van der Torre (2007), pp.29-32, Jongbloed (2008), p.94.   
913
 See art.15-16 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure for the classification of cases as simple (enkelvoudig) 
which are heard by a single judge and complex (meervoudig) which are heard by a chamber of three judges and 
Ernses (2009), pp.19-23.  
914
 On the outline of the judicial architecture in the Netherlands see Ijzermans (2004), pp.62-64.  
915
 See art.332 para 1 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. See also Meijknecht (2007), p.80; Meijknecht 
(2009), pp.36-38; Jongbloed (2008), p.98.  
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2.2.  Main features of judicial communities  
 
The legal status of German Land judges is regulated by the German Judiciary Act and separate 
Land laws.
916
 Judges (Richter) are professionally trained, follow a distinct career path and are, 
in principle, appointed for life.
917
 The system of education and training of judges is uniform 
and a person qualified for a judicial office is automatically qualified for other legal 
professions.
918
 At the end of their university legal education, graduates must pass the First 
State Examination (Erstes juristisches Staatsexamen) which is organised by the Ministry of 
Justice of the respective Land before they can continue on to a two years long 
apprenticeship/preparatory training (Vorbereitungsdienst/Referendariat) that provides them 
with broad training in the legal profession.
919
 Subsequently they are expected to pass the 
Second State Examination (Zweites juristisches Staatsexamen) that qualifies them to practice 
law. At that point, the individual can choose either to become an attorney (Rechtsanwalt) or a 
prosecutor or to seek a career on a judicial position. The examination results are the most 
crucial factor for employment within the judiciary. In some states the candidates are also 
interviewed.
920
 Newly appointed judges are subject to a probationary period which takes a 
minimum of three and a maximum of five years.
921
 After the probation period a judge will be 
appointed as judge for lifetime. Germany has one of the highest rates of judges per number of 
inhabitants in the European Union which amounts to 24,5 judge per 100 000 citizens which is 
only slightly lower than the Polish index.
922
 The absolute number of professional judges in 
Germany sitting in courts (at all levels) accounted to 20 131 in year 2007.
923
  
                                                 
916
 See Art.98(3) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
917
 This does to imply that a judge cannot be revoked or dismissed from her office, see sections 19, 21 and 24 of 
the German Judiciary Act. For instance, judicial service may be terminated if the respective judge is sentenced to 
at least one year’s imprisonment for a criminal offence with intent, see section 24 of the German Judiciary Act. 
Other legal professions are: attorney (Rechtsanwalt), notary (Notar) and state prosecutor (Staatsanwalt). It is 
claimed that judicial service enjoys a very high reputation in Germany and the judges have a unique status, are 
entitled to distinct privileges, see Murray&Stürner (2004), pp.7 and 71.  
918
 See Böttcher (2004), p.1321.  
919
 For the contents of the preparatory training see Section 5b of the German Judiciary Act.  
920
 See Böttcher (2004), p.13 
921
 See German Judiciary Act, section 12. See also Böttcher (2004), p.13.  
922
 From Jean (2010), p.9.  The rate for Poland is 25,9 judge per 100 000 inhabitants.  
923
 See report by CEPEJ, Scheme for evaluating judicial systems 2007. Country: Germany, to be found at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2008/germany_en.pdf (last accessed 3 May 2011). In 
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The Dutch judiciary consists of professional judges (rechters or raadsheren in 
appellate courts). The judiciary is part of the public service and judges are therefore civil 
servants (ambtenaren or more specifically rechtelijke ambtenaren) and they fall under the 
general law for civil servants.
924
 The foregoing does not imply that judges should be put in the 
same category as other civil servants which are employed by central public authorities. In 
many respects judges constitute a special group thereof.
925
 Dutch graduates possessing the title 
of Master of Laws (Mester in de rechten or mr.) with a so-called civil effect
926
 may apply for 
judicial training (rechtelijk ambtenaar in opleiding – RAIO-opleiding) which, in principle, 
lasts six years. The selection procedure consists of analytical/cognitive test, personal 
interview, psychological assessment and eventually the final interview with a special selection 
committee (Selectiecommissie rechterlijke macht - SRM).
927
 The internal training involves 
theoretical studying and courses of different length and practical preparations which take 
place within different sectors of courts, the public prosecutor’s office and outside the 
judiciary.
928
 After a successful training and if deemed suitable for the position, the candidate 
will be nominated an assistant to a judge (gerechtsauditeur) at a court and later she will be 
nominated a judge. One may also become a judge if she is graduated in law and has a 
minimum of six years of legal experience and is approved by the SRM in the course of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2009 there were 7 957,8 judges working at District Courts, 4 948,87 judges working at Regional Courts and 1 
800,79 judges working at Higher Regional Courts, statistics to be found at the website of the federal Ministry of 
Justice: 
http://www.bundesjustizamt.de/cln_115/nn_1634386/DE/Themen/Justizstatistik/Personal/Personal_20__node.ht
ml?__nnn=true (last accessed 3 May 2011). Female judges are clearly underrepresented and constitute 
approximately 41 percent of judges at the district level, 35 percent at the regional level and 28 percent at higher 
regional level (own calculation). In 2007 there were 3651 judges working at the courts of ordinary jurisdiction 
and 212 judges working at labour courts in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, see HiiL Report, p. 20. There is 
no data available as to the number of judges working in the civil sector only.  
924
 See Bovend’Eert&Kortman (2008), p.155. See the Act on Civil Servants (Ambtenarenwet – AW) of 12 
December 1929 with amendments.  
925
 From Bovend’Eert&Kortman (2008), p.155.  
926
 In Dutch civiel effect which implies that the graduate has followed and passed specified courses such as for 
instance civil law and procedure, criminal law and procedure and administrative law and procedure.  
927
 For the specific requirements which must be met by the candidates in order too be allowed to the judicial 
training see http://www.werkenbijderechtspraak.nl/LoopbaanmogelijkhedenRAIO.aspx (last accessed 15 March 
2011).  
928
 See the brochure Rechtspraak (2004), p.14.  
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selection procedure.
929
 There are also so-called deputy/replacement judges (rechter 
plaatsvervanger or onbezoldigd raadsheer) who work on a judicial position on a part-time 
basis but have regular permanent employment contracts elsewhere, for instance in law 
firms.
930
 In accordance with the rotation policy, judges are expected to transfer approximately 
every three or four years to a different sector of the court, this practice is based on the 
assumption that judges are supposed to be capable of judging all kinds of disputes.
931
 The 
Netherlands have relatively low rate of judges per number of inhabitants which accounts to 
13.3 judge per 100 000 citizens. The absolute number of judges amounted to 2 176 in 2008.
932
 
The vocational training of judges in Germany is conducted by the German Judicial 
Academy (Deutsche Richterakademie – DRA) which possess training venues in Trier and 
Wustrau. In addition, the Academy of European Law (Europäische Rechtsakademie - ERA), 
which has its main venue in Trier, provides trainings in Trier and several other European cities 
such as for instance Brussels, Warsaw or Budapest.
933
 The ERA trainings are not aimed 
exclusively at German judges but also legal professionals from other countries. As observed 
by Bell, the culture of the judiciary in Germany was traditionally referred to as to that of a 
“bureaucratic elite”.934 Moreover, the court system and its operation belongs to the Land 
matters and judges are recruited and subsequently appointed by particular Länder whereby the 
judges are perceived as land civil servants and predominantly have a professional career of a 
                                                 
929
 For more details see Bovend’Eert&Kortman (2008), p.161 and Ijzermans (2004), pp.69-70.  
930
 Deputy judges have the same judicial powers as “regular’ judges and are rewarded for each hearing they 
participate in. in order to become a deputy judge, the candidate must have a minimum of 6 years for the position 
of rechter plaatsvervanger and a minimum of 10 years for the position of onbezoldigd raadsheer. The candidates 
must also be approved by the SRM. For more details check www.rechtspraak.nl (last accessed 27 April 2011).  
931
 See Jongbloed (2008), p.101.  
932
 CEPEJ (2010), p.117. Next to that there were 900 deputy judges.  
933
 The German Judicial Academy is Germany's leading institution for training judges from all branches of 
jurisdiction including public prosecutors and from all parts of the country, see website at: http://www.deutsche-
richterakademie.de (last accessed 5 March 2011). The ERA, in turn, has begun work in Trier in 1992 and is a 
public foundation. Initially the founding patrons were the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Land of Rhineland-
Palatinate and the City of Trier. In the course of time, the majority of EU Member States has joined the 
foundation. The academy organizes conferences, seminars, study visits, language courses and other training 
projects, many of them multilingual. ERA enables legal practitioners such as judges, lawyers in private practice, 
business and public administration, academics and others to gain a wider and deeper knowledge of the diverse 
aspects of European law, see website at: www.era.int (last accessed 10 March 2011).  
934
 Bell (2006), p.108.  
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regional character.
935
 In that sense, professional education and judicial career trajectory may 
vary between judges of particular Länder. Judicial performance and the allocation of cases are 
assessed in accordance with benchmarks for the judicial workload (Pensenschüssel) which are 
set by the Ministers of Justice from both the Länder
 
and the Federation.
936
 Caseload discharge 
rate, reversal rate and to some extent peer evaluation constitute the base for periodical 
appraisal.
937
 “A common legal education, a deep commitment to constitutional values, judicial 
independence and subordination to the law” are listed as four main features which determine 
the nature of the German legal culture.
938
  
The judicial vocational training in the Netherlands is conducted by the Dutch Training 
and Study Centre for the Judiciary (Opleidingsinstituut van de Rechterlijke Organisatie – 
SSR) with venues in Utrecht and Zutphen.
939
 To guarantee the expertise of judges and the 
supporting staff, a national standard with regard to permanent education has been set up which 
currently obliges to follow 30 hours of training yearly.
940
 The courts performance is assessed 
taking into consideration five performance areas which are: impartiality and integrity, 
expertise, treatment of litigants and defendants, legal unity and speed and promptness of the 
court/sector in question.
941
 Individual judicial performance is assessed on the basis of regular 
performance appraisals.
942
  
                                                 
935
 Ibid, pp.110-111. The Land Ministry of Justice is responsible for the system of recruitment examinations, the 
judicial traineeship and it also decides on the number of available judicial posts. The Ministry is also responsible 
for technical matters such as court buildings, equipment or the judicial offices staff. In that sense, the 
organization, administration and policy of the courts are rather extensively controlled by the Land Ministry of 
Justice. The labour courts, in turn, will be supervised and administrated by the Land Ministry of labour.  
936
 See Böttcher (2004), p.1325. In accordance with the benchmarks, a local court judge is expected to hear 
approximately 600 cases, a regional court judge 140 cases and a higher regional court 70 cases. The standards are 
lower for family law judges.  
937
 See Langbein (1985), p.850. See also Schneider (2005), p.130 who describes the promotion system in German 
labour courts. The author claims that “(…) promotion decisions are strongly influenced by formalized 
performance appraisals assessing the judge’s past performance and potential. The ability to cope with the 
caseload and to write sound decisions are central among the criteria rated in these appraisals (…)” Hence, it 
occurs that judges with a higher reversal rate have lower chances for promotion.  
938
 From Bell (2006), p.169.  
939
 See the website at www.ssr.nl (last accessed 15 March 2011).  
940
 See Rechtspraak (2008), p.7. The permanent education is achieved by following courses and skills training 
workshops. The concerned judges and her superior decided yearly how the permanent education expectations 
should be fulfilled.  
941
 From Rechtspraak (2008), p.8.  
942
 See art.46a of the Law on legal position of the officers of justice (Wet rechtspositie rechterlijke ambtenaren -
Wrra) of 29 November 1996, repealed as of 1 July 2010 and replaced by art.37b of the Besluit rechtspositie 
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2.3. Sources of law 
  
Germany and the Netherlands belong to the group of civil law traditions based on Roman 
law.
943
 The written sources of domestic law in Germany include the Constitution 
(Grundgesetz – Basic Law), statutes (Gesetz) and executive laws/regulations (Verordnungen) 
of the Federation, the Ministries of the Federation and the Länder and other rules or laws 
(Satzungen). In addition to this, there are unwritten sources of law, which are the general 
principles enshrined in international law, customary law (Gewohnheitsrecht) which includes 
all general public practice recognized as binding and in particular situations case law.
944
 Due 
to the federal structure of the state, the different sources of law duplicate each other to a 
certain extent both at the Federal level and at the level of the individual Länder.
945
 The Basic 
Law is placed at the apex of the legal sources hierarchy whereby each legal provision must be 
constitutional both in form and substance.
946
 Legislation, executive power and case law are 
particularly bound by fundamental human rights, which in accordance with article 1(3) of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
rechterlijke ambtenaren (Brra). See also Bovend’Eert&Kortman (2008), pp.177-178. The courts’ performance 
and workload are measured in accordance with the so-called Lamicie system which divides cases into 49 different 
categories. Every category is subsequently assigned a specific amount of minutes which are needed in order to 
handle a specific case, for more see Der Torre et al (2007), pp.147-148.   
943
 In Germany some references to Germanic law can be found. Criminal law and civil law in Germany are 
codified at the national level in the criminal code (Strafgesetzbuch) and the civil code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - 
BGB) respectively. The civil code is divided into five books: the general part, obligations, property, family, and 
inheritance.The civil law system in the Netherlands was originally classified as Romanistic. However, German 
legal influences have recently gained some floor in the process of re-codification of the Dutch Civil Code 
(Burgelijk Wetbook – BW), see Taekema (2004), p.18. The Dutch Civil Code is divided into seven books: rights 
of individuals, legal entities, rights of assets, succession, the law of property, contracts and obligations. 
944
 Formally, the system of precedence does not exist in Germany. Only the case-law of the Federal 
Constitutional Court has precedential value. Cases do have binding authority over the parties, but not on the 
future cases. Cases of higher courts do, however, have persuasive value for lower courts judges. For more on the 
problem of bindingness of precedent in Germany check Alexy&Dreier (1997), pp.17-64.  
945
 The relationship between the laws at the Federal and Länder level is governed by Article 31 of the Basic Law 
which provides that where Federal and Land law are colliding then the Federal law prevails. In accordance with 
Article 70(1) of the Basic Law the Länder have the right to legislate insofar as the Basic Law does not confer 
legislative power on the Federation. In line with Article 70(2) of the Basic Law the division of authority between 
the Federation and the Länder is governed by the provisions of the Basic Law respecting exclusive and 
concurrent legislative powers. 
946
 See Foster (1993), p.51.  
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Basic Law are directly applicable.
947
 Importantly, the fundamental principles enshrined in the 
Basic Law may not be subject to amendment or any change.
948
 The Federal Constitutional 
Court is responsible for constitutional matters and has the power of judicial review.
 
It acts as 
the highest legal authority and ensures that legislative and judicial practice conforms to the 
Basic Law.
949
 The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court are to be obeyed by the lower 
courts since they have a binding value.
950
  
In the Netherlands, the sources of enacted law in include: treaties which also comprise 
of international law, the constitution (Grondwet), statutes (wetten) enacted by the Parliament 
and regulatory acts/ordinances (algemene maatregelen van bestuur). Similarly to Germany, 
the Netherlands do not have the system of precedent. The lower courts do, however, follow 
the decisions of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).
951
 Next to the written sources of law and 
case-law, customary law and general principles of law are classified as sources of law. The 
Netherlands does not know the institution of the constitutional judicial review since, in 
contrast to Germany and Poland, it does not have a constitutional court.  
The German Basic Law explicitly refers to the European Union in Article 23 
thereof.
952
 The general rules of international law occupy the space between the Basic Law and 
other laws. Article 25 of the Basic Law explicitly states that these are a component of Federal 
                                                 
947
 Fundamental rights can be invoked by affected individuals before the courts, ultimately by lodging a 
constitutional appeal before the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). 
948
 So called eternity clause, Ewigkeitsgarantie or Ewigkeitsklausel. Likewise, amendments to this Basic Law 
affecting the division of the Federation into Länder and their participation on principle in the legislative process 
are inadmissible.  
949
 See Art.93 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany on specific competences of the 
Constitutional Court. The Federal Constitutional Court is the ‘final arbiter’ with regard to the constitutional 
requirements which are put on constitutional, governmental, legislative and judicial bodies, see Bell (2006), 
p.109.  
950
 See art.31 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz, BVerfGG) in the 
version published on 12 March 1951, Federal Law Gazette I p.243 with later amendments which reads: “(…) the 
decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court shall be binding upon Federal and Land constitutional organs as 
well as on all courts and authorities.”  
951
 See Taekema, Introducing Dutch law [in] Taekema (2004), p.22. In that sense, the case-law of the Supreme 
Court has an authoritative force.  
952
 The first paragraph of Article 23 reads: “With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of 
Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social, and 
federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection 
of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer 
sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well 
as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or 
make such amendments or supplements possible, are subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.” 
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Law, that they take precedence over such laws and that they directly create rights and duties 
for residents of Germany. Nonetheless, the relationship between German constitutional law 
and the law of the European Union and consequently between the German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice is marked by a permanent tension of 
varying intensity attached to the Kompetenz-Kompetenz issue.
953
 Not much shall be said here 
with regard to this problem as the issue is thoroughly addressed in the academic writing
954
, it 
shall however be recalled that according to the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional 
Court  there are reservations to the process of integration within the European Union since 
there are constitutional limits to supremacy of EU law.
955
  
In contrast to Germany, the Dutch Constitution does not at all refer to the European 
Union and its law. The Netherlands belong to the monistic countries, i.e. in situations where 
an international treaty is ratified by the national parliament and published it automatically 
becomes a binding source of law.
956
 In accordance with article 94 of the Dutch Constitution 
international treaties take precedence over all other sources of law in case of conflict.
957
 In 
addition, Art. 93 of the Dutch Constitution explicitly states that international law rules have 
direct effect in the national legal order after their publication.
958
 The absolute primacy of 
international law over other sources of law distinguishes the Netherlands from the group of 
                                                 
953
 Basically speaking, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz discourse relates to the issue of the transfer of competences of 
the Federal Republic of Germany to the level of the European Union and the limits to the participation of the 
German state in the EU but also the allocation of competences between the German Constitutional Court and the 
ECJ. The German Constitutional Court established three forms of review of EU legal acts. In its Solange I 
judgment of 1974 reserved for itself the competence to scrutinize whether an EU legal act complies with the 
fundamental rights as enshrined in the Basic Law. In its Maastricht decision of 1993 it claimed to have the final 
competence to decide whether EU legal acts do not transgress the limits of the EU to act. In its Lisbon judgment 
of 2009 it claimed to have the competence to scrutinize whether Union’s legal acts are in line with the 
constitutional identity of the Basic Law. For a detailed analysis see Payandeh (2011), pp.9-38. 
954
 See for instance Kokott, Report on Germany [in] Slaughter et al (1998), pp.77-131, Mayer (2003); Ziller 
(2010), pp.53-76; Fischer-Lescano (2010); Makowski (1995), pp.155-179; Meessen (1993), pp.511-530; Kumm 
(1999), pp.351-386; Dyevre (2011), pp.346-361; Payandeh (2011), pp.9-38.  
955
 For the respective judgments of the German Constitutional Court see note 945.  
956
 Monism gained the status of the leading doctrine in 1906 when the Dutch Supreme Court spoke against the 
doctrine of transformation of international law into the national legal system. See Claes&De Witte, Report on the 
Netherlands [in] Slaughter et al (1998), p.172.  
957
 Art. 94 of the Dutch Constitution reads: “Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be 
applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of 
resolutions by international institutions.”  
958
 Art.93 of the Dutch Constitution reads “Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions 
which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they have been 
published.”  
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the three Member States. In line with the foregoing, even though the national judges do not 
have the power of (constitutional) judicial review of statutes
959
 they have the competence to 
declare national statutes inapplicable if the latter are considered at variance with rules of 
international law.
960
 With everything considered, it is claimed that, in contrast to many other 
Member States, the Netherlands have not experienced any major problems with the 
acceptance and accommodation of the principle of supremacy and direct effect of EU law into 
the national constitutional framework.
961
 
 
2.4. Role of the judge in a civil dispute 
 
The role of the judge in a civil procedure in Germany can be described as a rather strong and 
active one.
962
 Even though the principles of party control (Dispositionsgrundsatz) and the 
principle of party presentation (Verhandlungsgrundsatz)
963
 implies that the parties initiate the 
procedure, determine the subject-matter and are responsible for gathering and presenting the 
facts to the judge, it is the judge who is expected to ask questions and discuss the legal and 
factual grounds of the case with the parties
964
, provide instructions to the parties, formally 
control the proceeding and assess the legal aspects of the case of her own motion.
965
 The judge 
is not limited by the motions put forward by the parties and has the full authority in relation to 
                                                 
959
 Which is explicitly stated in Art.120 of the Dutch Constitution which reads: “The judges do not enter into 
review of the constitutionality of statutes and treaties.” 
960
 See Taekema, Introducing Dutch law [in] Taekema (2004), p.21.  
961
 See Claes&De Witte, Report on the Netherlands [in] Slaughter et al (1998), p.182 where the authors claim 
that “the case law of the ECJ, so far, has always fitted into the Dutch system: the principle of direct effect, 
supremacy, interpretation of national law as in Marleasing, or even Francovich have never required the judges to 
re-arrange national law in a dramatic way. It all fits into the system of the Dutch Constitution and Dutch judges 
have accepted the doctrine of the European Court on those matters as the governing law.” As the authors claim 
elsewhere, “the prevailing attitude towards international and European law is one of striking receptivity in 
principle, combined with cautious pragmatism in the application”, see p.188. The authors also point to the 
“internationalist attitude” of the Netherlands and a lack of sovereignty issue in the whole discourse.  
962
 Oberhammer&Domej (2005), p.300. A civil judge has not always had such a strong position. Originally the 
litigation was mostly in hands of the parties to the dispute but this has gradually changed in the course of the 
twentieth century, see Beier (1997), pp.68-69. As it is claimed elsewhere, the judges play a stronger role in civil 
proceedings in Germany than in other legal systems, see Rühl (2005), p.915.   
963
 See Stadler&Hau (2005), p.365.  
964
 The judge is also expected to point out to the parties those legal aspects of the cases which are overpassed by 
the parties.  
965
 See section 139 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung). For an overview of the judge’s 
responsibilities in civil proceedings see Murray&Stürner (2004), pp.164-177.  
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the legal questions in the dispute (iura novit curia). Expressed differently, it is fully up to the 
judge to find, assess and apply the relevant provisions, be it of a domestic or international 
nature.
966
  
In the Netherlands, the powers of a judge in a civil proceeding are somewhat weaker 
and rest on two principles, i.e. passiveness of the judge (lijdelijkheid van de rechter) and the 
autonomy of the parties to the dispute (partijautonomy).
967
 It is a general rule though that a 
judge is supposed to apply binding law. The parties may base their claims on specific legal 
provisions but it is still up to the judge to ex officio (ambtshalve) choose and apply the correct 
legal basis, also in situations when international law is applicable.
968
 Put differently, the judge 
is passive with regard to the fact-finding but active with regard to the applicable law. 
Consequently, if a judge fails to point the correct legal basis her decision will likely be 
overruled by the court of higher instance.
969
 This rule has, however, limited application in 
practice as it is narrowed by several other principles such as for instance audi alteram 
partem
970
 or the rule providing that if the parties ask the judge to rule on a basis of a specific 
legal provision, then the judge is obliged to observe such a request.
971
 From among the three 
respective Member States the Dutch civil judge seems to have the weakest and most passive 
position in the procedure whereas the German one seems to be assigned the most active role. 
It should yet not be forgotten that the functioning of civil judges in all three Member States is 
                                                 
966
 See Oberhammer&Domej (2005), pp.303-304.  
967
 See Verkerk (2005), p.281. In accordance with articles 23 and 24 the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure a judge 
is expected to decide on each issue which was put forward by the parties to the proceeding and the decision 
should be based only on the motions put forward by the parties. Jongbloed argues that “It is the consequence of 
substantive private law that the subjects of rights have the freedom to determine their own legal position. 
Realizing this freedom in a civil procedure requires party autonomy too. The extent of the court’s ‘passiveness’ 
mirrors this party autonomy in litigation. Both concepts constitute the weight that keeps the relationship between 
the court and parties in balance.”, see Jongbloed (2005), p.86.  
968
 See Verkerk (2005), p.288. See art.25 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure in accordance with which judges 
are expected to raise legal grounds which are not pointed out by the parties ex officio (de rechter vult ambtshalve 
de rechtsgronden aan). See also Meijknecht (2009), p.70 and Vriesendorp (1981). 
969
 See Verkerk (2005), p.288.  
970
 Meaning that the parties have the right to reflect upon the legal provision chosen by the judge which they did 
not put forward themselves. This rule is aimed at preventing the parties from being surprised by the choice of 
legal ground by the judge and finds support in the jurisprudence of the Dutch Supreme Court. See Verkerk 
(2005), p.289.  
971
 See Verkerk (2005), p.289. Elsewhere, it is argued that the task of a judge in a civil dispute is a difficult one 
since she must find an adequate balance between being passive and active at the same time, between deciding on 
the legal basis but at the same time sticking to the facts and evidence which are brought up by the parties, see for 
instance Vriesendorp (1981), p.1. 
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based on the iura novit curia principle which implies that the process of assessment of the 
legal grounds and the application of the law is an exclusive competence of the judge.  
 
3. Comparative empirical analysis between Germany, the Netherlands and 
Poland  
 
3.1. Knowledge of EU law  
 
The assessment of general knowledge of EU law among the civil judges in Germany and the 
Netherlands brought straightforward results. Similarly to their Polish counterparts, the 
German and Dutch judges admitted that their knowledge of EU law is considerably weaker 
than that of national law. 20 percent of German and Dutch judges declared to be well 
informed with regard to the developments in EU law.
972
 Likewise, only 12 percent of Dutch 
and German judges assessed their knowledge of EU law as (very) good which is virtually the 
same as in Poland.
973
 It is evident that in all three countries, it is a minority of the judges 
which reckons that their knowledge of EU law is sound.
974
 
 The Polish judges considered themselves more knowledgeable of situations in which 
they are supposed to refer a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice than their 
German and Dutch counterparts. Whereas 57 percent of Polish civil judges were of such an 
opinion, 39 percent of Dutch and German judges reckoned so.
975
 The Polish judges also seem 
to be more aware of the manner a preliminary question ought to be asked. Whereas 41 percent 
of the Polish judges thought it was clear how to refer a preliminary question, only 16 percent 
of German and 32 percent of Dutch counterparts were of a similar opinion.
976
 The foregoing 
findings may indeed come as a surprise. The fact that the basics of the preliminary ruling 
                                                 
972
 See HiiL Report, p.48. 23 percent of Polish judges stated to be well informed about the developments in EU 
law.  
973
 91 percent of Dutch and German judges assessed their knowledge of national law as good or very good, see 
HiiL Report, p.49. With regard to Poland is was 92 percent of the group.   
974
 See also Wind (2010), p.1053 from which it follows that similar situation is present in Sweden.  
975
 See HiiL Report, p.52 for the results for Germany and the Netherlands. 35,5 percent of the German and Dutch 
group declared that it is not clear to them when to refer a question.  
976
 See HiiL Report, pp.54-55 with regard to Germany and the Netherlands.  
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procedure constituted a necessary part of the trainings the Polish judges underwent shortly 
before joining the Union may, arguably, explain the results. This would also go in line with 
the findings concerning the tool of harmonious interpretation which, in turn, seems not to have 
been given a proper consideration during the judicial training in Poland. Indeed, the German 
and Dutch judges are evidently more knowledgeable of the rules pertaining to the principle of 
harmonious interpretation, i.e. whereas 57 percent of the German and Dutch judges declared 
to know the rules of harmonious interpretation, only 18 percent of the Polish judges reckoned 
so.
977
  
 It follows from the data that more German and Dutch than Polish judges gained 
sufficient knowledge of EU law during their legal studies.
978
 This finding does not come as a 
surprise taking into consideration the length of the EU membership in the respective countries 
and the fact that university EU law courses became available in Poland only in the last 15 
years. Nonetheless, the number in the respective Old Member States which amounted to 
approximately 19 percent seems to be surprisingly low taking into consideration that both 
countries are the founding members of the European Union. The conclusion following from 
the respective results is straightforward, i.e. so far the university educational systems have in 
most cases failed to provide their graduates and future judges with sufficient knowledge of EU 
law. At the same time the Polish judges are the most eager to broaden their knowledge of EU 
law. 91 percent thereof declared to be in need of broadening their EU law knowledge, 74 
percent of Dutch judges were of such an opinion and 64 percent of German judges reckoned 
so.
979
 Importantly, in all three countries the number of judges who never seek information 
about EU law amounted to 3 percent only.
980
  
The methods of acquiring EU law knowledge differ substantially between the 
countries. Whereas many Polish judges turn to external and to a lesser extent internal EU law 
courses, German judges predominantly make use of online databases and very rarely resort to 
                                                 
977
 See HiiL Report, p.57 with regard to Germany and the Netherlands.  
978
 As illustrated chapter 4, in Poland only 5 percent of the group stated that they gained sufficient knowledge of 
EU law during their legal studies. In the Netherlands and Germany this number accounted to nearly 19 percent, 
see HiiL Report, p.58.  
979
 See HiiL Report, p.61 with regard to the situation in Germany and the Netherlands.  
980
 HiiL Report, p.57.  
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EU law trainings.
981
 The Dutch judges seem to be the most open to all kind of sources of EU 
law knowledge, some make use of external and legal courses but the overwhelming majority 
uses legal handbooks and online databases. The Dutch judges are also clearly the most eager 
in consulting direct sources of EU law such as EU directives and regulations, the number 
slightly exceeded 60 percent and doubled the numbers for Germany.
982
 In all three countries 
judges frequently resort to the judgments of the European Court of Justice. 60 percent of the 
Polish and 55 percent of the German judges declared to resort to the judgments. The Dutch 
judges evidently have the lead in that respect, i.e. slightly more than 80 percent declared to 
resort to the jurisprudence of the ECJ.
983
 The results clearly visualize quite a considerable 
difference between the two Old Member States in that respect.   
 
                                                 
981
 Only 1 percent of the German judges resort to internal courses and 4 percent to external courses, see HiiL 
Report pp.59-60. Nearly 80 percent of German judges did not attend any course in EU law in the last 12 months. 
From the qualitative interviews it has also followed that German judges are rather sceptical about and critical of 
the available training facilities.  
982
 See HiiL Report, p.59 with regard to the situation in Germany.  
983
 See HiiL Report, p.59 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
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  n Poland = 312, Germany = 190, Netherlands = 138  
 
In both Poland and the Netherlands 64 percent of judges were of the opinion that EU law 
courses should be obligatory for judges. The number is considerably lower for Germany 
where only 36 percent reckoned so.
984
 
 By and large, the results for the respective countries carry several significant 
implications. First of all, even though there are differences between the three Member States, 
the prevailing trend is that the majority of national civil judiciaries seems to be inadequately 
equipped with EU law knowledge and frequently they are not certain of the obligations which 
EU law imposes on them.
985
 In that regard, many of the judges experience the feelings of 
insecurity with regard to EU law and the lack of general overview of EU law.
986
 Moreover, it 
should be observed that in all three countries the judges admit to be aware of their EU law 
                                                 
984
 See HiiL Report, p.62 with regard to the results for Germany.  
985
 See HiiL report, p.87 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
986
 See HiiL Report, pp.83-84 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
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knowledge deficiencies and evidently feel the need to broaden and enhance their knowledge 
of EU law.
987
 Importantly, the length of the membership does to seem to significantly 
influence the way the judges assess their familiarity with EU law. The empirical evidence also 
indicates that the level of EU law knowledge seems to go hand in hand with the practical 
experiences with the application thereof a concerned judge has.
988
 In that sense, judges who 
are more frequently exposed to EU law and apply it on a more frequent basis seem to possess 
better knowledge thereof. It should yet be underscored that this may again result in a vicious 
circle situation. An improper level of knowledge of EU law renders it difficult to see the 
potential relevance thereof in a specific case which results in (indeliberate) non-application. 
The lack of experience makes it, in turn, difficult to broaden and consolidate the knowledge of 
EU law. By and large, the problem of knowledge of EU law among the national judges is of a 
multi-dimensional character and does not origin in one single cause. Therefore, it should 
always be assessed in the light of the nature of the cases a judge deals with, the workload she 
is confronted with, the access to a proper EU law training and other sources of EU law. 
 
3.2. Attitudes towards the EU and its legal order  
 
With regard to the attitudes judges have towards EU law and the process of integration within 
the European Union, the results following from both studies are strikingly similar, i.e. the 
overwhelming majority of the Polish, German and Dutch judges are apparently pro-European 
and have a positive picture of the Union. 96 percent of the German and Dutch group are of the 
opinion that the membership in the EU is favourable for their countries which very much 
resembles the results for Poland where the rate amounted to 94 percent. Likewise, 89 percent 
of the Polish group and 86 percent of the Dutch and German group had a positive image of the 
Union.
989
  
                                                 
987
 See HiiL Report, p.84 with regard to the situation in Germany and the Netherlands.  
988
 See HiiL Report, p.84 with regard to the situation in Germany and the Netherlands. 
989
 See HiiL Report, p.65 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands. From the Eurobarometer 
(2010), p.130 it follows that 80 percent of the citizens in the Netherlands and 64 percent of the citizens of 
Germany support the membership of their country in the European Union. The Dutch citizens are evidently the 
most EU-enthusiastic in that respect. Likewise, 76 percent of the Dutch and 58 percent of the German 
respondents found that their country benefited from the membership in the Union, see ibid, pp.134-135. Also, 52 
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This positive image of the European Union as such does not seem to translate into a 
high level of confidence in its institutions though. The survey delivered very absorbing results 
with regard to the level of trust to national and transnational political and judicial bodies 
which are compiled in the following chart.
990
 Those in turn trigger interesting questions as to 
the way the functioning of EU law institutions is legitimized in the respective countries. From 
among the respective countries, clearly the Dutch judges place the most confidence in the 
European Court of Justice and German judges represent the lowest level of trust in the EU 
political bodies and the highest level of trust in the national parliament.
991
 Conversely, the 
Polish judges have evidently the lowest level of trust into the national political institutions 
which is much below the level of trust in the Union’s political institutions. 
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percent of the Dutch and 48 percent of the German respondents declared to have a positive image of the Union, 
see ibid, p.175.  
990
 The notion of the highest national court is referred to as to the German Constitutional Court, the Polish 
Supreme Court and the Dutch Supreme Court.  
991
 See HiiL Report, p.66.  
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Significant and arresting findings stem from the data concerning the attitudes judges in 
the three countries take toward the principle of supremacy of EU law. The tenet gains the most 
and the least support in, respectively, the Netherlands and Germany.
 992
 It follows that 76 
percent of the Dutch, 65 percent of the Polish and 51 percent of the German judges perceive 
EU law as the law taking precedence over national law. German judges are clearly the most 
rejective of the principle of supremacy of EU law. The following graph illustrates the 
distribution of the answers.  
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The subsequent results visualize that the national judiciaries are not consequent in the way the 
principle is comprehended and interpreted. It has occurred that 62 percent of the Dutch judges 
were of the opinion that they should follow the ruling of the ECJ if it was in conflict with a 
judgment of the national supreme court and only 36 percent of the German judges were in 
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 Ibid, p.69.  
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favour of such an approach.
993
 The Polish judges can once more be placed in between both 
groups as 50 percent of them would follow the ECJ, not the national highest court, if the 
judgments of both were in conflict. The foregoing shows that in all three countries there exists 
discrepancy between the number of judges who declare to support the principle of supremacy 
and those who would follow the judgment of the ECJ even if in conflict with a national 
judgment (with the latter group being evidently smaller than the former). The foregoing 
finding, in turn, induces rather perplexing questions as to the nature of the principle of 
supremacy of EU law itself and the boundaries thereof. The principle seems to be burdened 
with a sort of dichotomy or, as put by Craig and De Búrca, it reveals “a bi-dimensional 
character”.994  
The majority of the judges in the surveyed Member States see themselves as a part of 
the legal order of the European Union, i.e. 68 percent of the Polish and 65 percent of the 
German and Dutch judges reckoned so.
995
 Also, 66 percent of the Dutch, 79 percent of the 
Polish and 52 percent of the German find the application of EU law an important task of the 
national judge.
996
 Likewise, 90 percent of the Dutch, 83 percent of the Polish and 75 percent 
of the German judges are of the opinion that the uniform application of EU law across the 
Union is important.
997
 By and large, it might be put forward that the majority of the national 
judges reflect a favourable disposition towards the law of the Union and the judicial tasks 
which are assigned to it. Yet, it is clear that those are the Dutch and German judges who, 
respectively, take the most and the least EU law ‘friendly’ stance.  
The way judges approach their obligations stemming from EU and more precisely 
from the principle of supremacy of EU law seems to reflect the principles underpinning the 
national constitutional framework they operate in and the national legal tradition. As already 
mentioned, the Netherlands have not experienced any major problems with the acceptance and 
accommodation of the principle of supremacy and direct effect of EU law into the national 
                                                 
993
 Ibid, p.72. Furthermore, 16,7 percent of the Dutch and 48,5 percent of the German and 22 percent of the 
Polish judges would follow national supreme court. The remaining part of the group expressed neutral stance 
towards the problem indicating that the Polish group was the most ambivalent in that regard.  
994
 From Craig&De Burca (2008), p.377.  
995
 See HiiL Report, pp.67-68 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
996
 Ibid, p.68 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
997
 Ibid, pp.68 and 70 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
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constitutional framework
998
 and this seems to be mirrored in the results of the present 
empirical study. The Dutch judges are the most supportive of the EU legal order, they do not 
express any major reservations with regard to it and they are open to EU legal sources. 
Conversely, the previous discussion
999
 illustrated that there are many constitutional 
controversies attached to the accommodation of EU law in the German legal order and the 
issue of supremacy of EU law. Consequently, German judges who participated in the 
empirical part of the project reflect a somewhat different and more reserved approach towards 
the legal order of the EU and the principle of supremacy thereof. In turn, the Polish judges 
find themselves in between those two groups in many respects.  
 
3.3. Experiences with EU law in the judicial practice  
 
From the data following from the surveys it can be concluded that, even though there are 
differences between the respective Member States, in general the national civil judges deal 
with EU law in their daily practice rather sporadically. The frequency of the occurrence of EU 
law aspects is the lowest in Poland. Indeed, while 85 percent of the Dutch and 71 percent of 
the German judges did deal with at least one case in which they resorted to EU law in the 
course of the last 12 months, the rate for Poland amounted to 59 percent.
1000
 Put differently, 
the Dutch judges seem to be confronted with EU law most frequently. Alternatively, it could 
be conjectured that the Dutch judges are the most capable of identifying the EU law relevance 
for a specific case
1001
 or, arguably, most willing to scrutinize the possible relevance of EU law 
for a dispute. Also, it occurs that in both Germany and the Netherlands there is a group of 
judges, which accounts to approximately 10 percent of the surveyed population, which 
somewhat more frequently deal with EU law in their daily practice.
1002
 The results for Poland 
do not detect such a group. 
                                                 
998
 See section 2.3 of this chapter.  
999
 See section 2.3 of this chapter  
1000
 See HiiL Report, pp.37-38 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
1001
 As it is put forward by the authors of the HiiL Report, p.38.   
1002
 More frequently amounts to 26 and more cases with EU law relevance yearly. See HiiL Report, pp.38-39. 
The report does not provide a clear explanation to that but refers to the fact of specialization, i.e. labour law 
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The fact that the Dutch and German judges have a somewhat more comprehensive 
experience with the application of EU law than they counterparts in Poland can hardly come 
as a surprise taking into consideration the length of the membership in the EU of the 
respective countries. What has become clear though is that, irrespective of the length of the 
membership, private law judges in none of the countries have ever dealt with a “tide”1003 of 
EU law cases. By and large, the relevance of EU law for the daily practice of civil courts 
remains somewhat scant. At the same time the data also shows that that the caseload which 
national judges are confronted with seems to be the highest in Poland: whereas 8 percent of 
the Dutch and 18 percent of the German stated that their caseload exceeded 300 cases 
annually, 63 percent of the Polish judges dealt with more than 300 cases yearly.
1004
  
When examining more closely the manner judges resort to specific mechanisms of 
application of EU law it occurs that 62 percent of the German judges and 49 percent of the 
Dutch judges have been confronted with the principle of conforming interpretation and 
applied it in practice whereas only 22 percent of the Polish judges have ever resorted to the 
mechanism.
1005
 It has also become evident that the Dutch judges are much more open and 
resort to a wider variety of techniques and sources to interpret the EU directive in question.
1006
 
In that regard, the Polish judges can be placed in between both groups but in their usage of 
different sources they more resemble the Dutch judges. All in all, the German judges seem the 
most reserved and limited when it comes to interpreting national law in harmony with EU 
directives. Not surprisingly, the Dutch and German judges have more experience with the 
preliminary ruling procedure as 16 percent of the Dutch and 5 percent of the German group 
have resorted to the mechanism in their practice at least once.
1007
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
judges seem to be confronted with EU law more frequently, and a group of judges who deal with cross-border 
judicial cooperation.  
1003
 From Kühn&Bobek (2010), p.325.  
1004
 See Hiil Report, p.38 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
1005
 Ibid, p.41 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  
1006
 Ibid, p.42. For example, more than 80 percent of those Dutch judges who resorted to the mechanism did use 
the text and/or system of the directive at stake, whereas less than 20 percent of German judges did so. Likewise, 
approximately 23 percent of the Dutch judges used other language versions of the directive whereas the German 
judges, in fact, never resort to other language versions.  
1007
 Ibid, p.40.  
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Similarly to the Polish judges, the majority of the German and Dutch judges 
experience difficulties with the application of EU law in practice. The Report refers to this 
phenomenon as to “EU law – hard to spot, difficult to apply”.1008 Indeed, 60 percent of the 
German and Dutch judges find the EU provisions difficult to find. This proportion was 
somewhat lower in Poland and accounted to nearly 40 percent. Importantly, 55 percent of the 
Dutch and 69 percent of the German judges are of the opinion that the process of application 
of EU law does not proceed smoothly.
1009
 The proportion was again somewhat lower in 
Poland and amounted to 48 percent which were however accompanied by 41 percent of those 
who again took an indifferent stance toward the statement. In addition to that, finding relevant 
EU provisions seems to pose problems to judges in all three countries. 61 percent of the 
Polish, 78 percent of the Dutch and 65 percent of the German judges were indeed of the 
opinion that finding EU law provisions is a long lasting process.
1010
 All in all, the preceding 
numbers indicate that the gross majority of civil law judges do experience problems searching 
for, finding and eventually applying EU law. The results concerning the way judges perceive 
the legibility of EU legal sources such as the judgments of the ECJ and primary and secondary 
EU legal provisions are similar in all three countries which points to the widespread problem 
attached to reading and understanding the judgments of the ECJ, primary EU law but foremost 
the secondary EU law.
1011
  
In general, both studies expose several common patters in the way judges approach EU 
law and perceive its relevance for their daily practice. First of all, across the three countries 
judges are likely to lack adequate knowledge of EU law which implies that frequently they 
might be incapable of identifying the possible relevance of EU law for the pending disputes. 
This observation goes hand in hand with the finding which emphasizes the significance of the 
role the parties to the proceedings play in the process of application of EU law. Indeed, the 
majority of the judges believes that it is difficult to recognize when EU law becomes relevant 
for a specific dispute and should be applied, if the parties to the proceedings do not point this 
                                                 
1008
 Ibid, p.42.  
1009
 Ibid, pp.25-26.  
1010
 Ibid, p.42 with regard to the results for Germany and the Netherlands 
1011
 Only 9 percent of the Dutch and German were of the opinion that EU secondary law is clear, see ibid, p.43. 
In Poland, 16 percent of the group was of such an opinion.  
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out or wish to base their claims on EU law. The amount of judges who reckon so was very 
high for Germany and the Netherlands and amounted to 70 percent of the group and it was 
somewhat lower for Poland where it was 58 percent.
1012
 By and large, the preceding results 
once more immensely stress the significance of the parties to the proceedings in the whole 
process of Europeanisation of the judicial discourse and the judicial application of EU law. 
Third, across the three countries the judges seem to tend to trust that the legislator fulfills its 
obligations to implement EU law in a proper way whereby a possible engagement with EU 
law sources becomes pointless.
1013
 Moreover, as the projects for Germany and the Netherlands 
but also for Poland illustrate, EU law is frequently perceived as too abstract and remote from 
the down-to-earth ordinary cases of routine nature in first instance courts which are expected 
to be resolved efficiently and without any undue delay or an unnecessary legal research.
1014
 
Put differently, in view of the heavy and still growing caseloads the judges rationalize the 
process of adjudication
1015
 and aim at making as efficient as possible use of the resources 
which are at their disposal and aim at delivering swift and efficient solutions. The foregoing, 
in turn, implies that even if a judge detects the possible relevance of EU law for a pending 
dispute, she might not necessarily engage with the problem in order to avoid the possible 
delay or workload caused by the necessity of sophisticated and time-consuming legal 
research.
1016
 
 
4.  Preliminary conclusions 
 
The foregoing discussion visualizes several significant and thorny aspects attached to the issue 
of the functioning of national judges in their EU capacity which are common across the three 
Member States. As the findings illustrate, several sets of problems are not limited to Poland 
                                                 
1012
 See HiiL Report, p.42 for the results for Germany and the Netherlands.  Again, the lower number for Poland 
should be read in the light of the finding that a gross number of the judges has never dealt with EU law in 
practice. 
1013
 Except of those situations when EU is directly applicable, i.e. EU regulations are applied. See ibid, pp.39-40 
in which the German and Dutch judges indicate their belief in a correct transposition of EU law.  
1014
 See ibid, pp.40 and 82 for the conclusions for Germany and the Netherlands.  
1015
 From Fix-Fierro (2003), p.25. 
1016
 See HiiL Report, p.82 for the conclusions for Germany and the Netherlands.  
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only but have a much broader scope. Disparities across the New and Old Member States are to 
be found but overall there are more parallels than differences in the way national judges 
function as EU judges and the problems attached to it.  
The first problematic aspect attached to the functioning of national judges as EU law 
judges evidently relates to the issue of their familiarity with EU law and, consequently, the 
confidence they have with regard to their EU law competences. This problem goes along other 
thorny aspects which relate to the nature of EU law itself, the daily operational context or the 
activity of the parties to the proceedings with regard to EU law. All in all, it may be claimed 
that even though the intensity of the problems attached to the functioning of national courts as 
decentralized EU courts vary between the countries, the application of EU law yet remains a 
rather perplexing aspect of the daily judicial functioning for many judges not only in the New 
Member States.  
Similarly to Poland, the proper functioning of national judiciaries in their European 
capacity is not dependent upon one particular factor. Numerous factors seems to influence the 
way judges behave in the context of EU law  and there is no single, clear-cut answer to the 
question whether national judges are the agents of the European Union legal order. Even if the 
above suggests that it all ends up in a it-all-depends-situation, there are still plausible grounds 
to conclude that judges from one jurisdiction are quite likely to be more open to EU law, and 
consequently more willing to fulfill their obligations and expectations stemming from EU law 
than judges from another Member State. With everything considered it may be claimed that in 
the surveyed group, the Dutch judges seem to be the most open to and supportive of the legal 
order of the European Union and the Union itself. Most importantly, they are the least 
opposing the principle of supremacy of EU law. At the same time they also seem to be best 
equipped with adequate knowledge of EU law and to have the best access to the means of 
improvement of that knowledge. The German judges, in turn, are the most skeptical about and 
closed to EU law. Likewise, Germany has the highest rate of judges who do not support the 
principle of supremacy of EU law. Also, the stance of the Federal Constitutional Court toward 
EU law must bear on the way judges see their role attached to EU law. The Polish judges in 
many respects find themselves in between both groups. A rather scant experience with the 
application of EU law, the shortness of the membership and the obstacles stemming from the 
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daily operational context seem to result in considerable ambivalence towards EU law and the 
tasks attached to it which, however, does not imply that the Polish civil judges oppose or 
reject EU law. 
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Chapter 7 
National Judges as EU Law Judges: 
Reconciling Legal and Social 
Perspectives   
 
 
 
“Compliance is at its greatest when personal advantages are highest, 
organizational sanctions against opposition are certain and severe, and the 
legitimacy of the issuing authority is acknowledged. Conversely, it will be at its 
minimum when the individual’s utilities all point in the direction of opposition, 
organization sanctions are lenient and – most important – erratic in application, 
and the legitimacy of the higher authority is doubtful.” 
 
                                                                    - Samuel Krislov
1017
 
 
 
 
1. The theoretical model of a national judge as an EU law judge in a 
broader perspective  
 
At the outset of this study it was observed that the EU legal system has developed a very 
particular mechanism of EU rights protection which is operative on two levels. Early on, the 
Treaties established a centralized, supranational EU Court - the ECJ – which has played a 
crucial role in advancing the process of European integration. This centralized Court has 
induced, through its jurisprudence, that the EU rule of law should also be protected at the 
decentralized level, that is to say by the national judiciaries of the Member States.  
As illustrated in Chapter 2, in order for the national courts to effectively fulfill their 
tasks of decentralized EU courts, the ECJ has directly empowered national judges by 
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conferring new competences on them. As the years went by and the process of European 
integration deepened, the range of duties the acquis communautaire imposed on national 
judiciaries broadened. The doctrines of primacy and direct effect of EU law, indirect effect, 
effectiveness and the preliminary ruling procedure have become formidable instruments 
which allow national judges to undertake judicial actions which would normally not be 
permitted under national law. From the foregoing it follows that national judges of all levels 
and all specializations have become judges adjudicating EU law and that the process of legal 
integration within the EU and further development of the legal order of the Union has to a 
large extent become dependent on them.
1018
 They are the most crucial element of the judicial 
protection of EU rights
1019
 and first and very often also the last instance courts to consider the 
issues of EU law.
1020
 The General Court went so far as to call national courts the EU courts of 
general jurisdiction
1021
 and the European Parliament concluded in a recent resolution that 
national judges are “the keystone of the European Union judicial system who play a central 
and indispensable role in the establishment of a single European legal order.”1022 The role of a 
national judge has been elevated “to a constitutional mission in the European context.”1023 
The aforegoing reflects an arresting picture of a national judge who is familiar with the 
sources of EU law and applies them in her daily work. She resorts to and applies EU law ex 
officio, secures that EU law is observed by national authorities and cooperates and stays in 
dialogue with the ECJ through the preliminary ruling procedure. She scrutinizes the 
compatibility of national laws with EU law, gives effect to EU provisions which have direct 
effect and disregards national rules which are not compatible with EU provisions whereby she 
possibly acts in contradiction with national constitutions and enforces Union law against her 
own government. She resorts to and applies the jurisprudence of the ECJ which is for her the 
                                                 
1018
 From Lang, The principle of effective protection of Community law rights [in] O’Keeffe&Bavasso (2000), 
p.235.  
1019
 In fact, the vast majority of the rights that individuals derive from EU law can be enforced in national courts 
only, see Lang (2008), p.77. 
1020
 See Mik (1997), p.22.   
1021
 Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission of the European Communities [1990] ECR II-00309, 
para.42.  
1022
 European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2008 on the role of the national judge in the European judicial 
system 2007/2027(INI). 
1023
 From Cartabia (2007), p.41.  
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highest judicial authority with regard to EU law. She interprets national rules in the entire 
context of the European Union integration so that they comply with EU law objectives and she 
grants damages to individuals whose rights deriving from EU law are infringed by the 
Member States. She assures effective judicial review of EU law rights and secures that 
national procedures and remedies do not impede the effectiveness of EU law. In order to 
achieve all this, the national judge adopts different methodology and tools, such as for 
instance teleological and comparative interpretation methods. What is more, she reads EU 
provisions in 23 official languages of the European Union in order to compare them. All the 
foregoing tasks take place in the context of increasingly Europeanised national legal sources 
and aim at securing the fundamental principles of EU law such as its effectiveness and 
uniformity across all the Member States and the effective protection of the rights individuals 
derive from EU law. In a nutshell, all national judges are expected to be the agents of the legal 
order of the European Union, who actively participate in the process of legal integration 
within the Union and who treat the law of the Union as an integral (though supreme) part of 
the national legal order.  
Much has been written with regard to the fulfillment of the legal expectations which 
are put on national judges by EU law and the application of EU law by them in their 
jurisprudence. Various scholars focus on the aspects of, inter alia, the application of EU law 
by the highest national courts and the stance they take towards the principle of supremacy and 
direct effect of EU law or the process of cooperation of various national courts with the ECJ. 
Even though much academic work is devoted to the discussion concerning particular (and 
frequently controversial) judgments of national courts in which EU law was at stake, this 
stream of scholarship can by no means reflect the general picture of the functioning of 
national judges as EU law judges and the process of Europeanisation of national courts. 
Indeed, little is known about the general reception of EU law by national judges of lower 
instance courts, the factual impact of EU law on their daily practice and the potential obstacles 
national judges can come across while exercising their EU law competences. What does it 
mean to be an EU law judge in practice? Does the theoretical model translate into the daily 
functioning of an ordinary first instance judge who adjudicates in the area of private law? 
What is the virtual reception of the legal order of the European Union among national judges 
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and whether/how do they fulfill the tasks assigned to them by EU law? And even more 
essentially: are they prepared to do so? And what are the factors which might influence 
judges’ behaviour in the context of EU law? These and other questions of empirical nature 
have motivated the present study and become the focus thereof.  
By applying both legal and sociological, that is quantitative and qualitative, 
methodology, this study investigated whether the above-mentioned model of the national 
judge is indeed attainable in practice of the Polish civil judiciary and whether the Polish civil 
judge is participating and willing to participate in the process of legal integration in the 
European Union. Thus, the topic has been investigated from both theoretical and 
personal/individual perspective of the national judge. Three aprori established set of problems 
relating to, generally speaking, the knowledge of, experiences with and the attitudes towards 
EU law and the Union itself were investigated in the empirical part of the study. By observing 
what the individual perspectives of judges on the tasks following from EU law are, it was 
possible to sketch a general picture of the functioning of Polish civil judges in their EU law 
capacity. As the subsequent discussion will illustrate, the study also contributes to the Legal 
Consciousness theory and enables to draw a map of the forms thereof which are present 
among the surveyed judges. In that sense, the study has adopted an interdisciplinary 
methodology and a novel theoretical approach to the problem. Through the process of 
comparing the evidence for Poland with selected results stemming from a parallel project for 
Germany and the Netherlands its findings gain a broader validity.  
The following concluding observations in this chapter aim at collating the theoretical 
and empirical findings of the present study and at drawing a general picture of the functioning 
of Polish civil judges as EU law judges in practice, the reception of the legal order of the EU 
by them and the problems judges are confronted with in that regard. Also, the relevance of the 
Legal Consciousness theory and other existing legal and political science outlooks on this 
issue which are present in the academic writing are addressed.  
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2. National civil judiciary versus EU law: a multidimensional picture  
 
2.1. Plurality of the factors influencing judicial behaviour in the context of EU law  
 
Trivial as it may sound but one of the most cardinal conclusions stemming from the empirical 
exercise is that judicial behaviour cannot be explained by a single determinant. As plausibly 
observed by Choi and Gulati, judges do not operate in vacuum and a multitude of factors may 
motivate the way they behave.
1024
 Thus, as the quantitative and especially qualitative data 
seem to suggest, the actual functioning of judges (as EU law judges) is affected by a broad set 
of factors comprising, inter alia, the constitutional, institutional and procedural frameworks 
and the operational context with its internal constrains embedded in the social construct of the 
judicial environment. Furthermore, the local legal culture but also personal attributes may 
affect the way judges function. Those, as the qualitative data seem to indicate, may go hand in 
hand with social psychology features such as for instance self-interest, self-presentation and 
self-respect. Also, such aspects as, inter alia, the workload and the interaction with other legal 
and non-legal actors may play a role in the way judges receive, approach, engage with and in 
consequence apply EU law.
1025
 In that sense, the factors in play are multidimensional. 
Consequently, sketching the picture of the functioning of national judges as decentralized EU 
judges is therefore anything but straightforward. In the end one will have to agree that we 
must “remain mindful of the likelihood that no single theory or method will capture all of the 
factors at play.”1026 Hence, some level of simplification and generalization with regard to the 
final assessment of the situation and the factors that might have an influence upon it is 
indispensible.
1027
  
Arguably, the national judge has never functioned in such a demanding, challenging 
and complex environment. In view of the multiplication of legal sources and levels which only 
theoretically create one coherent and sensible system the judge has to find her own way to 
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meet the principles of legality, rule of law, effective judicial protection, transparency, 
consistency, constitutionality, impartiality, coherence of jurisprudence and the effectiveness of 
EU law, to name just a few. On top of that, she must be efficient and swift in her decision-
making. The present study supports the claim made by Baum that the behaviour of individual 
judges may be determined by many objectives and a good legal policy might be only one of 
them.
1028
 It should, however, be emphasized that a good legal policy and the rule of law are 
the paramount principles for national judges. Yet, it needs to be taken into account that both 
notions may be differently interpreted by different judges whose functioning seems, moreover, 
constrained by various factors which are embedded in the local legal, social and cultural 
environment and circumstances.  
 
2.2. Familiarity of the judges with the legal order of the EU   
 
From the preceding chapters it derives that a certain level of knowledge of EU law among the 
national judges seems a necessary pre-condition for the (proper) fulfilment of the expectations 
stemming from EU law. The line of the presented data and arguments reveals the vastness of 
deficiencies in cognizance of EU law among the civil judges of lower instance courts in 
Poland.  
The evidence for Poland clearly suggests that many judges lack proper knowledge of 
material EU law and the mechanisms of its application. What is more, in many instances the 
judges do not realize whether, when and how EU law might be relevant for the proceedings 
and what the factual judicial tasks attached to EU law are. The widespread conception that EU 
law becomes relevant only when a cross border element appears in a dispute renders the EU 
law discourse in many instances virtually non-existent. What is more, a rather blurred view of 
the role of the ECJ and its precedent for the judicial practice definitely hinders the execution 
of the judge’s European mandate. In that sense, it might be argued that the ‘zero condition’1029 
                                                 
1028
 From Baum (1997), p.24 where the author refers to a whole body of academic research into the motivations 
and goals of trail judges. Among those objectives one can find, inter alia, doing justice, disposing of caseload, 
creating cohesion, reducing uncertainty, promotion to a higher court, power within the courts or personal income, 
see p.17 therein for a partial typology of possible goals of judges.  
1029
 See note 467.  
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of the application of law is not met yet: frequently the judge either does not know European 
Union law and the judicial tasks attached to it to a satisfactory extent or is not confident about 
it. This lack of confidence with regard to EU law might, in turn, induce the feelings of 
uncertainty or even frustration and might, in some cases, results in attempts to avoid any EU 
law discourse. Certainly, this observation does not apply to the whole group. Instances when a 
judge possesses a good or even very good knowledge of EU law are definitely present. Those 
are yet and still (but arguably not everlastingly) the harbingers.  
The lack of adequate knowledge of substantive law of the EU, relevant case-law of the 
ECJ and frequently a poor level of awareness with regard to the tasks which EU law puts on 
national judges naturally triggers various questions. Those relate to, for instance, the actual 
operationalization of the task to apply EU law of a court’s own motion or the preliminary 
ruling procedure. One will have to agree that judges are not capable of applying EU law ex 
officio in the disputes they are handling if they do not know whether and when EU law 
becomes relevant and could be at stake. In a similar vein, they cannot adequately engage with 
the preliminary ruling procedure if they are not aware of, inter alia, the existing ECJ’s 
jurisprudence on the respective matter. Finally, the gaps in EU knowledge may result in 
situation when judges are not aware of the potential consequences of their incompliance with 
EU law. In that sense, the existing enforcement mechanism embodied in the infringement 
procedure and the principle of state liability, which in itself is very weak, becomes a totally 
meaningless tool with no potency to enforce judicial behaviour that would be compliant with 
the EU law expectations.  
Yet, it would by no means be justified to put the whole blame for the situation with 
regard to the knowledge of EU law among national judiciaries on the judges themselves 
and/or the system of university education and judicial training. The problem is clearly of a 
two-fold nature. On the one hand, the immensity and wideness of EU legislative activities 
which are, moreover, of a piecemeal character implies that EU law can, arguably, never be 
captured and comprehended by a simple judge of a lower instance civil court who is 
frequently confronted with cases of various character which may relate to sundry legal 
aspects. On the other hand, the broad and complex jurisprudence of the ECJ with regard to the 
factual obligations which are put on national judges and which are in many instances 
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incoherent, not straightforward or even contradictory results in a significantly blurred picture 
of the expectations. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the judicial tasks flowing from 
EU law are frequently miscomprehended or misinterpreted. The relatively short period of EU 
membership and the troublesome aspect of an access to a proper EU law training only add up 
to the complexity of the situation. However, also the results of the twin project for Germany 
and the Netherlands show that the majority of the judges is not satisfied with their 
acquaintance with EU law and/or not confident about it. Even though the problem has a 
somewhat different intensification in the two respective countries than in Poland, it shows that 
the length of the membership in the EU does not seem to play a major role in improving the 
EU law competence of the judges. By and large, the familiarity of national judges with EU 
law remains one if the most perplexing problems attached to the functioning of the judicial 
architecture in the European Union. As such the present study verifies the findings of the 
Draft Report on the role of the national judge commissioned by the European Parliament and 
other studies in the field and certainly underscores the necessity to pay more attention and 
invest more funds and efforts to guarantee an appropriate level of knowledge of EU law 
among the present and future judges of both New and Old Member States.
1030
  
Finally, the fact that an overwhelming number of judges in Poland, the Netherlands 
and (to a somewhat lesser extent) Germany declared to be willing to broaden their knowledge 
of EU law should undoubtedly be taken as a positive and optimistic sign which indicates not 
only that the majority of the judges does not reject EU law and its place in adjudication but 
also that they anticipate an increasing occurrence of EU law related matters in the future. Yet, 
an adequate level of knowledge of EU law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
proper functioning of national judges as EU law judges as other factors, such as, for instance, 
experiences with its application, attitudes or the local operational context might play an 
indispensible role therein.  
 
 
                                                 
1030
 Solid and constant training in European Union law throughout a judge’s studies and career was indicated by 
slightly more than half of the judges as the best manner to tackle the problem of knowledge. 73 percent of this 
group reckoned that there should be more training in EU law available, see p. 41 of the Draft Report. See also 
studies mentioned in notes 92 and 146.  
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2.3. Presence of EU law in the daily judicial practice and the role of the parties 
therein  
 
The aspect of knowledge of EU law goes hand in hand with the issue of the practical 
experiences with the application thereof. The empirical data seems to suggest that, on the one 
hand, the practical experience in resorting to and applying EU law seems one of the optimal 
manners of learning EU law. In that sense, judges learn EU law for purposes of a specific 
dispute due to the fact that, for instance, the parties refer to EU law or wish to base their 
claims there upon or an EU regulation ought to be applied. However, the idea that a judge 
learns EU law only for purposes of a specific case dangerously undermines the functioning of 
the whole system as, arguably, the judge will not be capable of noting the potential relevance 
of EU law in other cases. In that sense, aspects of EU law might often go unnoticed and 
unexplored which, in the end, seriously jeopardizes the effet utile of EU law and its uniform 
application across the Member States. 
Generally speaking, it has been detected that the experiences with resorting to and 
applying EU law by Polish civil judges are, so far, fairly limited. Many of the civil judges see, 
therefore, EU law as an abstract, remote or irrelevant aspect of adjudication. This scant 
practical experience with the application of EU law results in considerable number of judges 
who simply have a very ambivalent stance towards the obligations which are put on them by 
means of EU law. This seems to offer a good explanation to the fact that such a high 
proportion of the Polish group took a neutral stance toward many motions tested in the survey 
and/or did not know how to proceed with the vignettes. In a similar vein, the results for the 
Netherlands and Germany show that, even though the judges in both countries have somewhat 
more comprehensive experiences with the application of EU law than their Polish 
counterparts, the relevance of EU law for the daily practice of a civil judge remains, by and 
large, rather restrained or, especially if seen in the light of the overall case-loads the judges are 
confronted with.  
Moreover, from the figures presented in the previous chapters it has become evident, 
that the entire process of application of EU law, which commences with looking for and 
finding relevant provisions and the respective case-law of the ECJ, through the process of 
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interpreting thereof up to applying them in a specific case amounts to a time consuming, 
onerous and intricate process. Indeed, the qualitative study showed that once a judge is 
confronted with an EU law aspect it might, quite likely, cost her much time and effort to 
explore and comprehend the respective issue. This, in turn, ought to be read in the light of the 
daily reality of the functioning of the national courts and in particular in the light of the 
backlog of cases and efficiency expectations which are put on the judges. What is more, this 
infrequent occurrence of EU law in the daily practice implicates that its application remains 
exceptional and in consequence troublesome each time an EU law issues occurs. It might 
therefore be put forward that so long as EU law does not constitute a somewhat more wide-
spread element of adjudication in civil courts its application will remain and perplexing aspect 
thereof.  
This lack of experience goes parallel with the issue that in fact the private parties and 
their representatives are yet not very active in resorting to EU law sources and basing their 
claims thereupon. From both the quantitative and qualitative data it follows that the role of the 
litigants and foremost their professional representatives in pointing out that EU law might be 
at stake in a dispute seems indispensible. Also the results for Germany and the Netherlands 
clearly underscore the essential role of private parties in the process of Europeanization of 
judicial discourse. There is no doubt that without their input, engagement and willingness to 
resort to EU law in order to support their claims, the scope of the process of mainstreaming of 
EU law into the daily practice of (private law) courts in Poland and other countries will 
remain very restrained. Likewise, so long there are relatively few EU law cases, the 
knowledge of EU law among judges will remain rather limited, abstract and esoteric. Indeed, 
it emerges from the qualitative part of the study that when an EU law element is brought up by 
the parties then the judge undertakes searching for the respective EU law provisions, 
scrutinizing them and in consequence learning (but not necessarily applying) them. But yet, 
similarly to the situation present within the judiciary the whole issue boils down to the 
problem of the knowledge of EU law and the mechanisms of its application among attorneys 
and solicitors who, as a matter of fact, have learnt EU law in the exactly the same system of 
legal education as the judges who they stand before during the proceedings. Arguably, the 
knowledge of EU law is perceived by attorneys and solicitors as a very specialized and 
National Judges as EU Law Judges: Reconciling Legal and Social Perspectives  
 
 
 
324 
sophisticated field of law which implies that those possessing one are predominantly 
concentrated in large law firms placed in major economic centres across the country. 
With everything considered, the Polish civil judge frequently ends up in a vicious 
circle situation: parties rarely signal that EU law could be at stake and if they signal it then 
frequently their EU law claims are insufficiently substantiated. The limited and scattered 
knowledge of EU law makes it difficult for a judge to see and locate the potential relevance of 
EU law and that, in turn, results in the limited experience with resorting to it and applying it. 
This lack of experience with the application renders the process of broadening the knowledge 
of EU law or transforming and consolidating the already existent knowledge into its practical 
form excessively difficult. Likewise, the lack of experience with the application of EU law 
implies that each time a judge is confronted with it amounts to an effort- and, foremost, time-
consuming process which very much collides with the daily backlog of cases and output 
expectations. Although it may sound like a mere cliché but a direct experience with the 
application of EU law is the paramount determinant in the process of learning, understanding 
and consequently in the process of applying EU law. Some concepts of EU law, including the 
most pivotal systemic tenets such as primacy and direct effect thereof, remain just 
meaningless notions to many of the judges due to the lack of any practical experience in 
applying them.  
 
2.4.  Approach of the judges towards the EU and its law  
 
By no means is the foregoing passage aimed at implying that EU law operates in an EU 
unfriendly environment in Poland. On the contrary, it has been shown that judges are very 
friendly disposed towards the EU and perceive the Union’s membership as a favourable 
development. Strikingly similar results stem from the study for Germany and the Netherlands. 
What is more, the EU institutions receive, in fact, more trust on part of the Polish judges than 
national authorities. The fact that in the three concerned countries the judges are evidently 
pro-European underscores the finding that personal favourable attitudes towards the Union 
neither seem to influence the way the judges approach their tasks following from EU law and 
fulfill their role of the protectors of the EU rule of law nor do they it influence the manner 
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judges perceive EU law and its relevance for the daily judicial practice. Likewise, the 
favourable disposition to the Union does not need to indicate that judges will eagerly engage 
in the process of legal integration in the European Union. Political inclinations and personal 
perspectives seem to be set aside. It is the efficient resolution of conflicts and providing 
justice in accordance with the rule of law that are the primary objectives of the national lower 
court judge. This dispute resolution process takes, however, place in the local operational 
context which, in turn, does seem to bear on the way judges perceive and approach EU law.  
In a similar vein, the pivotal for the existence of the Union’s legal order principle of 
supremacy of EU law finds relatively much support among the judiciary and many judges 
declare to see EU law as an integral part of the national legal order. Parallel to that, the 
preliminary ruling procedure seems to gain considerable support. With regard to the stance 
judges take towards the principle of supremacy of EU law, it should yet not be forgotten that 
the Polish Constitution accepts the supreme position of EU law only over sub-constitutional 
legal acts. Consequently, as illustrated in Chapter 3, the absolute supremacy of EU law has 
been rejected by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. This stance of the CT may, in corollary, 
bear on the way judges perceive the problem. It also occurs that the principle of supremacy of 
EU law is interpreted in a narrow manner, i.e. through the prism of an evident (linguistic) 
incompatibility between national and EU law sources. Since, as illustrated in Chapter 3, the 
transposition of EU law in the area of private law in many instances took the form of a ‘copy 
and paste’ process1031, many judges assume that incompatibility between EU and national 
provisions cannot take place. With everything considered, the acceptance of the principle of 
supremacy of EU law proves to be marked with different nuances and to comprise different 
aspects. The evident dichotomy in the way the principle of supremacy of EU law is perceived 
by many national judges triggers various questions as to the constitutional underpinnings of 
EU law itself and the virtual place it occupies in the legal sources hierarchy. One thing is 
certain, the tension between the stance the ECJ takes towards the principle of supremacy of 
EU law and the manner most of the national constitutional courts see the problem does not 
                                                 
1031
 See section 5.1 of Chapter 3.  
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contribute to the legibility of the legal environment the judges function in.
1032
 As the stances 
are irreconcilable, the national judge, in case of potential variance of national constitutional 
provisions with EU law provisions, has to opt for one of the options. Such a situation should, 
however, be regarded as pathological and it evidently undermines the legal certainty. As there 
is no clear solution to the problem, many Polish judges seem to take a pragmatic stance 
towards the issue and assume that a situation of disagreement between the national 
Constitution and EU law is impossible in practice. 
 
2.5. Operational context, efficiency and procedural economy  
 
The preceding findings concerning the knowledge of, attitudes towards and experiences with 
EU law should be interpreted in the light of Posner’s claim that “judges are not moral or 
intellectual giants (alas), prophets, oracles, mouthpieces, or calculating machines. They are 
all-too-human workers, responding as other workers do to the conditions of the labour market 
in which they work.”1033 This characterisation very much applies to the Polish civil judge and 
arguably any national judge of other Member States. The focus must, therefore, be on the 
specifics of the daily functioning of a Polish civil judge and the impact thereof on her 
functioning in the context of EU law.  
Chapter 3 illustrates that, with the exception of the perplexing issue of the absolute 
primacy of EU law, the legal constitutional and institutional frameworks in Poland do not, in 
principle, establish any serious obstacles to the fulfilment of the expectations which are put on 
national judges by means of EU law. At the same time though, the legal order does not foresee 
any clear and straightforward rules which would regulate the issue of judicial application of 
EU law. As a matter of fact, neither the Constitution nor the procedural rules explicitly 
mention EU legal order and the role and place thereof in the national legal system. In that 
                                                 
1032
 See Avbelj (2011), pp.760-761 who claims that the necessity of choosing between the models by a judge 
“(…) entails uncertainty for the holders of rights and duties under EU law. Moreover, it is also detrimental for 
the judicial authority, if jurisprudence is torn between two visions of the integration’s legal structure, so that one 
judgment swings in that, another into the opposite direction; or that the same judgment mixes both models (…)” 
1033
 From Posner (2008), p.7. See also Oldfather (2007), p.127 who refers to “myth about the non-human-ness of 
judges.”  
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sense, the judicial tasks attached to EU law are communicated implicitly and many rules apply 
by analogy. This lack of an explicit solution does not seem to create a sufficiently clear legal 
framework for the national judges.  
In addition to the above, the empirical data also suggests that it is the operational 
context the judges function in, which may pose obstacles to the fulfilment of the EU law 
expectations. It occurs that the (most average) Polish civil judge suffers from time constrains 
having their roots in a significant workload and backlog of cases. The empirical research 
revealed a very down-to-earth reality where a judge works as swift as possible to decide her 
cases with justifiable dispatch and in consequence she will resort to the law which is directly 
at her disposal and which she knows relatively well, that is the national law. In that sense, any 
ex officio engagement with consulting EU law or looking for EU law relevance might be seen 
by many of the judges as, to quote one of them, a “hair splitting” exercise and an 
extracurricular activity. As already illustrated, any engagement with EU law sources and the 
legal assessment process, is a time- and effort consuming exercise which becomes even more 
intricate and perplexing if a judge has limited knowledge of EU law.
1034
 This observation 
gains another dimension if seen in the context of the daily judicial functioning paralleled with 
the constant lack of time on the part of judges. As it has been seen a judge’s performance is 
mostly assessed on the basis of backlog statistics and discharge of obligations. Also the 
personal reversal rate plays a role in the evaluation. In consequence, judges’ chances to be 
promoted are very much dependent upon the preceding factors. Put differently, lower instance 
judges have one common goal, i.e. to be as efficient as possible and decide their cases without 
any undue delay. In that sense, procedural economy is one of the primary objectives of a judge 
and therefore the time she has at her disposal seems one of the most precious commodities she 
posses. Yet, the foregoing sections have clearly shown that the processes of gaining the 
knowledge of EU law and engaging within any EU law discourse are intricate, complicated, 
                                                 
1034
 See also Oldfather (2011), p.20 who puts forward that “Even if we assume the ultimate existence of correct 
answer to any moderately complex legal problem, efforts to assess whether a given decision has reached that 
answer requires deep knowledge of both the applicable law and the particular facts and circumstances of the case 
involved. This requires, at a minimum, fully understanding of the facts, the parties’ arguments, and the governing 
legal materials, and thus requires, an assessment process involving as much effort as the court’s decisional 
process.” 
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laborious and time-consuming and therefore they might cause a potential delay with regard to 
all other cases and eventually threaten the fulfilment of normal daily tasks. In that sense, any 
engagement with EU law may even cause adverse effects for a judge for she will very likely 
have to set aside other pending cases in order to get acquainted with EU law in question. This 
gains a special significance for the operationalization of the preliminary ruling procedure 
since in order for a judge to refer a question which does not fall into the acte eclairé or acte 
clair doctrines she must be familiar with the existing jurisprudence in the respective field. Yet, 
the process of law finding will, very likely, be time consuming.  
 As claimed by Vermeule “judges are boundedly rational: their capacity to process 
information they can obtain is limited, in part because of cognitive failings.”1035 The Polish 
civil judge of a lower instance court will, most likely, have rather limited resources to engage 
with the process of EU law-finding.
1036
 Moreover, since EU law is a novel and tangled aspect 
of judicial decision-making which definitely does not enjoy a stable position in the daily 
practice the judge might fear that a particular case where EU law has been referred to and 
applied will run a higher risk of being quashed by an appellate court which again does bear on 
the final assessment of the judicial performance and progression on the career ladder but also 
her reputation with other judges.
1037
 In that sense, not only are there no ‘carrots’ (incentives or 
personal advantages) that could encourage judges to engage with EU law but there are in fact 
many ‘sticks’ (disincentives) present which will dishearten a judge from engagement with EU 
law.
1038
 Next to the above, there is no formal mechanism that would allow for a review of the 
                                                 
1035
 See Vermeule (2006), p.3. Similarly Guthrie et al (2002), p.50 where the authors claim “judges, it seems, are 
human. They appear to fall prey to the same cognitive illusions that psychologist have identified among lay 
persons and other professionals.”  
1036
 It could therefore be agreed with Jackson (2010), p.192 who argues that supreme courts are much better 
equipped to resort to foreign sources of law as their dockets are not that large and they have in overall more 
extensive control over them, they mostly have fewer cases, they are not under the persistent pressure to resolve 
disputes as efficiently as possible and they have a better knowledge of foreign sources of law. Jackson’s analysis 
regards the functioning of the courts in the US but her observations seem relevant for any judicial system in 
Europe. 
1037
 See ibid, p.150 “(…) judges may be understandably reluctant either to invest the time needed to feel 
comfortable relying on those (foreign or international – own annotation by the author) sources or to risk error in 
relying on them without that investment of time. Judges’ rational decisions are necessarily bounded ones, in a 
world exploding with legal information.”  
1038
 There is a considerable research proving that judges, similarly to “ordinary” people, respond to incentives, 
see for instance Choi&Gulati (2004), p.305; Schauer (2000), Ramseyer&Rasmusen (1997). Under the list of 
‘self-interest’ Schauer mentions inter alia: reputation and self-esteem, occupational ambition or peer group, see 
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way judges consult, refer to and apply EU law. Pure calculation of time and costs might 
therefore condition further participation in an EU law discourse.
1039
 Put differently, it may be 
claimed that the operational context in which the Polish civil judges has to work immensely 
bears on the way judges engage with EU law and consequently apply it. In Poland, the 
workload and output numbers seem one the most decisive factors affecting the way judges 
operate and consequently engage with and utilize (if at all) EU law. In that sense, the 
distribution of the resources, i.e. time, knowledge, judicial skills and competences, across the 
different levels of the civil judiciary in Poland explains why it is so perplexing for the 
ordinary civil judge of a lower instance court to become a truly EU law judge.
1040
 Also notions 
such as: costs, benefits or rationality, to name just a few, come to fore and imply the necessity 
of incorporating the insights from the disciplines of law-and-economics and psychology in 
order to accurately reflect the processes of adjudication.
1041
  
 
2.6. The role of the judge and judicial methodology 
  
Parallel to the problem of knowledge of EU law the issue of the judicial methodology and 
more precisely the methods of interpretation and judicial techniques traditionally utilized by 
judges proved to pose a significant obstacle to the operationalization of the EU law 
expectations. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the Polish legal culture rests on textual, positive and 
very formal approach to statutory law. Moreover, a precedent is not considered a formal 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Schauer (2000), pp.625-634.  The author observes however that it is necessary to see the limitations to the claim 
that maximize their personal interests, see pp.634-635.  
1039
 Therefore it should be agreed with Posner who claims that judges are rational and in their behaviour react to 
various benefits and costs (carrots and sticks) attached to different forms of behaviour, see Posner (2000), p.220.  
1040
 See Komarek (2007), pp.486-487 who argues that “(…) being a judge requires experience, education and 
skills not possessed by all judges to the same extent. “Judicial wisdom” is distributed throughout the system 
unevenly – more experienced judges generally sit at the higher courts, as these courts must solve more difficult 
questions. We do not necessarily have to explain the smaller number of references from national supreme (or 
higher) courts by their unwillgness to submit themselves to the Court of Justice authority. An equally sound 
explanation may actually be that they are more competent to deal with complex legal questions.”  
1041
 See Fix-Fierro (2003), p.53.  
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source of law.
1042
 The empirical data corroborated that indeed the above-mentioned 
characteristics of the national legal culture render the integration of EU law into the daily 
judicial practice in Poland difficult.
1043
 Furthermore, the traditional literalist school impedes 
the operationalization of the principle of harmonious interpretation. The teleological method 
which rests on looking for objectives and goals of legislation does not easily fit this traditional 
legalist culture and might be seen as illegitimate and crossing the boundaries of judicial 
function. Needless to say, this problem is a much more complex and intricate one since it may 
not be completely remedied by a “simple” improvement of knowledge of EU law and the 
anticipated change may not be considered an automatic one. It has become evident that it 
requires a significant switch in mentality and attitude towards and views on not only the law 
of European Union but also and most importantly the place and role the judiciary plays in the 
entire legal framework and the process of judicial enforcement of the law. The new role 
evidently expects an active approach on part of the national judge.  
The foregoing goes parallel to the aspect of the position of the judge vis-à-vis the 
national legislator and more precisely to the task of controlling by the judiciary the correctness 
of implementation of EU law by the lawmaker. The qualitative data seem to indicate that 
many of the judges do not seem to find it necessary to consult EU law sources, and more 
specifically, EU directives as they have been implemented by the legislator. In that sense, the 
mere fact of implementation of EU directives implies that it is not necessary to resort to them 
as it is not sensible to question the correctness of the legislative work. This also links to the 
fact that frequently EU law is associated with something that is too sophisticated and sublime 
and too exceptional to have any bearing on the simple and common, in the view of many 
judges, cases which appear before first instance civil courts. Consequently, judges may tend to 
adapt a passive and deferential attitude towards higher (appeal) courts and confine its role to 
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 See note 610 on the problem of the precedential value of the judgments of the ECJ in Poland and the 
doctrinal divergences in that respect presented by the scholars.   
1043
 Brodecki and Majkowska-Szulc claim that as long as the ECJ’s precedents are not recognized as an official 
source of law in Poland, so long the Polish legal culture will not synchronize with the European legal culture and 
the Polish judge will not fulfill the tasks which are put on her by virtue of EU law, see Brodecki&Majkowska-
Szulc (2006), p.57.  
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the mere application of the existing rules to the disputes they are presiding over.
1044
 The task 
of questioning the law, deliberating upon its content and establishing its correct interpretation 
should therefore take place, in view of many surveyed judges, at the higher level of 
adjudication, that is to say at the level of the appeal courts and the Supreme Court.  
  
2.7. Personal attributes of the judge and social psychology  
 
It has been observed by Drobak and North that “non-doctrinal factors and discretion are 
inherent in judicial decision-making.”1045 Indeed, as the qualitative data seems to suggest, 
personal traits of judges might possibly play a role in the way they function in the context of 
EU law. In that sense, individual motivation and ambition, the willingness and courage to step 
out of line and engage with a distinct legal discourse and to participate in the legal integration 
in the European Union might possibly influence the manner she approaches EU law. The 
feeling of commitment to and responsibility for the legal order of the European Union and the 
necessity of ensuring its effectiveness prompt judges to resort to the sources of EU law. This 
process of resorting to EU law sources does not necessarily imply that EU law will be directly 
applied in the pending case but it may be used as a supplementary argument or as an 
interpretative aid. As will be visualized hereafter, those individual attributes of national judges 
seem to determine to a high extent the form of legal consciousness. Finally, the specifics of 
judicial environment and social interaction with other judges may possibly bear on the way 
judges engage with EU law. As the empirical findings in Chapter 4 suggest, self-presentation 
and self-interest and closely connected to it ‘disgrace concerns’ might, arguably, dishearten 
the judge from employing the law and mechanisms which they are not sufficiently familiar 
with. As the qualitative data illustrates, social psychology, and more specifically taking care 
of own prestige, authority and good name among colleagues but also a broader legal 
community may also affect the process of engagement with EU law and particularly the 
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 This deferential attitude towards higher courts was also emphasized during the monitoring of the EU 
accession process, see Open Society Institute (2001), p.310.  
1045
 Drobak&North (2008), p.132.  
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process of dialogue with the ECJ.
1046
 Being afraid of ‘losing one’s face’ which would be 
reflected in, for instance, an improper employment of interpretation of EU legal sources, 
incorrect formulation of a preliminary question or referring a question which falls within the 
acte eclare doctrine might effectively dishearten the judges from resorting to mechanism 
which are novel and not yet fully grasped.  
 
2.8. Naivety of the theoretical model of the national judge as an EU judge  
 
Based on the findings in this study, it may be argued the theoretical model of an EU law judge 
as established by the ECJ reveals an arresting and plausible in writing but certainly an elusive 
legal perspective on the role of a national judge. Indeed, as the study has shown, this 
theoretical model of EU law judge seems to be marked by a high level of abstraction, is a 
naïve reflection of Dworkin’s Hercules judge of “superhuman intellectual power and patience 
who accepts law as integrity”1047 and can by no means reflect the way the national judge 
functions in reality.  
As illustrated, this naivety of the model has several general causes. The first one 
relates to the evident complexity of the multidimensional legal order, intensity of EU 
regulatory processes and the overkill of expectations which are put on the national judiciary 
by means of EU law and which do not always easily accommodate in the national 
constitutional, procedural and operational framework and the local legal culture. The 
foregoing, in turn, introduces much (legal) uncertainty and lack of confidence on part of the 
judges as to the correct way of proceeding in such an intricate legal environment. The second 
ground, which only adds up to the complexity of the situation has its roots in inadequate 
institutional arrangements which result in national judges who are, in many instances, ill-
equipped to function in the context of EU law. All in all, the law of the EU remains a 
somewhat abstract and remote legal order to the majority of the Polish civil judges.
1048
 The 
                                                 
1046
 See section 4.4 of Chapter 4.  
1047
 Dworkin (1996), p.239. See also Bobek, The new European judges and the limits of the possible [in] 
Łazowski (2010), p.127. 
1048
 Interestingly, scholars which conducted a research concerning the impact of EC law on the practicing 
lawyers in the Netherlands and Scotland arrived at congruent conclusions. The authors claim that “It was clear 
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foregoing, in turn, implies that the full coherence of EU law, legal uniformity and legal 
convergence across the European Union are somewhat elusive concepts.  
 
3. Implications of the study for the theory of Legal Consciousness 
 
Next to reflecting on the problem of the daily functioning of national judges as decentralized 
EU judges, the present study aimed at contributing to the socio-legal theory of legal 
consciousness of Ewick and Silbey. This objective was to be achieved by means of anchoring 
vignettes which were included in the quantitative part of the study. As illustrated in section 2 
of the present chapter, the chosen method proved to be marked by several pitfalls though. 
Ultimately, the vignettes delivered invaluable, though rather intricate in terms of 
interpretation, data which complemented the novel picture of the national courts functioning 
in their European capacity. The qualitative part of the study verified what the vignettes had 
already partly reflected. The stances judges take towards the principle of supremacy of EU 
law is only a component of the general picture of the functioning of national judges in their 
EU capacity and the final picture of the present situation may not be based on this agent only. 
It has, in fact, occurred that the approach judges take to the issue of ex officio application of 
EU law is one of the main determinants of legal consciousness. Indeed, the quantitative and 
qualitative data has shown that judges are in clear disagreement with regard to the problem of 
the application of EU law of a judge’s own motion. By and large, the final assessment of the 
existing forms of legal consciousness had to take the qualitative data into account. 
The aforegoing analysis implies that for the purpose of the present study only some of 
the elements of the theory of legal consciousness developed by the mentioned authors may be 
borrowed and applied. For the purposes of the present study, the theory of Ewick and Silbey 
have therefore been reconceptualized in order to adjust to the results gained in the survey and 
the interviews. The empirical findings illustrate that Polish civil judges, similarly to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
from the findings that lawyers felt somewhat distant from the European legal system, they had difficulties in 
gaining access to information, they believed that the inter-relationship between EC and their domestic law was 
too complex, and they found it difficult to keep pace with developments.”, see Őrücü (2007), p.447.  
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characters of the Common place of law, reveal three general forms of legal consciousness with 
regard to European Union law. Each detected form is characterized by features which, 
however, do not entirely overlap with the accounts distinguished by Ewick and Silbey. At the 
same time, the core of each form remains the same as with Ewick and Silbey and rests on 
either the conformity, engagement or resistance model. Consequently, three accounts of legal 
consciousness among the Polish civil judges have been detected, those are: passive formalists, 
EU law activists and EU critics. Each form is characterized by the following attributes:   
 
- A judge archetyped as a passive formalist which partly overlaps with the before the 
law formation will perceive EU law as a distinct, magisterial, autonomous, majestic, 
separate, impartial sphere of law that can be engaged but only in particular situations. 
Frequently EU law will be seen as something irrelevant and abstract. It will be a 
“space outside of everyday life.”1049 Nonetheless, the judge will accept the normativity 
and authority of EU law and will be loyal to it but she will not necessarily engage with 
it so long it is not necessary. A passive formalist may sometimes feel frustrated about 
her own powerlessness
1050
 and possibly about her lack of knowledge of EU law or the 
methods of its application. It may happen that she will not know how to proceed with a 
particular issue regarding EU law. She will, in principle, accept the legal premises of 
EU law, will see EU law as valid and binding but she will not necessarily engage in 
that law of her own motion. Instead, she will, for instance, wait until the parties to the 
proceeding claim that EU law could be at stake and should be applied. Alternatively, 
she may show indifference toward EU law which will most likely origin from the lack 
of adequate knowledge and/or experience with the application of EU law. Put 
differently, she will frequently adopt a passive attitude towards it and therefore she 
will possibly have no or a limited experience with EU law. She will accept the 
significance of the preliminary ruling procedure but she will consider engaging with it 
only in an exceptional situations. Recapitulating, a judge acting before the law will 
                                                 
1049
 Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.76.  
1050
 Ibid, pp.47, 74-108.  
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conform to the law of the European Union but will see it as a remote and distinct 
aspect of the daily practice.  
 
- A judge archetyped as EU law activist which will share some components of the with 
the law paragon, will perceive EU law as an axiomatic part of her daily practice which 
she will unconditionally and eagerly engage with, frequently of her own motion.
1051
 
EU law will be an available and effective instrument that can be used, a tool which 
allows to achieve a multitude of objectives. The objectives are not necessarily purely 
legal in their nature. Satisfying a personal conviction that a national judge is obliged to 
ensure the effectiveness of EU law, to understand the aims of legal provisions, to treat 
EU law as an integral part of adjudication or to give a proper consideration to all 
possible aspects of a dispute may be possible motives which make the judges resort to 
EU law. In this setting, EU law will be operating simultaneously with domestic legal 
provisions and it will be in a frequent interaction with it. The principles of EU law will 
be accepted in their entirety, i.e. they will be perceived as fully binding, legitimate and 
valid. A judge with EU law will not wait for the parties to the proceeding to point out 
that EU law could be at stake. Frequently, she will be unsatisfied with the quality of 
EU law legal arguments which are brought by the parties to the dispute. Judges 
belonging to this group will resort to the preliminary ruling procedure provided that it 
is necessary and the operational context gives room to do so. In sum, a judge acting 
with the law will engage with the law of the European Union and will be committed to 
it, she will perceive it as a fully integral part of the national legal order, i.e. both 
systems will be connected and intertwined.  
 
- A judge having critical and conditional attitude to the European Union legal order 
shares some feature with the against the law embodiment and can be characterized as 
occasionally resistant to EU law, as trying to avoid or omit it and frequently having a 
cynical attitude towards it. At times, EU law will be perceived as an arbitrary product 
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National Judges as EU Law Judges: Reconciling Legal and Social Perspectives  
 
 
 
336 
of power against which she struggles
1052
, as a foreign element which can be escaped 
from. The reasons to escape from EU law or trying to omit or avoid it might be, 
however, of a different nature and origin. The most significant reason seems to relate 
to the fact that EU law adds an unnecessary complexity (technical, interpretative) to 
the legal discourse. Very likely, a critical judge will not accept the principle of 
absolute primacy of EU law.  She will not consider engaging in the preliminary ruling 
procedure, unless there is no room to avoid it. Quite likely she will be somewhat 
cynical about the authority of the European Court of Justice and will not 
unconditionally accept its precedent. It can be observed that the notion of resistance or 
being against does not have to be interpreted in terms of absolute rejection of EU law 
and negation of its binding force. This goes in line with Nielsen who claims that the 
“resistance paradigm is a complex one since the problem of resistance is at the same 
the problem of definition thereof”.1053 As the local constitutional, institutional and 
procedural frameworks constitute constraints to the national judge and will not allow 
her to simply reject or disregard EU law in its entirety, she will use the leeway at her 
disposal, or the vague and ambiguous terrains in the processes of judicial application 
of law which provide for some margin where discretionary powers can be exercised. 
Put differently, the critical judge may tend to use the discretionary space created by 
law to avoid involvement in the EU law discourse and its potential application.  
 
In their study Ewick and Silbey established a scheme reflecting specific dimensions of 
particular Legal Consciousness embodiments.
1054
 Those dimensions are: normativity, 
constraint, capacity time-space and archetype.
1055
 The scheme has been borrowed and applied 
in the present study in order to reflect the main notions and premises which are likely to 
emerge within a specific legal consciousness variation. The subsequent table summarizes and 
                                                 
1052
 Ibid, pp.28, 47, 165-220.  
1053
 Nielsen (2000), p.1086.  
1054
 See Ewick&Silbey (1998), p.82 where the authors observe that: “These dimensions of legal consciousness 
should be understood as axes of interpretation that provide alternative vantage points from which to view 
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1055
 Ibid, pp.82 and 224.  
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complies the foregoing line of discussion. Yet, it should not be seen as rigid and clear-cut 
scheme as the forms of legal consciousness are subject to evolution and change. Also, some 
judges may at times even reflect a contradictory or mixed form of legal consciousness. This 
finding reaffirms Ewick and Silbey’s conclusion that that legal consciousness is not a steady 
phenomenon as it is emergent and moving and evolves with the knowledge and 
experiences.
1056
  
 Engagement with 
EU law 
Passivity towards EU 
law 
Criticisms of EU law 
 
Normativity  
 
 
 
 
EU law unconditionally  
supreme 
 
EU law supreme but  
elusive, abstract and 
frequently 
misinterpreted  
 
National constitution 
supreme 
EU law conditionally 
supreme  
 
Constraint 
 
 
Interpretative doubts 
Technical obstacles: 
access to EU law  
sources,  
procedural efficiency  
 
Operational context 
Time constraints 
Autonomy of the parties 
Lack of a  
cross-border element 
Knowledge  
Lack or limited  
Experience  
Powerlessness  
Uncertainty  
Separation of powers  
 
Complexity  
Tension  
Autonomy of the parties  
Time constraints 
Unjustness of EU law 
Unrightness of EU law 
Access to EU law 
sources 
Limits of knowledge  
Lack or limited 
Experience  
 
                                                 
1056
 See also analysis by Jackson (2010) who distinguishes three forms of postures towards international law 
presented by selected national constitutional courts, those are: resistance, convergence and engagement, see 
pp.8-9. The author stipulates, however, that her classification is “necessarily overdrawn” as the schemes “can 
best be understood as arrayed along a continuum, so that stronger form of engagement may be very similar to 
milder forms of convergence.”, p.9.  
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Capacity 
 
 
 
Self-engagement  
(ex officio)  
Openness  
Courage 
Motivation  
Ambition  
Skills 
Loyalty to EU 
Knowledge  
Experience  
Rules and procedures  
Hierarchy 
Organization   
Heuristics  
 
Judicial discretion 
Flexibility 
Conditional loyalty  
 
 
 
Time/space 
 
 
 
 
Fully integrated  
Intertwining legal 
orders  
 
Distinct  
Abstract  
 
Distinct 
Tension and possible 
collision  
Archetype  Activists  Passive formalists Critics 
 
The preceding discourse highlights that the knowledge of EU law and experience with the 
application of EU law are evidently salient factors bearing on the form of legal consciousness.  
Without a satisfactory knowledge of EU law a judge cannot engage with it of her own motion 
and cannot feel confident about the way she proceeds with EU law. The lack of confidence 
may in turn induce the feelings of frustration and anxiety. Good knowledge of EU law does 
not imply a wide experience with the application of EU law though. Some of those possessing 
good knowledge of EU law (or claiming to posses one) are frequently suppressed from 
engaging with EU law by other factors, such as for instance operational context, a lack of time 
or a lack of motion by the parties to the dispute. Put differently, knowledge of EU law is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for a national judge to become a true agent of EU legal 
order. The incorrect, from the perspective of EU law, way of proceeding with EU law issues 
has its roots in the ignorance of EU law, lack of familiarity with the tools of its application, 
present misconceptions concerning the role of precedent in the process of application. Next to 
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that, the way the judge perceives her role in the legal order and the process of application of 
the law as such is an important determinant of the form of legal consciousness. In addition, the 
degree of openness to the foreign elements and the operational context affect the stance the 
judge takes toward EU law. It has also been shown that all judges regard EU as a positive 
development and the membership as profitable for the country. However, judges belonging to 
the group of activists will reveal a somewhat enthusiastic view of the European Union 
whereas those belonging the group of critics will very likely indicate its drawbacks and 
pitfalls.  
 
4. Reflecting on the theories of legal integration within the EU 
 
The foregoing considerations naturally bring the theories of legal integration within the 
European Union to the fore. Indeed, the empirical results concerning the principle of 
supremacy of EU law and the mechanism of the preliminary ruling which were delivered in 
the course of research combined with normative insights following from the jurisprudence of 
the highest courts open the door to further examination of the existing legal and political 
science theories of legal integration which were mentioned in the General Introduction to this 
study. It needs to be recognized that the methodological approach taken in the present study 
differs from the one taken by the various authors presenting the mentioned theories. It namely 
relies on empirical data that rests on the assumptive reasons judges provided to the question 
whether and why they accept the principle of supremacy of EU law and whether and why they 
would (not) resort to the preliminary ruling procedure. And yet, this data proves to easily lend 
itself to adding a new dimension and additional insights to the existing theoretical paradigms 
and hypotheses.
1057
  
In the course of interviews it has emerged that the theories falling under the neo-
realism school of thought do not seem to gain sufficient support.
1058
 The principle of 
                                                 
1057
 It should be kept in mind in this context that the following hypotheses apply to the Polish civil judiciary only 
and should not be expanded to the context of other branches of judiciary and/or to judiciaries in other Member 
States. 
1058
 For the respective theories see General Introduction, pp.7-11.  
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independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the desire to stay out of any political 
discourse implies that promoting any national interest or political concerns through the 
participation in the preliminary ruling procedure would not be in the interest of judiciary. 
Lower instance judges are mostly focused on providing (swift) solutions to problems of the 
parties before them. In view of the judges, own political preferences ought to be put aside. 
Hence, they do not seem to play any significant role in the way judges of lower level courts 
make their decisions. Moreover, the fact that the Polish civil judge puts more trust in the 
European legislator than the national one could, arguably, indicate that in fact the Polish civil 
judge should eagerly engage with the preliminary ruling procedure which is, as the data 
clearly shows, not the case.  
The judicial empowerment theory, which belongs to the neo-functionalism school of 
thought, seems to gain some, though restrained, support as some of its elements do seem 
plausible and might possibly bear on the way judges behave in the legal integration in the 
European Union.
1059
 From the purely theoretical point of view, the national judge indeed 
seems empowered and advantaged by participating in the construction of the EU legal 
order.
1060
 The question which arises is, however, whether the Polish civil judge (of a lower 
instance court) longs for the empowerment and the new competences and whether she is 
willing to make use thereof. The empirical data suggests that the Polish civil judge does not 
necessarily desire to conduct judicial review and control the legal acts of the parliament. She 
wants to apply the law and find swift solutions to the problems and she does not aspire to 
make the law. She also believes in a good will of the legislator to implement EU law correctly 
and she does not seem to intend to correct its errors and neglects. In that sense, the idea of 
separation of powers seems to have quite strong bearing on the functioning of Polish civil 
judges and, from that perspective, the empowerment doctrine does not seem to gain much 
empirical support. However, judicial empowerment seen through the prism of “the personal 
self-aggrandisement which comes from directly participating in Community-building”1061 
might indeed have influence on some judges who, in turn, will quite likely belong to the group 
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1060
 See Stone Sweet (2000), p.165.  
1061
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of the ‘activist’ legal consciousness.1062 For the majority of the judges, though, the active 
participation in legal integration within the EU may bring about results which may be, as a 
matter of fact, converse to empowerment. As it was illustrated, resorting to EU law and 
foremost participating in the preliminary ruling mechanism might even cause disadvantageous 
effects on the position and authority of a judge. In that sense, participating in the process of 
legal integration may, in fact, bring about results which would be reverse to the judicial 
empowerment hypothesis.
1063
 By and large, Kilpatrick can be followed who claims that the 
judicial empowerment doctrine can partly explain the manner judges engage with EU law but 
it is not the only or the most significant explanation.
1064
  
Alter’s theory of inter-court competition does not seem to gain enough support and 
have much relevance in the context of functioning of Polish civil courts either. From the 
empirical data it follows that it is not clear how national lower courts could enhance their 
position vis-à-vis other levels of judiciary through the participation in the preliminary ruling 
mechanism. Conversely, the Polish judiciary as a whole should be viewed in terms of team 
and cooperation in lieu of competition or strategic actions. Also, the deferential stance the 
lower courts take towards the higher courts should be underscored. The claim of Alter that 
lower court judges are less interested with ensuring coherence across the legal system does not 
seem to go along with the empirical findings for Poland. As the qualitative data seems to 
suggest, the uniformity and coherence of jurisprudence are in fact one of the primary 
objectives of the lower courts judges.
1065
 The intricacies of the national judicial structure, the 
hierarchy and distribution of tasks between different levels of judiciary which are reflected in, 
inter alia, procedural law but also custom and local legal culture tell against interpreting the 
entire system through the prism of power seeking.
1066
 In the end the primary objective of 
judges is to deliver as many correct legal decisions as possible, instead of competing with 
                                                 
1062
 See preceding section of the present chapter.  
1063
 See also Wind (2010), pp.1039-1063 who rejects the theory of Alter and suggest that her thesis cannot be 
generalized and stretched to the way judges behave in the process of European Union integration as such.  
1064
 See Kilpatrick (1998), p.137.  
1065
 See Alter (2001), p.49 where the author claims that “Lower court judges, with the luxury of focusing only at 
the case at hand, are usually less concerned with the coherence of the national legal system.”  
1066
 In that regard the author agrees with the critic lavished upon Alter by various writers. See for instance 
Kilpatrick (2001), p.3; Micklitz (2005), pp.432-433; Wind (2010), p.1045.  
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each other. This is in line with Micklitz who argues, contrary to Alter, that it is not about the 
competition between the lower courts and the higher courts, but the desire to resolve disputes, 
which is the driving force behind the preliminary references made by the lower courts.
1067
 
Also, a new trend in referring questions to the ECJ is increasingly more present in the 
jurisprudence of the Court as judges more frequently come across problems with interpreting 
and applying the directly applicable provisions of EU regulations in the field of cross-border 
cooperation between national courts.
1068
 It that sense, resorting to the mechanism of 
preliminary ruling does not necessarily have to origin in the problem of potential 
incompliance of national provisions with EU law but it follows from an explicit problem of 
interpretation of EU law provisions. This increasingly more relevant trend adds another 
dimension to the theories of legal integration within the EU.  
Another doctrinal stream which builds on the judicial empowerment doctrine focuses 
predominantly on the role of private actors in propelling the legal integration machine.
1069
 
Indeed, from the empirical data it emphatically follows that without the engagement of private 
litigants with the EU law discourse, without their activity in bringing the aspects of EU law 
before the courts EU law will not easily be mainstreamed in the daily practice of the Polish 
civil courts. Consequently, also the procedure of the preliminary ruling will remain a 
somewhat empty notion if the litigants do not pressure the judges to resort it. By and large, the 
role of private litigants in the process of legal integration in the EU deserves strong emphasis. 
As the practice in Poland shows, private litigants do not yet seem to be fully aware of the 
potential power EU law gives at their disposal.   
With everything considered, a very nuanced legalist approach to the legal 
integration
1070
 informed by some insights from the resource-constrained team theory of 
Kornhauser
1071
 and Ramos
1072
, behavioural economics presented by Posner
1073
 and the theory 
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 See Micklitz (2005), p.433.  
1068
 In the last five years there have been 48 references from national courts in which the problem of 
interpretation of Brussels I Regulation was at stake with Austrian and German courts having resorted to the 
mechanism most often.  
1069
 See General Introduction, p.9 and note 29.  
1070
 As named by Alter, Explaining national courts acceptance of ECJ [in] Slaughter et al (1998), p.231.  
1071
 Kornhauser (1995), p.1612 who sees the judicial system as a team in which all members share a common 
goal ”to maximize the expected number of correct answers.” See also Torres Perez (2009), p.132 
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of self-presentation of Baum
1074
 seems to be of utmost relevance for the purposes of the 
present study. Such a thesis is premised on the assumption that judges reconcile with the 
principle of supremacy of EU law and engage with the preliminary ruling procedure because 
of the coercive nature of EU law and its logic. The responses to the anchoring vignettes and 
the qualitative part of the study clearly show that many judges take a very legalistic approach 
to EU law and the principle of supremacy thereof. In accordance with the advanced by the 
judges arguments, Poland has become a member of the European Union and by doing so it 
agreed to observe and apply its rules and principles. Similarly, it is commonly recognized that 
the Court of Justice is the only body having the competence to interpret EU law. The 
obligation to observe those principles is underpinned by the national Constitution and it 
extends to the judiciary as well. In view of the judges, it is a fact that cannot be subjected to 
any resistance, rejection or political inclinations. Likewise, the participation in the procedure 
of the preliminary ruling will very likely have formal motives. The paramount source of the 
subordination to EU law is the principle of good legal policy and the authority of the law and 
the European Court of Justice as one of its creators. In a similar vein, disobeying decisions of 
the Court would simply mean breach of the law. Finally, the need to ensure uniformity and 
coherence of the legal system and judicial decisions across the country but also across the 
European Union seem to occupy a supreme place in the hierarchy of judicial principles. The 
virtual fulfilment of the obligations stemming from EU law is, however, very much dependent 
on the operational framework the judge functions in which include, inter alia, time constrains, 
efficiency expectations, organizational goals of judges, division of labour and the 
methodology the judges are accustomed with. What is more, social psychology and personal 
merits, skills and cognitive capabilities and the way judges respond to their working 
environment and strive at being perceived as being capable of doing their work have to be 
taken into consideration. The fact that judges are hesitant to involve into the preliminary 
ruling procedure does not imply that they are hostile to EU law, do not comply with it or reject 
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1073
 See Posner (2000) and his theory of judges as “rational maximizers”.  
1074
 See Baum (2006) and Oldfather (2007).  
National Judges as EU Law Judges: Reconciling Legal and Social Perspectives  
 
 
 
344 
the principle of its supremacy.
1075
 Arguably, many judges would be willing to resort to the 
mechanism of preliminary ruling but various contextual aspects will first be taken into 
consideration, the process of balancing different arguments will take place which may finally 
result in an attempt to resolve the EU law problem on a judge’s own, without involving the 
ECJ. Therefore, an active participation of national judges in the mechanism of the dialogue 
with the ECJ indicates a far-going integration of EU law in the national legal order and its 
mainstreaming in the processes of adjudication. Yet, the fact that national judges do not refer 
preliminary questions does not need to imply that they do not recognize EU law or reject it. In 
that sense, the relatively low number of preliminary questions sent by the Polish civil judges 
can by no means indicate the rejection of the EU law. The preliminary ruling should therefore 
be seen as a rather exceptional mechanism and not an axiomatic and natural tool which the 
judge eagerly resorts to.
1076
  
What is more, limited knowledge of EU law or understanding the system works may 
cause (unintended) judicial mistakes and result in for instance ignorance of or incompliance 
with EU law.
1077
 This again supports the legalist approach to the process of legal integration 
which claims that incompliance with EU law might simply be caused by judicial mistakes 
which are linked to the lack of adequate knowledge of EU law.
1078
 Likewise, the account 
provided by Brunnel and Stone Sweet who assume that judges prefer to dispose of their cases 
as efficiently as possible is very much in line with the foregoing.
1079
 Some judges will 
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 This goes in line with Claes and Vink who claim that “when explaining the use of the procedure across 
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therefore be more willing to consume EU law than other. This finding is also supported if the 
branch of civil judiciary is juxtaposed with the administrative jurisdiction in Poland. As 
existing research shows the administrative courts are confronted with EU law issues on a daily 
basis due to the intense regulatory activity of the EU in this area of adjudication. 
Consequently, administrative judges resort to the preliminary ruling procedure on a much 
more frequent basis.
1080
 The patchwork EU legislative activity in the private law area implies 
that civil judges are confronted with EU law problems rather sporadically whereby they 
engagement with the preliminary ruling procedure would also be exceptional. In that sense, 
the process of Europeanization of adjudication takes a sectoral form and should, therefore, 
also be scrutinized as such.
1081
 
With everything considered, it is impossible to generate one, and absolute theory 
which would, moreover, apply to the judiciaries of all the Member States. In fact, nearly all 
existing theories provide for valuable and insightful explanations of judicial behaviour in the 
process of legal integration within the European Union but none of them should be taken for 
granted and applied without reservations.  
 
5.  Embracing the future: implications and recommendations  
 
From the preceding sections a complex and somewhat perplexing picture of the functioning of 
national judges as EU judges looms. On the one hand it has been shown that the theoretical 
model of a national judge as created and expected by the European Court of Justice is 
somewhat naïve and difficult (but not impossible) to be met in practice. On the other hand, 
many judges seems to lack appropriate skills to properly function in the EU capacity and the 
legal environment they function in does not necessarily create optimal circumstances to fulfill 
all the expectations. In that sense, the study delivers further evidence that the progress towards 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
of the day having disposed of more, rather than fewer, work-related problems. As the percentage of cases 
involving EC law rises, so do judicial incentives to master the tools that are most appropriate for the job, and 
those tools have been supplied by the European Court. Judges that do not need these tools will be more reticent 
to master them, and have less reason to be concerned with the overall effectiveness of EC law (…)”.  
1080
 See Jaremba (2011).  
1081
 See Wind et al (2009), p.74.  
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the legal convergence and coherence and the uniform application of EU law across the Union 
remain elusive concepts.   
Yet, even though there seems to be a considerable gap between the model of a national 
judge as expected by EU law and its possible shape in practice, this should not imply that 
nothing can be done to overcome the obstacles, even if only partly. Hence, the broad scope of 
the study results in a wide range of recommendations and suggestions which might facilitate 
the functioning of national judges in the EU law capacity. The subsequent suggestions are 
premised on a realistic and not idealistic attitude towards possible changes which implies that 
they are of essentially practical and pragmatic character and they pertain to both legal and 
extra-legal aspects of the legal and judicial environment. The most significant proposals relate 
to the core problem of disseminating EU law knowledge and possible procedural adjustments 
in national law. The following recommendations concern in particular the situation in Poland 
but many of them have a much broader dimension and are applicable to other Member States.  
 
5.1. Training in EU law, specialization and socialization 
 
The multifarious evidence included in this study suggests that that the problem of a lack of 
knowledge of EU law among national judiciaries is widespread across the Member States, 
albeit the intensification of the problem might take different degrees in particular countries. 
The problem of education in EU law should, therefore, be given more concern and the 
solutions should pertain to system of education at all levels, be it university legal education or 
judicial vocational training. It is reasonable to infer that without a certain amount of 
confidence with regard to the knowledge of EU law and the way the entire multi-level system 
works, the national judge will remain rather skeptical, hesitant or closed towards it in her daily 
practice.
1082
 Yet this is only one side of the story. From both studies it follows that the 
massiveness and complexity of Union’s law which is of a piecemeal character leads to the 
situation where the whole body of EU law can never be captured. In that respect, it seems 
                                                 
1082
 See Law&Chang (2011), pp.39-43 in which the authors claim that the most plausible reason of resorting to 
foreign law by justices is educational and professional background of judges. The authors juxtaposed Taiwanese 
Constitutional Court and the US Supreme Court justices.  
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unrealistic to expect national judges to know the entire body of EU law as it is unrealistic to 
require judges to know the entire body of national law. Instead it is rational to expect that a 
judge is familiar with the body of EU law (including jurisprudence of the ECJ) in the domain 
she adjudicates in. The foregoing may however become somewhat perplexing in case of those 
lower instance civil law judges who are daily confronted with cases of heterogeneous 
character. These findings naturally underscore the necessity of further specialization in the 
judiciary which could also facilitate the functioning of national judges in the context of EU 
law.   
For the change in the way judges approach EU law to take hold a significant 
modification in the way the law is taught both during the legal studies and the professional 
legal training thereafter is necessary. First of all, the aspects of EU material law ought to be 
mainstreamed in the teaching of any domain of national law. In that sense, while teaching 
private, company or labour law the relevance of EU directives should be given a proper 
consideration. Secondly, the rules of the internal market and the four freedoms should be 
given adequate attention. Third, during the judicial and vocational training judges should 
clearly be made aware of the expectations which are put on them by means of EU law which 
follow from the principles of direct effect, supremacy, indirect effect and the procedure of the 
preliminary ruling. Teaching of EU law itself also should be concentrated on the meaning of 
these tenets but foremost their practical relevance. As it has been illustrated in this study, 
judges mostly learn through practical experience. Hence, the vocational training should rest on 
practical examples of application of EU law based on hypothetical cases which are necessarily 
embedded in the local legal and factual circumstances. The positivistic and doctrinal manner 
of teaching the law, still so firmly present in the Polish legal education, can by no means 
provide national judges with relevant knowledge of EU law and adequate skills for its further 
application.  
A coherent, free of charge, transparent system of trainings available to any judge who 
wishes to broaden her knowledge in that respect seems indispensible. It should also not be 
forgotten that trainings (in EU law) play an important socialization role. Judges can learn from 
each other, share their problems attached to the application of EU law they came across EU 
and share their solutions. Those who have not dealt with EU law might, in turn, learn from 
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their colleagues that EU law aspects will sooner or later appear in their own practice as well.  
Finally, a free and transparent access to all sources of EU law should be warranted to each and 
every judge. Even though the foregoing may seem axiomatic but the practice shows otherwise. 
 
5.2. Procedural aspects: legibility, transparency, recognition and accessibility  
 
Judges of lower instance courts prefer to work with clear procedural rules which provide them 
with explicit, ready-made solutions in specific situations. It seems necessary that the 
Constitution explicitly recognizes the membership of the country in the European Union and 
the place of its sources of law in the national legal order. In that sense, EU law would become 
‘domesticated’ and officially integrated in the national system. Likewise, introduction of 
concrete provisions regulating the preliminary ruling to the ECJ in the Polish Code of Civil 
Procedure seems one of the steps which could be undertaken by the legislator in order to ease 
the functioning of national judge as EU law judge. Furthermore, the legislative amendments 
which aim at implementing EU law directives should be given a proper recognition. In that 
sense, the elements introduced to national law in the course of implementation of EU 
directives should clearly be distinguished in the civil code and other legislative acts. This 
could easily be achieved by for instance printing the implementing provisions in different 
color/other italics.  
 In addition, the perplexing aspect of access to (translated!) jurisprudence of the ECJ 
should be given even more attention. It has abundantly been made clear that that the lack of 
proper translation of ECJ’s case-law, especially that preceding the membership, is a large 
technical obstacle for the adequate functioning of national judges in their EU law capacity. In 
this context it has to be welcomed that translations of the recent case-law of the ECJ improved 
substantially which should be seen as a positive sign.   
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5.3. Jurisprudence of the higher courts and the national doctrine: call for 
coherence and unanimity  
 
Both the Constitutional Tribunal but foremost the Supreme Court should continue their work 
in educating the judges how they are expected to approach EU law and fulfill their 
expectations following from it. In that respect two aspects are of utmost importance. First of 
all, the highest courts and consequently the doctrine should emphasize the relevance, authority 
and role of the ECJ’s precedent for jurisprudence. Second, it is of utmost importance that 
contradictory signals with regard to the role of ECJ’s precedent are avoided. The foregoing 
also applies to the legal scholarship which does not seem to send a straightforward message to 
the judges in that respect.
1083
 
  
6. Suggestions for further research 
 
As the present study reveals, a purely theoretical and normative approach is unsatisfactory to 
explain the functioning of national judges in the context of EU law and the “habit of 
obedience”1084 attached to EU law. The political science scholarship, which is at abundance, 
seems to frequently play down the normative factors which are at stake. It that sense, 
empirical research based on, inter alia, individual experiences of legal actors with EU law 
which is well informed by the normative insights but open to other potential political, 
psychological, sociological, behavioral or economical determinants very much enriches the 
existent picture of the national judge as EU law judge. The present study reveals that there is a 
great deal of empirical and multidisciplinary research yet to be done in the field of the 
functioning of national courts in their European capacity and the implementation of EU law at 
the national level in general. Numerous further research questions are prompted which go 
along three general lines.  
First, the present study pertains to the issue of EU law at a very aggregate level. It 
nevertheless highlights that there is great deal of uncertainty and practical problems attached 
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 See note 610.  
1084
 From Weiler (1993), p.423.  
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to more specific aspects of the application of EU law such as, for instance, the cross-border 
judicial cooperation and the application of the EU regulations in this area or the application of 
the EU principle of proportionality. In that respect, the practical experiences of national judges 
with those aspects seem interesting issues to be investigated. Parallel to that there is a problem 
of the functioning of criminal law judges in their EU capacity. The Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced changes in the area of criminal law, which are for instance reflected in the 
availability of the preliminary ruling procedure, that put a whole range of questions to the 
fore. Those relate to for instance the state of preparation of criminal judges to the functioning 
in their EU capacity and the possible obstacles they may run to while exercising their EU 
competences.  
The second aspect relates to the process of national implementation of the judgments 
of the ECJ by the courts which referred their questions to the ECJ. This could be done from 
two points of departure: a purely normative one where national rulings implementing the 
ECJ’s decisions are analyzed and an empirical one where the concerned judges are questioned 
about their experiences with the implementation of the respective ruling to the case at hand 
and possible problems attached to. This could share more light on the process of specific 
implementation of ECJ’s jurisprudence and the compliance behaviour of judges.1085 Such 
study would also contribute to the discussion on the issue of legitimacy of the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ as the national judges are the very customers of its rulings. In this context the views 
of judges on the methodology of the ECJ, the clarity and style of its case-law and the 
practicability and feasibility of the judgments could be investigated. Such a study would not 
only allow to see the potential problems attached to the implementation of ECJ’s judgments. It 
would also give a food for thought for the Court itself which in turn could contribute to, on the 
one hand, the enhancement of the judicial dialogue between the European Union Court judges 
and the national judges and, on the other hand, strengthening the Court’s authority.  
Third, the problem of judicial application of EU law should also be examined from the 
other side, i.e. from the point of view of the legal actors who represent their clients before the 
national courts and their reception of EU law and the place they assign it in their daily 
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 For examples of research in this area see for instance Nyikos (2003). 
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practice.
1086
 The research concerning the behavior of litigants in the context of EU law 
combined with the insights from the present study would provide a much broader and 
complete picture of the Europeanisation of the judicial discourse in the EU Member States.  
Finally, the system of national implementation of EU law is not constrained to the 
aspect of adjudication itself as the issue should be seen through the wider prism. In that sense, 
not only the functioning of judiciary system but also the impact of EU law on the 
governmental authorities and the compliance behaviour of national civil servants needs to be 
addressed.
1087
  
 
7.  Final remarks: taming the Fox  
 
In the course of the process of Europeanisation, the legal, including judiciary, systems of the 
Member States and of the EU have been brought and bound together. In order to properly act 
in their EU capacity the national judges ought to understand the different nature of the role 
they are expected to play in this multidimensional legal order. They must understand that they 
are functioning in the context of increasingly more homogenous European legal order. 
National judges must not and cannot be passive actors in the process of legal integration in the 
European Union.
1088
 They are expected to actively participate in the construction of a common 
legal order and should engage with and remain in dialogue with the ECJ.
1089
 Non-fulfillment 
of this duty can seriously compromise the unity and effet utile of EU law across the Union. 
The success of fulfillment of this new role attached to EU law rests upon several necessary 
components such as adequate knowledge of EU law, good will of national judges to 
collaborate and contribute to the common European Union project but also a favourable 
constitutional, procedural and operational environment. All in all, the present study reaffirms 
                                                 
1086
 For a limited in scope research concerning Dutch and Scottish lawyers see Őrücü (2007), pp.435-449.   
1087
 It is necessary to observe that there is limited amount of congruent scholarship work done by political science 
scholars. See work of Mastenbroek (2010) (2011) on the impact of EU law on the functioning of Dutch civil 
servants and the Europeanisation of governmental authorities in the Netherlands.  
1088
 This claim is expressed in many other studies, see for instance Groussot et al (2009), p.109. 
1089
 From Maduro (2007), p.30.  
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the finding that the developments in the sphere of law must always be read in a much broader 
context.
1090
  
When addressing the question whether national courts function as decentralized EU 
courts legal scholarship seems to be preoccupied with the question whether national judges 
ensure the supreme position of EU law in their legal systems. The present study supports the 
observation that confining the academic discourse concerning the functioning of national 
courts in European capacity to the problem of acceptance of the principle of supremacy of EU 
law by national judiciaries is, arguably, not a satisfactory approach for the overall assessment 
of the reception of the EU legal order by national judiciaries. Being an EU judge does not 
confine itself to ensuring that the law of the European Union takes a supreme position vis-à-
vis national law but goes much beyond that. It is presently put forward that situations when 
judges utterly reject EU law and the principle of its supremacy are in fact pathological and 
exceptional. If national judges indeed proceed so then they do not necessarily do it just for the 
sake of rejecting the place of EU law in the national legal order but, very likely, there are 
other factors having influence thereupon. To truly understand the functioning of national 
judges as EU judges it is necessary to investigate how they approach, inter alia, the obligation 
to apply EU law ex officio which seems to be of the most absorbing but at the same time most 
confusing EU law aspects attached to the functioning of national courts as decentralized EU 
courts.  
This study has shown that the functioning of Polish civil courts, and arguably any 
court in each Member State, as EU courts is a complex issue comprising of various legal and 
extra-legal variables. For the time-being EU law seems to remain a somewhat abstract, remote 
and therefore also to some extent irrelevant and unexplored aspect of the judicial decision-
making for many civil judges in Poland. In anticipating the ways the process will develop in 
the future it should be taken into consideration that the novelty of the entire system 
comprising new mechanism and the way they work requires adapting time for national 
lawyers
1091
 as “one only understands the things that one tames.”1092 In that sense the Polish 
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 From Dehousse (1998), p.4.  
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 From Volcansek (1986), p.251 where the author claims that “Active use of the mechanisms, which implies 
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civil judges and the whole judiciary system are currently only at the beginning of a complex, 
yet definitely fascinating, process of Europeanisation. The process of domesticating the Fox 
has commenced but it has been progressing with somewhat little steps.
1093
 Yet, envisaging the 
way the situation might develop in the future is necessarily conjectural as it is dependent upon 
various factors which are essential to facilitate the process. So long as the Fox is not fully 
tamed nearly any case comprising EU law element will be an indeterminate and hard case.
1094
 
“Hard cases, it is said, make bad law.”1095 They may also generate bad feelings between 
judges.
1096
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
be confused with resistance. Where knowledge of Community law was attainable in a tangible way, acceptance 
of Community norms was more rapid.”  
1092
 De Saint-Exupéry (2000), p.70.  
1093
 See Jupille&Caporaso (2009), p.205 for the “indigenization model”. The authors put forward that national 
courts “gradually domesticate previously alien concepts.” The authors test the principles of EU law such as: 
purposive interpretation, proportionality and legitimate expectations which were alien to the British legal 
tradition.  
1094
 Traditionally, the term “hard case” is used to describe a difficult case to which a solution is not 
straightforward due to different interpretations of law which can affect the clarity thereof. As it is put by 
Dworkin “when a particular law-suit cannot be brought under a clear rule of law, laid down by some institution 
in advance, then the judge has, according to that theory, a discretion to decide the case either way”, see Dworkin 
(1978), p.81. In the context of present project the term “hard case” is used to describe a case in which the 
overlaps of different legal systems, the interpretative doubts attached to this and different judicial mechanisms 
which are supposed to be applied, leave a judge in situation where clear-cut legal answers are scarce. In that 
sense, the Dworkin’s Hercules judge gains a new dimension in the context of EU legal order, see ibid, p.105.  
1095
 Legal maxim attributed to John Campbell Argyll (1678-1743).  
1096
 See Oxford dictionary of proverbs (2003), p.156.  
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ANNEX I 
 
EU acquis in the field of private law
1097
 
 
 
Consumer Protection and Contract Law Directives:  
○ Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products as amended by Directive 
1999/34/EC, OJ L 210/29 as amended by directive 1999/34/EC, OJ L 141/20; the so called Products Liability 
Directive.  
 
○ Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contacts negotiated 
away from business premises, OJ L 372/31.  
 
○ Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States 
relating to self-employed commercial agents, OJ L 382/17. 
 
○ Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member states concerning consumer credit as modified by Directive 90/88/EEC, 
98/7/EEC and 2008/48/EC, OJ L 42/48. 
 
○ Council Directive 92/59/EEC of 29 June 1992 on general product safety, OJ L 228/24. 
 
○ Council Directive 89/109/EEC of 21 December 1988 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to materials and articles intended to come into contact with foodstuffs, OJ L 40/38. 
 
○ Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and package tours, OJ L 
158/59. 
 
○ Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L 95/29. 
 
○ Directive 94/47/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 October 1994 on the protection of 
purchasers in respect of certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the right to use immovable 
properties on a timeshare basis,  OJ L 280/83.  
 
○ Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of 
consumers in respect of distance contracts, OJ L 144/19. 
 
○ Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on consumer protection 
in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, OJ L 80/27. 
 
○ Directive 1999/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 June 1999 amending Directive 
89/398/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to foodstuffs intended for particular 
nutritional uses, OJ L 172/38. 
 
○ Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the 
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171/12. 
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○ Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labeling, presentation and advertising of 
foodstuffs as amended by Directive 2003/89/EC, OJ L 109/29 and OJ L 308/15 respectively. 
 
○ Directive 2001/95/EC of 3 December 2001 on general product safety, OJ L 11/4.   
 
○ Directive 2002/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 June 2002 on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member states relating to food supplements, OJ L 183/51. 
 
○ Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the 
distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directives 90/619/ EEC, 97/7/EC and 
98/27/EC, OJ L 271/16. 
 
○ Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products, OJ L 152/16. 
 
○ Directive 2004/35/CE of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage, OJ L 143/56. 
 
○ Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the 
internal market and amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) 
No 2006/2004, OJ L 149/22. 
 
○ Directive 2006/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2006 – Unfair Commercial 
Practices directive, OJ L 149/22. 
 
○ Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ L 376/36. 
 
System of Payments Directives: 
○ Directive 97/5/EC of the European Parliament and Council on cross-border credit transfers, OJ L 43/25. 
 
○ Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in 
payment and securities settlement systems, OJ L 166/45. 
 
○ Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late 
payment in commercial transactions, OJ L 200/35. 
 
○ Directive 2007/64/EC of the. European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment 
services in the internal market, OJ L 319/1. 
 
Electronic Commerce and Communication Directives: 
○ Directive 99/93 of 13 December 1999 the European Parliament and Council on a Community framework for 
electronic signatures, OJ L 13/12. 
 
○ Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178/1. 
 
○ Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and 
users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108/51. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
ANNEX I 
 
 
 
357 
Financial Services and Insurance Directives: 
○ Council Directive 79/267/EEC of 5 March 1979 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life insurance as amended by directive 
90/619/EEC and later by Directive 92/96/EEC, OJ L 63/1, OJ L 330/50 and OJ L 360/1 respectively. 
 
○ Council Directive 79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979 coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to 
official stock exchange listing, OJ L 66/21. 
 
○ Council Directive 80/390/EEC of 17 March 1980 co-coordinating the requirements for the drawing up, 
scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the admission of securities of official stock 
exchange listing as amended by Directive 87/345/EEC, OJ L 100/1 and OJ L 185/81 respectively.   
 
○ Council Directive 82/121/EEC of 15 February 1982 on information to be published on a regular basis by 
companies the shares of which have been admitted to official stock-exchange listing, OJ L 48/26. 
 
○ Council Directive 87/344/EEC of 22 June 1987 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to legal expenses insurance, OJ L 185/77.  
 
○ Council Directive 88/627/EEC of 12 December 1988 on the information to be published when a major holding 
in a listed company is acquired or disposed of, OJ L 348/62. 
 
○ Council Directive 89/298/EEC of 17 April 1989 co-coordinating the requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny 
and distribution of the prospectus to be published when transferable securities are offered to the public,  OJ L 
124/8. 
 
○ Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ L 334/30. 
 
○ Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to direct insurance other than life assurance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 
88/357/EEC, OJ L 228/ 1, the so-called third non-life Insurance Directive. 
 
○ Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field, OJ L 141/27. 
 
○ Directive 96/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 March 1996 amending Directive 
89/647/EEC as regards recognition of contractual netting by the competent authorities, OJ L 85/17. 
 
○ Council Directive 98/29/EC of 7 May 1998 on the harmonisation of the main provisions concerning export 
credit insurance for transactions with medium and long-term cover, OJ L 148/22.  
 
○ Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of 
securities to official stock exchange listing and on information to be published on those securities as amended by 
Directive 2003/71/EC, Directive 2004/109/EC and Directive 2005/1/EC, OJ L 46/11, OJ L 345/64, OJ L 390/38 
and OJ L 79/9 respectively. 
 
○ Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life 
assurance, OJ L 345/1.  
 
○ Directive 2002/92/EC of 9 December 2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council on insurance 
mediation, OJ L 9/3.  
 
○ Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance and 
amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 92/49/EEC as well as Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC, OJ L 
323/1, OJ L 228/3, OJ L 168/21,OJ L 330/1 and OJ L 345/1 respectively.  
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○ Fifth Directive 2005/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 amending Council 
Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 2000/26/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, 
OJ L 149/14, OJ L 103/1, OJ L 8/17, OJ L 172/1, OJ L 129/33, OJ L 181/65 respectively.  
 
○ Directive 2007/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 amending Council 
Directive 92/49/EEC and Directives 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as regards 
procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in 
the financial sector, OJ L 247/1. 
 
Intellectual Property Directives: 
○ First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member states 
relating to trade marks, OJ L 40/1. 
 
○ Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 122/42. 
 
○ Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain related to 
copyrights in the field of intellectual property, OJ L 346/61. 
 
○ Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the co-ordination of certain rules concerning copyright 
and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ L 248/15. 
 
○ Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain 
related rights, OJ L 290/9. 
 
○ Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of 
databases, OJ L 77/20.   
 
○ Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of topographies of semiconductor 
products, OJ L 24/36. 
 
○ Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions, OJ L 213/13. 
 
○ Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal 
protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access, OJ L 320/54. 
 
○ Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection 
of designs, OJ L 289/28. 
 
○ Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society, OJ L 167/10. 
 
○ Directive 2001/37/EC of the European  Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, 
presentation and sale of tobacco products, OJ L 194/26.  
 
○ Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, OJ L 108/7. 
 
○ Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights (corrected version), OJ L 195/16. 
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Company Law Directives:  
○ First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection 
of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the 
Community, OJ L 65/8. 
 
○ Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the 
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability 
companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent 
as amended by Council Directive 92/101/EEC of 23 November 1992, OJ L 26/1 and OJ L 347/64 respectively.  
 
○ Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty concerning 
mergers of public limited liability companies, OJ L 295/36. 
 
○ Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty, concerning 
the division of public limited liability companies, OJ L 378/47. 
 
○ Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on 
consolidated accounts, OJ L 193/1. 
 
○ Eighth Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 April 1984 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the 
approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents, OJ L 126/20. 
 
○ Council Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 December 1986 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks 
and other financial institutions, OJ L 372/1.   
 
○ Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in respect 
of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of another State, OJ L 
395/36. 
 
○ Twelfth Council Company Directive 89/667/EEC of 21 December 1989 on single-member private limited-
liability companies, OJ L 395/40. 
 
○ Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, 
divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member States, as 
amended by Council Directive 2005/19/EC of 17 February 2005 and Council Directive 2006/98/EC, OJ L 225/1, 
OJ L 58/19 and OJ L 363/129 respectively.  
 
○ Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of 
parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States as amended by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 
22 December 2003, OJ L 225/6 and OJ L 7/41 respectively.  
 
○ Council Directive 90/604/EEC of 8 November 1990 amending Directive 78/660/EEC on annual accounts and 
Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts as concerns the exemptions for small and medium-sized 
companies and the publication of accounts in ecus, OJ L 317/57. 
 
○ Council Directive 90/605/EEC of 8 November 1990 amending Directive 78/660/EEC on annual accounts and 
Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts as regards the scope of those Directives, OJ L 317/60. 
 
○ Council Directive 91/674/EEC of 19 December 1991 on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of 
insurance undertakings, OJ L 374/7. 
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○ Council Directive 92/101/EEC of 23 November 1992 amending Directive 77/91/EEC on the formation of 
public limited-liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, OJ L 347/64.   
 
○ Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in 
payment and securities settlement systems, OJ L 166/45. 
 
○ Directive 98/78/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 1998 on the supplementary 
supervision of insurance undertakings in an insurance group, OJ L 330/1. 
 
○ Directive 2001/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 amending 
Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC and 86/635/EEC as regards the valuation rules for the annual and 
consolidated accounts of certain types of companies as well as of banks and other financial institutions, OJ L 
283/28. 
 
○ Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives 
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts of certain 
types of companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, OJ L 178/16. 
 
○ Directive 2003/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 amending Council 
Directive 68/151/EEC, as regards disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies, OJ L 221/13. 
 
○ Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, OJ L 
142/12. 
 
○ Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial 
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 145/1. 
 
○ Directive 2006/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 amending directive 
2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments, as regards certain deadlines, OJ L 114/60.  
 
○ Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border 
mergers of limited liability companies, OJ L 310/1. 
 
○ Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of 
annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and 
repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC, OJ L 157/87. 
 
○ Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated 
accounts, 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial institutions 
and 91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of insurance undertakings, OJ L 224/1. 
 
○ Directive 2006/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 amending Council 
Directive 77/91/EEC as regards the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and 
alteration of their capital, OJ L 264/32. 
 
○ Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain 
rights of shareholders in listed companies, OJ L 184/17. 
 
○ Directive 2007/63/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 amending Council 
Directives 78/855/EEC and 82/891/EEC as regards the requirement of an independent expert’s report on the 
occasion of merger or division of public limited liability companies, OJ L 300/47. 
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○ Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital, OJ L 
46/11. 
 
○ Directive 2008/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 amending Directive 
2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, as regards the implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission, OJ L 81/53. 
 
Public Procurement Directives: 
○ Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and 
public works contracts as amended by Council Directive 92/50/EEC, OJ L 395/33. 
 
○ Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the co-ordination of procedures for the award of 
public service contracts, OJ L 209/1. 
 
○ Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of 
public works contracts, OJ L 199/54. 
 
○ Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ L 
134/1. 
 
Labour Law, Social Security and Equal Opportunities Directives: 
○ Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions as amended by Directive 
2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002, OJ L 39/40 and OJ L 269/15 
respectively. 
 
○ Council Directive 91/383/EC of 25 June 1991 supplementing the measures to encourage improvements in the 
safety and health at work of workers with a fixed-duration employment relationship or a temporary employment 
relationship, OJ L 206/19. 
 
○ Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer's obligation to inform employees of the 
conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship, OJ L 288/32. 
 
○ Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of young people at work, OJ L 216/12. 
 
○ Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a 
procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of 
informing and consulting employees, OJ L 254/64. 
 
○ Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by 
UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ L 145/4. 
 
○ Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ L 18/1. 
 
○ Council Directive 97/74/EC of 15 December 1997 extending, to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in 
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and 
consulting employees, OJ L 10/22. 
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○ Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on 
sex, OJ L 14/6. 
 
○ Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, OJ L 14/9. 
 
○ Council Directive 98/23/EC of 7 April 1998 on the extension of Directive 97/81/EC on the framework 
agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC to the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, OJ L 131/10. 
 
○ Council Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employed 
and self-employed persons moving within the Community, OJ L 209/46. 
 
○ Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
collective redundancies, consolidating Directives 75/129/EEC and 92/56/EEC, OJ L 225/16. 
 
○ Council Directive 1999/63/EC of 21 June 1999 concerning the Agreement on the organisation of working time 
of seafarers concluded by the European Community Ship-owners’ Association (ECSA) and the Federation of 
Transport Workers' Unions in the European Union (FST) as amended by Directive 2009/13/EC, OJ L 167/33 and 
OJ L 124/30 respectively. 
 
○ Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work 
concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, OJ L 175/43. 
 
○ Council Directive 2000/34/EC of 22 June 2000 and of the Council of 22 June 2000 amending Directive 
93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the orginisation of working time to cover sectors 
and activities excluded from that Directive, OJ L 195/41. 
 
○ Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180/22. 
 
○ Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, OJ L 303/16. 
 
○ Directive 2000/79/EC of 27 November 2000 concerning the European Agreement on the Organisation of 
Working Time of Mobile Workers in Civil Aviation concluded by the Association of European Airlines (AEA), 
European transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), European Cockpit Association (ECA), European Regions Airline 
Association(ERA) and the International Air Carrier Association (IACA), OJ L 302/57.  
 
○ Council Directive, 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, OJ L 303/16. 
 
○ Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses, consolidating Directives 77/187/EC and 98/50/EC, OJ L 82/16. 
 
○ Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with 
regard to the involvement of employees, OJ L 294/22.   
 
○ Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, OJ L 80/29. 
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○ Directive 2002/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 on the organisation of 
the working time of persons performing mobile road transport activities, OJ L 80/35. 
 
○ Directive 2002/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council 
Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of 
employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ L 270/10. 
 
○ Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and 
supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision, OJ L 235/10. 
 
○ Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society 
with regard to the involvement of employees, OJ L 207/25. 
 
○ Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L 299/9. 
 
○ Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373/37. 
 
○ Council Directive 2005/47/EC of 18 July 2005 on the Agreement between the Community of European 
Railways (CER) and the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) on certain aspects of the working 
conditions of mobile workers engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector, OJ L 195/15. 
 
○ Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation, OJ L 204/23. 
 
○ Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of 
employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (Codified version), OJ L 283/36. 
 
○ Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on temporary 
agency work, OJ L 327/9. 
 
○ Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the establishment of a 
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of 
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees (Recast), OJ L 122/28. 
 
Miscellaneous Directives: 
○ Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281/31. 
 
○ Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201/37. 
 
EU Regulations: 
○ Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to 
periods, dates and time limits, OJ L 124/1.  
 
○ Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community, OJ L 149/2. 
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○ Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 of the Council of 21 March 1972 fixing the procedure for implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their 
families moving within the Community, OJ L 74/1. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), 
OJ L 199/1. 
 
○ Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 326/21. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of the Council of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of judicial 
and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 160/37. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (so-called Brussels I Regulation), OJ L 12/1.  
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 160/1. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member 
States in the taking evidence in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 174/1. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), OJ L 
294/1. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the 
application of international accounting standards, OJ L 243/1. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1/1. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE), OJ L 207/1. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) 1347/2000 (so-called Brussels II Regulation), OJ L 338/1. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation 
or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, OJ L 46/1. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 785/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on insurance 
requirements for air carriers and aircraft operators, OJ L 138/1. 
 
○ Council Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for 
uncontested claims, OJ L 143/15. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of 12 December 2006 of the Council and European Parliament creating a 
European Order for Payment Procedure, OJ L 399/1. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of 11 July 2007 of the Council and European Parliament establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199/1. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (so-called Rome II), OJ L 199/40.   
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○ Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on rail 
passengers’ rights and obligations, OJ L 315/14. 
 
○ Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177/6. 
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ANNEX II 
Questionnaire  
Translation from the Polish version into English  
 
EU law and experiences of national judges 
  
This questionnaire is part of a study concerning the judicial application of EU law by national judges. On the 
basis of your answers it will be attempted to understand how Polish judges experience the application of EU law 
in practice and what stance they take towards the obligations which are put on them by means of EU law. The 
goal of this project is to come up with a set of solutions which will help the national judges in the process of 
application of European Community law.  
 
The questions in this questionnaire relate to your personal views and experiences with regard to EU law. The 
survey is conducted in the framework of a doctoral thesis carried out at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, 
School of Law, Department of EU law by Urszula Jaremba. The project is conducted in cooperation with the 
National School for Judiciary and Public Prosecutors and the University of Groningen which is involved in a 
similar project concerning the Dutch and German judges.  
 
This questionnaire has been sent to selected judges of first and second instance courts which adjudicate in civil 
law cases. The validity of the evidence is fully dependent upon the data gained through this questionnaire and 
you are kindly asked to fill out this survey to the fullest extent possible. Participating in this research will be 
anonymous and the data will be stored confidential. The filling in of this questionnaire will take approximately 
20 minutes. The above-mentioned PhD candidate will be the only person having access to the questionnaires.  
At the end of this questionnaire, we will ask you if you are willing to participate in a short interview in 
continuation of this research. Should you experience any problems with this questionnaire please contact 
U.Jaremba, tel no….. or e-mail at… 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation.  
Sincerely,  
Urszula Jaremba 
  
 
Part 1  
The following questions concern your familiarity with EU law  
 
Can you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the propositions mentioned below? 
 Strongly 
 agree 
Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly 
 disagree 
I am in general well informed about legal 
developments in Polish law 
     
I am in general well informed about legal 
developments in EC law  
     
It is clear when EU law should be applied ex officio       
I know in which situations I am expected to refer  
a preliminary question to the ECJ  
     
The procedure of the preliminary ruling is clear to me      
I know how I am supposed to proceed       
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with an answer of the ECJ to the asked by me 
question  
 
As an estimate, over how many cases did you preside over during the past 12 months? 
 
As an estimate, in how many of those cases did European Community law play a role? 
 
In how many of those cases did you consult other persons? 
 
Can you indicate who you approached in these cases? 
Multiple answers possible. 
 Colleague(s) judge(s) from my home/another court 
 Foreign judge(s) 
 Acquaintances in legal profession 
 Friends/acquaintances/family 
 Academic scholar 
 I did not consult anyone  
 Differently, namely__________________________________________________________ 
 
Which of the following sources do you use to look for information on EU law? 
Multiple answers possible. 
 Legal textbooks 
 Judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
 Legal journals 
 EC Directives 
 EC Regulations 
 Consultations in my won court 
 Online databases (EUR-LEX, curia, etc.) 
 Internal courses 
 External courses  
 I never look for information on EC law  
Differently, namely______________________________________________________________ 
  
How do you assess your knowledge of national law? 
 Very good 
 Good 
 Moderate 
 Poor 
 Very poor  
 
How do you assess your knowledge of EU law? 
 Very good 
 Good 
 Moderate 
 Poor 
 Very poor  
 
How do you assess your knowledge of EU law, in comparison with that of your colleagues? 
 Higher  
 The same 
 Lower 
 I do not know/ no opinion  
 
Do you feel the need to broaden your knowledge of EU law? 
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 Yes 
 No 
 I do not know/ no opinion  
 
Are you willing to participate in EU law trainings? 
 Definitely 
 Rather yes 
 Rather not 
 Definitely not  
 I do not know/ no opinion  
 
Which form of EU law trainings would you prefer? 
 1 day long training in own court 
 3-5 days long external trainings   
 3-5 days long trainings abroad  
 Postgraduate (weekend) studies 
 E-learning  
 
If you are not willing to participate in EU law trainings, why not?  
 I do not need it in my practice 
 I am not interested in EU law  
 I have no time to follow trainings  
 I do not like the form of the trainings   
 Other reasons, namely ______________________________________________________ 
 
Which issues of EC law should be subject of trainings? 
 The principles and sources of EU law 
 The obligations of national courts with regard to EU law  
 EU material law , in particular………………. 
 EU procedural law   
 Other, namely________________________________ 
 
Which aspects of EC material law should be subject of trainings? 
 Employment and social security law  
 Competition law  
 Consumer law 
 Contract law 
 Other, namely________________________________ 
 
 
Can you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following propositions?  
 Strongly 
agree 
agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
EU law trainings offer is satisfactory       
Courses in European law should be  
obligatory for national judges. 
     
Judges should be obliged to follow a  
course in EU law yearly 
     
Courses in European law are too  
theoretical and not sufficiently focused  
on practice 
     
Whether and how I apply European law  
in a concrete case depends of the  
input of the parties in that respect 
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Courses in European law give sufficient  
information on the question when  
and how I ought to apply European law  
in a concrete case 
     
Amount of EU law is so large that I find it  
difficult to keep up with it  
     
During law school, I have acquired  
sufficient knowledge of European Community 
law 
     
Information on European law is so  
abundant, that I find it difficult  
to get familiar with it  
     
Courses for judges in European law should 
exclusively be given by judges 
     
 
 
How many hours (including preparation) did you spend on courses in European law during the past 12 months? 
0/ 1-10 / 11-20 / 21-30 / 31-40/ More than 40 
  
Which institution organized the courses? NSJP/ Europäische Rechtsakademie (ERA)/ Own court/ My judicial 
district/ Different, namely________________ 
 
How do you value the quality of this last course? Very low/ Rather low / Average / Good / Very Good/ Don’t 
know/no opinion  
 
How do you assess your access to the sources of EU law and jurisprudence of the ECJ? 
 I have a very good access to all the documents and jurisprudence  
 I have sufficient access to the documents and jurisprudence 
 I do not have sufficient access to all necessary documents and jurisprudence 
 I have no or nearly no access to the documents and jurisprudence  
 Don’t know/no opinion  
  
 
Part 2 Next part deals with your experiences with EU law in practice   
 
Can you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the propositions mentioned below? 
 Strongly 
agree  
Agree  Neutral Disagree  Strongly 
disagree  
In practice, it is difficult to recognise if EU law is 
applicable to a case, if the parties do not point this out 
     
I think EC law provisions law is easy to find      
In my experience, the application of European law is 
swift  
     
In general, judgements of the ECJ are clear and 
comprehensible  
     
In general, secondary EC law is clear and 
comprehensible  
     
  
 
Have you ever posed a preliminary question to the ECJ? Yes/No 
 
Why did you never pose a preliminary question to the ECJ? (several answers possible) 
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 It takes too long to formulate a preliminary question 
 It takes too long to get an answer on a preliminary question. 
 It is not clear to me how the preliminary procedure works. 
 I think that only the Supreme Court should refer preliminary questions  
 Too much workload does not make it possible to engage with the issue  
 European Community law has never played a role in my cases  
 European Community law which played a role in cases over which I had to judge, was always clear.  
Differently, namely_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Has the answer provided by the ECJ to your preliminary question satisfied your expectations? 
Yes/ No, why not? _____________________________________________________________ 
 
What is the probability that you would send a preliminary question to the ECJ in case of interpretative doubts 
with regard to EU law? 
 I would definitely use the procedure  
 I would probably use the procedure 
 I would probably not use the procedure 
 I would definitely not use the procedure  
 I don’t know   
 
 
Do you know the rules concerning the harmonious interpretation of EU law? Yes/No/ Partially  
 
Do you find those rules practicable? Yes /No /Partially 
 
Have you ever interpreted national regulation in conformity with an EU law? Yes/No /I do not know 
 
Which sources did you resort to in order to gain more information about the concerned EC directive?  (Several 
answers possible) 
 Text/system of the directive  
 Other language versions of the directive  
 Preamble of the directive 
 Aims of the directive 
 Jurisprudence of the ECJ 
 Literature 
 National jurisprudence  
 National jurisprudence from another Member State 
 I do not know 
 
Did the interpretation of national provisions in harmony with EU law deviate from the normal reading of the 
concerned provisions? Yes /No  
 
In your own court, are there special consultant judges for EC law? Yes /No/ I don’t know 
 
If so, have you ever resorted to them in order to solve an EU law problem? Yes/ No 
 
Can you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the propositions mentioned below? 
 Strongly 
agree  
Agree  Neutral Disagree  Strongly 
disagree  
Provisions of the EC Treaty are clear and 
comprehensible 
     
Finding provisions of EC law which might be 
applicable to a pending case is a long-lasting process  
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Application of EU law takes longer that first assumed       
I apply EU law only if it provides a better solution that 
national law  
     
Rules with regard to state liability  in damages for 
breaches of EC law are clear  
     
Interpretations of EC law by the ECJ go too much 
beyond the letter of law   
     
 
 
Part 3  
The next questions deal with your opinion on the European Union and the role of the national judge. 
 
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following propositions?  
 
The membership in the EU is favourable for Poland 
 Very strong agreement 
 Fairly strong agreement 
 I do not know/no opinion 
 Fairly strong disagreement 
 Very strong disagreement 
 
 I have in general a positive view of the European Union. 
 Very strong agreement 
 Fairly strong agreement 
 I do not know/no opinion 
 Fairly strong disagreement 
 Very strong disagreement 
 
Can you indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions? 
 Very high Rather High  Moderate Rather low  Very low 
The European Parliament      
The European Commission      
The Council of the European 
Union (Council of Ministers) 
     
The Polish parliament       
The European Court of Justice      
The Supreme Court of Poland      
The Constitutional Tribunal of 
Poland 
     
The European Court of Human 
Rights 
     
Ministry of Justice of Poland       
 
 
Can you indicate how attached you feel to... 
 Not attached 
at all  
Rather 
unattached 
Neutral stance Rather 
attached 
Very strongly 
attached 
Poland      
The European Union      
Place where you live       
Europe      
The city where you were born      
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Can you indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the propositions mentioned below? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree  Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
As a national judge, I feel to be part of the European 
legal order. 
     
Ex officio application of Community law should be 
extended. 
     
Uniform application of Community law in all Member 
States is important. 
     
I consider EC law to take precedence over national law.      
The rules of application of EU law are alien to the Polish 
legal system. 
     
The principle of supremacy of EC law is essential for the 
existence of EU legal order. 
     
Application of EC law is an important tasks of national 
civil judges 
     
National court shall set aside obstacles of procedural 
nature in order to ensure effectiveness of EC provisions  
     
EC legal order constitutes an integral part of the national 
legal order  
     
I see myself as a Community law judge.      
I believe that, when judgements of the ECJ and the 
Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal are in conflict, a 
national judge should follow the judgement of the 
national court 
     
One should agree with the ECJ with regard to the 
principle of state liability for breaches of Community 
law 
     
Legal definitions and terminology enshrined in EU law 
sources easily fit in national law  
     
I reluctantly apply EU law because I am of the opinion 
that its origins are undemocratic  
     
The preliminary ruling procedure is useful       
I support one common code of civil law for the entire 
EU  
     
I support one common code of civil procedure for the 
entire EU  
     
EC legal order is separate from the national legal order       
 
 
 
In the next part of this questionnaire there are several fictive situations illustrated. Could you describe in each 
case how you think you would act? 
 
Vignette 1: In its recent judgment the ECJ has ruled that a certain national regulation is in conflict with 
European Union law. You have to judge over a case whereby this national regulation stands central. However, 
the national legislator has so far not undertaken any action to change the respective national provisions. You do 
not agree with the interpretation by the Court of Justice but you apply this interpretation to the case pending 
before you because you are of the opinion that EU law should take precedence over national law. 
 
 I would definitely proceed the same way   
 I would probably proceed the same way 
 I don’t know how I would proceed  
  
 
ANNEX II 
 
 
 
373 
 I would probably proceed differently  
 I would definitely proceed differently 
Could you please explain your choice? _____________________________________________ 
 
 
Vignette 2: In a dispute pending before you, one of the parties draws your attention to the EU legal 
character of the case. You decide, however, not to pay attention to this aspect, as you do not feel to be 
responsible for the application of European law. 
 I would definitely proceed the same way   
 I would probably proceed the same way 
 I don’t know how I would proceed  
 I would probably proceed differently  
 I would definitely proceed differently 
Could you please explain your choice? ________________________________ 
Vignette 3: You are presiding over a case where national and EU law provisions can apply. Both parties 
to the dispute are of the opinion that national law regulates the issue way in a satisfactory way and 
therefore you are not referring to EU law in the respective case. In a similar dispute you decide to resort 
to EU law because the parties to the proceedings wish so. You are of the opinion that it does not matter 
what kind of rules are applied, as long as the dispute is settled. 
 I would definitely proceed the same way   
 I would probably proceed the same way 
 I don’t know how I would proceed  
 I would probably proceed differently  
 I would definitely proceed differently 
Could you please explain your choice? ________________________________ 
 
Vignette 4: The European Court of Justice renders a ruling in line with which specific national 
provisions are in conflict with EU law. You preside over a case in which those national provisions 
constitute the legal basis for the judgment. You are familiar with the judgment of the Court but you do 
not refer to it in the respective dispute. You are of the opinion that a national judge has to apply the law 
which is enshrined in the national civil code and national statutes and not the case-law of the ECJ.  
 I would definitely proceed the same way   
 I would probably proceed the same way 
 I don’t know how I would proceed  
 I would probably proceed differently  
 I would definitely proceed differently 
Could you please explain your choice? ________________________________ 
 
Vignette 5: You are uncertain whether particular national provisions are in compliance with an EU 
directive. As you believe it is your duty to apply European law and ensure the effectiveness of EU law 
you refer a preliminary question to the ECJ concerning the interpretation of the directive. The ECJ rules 
that the national regulation is in conflict with the directive. Consequently, you set aside the national 
provisions and follow the ruling of the ECJ.  
 I would definitely proceed the same way   
 I would probably proceed the same way 
 I don’t know how I would proceed  
 I would probably proceed differently  
 I would definitely proceed differently 
Could you please explain your choice? ________________________________ 
 
Vignette 6: You have to decide in a case to which both European and national rules can apply. You 
consider both sources and decide to apply European Union rules to this case, because in your eyes those 
rules offer a better solution to the dispute.  
 I would definitely proceed the same way   
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 I would probably proceed the same way 
 I don’t know how I would proceed  
 I would probably proceed differently  
 I would definitely proceed differently 
Could you please explain your choice? ________________________________ 
 
Part 4 Basic personal data  
 
What is your age? 29-35 years/36-40 years / 41-50 years / 51-60 years / 61 and more  
 
 
What is your gender? Male/ Female 
 
Do you perform other functions next to your judge function? Yes/ No 
 
 
In which chamber do you adjudicate? civil / employment and or/social security / commercial / other, namely 
________________________________ 
 
How long do you adjudicate in your chamber? 
 
In which chamber did you adjudicate before? Civil/ employment and or/social security / commercial / criminal/ 
municipal / land and mortgage register / family and juvenile / other/ I have not changed the chamber  
 
 
In which appellate unit do you adjudicate? Warsaw / Rzeszów / Poznań / Gdańsk / Białystok / other  
 
 
In which instance do you adjudicate? First/ Second  
 
Do you have further observations or comments with regard to EU law? If so please share them here 
________________________________ 
 
For a better perspective on how European Community law is dealt with by judges in practice, we are willing to 
complement the insights (acquired with this questionnaire) with interviews. If you are willing to share your 
experiences and opinion on European law in a short interview, please fill in your personal contact information. 
This information will be treated confidentially and the anonymity of the interviewee will be ensured.  
 
Name: 
Phone number:  
E-mail address:  
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
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ANNEX III 
Kwestionariusz  
 
Prawo UE a doświadczenia sędziów krajowych  
 
Niniejszy kwestionariusz jest częścią badań nad kwestią sądowego stosowania prawa Unii Europejskiej przez 
sędziów krajowych. Na podstawie odpowiedzi, których udzieli Pan/i w ramach poniższej ankiety podjęta bedzie 
próba zrozumienia jak polscy sędziowie doświadczają stosowanie prawa europejskiego w praktyce oraz jaki 
mają stosunek do nałożonych na nich przez prawo europejskie zadań. Wbadania te pozwol na wypracowanie 
zespou rozwiązań, które ułatwią sędziom krajowym stosowanie prawa WE w ich codziennej praktyce.  
Pytania w poniższym kwestionariuszu dotyczą Pana/i osobistych poglądów i doświadczeń na temat sądowego 
stosowania prawa europejskiego. Badania są prowadzone w ramach przewodu doktorskiego, który został otwarty 
na Uniwersytecie Erazma w Rotterdamie, wydział Prawa, Katedra Prawa Europejskiego przez Urszulę Jarembę. 
Badania są prowadzone we współpracy z Krajową Szkołą Sądownictwa i Prokuratury oraz Uniwersytetem w 
Groningen, który prowadzi podobne badania wśród sędziów holenderskich i niemieckich.  
Kwestionariusz ten został rozesłany do wybranych polskich sędziów sądów powszechnych pierwszej i drugiej 
instancji orzekających w sprawach szeroko pojętych spraw cywilnych. Adekwatność wspomnianych badań jest 
w pełni zależna od wyników, które zostaną otrzymane w kwestionariuszach, w związku z czym uprasza się o jak 
najdokładniejsze wypełnienie ankiety. Wypełnienie ankiety zajmuje około 20 minut. Sędziom biorącym udział w 
badanich zapewnia się pełną poufność. Jedyną osobą mającą wgląd w wypełnione kwestionariusze jest wyżej 
wymieniona doktorantka.  
W przypadku gdy zgodzi się Pan/i na dalszy udział w badaniach w postaci osobistego wywiadu uprasza się o 
podanie danych kontaktowych na końcu kwestionariusza. W przypadku jakichkolwiek problemów z 
wypełnieniem akwestionariusza prosi się o kontakt telefoniczny lub e-mailowy z p.U.Jarembą pod numer...  
 
Serdecznie dziekuję za współpracę! 
 
Z poważaniem,  
Urszula Jaremba  
 
 
Część 1. Poniższe pytania dotyczą Pani/a znajomości prawa wspólnotowego  
 
Czy może Pan/i wskazać na ile sie Pan/i zgadza lub nie zgadza z poniższymi stwierdzeniami? 
 Zdecydowanie 
się zgadzam 
Raczej 
się 
zgadzam 
Neutralna 
postawa 
Raczej się 
nie 
zgadzam 
Całkowicie 
się nie 
zgadzam 
Jestem ogólnie dobrze poinformowany/a o 
zmianach dokonywanych w polskim prawie 
     
Jestem dobrze poinformowany/a o zmianach i 
nowych przepisach wprowadzanych w prawie 
WE 
     
Jest dla mnie jasne kiedy powinieniem stosować 
prawo europejskie z urzędu 
     
Wiem w jakich sytuacjach powinienem 
skierować pytanie prejudycjalne do ETS 
     
Procedura kierowania pytań prejudycjalnych 
jest dla mnie czytelna 
     
Wiem jak należy postąpić z orzeczeniem 
wydanym przez ETS na zadane pytanie 
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W ilu sprawach orzekał Pan/i w ciągu ostatnich 12 miesięcy? (prosze podać przybliżoną liczbę) 
W ilu z tych spraw prawo WE odegrało rolę? 
W ilu ze spraw z elementem prawa UE konsultował/a się Pan/i z kimś innym? 
 
Czy może Pan/i wskazać z kim się konsultował/a Pan/i?  
(więcej niż jedna odpowiedź możliwa)  
 Koleżanka/kolega z sądu 
 Sędzia orzekający w innym kraju 
 Znajomy/i w adwokaturze  
 Przyjaciele/znajomi/rodzina 
 Pracownik akademicki 
 Z nikim się nie konsultowałam/em  
 Inne, mianowicie__________________________________________________________ 
 
Czy może Pan/i wskazać z których z obok podanych źródeł korzysta Pan/i w celu zdobycia informacji o prawie 
UE? (więcej niż jedna odpowiedź możliwa)  
 Podręczniki prawnicze 
 Orzecznictwo ETS 
 Czasopisma prawnicze 
 Dyrektywy WE 
 Rozporządzenia WE 
 Konsultacje z moim sądzie  
 Źródła online (eurolex, curia etc.) 
 Szkolenia w moim sądzie 
 Szkolenia poza moim sądem 
 Nigdy nie szukam informacji o prawie WE 
 Inne, mianowicie ______________________________________________________________ 
  
Jak ocenia Pan/i swoja wiedzę na temat prawa krajowego?  
 Bardzo dobra 
 Dobra 
 Średnia 
 Słaba 
 Bardzo słaba 
 
Jak ocenia Pan/i swoją wiedze na temat prawa UE?  
 Bardzo dobra 
 Dobra 
 Średnia 
 Słaba 
 Bardzo słaba 
 
Jak ocenia Pan/i swoja wiedzę na temat prawa europejskiego w porównaniu ze swoimi kolegami/koleżankami z 
sądu? 
 Lepsza niż u kolegów  
 Taki sam poziom 
 Słabsza niż u kolegów 
 Nie wiem/brak opinii  
 
Czy czuje Pan/i potrzebę poszerzania swojej wiedzy na temat prawa europejskiego?  
 Tak 
 Nie 
 Nie wiem/brak opinii 
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Czy wyraża Pan/i chęć uczestniczenia w szkoleniach z prawa UE?  
 Zdecydowanie  
 Raczej tak  
 Raczej nie  
 Zdecydowanie nie   
 Nie wiem/brak opinii  
 
Jaką formę szkoleń z prawa UE preferował(a)by Pan/i? 
 Jedniodniowe szkolenia we własnym sądzie  
 3-5-dniowe szkolenia w kraju    
 3-5-dniowe szkolenia za granicą  
 Studia podyplomowe  
 E-learning  
 
Jeśli nie wyraża Pan/i chęci uczestniczenia w szkoleniach z prawa UE dlaczego nie? 
 Nie potrzebuję go w praktyce  
 Prawo UE mnie nie interesuje    
 Brak czasu na szkolenia   
 Nieakrakcyjna forma szkoleń 
 Inne powody, mianowicie ______________________________________________________ 
 
Które zagadnienia prawa WE powinny być objęte szkoleniami? 
 Zasady prawa UE i źródła prawa unijnego  
 Obowiązki sądów krajowych wynikające z prawa UE  
 Unijne prawo materialne, w szczególności ………………. 
 Unijne prawo procesowe 
 Inne zagadnienia, mianowicie ________________________________ 
 
Które zagadnienia materialnego prawa WE powinny być objęte szkoleniami? 
 Prawo pracy i/lub ubezpieczeń społecznych  
 Prawo konkurencji   
 Ochrona konsumentów 
 Prawo zobowiązań 
 Inne, mianowicie ________________________________ 
 
 
Czy może Pan/i wskazać na ile sie Pan/i zgadza lub nie zgadza z poniższymi stwierdzeniami? 
 
 Zdecydow
anie się 
zgadzam 
Raczej 
się 
zgadzam 
Neutralna 
postawa 
Raczej się 
nie 
zgadzam 
Całkowicie 
się nie 
zgadzam 
Oferta szkoleń dla sędziów z prawa europejskiego 
jest zadowalająca 
     
Szkolenia dla sędziów z prawa europejskiego 
powinny być obowiązkowe 
     
Sędziowie powinnni każdego roku obowiązkowo 
przechodzić szkolenia z prawa europejskiego 
     
Szkolenia z prawa europejskiego są zbyt 
teoretyczne i niewystarczająco skoncentrowane 
na praktyce 
     
To czy i jak stosuję prawo WE w danej sprawie 
zależy od wkładu stron w tej kwestii 
     
Kursy z prawa UE dostarczają wystarczającej 
informacji kiedy i w jaki sposób należy 
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zastosować to prawo w konkretnej sprawie 
Ilość informacji na temat prawa europejskiego 
jest tak olbrzymia, że trudno jest mi się z nią 
zaznajomić 
     
Podczas moich studiów prawniczych nabyłem 
wystarczającą ilość wiedzy na temat prawa UE 
     
Kursy z prawa UE powinny być prowadzone 
wyłącznie przez sędziów 
     
 
Ile godzin spędził/a pan/i na szkolenia z UE (wliczając przygotowania) w ciągu ostatnich 12 miesięcy? 
 0 
 1-10 
 11-20 
 21-30 
 31-40 
 Więcej niż 40 
  
Przez kogo były organizowane szkolenia?  
 KCSSiP/ KSSiP 
 Europäische Rechtsakademie (ERA) w Trierze  
 Rodzimy sąd 
 Okręg apelacyjny   
 DiffereInne, mianowicie ________________ 
 
Jeśli przeszedł/przeszła pan/i szkolenia z prawa europejskiego w latach 2007/2008 jak ocenia pan/i poziom tych 
szkoleń? bardzo niski / raczej niski / średni / wysoki / bardzo wysoki / Nie wiem/brak opiniii   
Jak ocenia Pan/i swój dostęp do źródeł prawa UE i orzecznictwa ETS?  
 Mam bardzo dobry dostęp do powyższych dokumentów   
 Mam wystarczający dostęp do powyższych dokumentów   
 Nie mam wystarczającego dostępu do powyższych dokumentów   
 Nie mam wcale lub prawie wcale dostępu do powyższych dokumentów   
 Nie wiem/brak opinii   
  
Część 2: poniższe pytania dotyczą Pana/i doświadczeń ze stosowaniem prawa UE 
 
Proszę wskazać do jakiego stopnia zgadza lub nie zgadza się Pan/i z poniższymi stwierdzeniami.  
 Zdecydowanie 
się zgadzam   
Raczej 
się 
zgadzam   
Neutralna 
postawa  
Raczej się 
nie 
zgadzam   
Zdecydowanie 
się nie zgadzam   
W praktyce trudno jest rozpoznać czy 
prawo UE ma zastosowanie w konkretnej 
sprawie jeśli strony sporu same się do 
niego nie odwołają 
     
Przepisy prawa WE są łatwe do 
odnalezienia 
     
Stosowanie prawa WE przebiega szybko      
Orzeczenia ETS są z reguły jasne i 
czytelne 
     
Wtórne prawo WE jest z reguły jasne i 
czytelne 
     
  
Czy kiedykolwiek zadał Pan/i pytanie prejudycjalne Trybunałowi w Luksemburgu? Tak / Nie 
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Jeśli odpowiedz na powyższe pytanie jest negatywna to dlaczego?   
 Sformułowanie pytania zajmuje zbyt wiele czasu  
 Otrzymanie odpowiedzi na pytanie trwa zbyt długo  
 Procedura kierowania pytań prejudycjalnych nie jest dla mnie czytelna 
 Uważam że tylko Sąd Najwyższy powinien korzystać z procedury 
 Too much workload does not make it possible to engage with the issue  
 Prawo wspólnotowe nie odgrywało do tej pory roli w sprawach w których orzekam 
 Prawo WE, z którym miałem/am do tej pory do czynienia było jasne i czytelne.  
 Inne, mianowicie_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Czy odpowiedź, której udzielił spełniła Pan/i oczekiwania? Tak/Nie  
Dlaczego nie? 
 
Jakie jest prawdopodobieństwo, że w przypadku wątpliwości interpretacyjnych co do przepisów prawa WE 
skorzystałby Pan/i z procedury pytania prejudycjalnego? 
 
 Na pewno skorzystałabym z procedury  
 prawdopodobnie skorzystałabym z procedury  
 prawdopodobnie nie skorzystałabym z procedury  
 na pewno nie skorzystałabym z procedury   
 Nie wiem    
 
Czy zna Pan/i zasady ustanowione przez ETS dotyczące interpretacji prowspólnotowe? Tak/ Nie / Częściowo 
 
Czy te zasady są według pan/i wykonalne? Tak / Nie /Częściowo 
 
Czy kiedykolwiek w swojej praktyce dokonał/a Pan/i interpretacji prowspólnotowej? Tak / Nie / Nie wiem  
 
Jeśli tak, jakie źródła skonsultował/a Pan/i w celu zdobycia informacji na temat dyrektywy zgodnie z którą 
interpretował/a Pan/i prawo krajowe?  (kilka odpowiedzi możliwych)  
 Tekst/systematyka  dyrektywy 
 Inne wersje językowe dyrektywy 
 Preambuła dyrektwy  
 Cele dyrektywy 
 Orzecznictwo ETS 
 Literatura  
 Krajowe orzecznictwo 
 Orzecznictwo zagranicznych sądów 
 Nie wiem  
 
Jeśli tak, czy na podstawie owej dyrektywy nadał/a Pan/i takie znaczenie krajowym przepisom prawnym, które 
normalnie nie miałoby miejsca? Tak/ Nie 
 
Czy w Pan/i sądzie są wyznaczeni sędziowie, członkowie sieci ds. prawa WE?  Tak/ Nie/ Nie wiem  
 
Jeśli tak, czy korzystał/a Pan/i z ich pomocy przy rozwiązywaniu problemów powstałych przy stosowaniu prawa 
UE? Tak/ Nie 
 
Proszę wskazać do jakiego stopnia zgadza lub nie zgadza się Pan/i z poniższymi stwierdzeniami.  
 Zdecydowanie 
się zgadzam   
Raczej 
się 
zgadzam   
Neutralna 
postawa  
Raczej się 
nie 
zgadzam   
Zdecydowanie 
się nie zgadzam   
Przepisy Traktatu WE są jasne i czytelne      
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Odnalezienie stosownych przepisów 
prawa europejskiego mogących mieć 
zastosowanie w toczącej sie sprawie jest 
długotrwałym procesem 
     
Stosowanie prawa europejskiego zajmuje 
w rzeczywistości więcej czasu niż się 
założyło 
     
Stosuję prawo europejskie tylko w 
przypadku jeśli oferuje ono lepsze 
rozwiązanie sporu niż prawo krajowe 
     
Kompetencje i obowiązki sądu krajowego 
w zakresie roszczeń odszkodowawczych 
za szkody wywołane pogwałceniem 
prawa WE są jasne  
     
Interpretacje prawa WE dokonywane 
przez ETS wychodzą zbyt daleko poza 
literę tego prawa    
     
 
 
Część 3: Poniższe pytania dotyczą Pana/i zdania na temat UE i roli sędziego   
 
Czy może Pan/i wskazać na ile sie Pan/i zgadza lub nie zgadza z poniższymi stwierdzeniami? 
 
Uważam, że członkowstwo w UE jest pozytywne dla RP.  
Całkowicie się zgadzam/ Zgadzam sie/ Nie wiem/ brak zdania/ Nie zgadzam się/ Absolutnie się nie zgadzam 
  
Ogólnie mam pozytywny obraz UE. 
Całkowicie się zgadzam/ Zgadzam sie/ Nie wiem/ brak zdania/ Nie zgadzam się/ Absolutnie się nie zgadzam 
 
Czy może Pan/i wskazać jaki jest Pana/i poziom zaufania do poszczególnych instytucji? 
 Bardzo 
wysoki        
Raczej 
wysoki 
Średni Raczej niski  
 
Bardzo niski 
Parlament Europejski      
Komisja Europejska      
Rada Ministrów Unii 
Europejskiej 
     
Parlament RP      
Europejski Trybunał 
Sprawiedliwości  
     
Sąd Najwyższy RP      
Trybunał Konstytucyjny RP      
Trybunał Praw Człowieka w 
Sztrasburgu 
     
Ministerstwo Srawiedliwości        
 
Proszę wskazać do jakiego stopnia czuje się Pan/i przywiązany/a do… 
 W ogóle 
nieprzywiązany/a 
Raczej 
nieprzywiązany/a 
Obojętny 
stosunek 
Raczej 
przywiązany/a 
Bardzo mocno 
przywiązany/a 
Polski      
Unii Europejskiej      
Miejsce gdzie Pan/i 
mieszka 
     
Europy      
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Miejsce gdzie się 
Pan/i urodził/a 
     
 
 
Czy może Pan/i wskazać na ile sie Pan/i zgadza lub nie zgadza z poniższymi stwierdzeniami? 
 Zdecydo
wanie się 
zgadzam 
Raczej 
się 
zgadzam 
Neutralna 
postawa 
Raczej 
się nie 
zgadzam 
Całkowic
ie się nie 
zgadzam 
Jako sędzia krajowy czuję się częścią Wspólnotowego  
porządku prawnego 
     
Sądowe stosowanie prawa Wspónotowego z urzędu 
powinno byc rozszerzone 
     
Jednolite stosowanie prawa wspólnotowego we 
wszystkich państwach członkowskich jest istotne   
     
Postrzegam prawo wspólnotowe jako mające 
pierwszeństwo nad prawem krajowym 
     
Uważam że zasady stosowania prawa europejskiego sa 
obce prawu polskiemu. 
     
Zasada prymatu prawa wspólnotowego nad krajowym 
jest warunkiem koniecznym dla istnienia 
wspólnotowego porządku prawnego 
     
Stosowanie prawa europejskiego jest ważnym zadaniem 
spoczywającym na sędziach krajowych orzekających w 
sprawach cywilnych 
     
Sąd krajowy powinien usunąć istniejące przeszkody 
natury proceduralnej w celu zapewnienia pełnej 
efektywności przepisu WE  
     
System prawa WE stanowi integralną część polskiego 
porządku prawnego  
     
Postrzegam siebie jako sędziego prawa wspólnotowego      
W przypadku jeśli orzeczenie ETS jest w kolizji z 
orzeczeniem TK lub SN, sędzia polski powinien dać 
pierwszeństwo orzeczeniom polskich sądów 
     
Należy się zgodzić z ETS w kwestiach 
odpowiedzialności odszkodowawczej państwa za szkody 
wyrządzone naruszeniem prawa wspólnotowego 
     
Definicje i terminy prawne stosowane w prawie WE 
łatwo akomodują się w prawie krajowym   
     
Stosuję prawo UE niechętnie ponieważ jestem zdania, że 
jego zalążki są niedemokratyczne 
     
Procedura pytania prejudycjalnego jest przydatna      
Popieram utworzenie jednego wsólnotowego kodu 
cywilnego dla całej UE 
     
Popieram utworzenie jednego wsólnotowego kodu 
postępowania cywilnego dla całej UE 
     
EC legal order is separate from the national legal order       
 
 
Jak ocenia Pan/i decyzje podjęte przez sędziów w poniżej opisanych sprawach i do jakiego stopnia utożsamia sie 
Pan/i ze sposobami w jaki hipotetyczni sędziowie podjęli decyzję? 
 
1. W ostatnim czasie ETS wydał orzeczenie z którego wynika ze pewne kwestie normowane przez prawo 
krajowe są sprzeczne z prawem wspólnotowym. Ustawodawca nie podjął jednak żadnych kroków aby prawo to 
  
 
ANNEX III 
 
 
 
382 
zmienić w celu jego dostosowania do europejskich wymagań. Ma Pan/i do czynienia ze sprawą, w której owa 
norma krajowa jest podstawą do wydania orzeczenia. Co prawda nie zgadza się Pan/i z interpretacja dokonaną 
przez ETS jednakże postanawia Pan/i  zastosować ową interpretację w sprawie przed nim się toczącą gdyż 
uważa Pan/i że prawo europejskie ma pierwszeństwo w stosunku do prawa krajowego.  
1. na pewno postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób  
2. najprawdopodobniej  postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób 
3. nie wiem czy bym postąpił/a w ten sam czy inny sposób 
4. najprawdopodobniej postąpił(a)bym  w inny sposób 
5. na pewno postąpił(a)bym w inny sposób 
Czy mogłaby Pan/i wytłumaczyć swój wybór? ________________________________ 
 
2. W toczącej się przed Panem/ią sprawie jedna ze stron powołuje się na przepisy prawa wspólnotowego, które 
według strony powinny być zastosowane. Postanawia Pan/i jednak nie poświęcać uwagi temu aspektowi sprawy, 
gdyż nie uważa się Pan/i odpowiedzialnym/ą za stosowanie prawa europejskiego. 
1. na pewno postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób  
2. najprawdopodobniej  postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób 
3. nie wiem czy bym postąpił/a w sam ten czy inny sposób 
4. najprawdopodobniej postąpił(a)bym  w inny sposób 
5. na pewno postąpił(a)bym w inny sposób 
Czy mogłaby Pan/i wytłumaczyć swój wybór? ________________________________ 
3. Ma Pan/i do czynienia ze sprawą, w której mogą być zastosowane przepisy prawa krajowego jak i 
wspólnotowego. Obie strony procesu uważają że prawo krajowe reguluje kwestię w odpowiedni sposób i dlatego 
też postanawia Pan/i nie odwoływać się do przepisów wspólnotowych. W bardzo podobnej sprawie powołuje się 
Pan/i jednakże na prawo wspólnotowe gdyż chcą tak strony postępowania. Uważa Pan/i, że nie robi różnicy 
jakie prawo będzie stanowić podstawę orzeczenia o ile kwestia sporna zostanie rozstrzygnięta.   
1. na pewno postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób  
2. najprawdopodobniej  postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób 
3. nie wiem czy bym postąpił/a w sam ten czy inny sposób 
4. najprawdopodobniej postąpił(a)bym  w inny sposób 
5. na pewno postąpił(a)bym w inny sposób 
Czy mogłaby Pan/i wytłumaczyć swój wybór? ________________________________ 
 
4. ETS wydał w ostatnim czasie orzeczenie, z którego wynika że krajowe uregulowania pewnej kwestii są 
niezgodne z prawem wspólnotowym. Rozpatruje Pan/i sprawę, w której wspomniane uregulowania krajowe 
stanowią podstawę dla wydania wyroku. Zna Pan/i orzecznie ETS ale nie odwołuje się Pan/i do niego, gdyż 
uważa Pan/i że sędzia krajowy musi stosować prawo zawarte w kodeksie cywilnym i innych krajowych aktach 
prawnych a nie orzeczenia ETS.  
 
1. na pewno postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób  
2. najprawdopodobniej  postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób 
3. nie wiem czy postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam czy inny sposób 
4. najprawdopodobniej postąpił(a)bym  w inny sposób 
5. na pewno postąpił(a)bym w inny sposób 
Czy mogłaby Pan/i wytłumaczyć swój wybór? ________________________________ 
 
5. Nie jest Pan/i pewien/a czy przepisy krajowe są zgodne z dyrektywą WE. Ponieważ uważa Pan/i że Pana/i 
obowiązkiem jest zapewnić skuteczność przepisom prawa wspólnotowego postanawia Pan/i zwrócić się z 
pytaniem prawnym do ETS. Pytanie dotyczy interpretacji wspomnianej dyrektywy. ETS wydaje orzeczenie, z 
którego rzeczywiście wynika że przepisy krajowe sa niezgodne z dyrektywą. W konsekwencji odmawia Pan/i 
zastosowania przepisu prawa polskiego i wydaje stosowny wyrok w oparciu o orzeczenie ETS.  
1. na pewno postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób  
2. najprawdopodobniej  postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób 
3. nie wiem czy postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam czy inny sposób 
4. najprawdopodobniej postąpił(a)bym  w inny sposób 
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5. na pewno postąpił(a)bym w inny sposób 
Czy mogłaby Pan/i wytłumaczyć swój wybór? ________________________________ 
 
6. Ma Pan/i do czynienia ze sprawą, w której mają zastosowanie zarówno przepisy krajowe jak i wspólnotowe. 
Rozważa Pan/i obydwa przepisy i dochodzi do wniosku, że przepis wspólnotowy oferuje lepsze rozwiązanie od 
krajowego w tej konkretnej sprawie. Z tego też powodu postanawia Pan/i zastosować prawo wspólnotowe.  
1. na pewno postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób  
2. najprawdopodobniej  postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam sposób 
3. nie wiem czy postąpił(a)bym  w ten sam czy inny sposób 
4. najprawdopodobniej postąpił(a)bym  w inny sposób 
5. na pewno postąpił(a)bym w inny sposób 
Czy mogłaby Pan/i wytłumaczyć swój wybór? ________________________________ 
 
Część 4: Informacje podstawowe 
 
Wiek? 29-35 lat/36-40 lat/41-50 lat /51-60 lat /61 lub więcej  
 
Płeć: Kobieta/Mężczyzna 
 
Czy wykonuje Pan/i inne funkcje poza zawodem sędziego? Tak/ Nie  
 
W którym wydziale pan/i orzeka? Cywilny, prawa pracy/ubezpieczeń społecznych / gospodarczy  
 
Jak długo wykonuje pan/i zawód sędziego w w swoim wydziale ? 
 
W którym wydziale orzekał/a Pan/i wcześniej? cywilny/ pracy i/lub ubezpieczeń społecznych/ gospodarczy/ 
karny / grodzki / ksiąg wieczystych / rodzinny i nieletnich / inny / nie zmieniłem/am wydziału  
 
W którym okręgu apelacyjnym Pan/i orzeka? warszawki, rzeszowski / poznański / gdański / białostocki / inny  
 
W której instancji Pan/i orzeka? Pierwsza / Druga  
 
Czy ma Pan/i inne spostrzeżenia na temat stosowania prawa WE, którymi chciałaby Pan/i się 
podzielić?…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
W dalszej części badań przewidziane jest przeprowadzenie osobistych wywiadów z wybraną grupą sędziów na 
temat ich własnych doświadczeń ze stosowaniem prawa UE. Celem wywiadu jest uzyskanie głębszej i bardziej 
szczegółowej wiedzy na temat wyzwań jakie prawo UE stawia sędziom krajowym. Czy zgodził(a)by sie Pan/i na 
uczestnictwo w osobistym wywiadzie? Jeśli tak, proszę o podanie wybranych danych kontaktowych. Dane te 
zostaną wykorzystane tylko i wyłącznie w celu podjęcia z Panem/Panią kontaktu.  
Imię i nazwisko; Tel; E-mail; Inne dane:  
 
 
Serdecznie dziekuję za współpracę! 
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ANNEX IV 
List of general interview questions (translated from Polish)  
 
- What are your experiences with the application of EU law so far? How many times have you 
dealt with EU law in your practice? 
- What was the nature of the EU law related problems you came across? 
- Which of the cases are engraved in your memory? Why? 
- If you have so far no experiences with the application of EU law, why do you think this is so? 
- What is in your opinion the role of the parties in the process of application of EU law? 
- How do you assess your workload? 
- Do the processes of application of EU law imposes a higher workload on part of the judge? 
- Which interpretative methods do you employ on a daily basis? 
- What is your general opinion about the jurisprudence of the ECJ? What is its role for your 
daily practice? 
- Is the jurisprudence ‘workable’ and clear? 
- How and when have you acquired knowledge of EU law? 
- What is your access to the sources of EU law? 
- What is your opinion about the amount of EU law? 
- What is your opinion about the quality of EU law? 
- How do you assess the new role which is put on you by EU law? 
- Do you see any obstacles for the application of EU law? 
- What is your opinion about the preliminary ruling procedure?  
- Would you be willing to employ the procedure in your own practice? Why yes/not ?  
- Do you think that the procedure could be employed by the judges to achieve other than legal 
purposes? What can motivate a judge to ask a question? 
- Do you feel you constitute a part of EU legal order? 
- How do you assess the EU in general? 
- Could you shortly describe your attitude towards EU law? 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
Introductie  
 
Een van de belangrijkste juridische ontwikkelingen in Europa in de laatste decennia is het proces van 
Europeanisering van het nationale recht. EU wetgeving heeft in toenemende mate invloed op een 
groot aantal nationale rechtsgebieden door middel van een zeer intens wetgevingsproces en door de 
rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie. In de loop van de tijd hebben de EU-regels 
niet alleen de nationale, staats- en bestuursrechtwetten, maar ook het gebied van privaatrecht 
geëuropeaniseerd. Dit proces van europeanisering heeft geleid tot de toename van het aantal 
rechtsbronnen en tevens tot een snelle transformatie van de nationale wetgeving op diverse gebieden. 
Het voorgaande krijgt een heel bijzonder belang gezien het feit dat EU recht individuele belangen kan 
beïnvloeden, daar individuen een beroep op EU-recht kunnen doen in de nationale rechtbanken. Dit 
principe, dat een van de meest revolutionaire kenmerken van de rechtsorde van de EU is, werd in 1963 
al toegepast door het Hof van Justitie in de historische Van Gend & Loos-uitspraak. Van groot belang 
om is te weten dat het systeem van de EU-verdragen aan de ene kant een systeem van rechterlijke 
bescherming op het niveau van de Europese Unie creëert, maar aan de andere kant geen afzonderlijke 
EU-rechtbanken vestigt in elke lidstaat, die de rechten van de individuen beschermen welke 
voortvloeien uit het EU-recht. Als gevolg daarvan, worden geschillen met betrekking tot EU recht 
tussen individuen en overheden of tussen individuen behandeld in de nationale rechterlijke instanties. 
De nationale rechters zijn verplicht om deze EU-rechten te beschermen en tegelijkertijd wordt van hen 
verwacht dat ze het “effet utile” van het EU-recht waarborgen. Met andere woorden, de nationale 
rechters van alle niveaus en alle specialisaties zijn EU-rechters geworden en de verdere ontwikkeling 
van de rechtsorde van de Unie is voor een groot deel afhankelijk geworden van hen.  
 Om deze belangrijke taak te kunnen vervullen biedt het EU-recht verschillende mechanismen 
aan de nationale rechters. Die mechanismen volgen uit onder meer de fundamentele beginselen van de 
EU-recht, zoals voorrang van het EU-recht, rechtstreekse werking, richtlijnconforme interpretatie en 
prejudiciële beslissing voor het Hof van Justitie. Uit Hoofdstuk 2 van deze studie wordt duidelijk dat 
het geheel van verwachtingen richting de nationale rechters door het EU-recht erg groot is. Van de 
nationale rechter wordt verwacht dat ze bekend is met de bronnen van het EU-recht en dat ze deze in 
haar dagelijks werk toepast. De nationale rechter past het EU-recht ambtshalve toe en ziet erop toe dat 
nationale autoriteiten het EU recht volgen. De nationale rechter blijft in dialoog met het Hof van 
Justitie via de prejudiciële procedure. De nationale rechter beslist het inhoudelijke conflict tussen 
nationaal recht en Unierecht in het voordeel van de Unie. Ze geeft uitvoering aan de EU-bepalingen 
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die rechtstreekse werking hebben. Ze past de jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof van Justitie, welke 
voor haar de hoogste rechterlijke instantie met betrekking tot EU-recht is, toe. Ze interpreteert 
nationale regels in de volledige context van de integratie van de Europese Unie zodat ze voldoen aan 
de doelstellingen van het EU-recht en ze kent schadevergoedingen toe aan individuen wiens EU 
rechten door de lidstaat geschonden zijn. Om dit alles te bereiken gebruikt de nationale rechter andere 
methodologie zoals bijvoorbeeld teleologische interpretatie en vergelijkende methoden. De 
voorgaande taken vinden plaats in de context van het steeds meer geëuropeaniseerd raken van 
nationale juridische bronnen en het streven naar het waarborgen van de fundamentele beginselen van 
EU-wetgeving, zoals de effectiviteit en de uniformiteit van het EU-recht in alle lidstaten en de 
effectieve bescherming van de rechten die individuen ontlenen aan de EU-wetgeving. 
Echter, ondanks het feit dat de nationale rechter nooit eerder zo'n krachtige speler in het proces van 
rechtsbescherming is geweest, kan een correcte en uniforme toepassing van de nieuwe hulpmiddelen 
die door de EU-wetgeving aan haar toegewezen wordt te maken krijgen met allerlei problemen. Zo 
wordt er onder andere geopperd dat de nationale rechters niet voldoende kennis van de EU-bronnen 
hebben, niet bekend zijn met de methoden van de juridische interpretatie zoals die worden toegepast 
door het Europese Hof van Justitie, vreemde taalvaardigheden missen of simpelweg geen toegang 
hebben tot EU-wetgevingsbronnen. Anderen wijzen op de kenmerken van de autonome wettelijke en 
gerechtelijke systemen van de lidstaten, kenmerken van de nationale rechtscultuur die belemmerend 
zouden kunnen werken op de vervulling van de verwachtingen van de EU-wetgeving, de grenzen van 
de rechterlijke discretie of de nationale procedurele obstakels. Daarom moet ervan uitgegaan worden 
dat de uniforme uitvoering van de verwachtingen die voortvloeien uit het EU-recht door nationale 
rechters niet vanzelfsprekend is. 
 
Onderzoeksdoel en methodologie  
 
Deze studie poogt de manier waarop de civiele rechters van lagere rechtbanken in Polen - een relatief 
nieuwe lidstaat van de EU - zich gedragen in het kader van de EU-wetgeving te doorgronden en uit te 
leggen of en hoe de nationale rechters zich aanpassen aan de nieuwe juridische situatie die door de 
EU-wetgeving is ontstaan. In feite is er weinig bekend over de algemene aanvaarding van het 
Unierecht door nationale rechters van lagere rechtbanken, de feitelijke impact van de EU-wetgeving 
op hun dagelijkse werkzaamheden en de mogelijke belemmeringen die nationale rechters zoal 
tegenkomen tijdens de uitoefening van hun EU-wetgevingsbevoegdheden. Wat betekent het om een 
EU rechter te zijn in de praktijk? Is het theoretisch model van de nationale rechter als EU-rechter te 
vertalen naar de dagelijkse werkzaamheden van een gewone eerste instantie rechter die oordeelt op het 
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gebied van privaatrecht? In welke mate wordt de rechtsorde van de Europese Unie aanvaard onder 
nationale rechters en (in welke mate) voldoen zij aan de taken die aan hen zijn toegekend door de EU-
wetgeving? En van nog groter belang: zijn ze bereid om dit te doen? En wat zijn de factoren die het 
gedrag van rechters in het kader van de EU-wetgeving kunnen beïnvloeden? Deze en andere vragen 
van empirische aard waren de katalysator van deze studie en tevens de focus gedurende de rest van 
deze studie. 
Om antwoorden te vinden op de bovenstaande vragen gaat de studie in op de mate van de 
impact van het Unierecht op het dagelijkse gerechtelijke functioneren van nationale rechters en de 
manier waarop nationale rechters het EU-recht benaderen. Dit is gedaan door middel van empirische 
data, zowel kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve, die zijn verkregen van Poolse civiele rechters door middel 
van een vragenlijst en semi-gestructureerde diepte-interviews. De data richten zich op drie clusters van 
problemen die betrekking hebben op: de kennis van de EU-wetgeving bij de nationale rechters, hun 
ervaringen met de toepassing ervan en hun houding tegenover de nieuwe rol opgelegd door de EU-
wetgeving. Deze drie variabelen worden onderzocht in de bredere institutionele en operationele 
juridische context van het dagelijkse gerechtelijke functioneren. Op die manier wordt het beeld van de 
werking van de nationale rechter geschetst vanuit het persoonlijk perspectief van de rechter. Door te 
onderzoeken wat de individuele perspectieven van de rechters zijn over de taken die voortvloeien uit 
EU-recht, kon er een algemeen beeld worden geschetst van het functioneren van de Poolse civiele 
rechters als Europese Unie rechters. Met andere woorden, het onderzoek stelt eerst de formele, 
juridische context vast waarin de rechters functioneren en vervolgens richt het zich op de manier 
waarop rechters persoonlijk de EU rechtmatigheid opvatten, de manier waarop ze hun functie als de 
EU-wetgeving rechters zien en begrijpen en de manier waarop ze de EU-wetgeving in hun dagelijkse 
praktijk ervaren. Samenvattend richt deze studie zich op de manier waarop Poolse civiele rechters 
denken en handelen als ze te maken krijgen met het EU-recht. Tot slot zal deze studie delen van de 
empirische verkregen data vergelijken met soortgelijke gegevens verkregen uit parallelle studies voor 
Duitsland en Nederland. 
 
Structuur van het boek 
 
Vijf thema's staan centraal in dit boek. Eerst worden de theoretische en methodologische 
uitgangspunten van het onderzoek besproken. Ten tweede wordt het normatieve kader van het 
onderzoek toegelicht. Daartoe wordt het Europeaniseringsproces van de nationale rechtsordes en de 
implicaties daarvan voor de nationale rechterlijke macht oppervlakkig besproken. En vervolgens 
worden de feitelijke verplichtingen, die door de EU-wetgeving aan de nationale rechters wordt 
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opgelegd, besproken. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de gerechtelijke structuur in Polen nader uitgewerkt. 
Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 geven de kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve bevindingen weer die zijn opgedaan tijdens 
het empirische onderzoek. Daarna volgt het vergelijkende hoofdstuk waarin de resultaten van de 
parallelle onderzoeken in Nederland en Duitsland worden samengevoegd. Het laatste deel van deze 
studie heeft als doel om alle bevindingen van deze studie te verzamelen. Het functioneren van de 
Poolse civiele rechters als EU-wetgeving rechters kan dan zo breed mogelijk worden beoordeeld. In 
dit laatste stuk worden ook aanbevelingen gegeven hoe het functioneren van de Poolse civiele rechters 
as EU rechters ondersteund kan worden. 
 
Bevindingen  
 
Een van de belangrijkste conclusies die uit het empirische onderzoek naar voren komt  is dat 
gerechtelijke gedrag niet kan worden verklaard door slechts een enkele factor. Uit de empirische 
gegevens blijkt dat het functioneren van rechters als EU-rechters wordt beïnvloed door een brede 
reeks van factoren waaronder, onder andere, de constitutionele, institutionele en procedurele kaders en 
de operationele context met zijn interne beperkingen ingebed in de sociale constructie van het 
gerechtelijke milieu. Bovendien kan de lokale rechtscultuur, maar ook de persoonlijke eigenschappen 
van de rechter van invloed zijn op de manier waarop rechters functioneren als EU-rechters. Dit laatste, 
zoals uit de kwalitatieve data lijkt, kan hand in hand gaan met sociale psychologie functies, zoals 
bijvoorbeeld eigenbelang, zelfpresentatie en zelfrespect. Maar ook aspecten zoals onder meer de 
werklast en de interactie met andere juridische en niet-juridische actoren kunnen een rol spelen in de 
manier waarop rechters de EU-wetgeving ontvangen, benaderen, zich eigen maken en als gevolg 
daarvan toepassen. Met betrekking tot de specifieke clusters van problemen die werden onderzocht in 
het empirische deel van de studie werd het volgende gevonden. 
 
Kennis 
 
De reeks van data en argumenten onthult de flinke tekortkomingen in de kennis van de EU-wetgeving 
bij de burgerlijke rechters van lagere rechtbanken in Polen. Bij veel rechters in Polen ontbreekt een 
goede kennis van essentiële EU-wetgeving en de manier van toepassing ervan. Bovendien realiseren 
de rechters zich in veel gevallen niet of, wanneer en hoe de EU-wetgeving relevant zou kunnen zijn 
voor de procedures en wat de feitelijke justitiële taken zijn welke aan de EU-wetgeving verbonden 
zijn. De wijdverspreide opvatting dat de EU-wetgeving alleen relevant is wanneer er een 
grensoverschrijdend element verschijnt in een geschil, maakt de EU-wetgevingsdiscussie in veel 
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gevallen vrijwel “niet-bestaand”. Bovendien wordt, door een nogal onduidelijk beeld van de rol van 
het Europese Hof van Justitie en de toepassing ervan in de juridische praktijk, de uitvoering van het 
Europese mandaat door de rechter duidelijk belemmerd. Uiteraard is deze constatering niet van 
toepassing op de gehele onderzoeksgroep. Gevallen waarin een rechter beschikt over een goede of 
zelfs zeer goede kennis van de EU-wetgeving zijn zeker aanwezig. De oorzaken welke ten grondslag 
liggen aan het gebrek aan kennis van de EU-wetgeving zijn duidelijk van een tweeërlei aard. Aan de 
ene kant, de oneindigheid en uitgebreidheid van de EU-wetgeving die bovendien van een 
fragmentarisch karakter is. De EU-wetgeving kan wellicht daarom ook nooit volledig worden eigen 
gemaakt en begrepen door een eenvoudige civiele rechter van een lagere instantie die vaak 
geconfronteerd wordt met gevallen van diverse aard die betrekking kunnen hebben op uiteenlopende 
juridische aspecten. Aan de andere kant, de brede en complexe jurisprudentie van het Europese Hof 
van Justitie met betrekking tot de feitelijke verplichtingen die worden gesteld aan de nationale rechters 
en welke in veel gevallen incoherent, niet eenvoudig of zelfs tegenstrijdig zijn. Dit resulteert in een 
aanzienlijk vertroebeld beeld van de verwachtingen. In het algemeen is de bekendheid van de 
nationale rechter met EU-recht blijft een van de meest ingewikkelde problemen gelet op de werking 
van de rechterlijke structuur in de Europese Unie. 
 
Ervaringen 
 
Over het algemeen is gebleken dat de ervaringen van de Poolse civiele rechters met het zich wenden 
tot en het toepassen van het Unierecht tot nu toe vrij beperkt zijn. Het merendeel van de civiele 
rechters zien het EU-recht dan ook als een abstract, op afstand of niet relevant aspect van de 
besluitvorming. Deze geringe praktische ervaring met de toepassing van de EU-wetgeving leidt tot een 
aanzienlijk aantal rechters met eenvoudigweg een zeer ambivalente houding ten opzichte van de 
verplichtingen die hen worden opgelegd door de EU-wetgeving. De resultaten voor Nederland en 
Duitsland tonen eveneens aan dat, hoewel de rechters in beide landen iets uitgebreidere ervaringen 
hebben met de toepassing van het EU-recht dan hun Poolse tegenhangers, het belang van de EU-
wetgeving in de dagelijkse praktijk van een civiele rechter over het algemeen beperkt blijft, zeker 
gelet op het aantal zaken waar de rechters mee geconfronteerd worden. Bovendien wordt uit de 
empirische gegevens duidelijk dat de toepassing van Unierecht, die begint met het zoeken naar en het 
vinden van relevante bepalingen en de daarop betrekking hebbende rechtspraak van het Hof van 
Justitie, door het gehele proces van het interpreteren tot aan de toepassing ervan in een specifieke zaak 
neerkomt op een tijdrovend, kostbaar en ingewikkeld proces. De kwalitatieve studie toonde inderdaad 
aan dat een rechter, zodra deze wordt geconfronteerd met een Unierecht aspect, het haar zeer 
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waarschijnlijk veel tijd en moeite zal kosten om de desbetreffende kwestie te verkennen en te 
begrijpen. Dit alles moet bovendien gezien worden in relatie tot de dagelijkse praktijk van de werking 
van de nationale rechterlijke instanties en in het bijzonder in relatie tot de achterstand van zaken en 
efficiëntieverwachtingen die worden opgelegd aan de rechters. Het niet vaak voorkomen van het 
Unierecht in de dagelijkse praktijk betekent bovendien dat de toepassing ervan als uitzonderlijk wordt 
gezien en als gevolg daarvan het als een lastige kwestie wordt gezien elke keer als er een EU-
wetgevingszaak speelt. Dit gebrek aan ervaring loopt gelijk op met het feit dat private partijen en hun 
vertegenwoordigers nog niet erg actief hun toevlucht nemen tot de EU-wetgeving en dus hun claims 
niet daarop baseren. Uit zowel de kwantitatieve en kwalitatieve gegevens blijkt dat de rol van de 
partijen en vooral hun professionele vertegenwoordigers in het erop wijzen dat de EU-wetgeving van 
toepassing zou kunnen zijn in een geschil onmisbaar lijkt. Ook de resultaten voor Duitsland en 
Nederland onderstrepen duidelijk de essentiële rol van private partijen in de Europeanisering van de 
gerechtelijke behandeling. Zonder twijfel zal zonder hun inbreng de betrokkenheid en bereidheid om 
toevlucht te nemen tot de EU-wetgeving om hun eisen te steunen, en dus de reikwijdte van het proces 
van integratie van de EU-wetgeving in de dagelijkse praktijk van (privaatrechtelijke) rechtbanken van 
Polen en andere landen, zeer beperkt blijven. 
 
Opvattingen  
 
Uit de empirische data blijkt dat de rechters de EU gunstig gezind zijn en het EU-lidmaatschap als een 
positieve ontwikkeling zien. Opvallend vergelijkbare resultaten komen voort uit de studie in Duitsland 
en Nederland. De EU-instellingen krijgen in feite zelfs meer vertrouwen van een deel van de Poolse 
rechters dande nationale autoriteiten.. In dezelfde geest krijgt het bestaan van het principe van 
voorrang van het Unierecht relatief veel steun onder de rechterlijke macht en veel rechters geven aan 
de EU-wetgeving te zien als een integraal onderdeel van de nationale rechtsorde. Parallel aan dat lijkt 
de prejudiciële procedure  aanzienlijke steun te winnen. Het feit dat in de drie betrokken landen de 
rechters duidelijk pro-Europees zijn onderstreept de bevinding dat de persoonlijke positieve instelling 
ten aanzien van de Unie aan de ene kant niet de manier beïnvloedt waarop de rechters hun taken 
benaderen naar aanleiding van de EU-wetgeving en hun rol van de beschermers van de EU–wetgeving 
en anderzijds ook niet de wijze beïnvloedt hoe rechters het EU-recht zien en de relevantie ervan voor 
de dagelijkse juridische praktijk. Evenzo hoeft de gunstige gezindheid richting de EU niet te 
betekenen dat de rechters enthousiast bezig zullen zijn met het juridische integratieproces in de 
Europese Unie. Politieke voorkeuren en persoonlijke perspectieven lijken opzij te worden geschoven. 
De primaire doelstellingen van de nationale lagere rechter zijn eerder het efficiënt oplossen van 
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conflicten en het rechtspreken in overeenstemming met de beginselen van de rechtsstaat. Dit proces 
van beslechting van geschillen vindt echter plaats in een lokale operationele context, iets wat invloed 
heeft op de manier waarop nationale rechters het EU recht waarnemen en benaderen.  
 
Andere bevindingen  
 
Naast bovengenoemde punten blijkt uit de empirische data ook dat de operationele context waarin de 
rechters functioneren belemmeringen kunnen vormen voor de invulling van de verwachtingen welke 
uit het Unierecht voortkomen. Het blijkt dat de (meest gemiddelde) Poolse civiele rechter lijdt aan 
tijdsdruk welke voortkomt uit het aanzienlijke werkpakket en achterstand in de behandeling van de 
zaken.  Uit de data lijkt naar voren te komen dat een rechter zo snel als mogelijk werkt om haar zaken 
op een rechtvaardige manier te beslissen met als gevolg dat ze haar toevlucht neemt tot de wet die 
rechtstreeks tot haar beschikking staat en zij relatief goed kent, dat is de nationale wetgeving. Op deze 
manier zal elke ambtshalve raadpleging van EU-wetgeving of het zoeken naar relevante EU-
wetgeving door veel rechters worden gezien als een extra activiteit buiten het gewone werk om, of 
zoals een van de rechters zei: een "hair splitting" oefening. Daarnaast zal de Poolse civiele rechter van 
een rechtbank in lagere aanleg waarschijnlijk gelimiteerde toegang hebben tot bronnen die toegang 
verschaffen tot het proces van EU rechtsvinding. Bovendien is EU recht een nieuw en verwarrend 
aspect in juridische besluitvorming zonder een stabiele positie in het dagelijks gebruik, waardoor de 
rechter zou kunnen vrezen dat een zaak waarin EU recht is toegepast een hoger risico loopt om 
vernietigd te worden door een hogere rechtsinstantie, wat van invloed kan zijn op de eindbeoordeling 
van de juridische capaciteiten en voortgang op de carrièreladder, maar ook haar reputatie bij andere 
rechters. Parallel aan het probleem van kennis van EU recht, de kwestie van juridische methodologie 
en meer precies, de methoden van interpretatie en juridische technieken die traditioneel gebruikt 
worden door rechters bleken een significant obstakel te zijn voor de operationalisering van de 
verwachtingen van EU recht. Zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 3 berust de Poolse juridische cultuur op 
een letterlijke, positivistische en zeer formele benadering van de wet. Precedent wordt bovendien niet 
gezien als een formele bron van recht. Empirisch onderzoek bevestigt dat bovengenoemde kenmerken 
van de nationale juridische cultuur de integratie van EU recht in de dagelijkse juridische praktijk in 
Polen bemoeilijken. Daarnaast belemmert de traditionele literalistische school de operationalisering 
van het principe van harmonieuze interpretatie. De teleologische methode, die rust op het zoeken naar 
objectieven en doelen van wetgeving past niet gemakkelijk in de traditionele positivistische cultuur en 
zou gezien kunnen worden als onwettig en het doorkruisen van de grenzen van de juridische functie. 
Hiernaast lijken de kwalitatieve data te suggereren dat de persoonlijke eigenschappen van rechters een 
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rol kunnen spelen in de manier waarop zij functioneren in de context van EU recht. In die zin kunnen 
individuele motivatie en ambitie, de bereidheid en de moed om uit gewoonten te stappen en een 
distinctieve juridische koers te volgen en te participeren in de juridische integratie van de Europese 
Unie de manier bepalen waarop iemand functioneert als een EU rechter. Het gevoel van inzet en 
verantwoordelijkheid voor de rechtsorde van de Europese Unie en de noodzaak om voor effectiviteit 
te zorgen bemoedigt rechters om zich te richten tot bronnen van EU recht. Zoals de empirische 
bevindingen in hoofdstuk 4 laten zien, zelfpresentatie en zelfinteresse en dicht daaraan verwant, de 
‘angst voor oneer’, kunnen de rechter ontmoedigen om de wet en mechanismen te gebruiken waarmee 
zij niet voldoende bekend zijn. Gebaseerd op de bevindingen in dit onderzoek kan over het algemeen 
beargumenteerd worden dat het theoretische model van EU rechter zoals vastgesteld door het HvJ een 
boeiend en plausibel beeld schetst op papier, maar dat het een ongrijpbaar perspectief op de rol van de 
nationale rechter biedt. Zoals dit onderzoek laat zien lijkt het theoretische model van de EU rechter te 
worden gekenmerkt door een hoog niveau van abstractie en reflecteert dit in geen geval de manier 
waarop de nationale rechter in realiteit functioneert. Zoals geïllustreerd zijn er verschillende oorzaken 
voor de naïviteit van dit model. De eerste betreft de evidente complexiteit van een multidimensionele 
rechtsorde, de intensiteit van EU wetgevingsprocessen en de overdaad aan verwachtingen die 
opgelegd worden aan de nationale rechterlijke macht door EU recht, die niet gemakkelijk te 
huisvesten zijn in het nationale constitutionele, procedurele en operationele kader en de lokale 
juridische cultuur. Bovengenoemde zorgt voor veel (rechts)onzekerheid en gebrek aan vertrouwen bij 
een deel van de rechters wat betreft de juiste manier van handelen in een dergelijk ingewikkeld 
juridisch milieu. De tweede oorzaak voegt enkel toe aan de complexiteit van de situatie en is 
geworteld in inadequate institutionele regelingen die resulteren in nationale rechters welke in veel 
gevallen slecht uitgerust zijn om te functioneren in de context van EU recht. In het geheel bezien, het 
EU recht blijft een enigszins abstracte en afgezonderde rechtsorde voor het merendeel van de Poolse 
civiele rechters. Bovengenoemde impliceert dat volledige samenhang van EU recht, juridische 
uniformiteit en convergentie van de Europese Unie enigszins concepten van desillusie zijn. Dit 
onderzoek heeft laten zien dat het functioneren van Poolse civiele rechtbanken, en misschien wel 
iedere rechterlijke instantie in iedere lidstaat, als EU rechterlijke instanties een complex onderwerp is, 
bestaande uit verschillende juridische en buitengewoon juridische variabelen. Voor nu lijkt het EU 
recht een enigszins abstract, afgezonderd en daarom ook tot op zekere hoogte een irrelevant en 
onontgonnen aspect van de juridische besluitvormingsprocessen te blijven voor veel Poolse civiele 
rechters. Bij anticiperen op de manieren waarop dit proces zich zal ontwikkelen in de toekomst moet 
men in aanmerking nemen dat de nieuwigheid van het gehele systeem bestaande uit een nieuw 
mechanisme en de manier waarop er gewerkt wordt, aanpassingstijd vereist voor nationale juristen. In 
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die zin staan de Poolse civiele rechters en het gehele juridische systeem momenteel slechts aan het 
begin van een complex, maar zeker ook fascinerend proces van Europeanisering. Dit proces lijkt met 
kleine stapjes vooruitgang te boeken.  
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